Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Capital Electric Cooperative, Inc. appealed a judgment affirming a Public Service Commission order granting Montana-Dakota Utilities Company ("MDU") a certificate of public convenience and necessity to extend its electric service in Burleigh County. Because the Commission's order was in accordance with the law, its findings of fact were supported by a preponderance of the evidence and sufficiently addressed the evidence presented, and those findings supported the conclusions of law, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Capital Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. N.D. Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

Maryland Underground Damage Prevention Authority cited Reliable Contracting Company for violating Md. Code Ann. Pub. Util. Cos. 12-101, under which advance notice must be given to the one-call system of certain types of excavation, and imposed a civil monetary penalty. Reliable Contracting petitioned for judicial review, asserting that the Authority’s enabling statute conferred judicial power on a non-judicial body in violation of separation of powers principles. Reliable Contracting also contended that the statute failed to provide adequate guidance to the Authority for the assessment of such penalties. The circuit court upheld the constitutionality of the statute. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remanded, holding (1) the Authority is an administrative agency in the executive branch of State government that exercises quasi-judicial powers subject to judicial review, and therefore, its enabling law is not contrary to the State Constitution’s Judicial Vesting Clause or Separation of Powers Clause; and (2) because the Authority is an administrative agency, Md. Code Ann. State Gov't 10-1001 provides guidelines for the exercise of its discretion in assessing civil penalties. View "Reliable Contracting Co. v. Underground Facilities Damage Prevention Auth." on Justia Law

This is the third appeal from the City of Gulfport’s taking of the Dedeaux Utility Company via eminent domain. Dedeaux appealed after the first two trials, and the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded both times. The parties have since held a third trial, and Gulfport appealed and Dedeaux cross-appealed issues raised from the third trial. Gulfport raised thirteen issues on appeal. And while the Court gave careful consideration to each, the Court found only five warranted discussion, and yet none warranted reversal of the third trial's final judgment. Gulfport asked the trial judge to “determine a fair and equitable interest rate to be paid on the Final Judgment based upon the rates paid on invested funds during the time period in which the eminent domain action was pending.” The Supreme Court reversed the trial judge’s post-trial order denying Gulfport’s motion to establish the interest rate, and remanded this action to the Harrison County Special Court of Eminent Domain for the limited purpose of determining the applicable interest rate and entering an order requiring payment of that interest. The Court declined to address Dedeaux’s cross-appeal. View "City of Gulfport v. Dedeaux Utility Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Trumbull County has provided sewer service to General Motors’ Lordstown Assembly Plant since 1964. In the mid-2000s, the County borrowed $3.4 million from the U.S. Department of Agriculture to maintain and improve its sewer lines. That loan obligation triggered the protections of 7 U.S.C. 1926(b), under which sewer providers that owe money to the Department are protected from competition with other sewer providers. The County claims that the Village of Lordstown violated section 1926(b) when the Village built sewer lines that could one day serve GM’s Plant. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, holding on the merits that the Village’s mere construction of sewer lines did not curtail or limit the County’s service. The Sixth Circuit vacated, reaching the same result on grounds of lack of standing. While the County still owes a balance, section 1926(b) affords it a legally protected interest in freedom from competition, but it has shown not any actual or imminent invasion of that interest. Sewer lines can last for decades, so the mere fact of their construction does not show that the Village intends to compete with the County anytime soon. View "Trumbull Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Village of Lordstown" on Justia Law

Ed Friedman, joined by others, filed a complaint raising issues regarding the health effects Central Maine Power Company’s (CMP) advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) system. After conducting an investigation, the Maine Public Utilities Commission concluded that AMI does not pose a credible threat of harm to the health and safety of CMP’s customers. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission applied the correct credible threat standard; (2) the Commission’s determination was supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the two Commissioners serving on the panel unequivocally concurred in the decision despite their differing rationales. View "Friedman v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Monterey Peninsula Water Management District, a public agency, undertook work to mitigate environmental damage caused by California-American Water Co. (Cal-Am), a public utility, and then assessed a fee on the utility’s customers for the work. The fