Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower courts that a natural gas utility company's invoicing practice was "unjust, unreasonable, [or] unfair" under Kan. Stat. Ann. 66-1,206(a), holding that the lower courts reached the correct conclusion.Plaintiffs complained to the Kansas Corporation Commission about Texas-Kansas-Oklahoma Gas, LLC's (TKO) billing practices. The Commission decided that Plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of proving that TKO's rates or practices with regard to them were unreasonable. On review, the district court agreed with Plaintiffs and remanded the case to the Commission to calculate how much TKO overbilled Plaintiffs. The court of appeals agreed that the Commission erred in its analysis of TKO's billing methodology but altered the district court's refund directive and ordered the Commission to decide an appropriate remedy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) TKO's calculating method constituted an unlawful practice; and (2) the case is remanded to the Commission to fashion an appropriate remedy. View "Hanson v. Kansas Corp. Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the Public Utilities Commission requiring Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co., Inc. to pay for electricity consumed during a three-year period in which the Ohio Edison Company failed to bill Allied for one of its electric meters, holding that Allied failed to demonstrate reversible error.Ohio Edison estimated the amount owed based on Allied's historical electricity usage. The Commission determined that Ohio Edison provided sufficient evidence supporting the accuracy of its estimates and that Ohio Edison's estimated back bill was fair and reasonable. Allied appealed, challenging the Commission's orders on two grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Allied failed to demonstrate that the Commission erred in deciding the complaint in Ohio Edison's favor. View "In re Complaint of Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co. v. Ohio Edison Co." on Justia Law

To connect a California caller to a California recipient, long-distance carriers must purchase access to local exchange services provided by local carriers (switched access services). Long-distance carriers have no control over which local carrier will provide switched access services and “have no choice but to use this service." In its complaint to the Public Utilities Commission, Qwest (a long-distance carrier) alleged that local carriers discriminated against it by providing other long-distance carriers, AT&T and Sprint, with discounted rates for switched access services. Qwest was not charged more than the rates set forth in the local carriers’ tariffs. The Commission concluded Qwest showed that it was similarly situated to AT&T and Sprint and that there was no rational basis for treating Qwest differently with respect to the rates. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting challenges to the Commission failing to conduct an additional evidentiary hearing, finding Qwest was similarly situated to the Contracting Carriers without considering various factors the Commission identified in earlier Decisions; treating differences in the cost of providing service as the only “rational basis” for different rates; concluding Qwest is entitled to refunds; and in determining for the first time during the rehearing that switched access is a monopoly bottleneck service. View "Bullseye Telecom, Inc. v. California Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) did not abuse its discretion in deciding not to reopen a December 2014 order (Order No. 32600) upon allegations raised in 2019 that changed circumstances warranted relief from the order.The order at issue approved a purchase power agreement (PPA) in which Hawaiian Electric Company agreed to purchase wind energy generated by Na Pua Makani on a wind farm to be constructed on the island of O'ahu. Life of the Land (LOL) sought to reopen the order with reference to Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b). The PUC denied LOL's motion for relief, concluding that it was without jurisdiction to consider the motion because LOL had not timely appealed the order under Haw. Rev. Stat. 269-15.5 and, alternatively, that the motion for relief was an untimely motion for rehearing or reconsideration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the PUC did not abuse its discretion in declining to turn to HRCP Rule 60(b) to reopen Order No. 32600. View "In re Application of Hawaiian Electric Co." on Justia Law

Under the Natural Gas Act, to build an interstate pipeline, a natural gas company must obtain from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) a certificate of "public convenience and necessity,” 15 U.S.C. 717f(e). A 1947 amendment, section 717f(h), authorized certificate holders to exercise the federal eminent domain power. FERC granted PennEast a certificate of public convenience and necessity for a 116-mile pipeline from Pennsylvania to New Jersey. Challenges to that authorization remain pending. PennEast sought to exercise the federal eminent domain power to obtain rights-of-way along the pipeline route, including land in which New Jersey asserts a property interest. New Jersey asserted sovereign immunity. The Third Circuit concluded that PennEast was not authorized to condemn New Jersey’s property.The Supreme Court reversed, first holding that New Jersey’s appeal is not a collateral attack on the FERC order. Section 717f(h) authorizes FERC certificate holders to condemn all necessary rights-of-way, whether owned by private parties or states, and is consistent with established federal government practice for the construction of infrastructure, whether by government or through a private company.States may be sued only in limited circumstances: where the state expressly consents; where Congress clearly abrogates the state’s immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment; or if it has implicitly agreed to suit in “the structure of the original Constitution.” The states implicitly consented to private condemnation suits when they ratified the Constitution, including the eminent domain power, which is inextricably intertwined with condemnation authority. Separating the two would diminish the federal eminent domain power, which the states may not do. View "PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey" on Justia Law

Spire planned to build a St. Louis-area pipeline and unsuccessfully solicited natural gas “shippers” to enter into preconstruction “precedent agreements.” Spire later entered into a precedent agreement with its affiliate, Spire Missouri, for 87.5 percent of the pipeline’s projected capacity. Spire applied to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for a certificate of public convenience and necessity (Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717f(c)(1)(A)), conceding that the proposed pipeline was not needed to serve new load but claiming other benefits. As evidence of need, Spire relied on its precedent agreement with Spire Missouri. FERC released an Environmental Assessment, finding no significant environmental impact. EDF challenged Spire’s application, arguing that the precedent agreement should have limited probative value because the companies were corporate affiliates. The Order approving the new pipeline principally focused on the precedent agreement.The D.C. Circuit vacated the approval. FERC may issue a Certificate only if it finds that construction of a new pipeline “is or will be required by the present or future public convenience and necessity.” Under FERC’s “Certificate Policy Statement,” if there is a need for the pipeline, FERC determines whether there will be adverse impacts on existing customers, existing pipelines, or landowners and communities. If adverse stakeholder impacts will result, FERC balances the public benefits against the adverse effects. FERC’s refusal to address nonfrivolous arguments challenging the probative weight of the affiliated precedent agreement did not evince reasoned and principled decision-making. FERC ignored evidence of self-dealing and failed to thoroughly conduct the interest-balancing inquiry. View "Environmental Defense Fund v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission erred by approving affiliated-interest agreements under Minn. Stat. 216B.48, subdivision 3 without first considering whether environmental review was necessary, holding that the Commission was not required to conduct review under Minn. Stat. Ch. 116D before approving affiliated-interest agreements that govern construction and operation of a Wisconsin power plant by a Minnesota utility.At issue was whether chapter 116D - the Minnesota Environmental Protection Act (MEPA) - requires the Commission to conduct an environmental review before deciding to approve affiliated-interest agreements that will govern the construction and operation of a power plant in a neighboring state. The Commission in this case that its jurisdiction was limited to power plants proposed to be built in Minnesota, and therefore, the power plant in this case was not subject to Minnesota's permitting and environmental review regulations. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that MEPA did not apply. View "In re Minnesota Power's Petition for Approval of the EnergyForward Resource Package" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that Data Foundry, Inc., an internet service provider, had standing to bring its claims but affirming the trial court's dismissal of Data Foundry's claims in part on other grounds, holding that the court of appeals erred by affirming portions of the trial court's judgment.The City of Austin sets the rates that Austin Energy, an electric utility owned by the City, charged to Austin residents for retail electric services. Data Foundry, which purchased electricity from Austin Energy, brought this action alleging that the rates charged by the City were illegal. The trial court granted the City's motion to dismiss on the ground that Data Foundry lacked standing because it failed to allege it had suffered a particularized injury. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal on other grounds. The Supreme Court remanded all of Data Foundry's claims to the trial court for further proceedings, holding (1) Data Foundry had standing to bring its claims; (2) the court of appeals correctly reversed the dismissal of some of Data Foundry's claims, including its common-law and constitutional claims; and (3) the court of appeals erred by affirming portions of the trial court's judgment on other grounds. View "Data Foundry, Inc. v. City of Austin" on Justia Law

Over 20 years ago, numerous parties alleged in the Antelope Valley Groundwater Cases (AVGC) that, without a comprehensive adjudication of all competing parties' rights to produce water from and a physical solution for the aquifer, the continuing overdraft of the basin would negatively impact the health of the aquifer. In this case, the trial court was required to find a physical solution that balanced the needs of thousands of existing users, all of whom competed for the scarce water that replenished the aquifer underlying the Antelope Valley Adjudication Area (AVAA), and to craft its provisions to protect the long-term health of the aquifer and the region's residents. The trial court determined that severely reduced water usage was required of existing users, and that severely curtailed access was required for future users. On appeal, the Willis Class challenged the judgment approving the Physical Solution, a proposed plan designed to bring the AVAA basin into hydrological balance.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment and concluded that the Physical Solution adequately balanced the competing interests of the parties within the parameters of governing California law and was not inconsistent with the terms of the Settlement. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion when it equitably apportioned the available groundwater and placed limits and conditions on future pumping. Furthermore, the court rejected Willis's claims that the limits placed on Willis's post-Settlement participation in the litigation amounted to a denial of due process. The court explained that Willis was afforded an adequate notice and opportunity to present its contentions as part of the lengthy process of crafting the final Physical Solution. View "Willis v. Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court upholding the determination of the Public Utility Commission that Southwestern Electric Power Company (SWEPCO) met its burden of establishing that its decision to build a power plant was a prudent one and allowing SWEPCO to include the plant's construction costs in its utility rates, holding that the court of appeals erred.In reversing, the court of appeals concluded that the Commission had used an improper standard for assessing SWEPCO's decision to complete construction of the plant and that, because SWEPCO did not produce independent expert testimony, the Commission's decision was without a proper basis. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commission properly applied its standard in evaluating SWEPCO's decision to complete construction; and (2) substantial evidence supported the Commission's decision. View "Public Utility Commission of Texas v. Texas Industrial Energy Consumers" on Justia Law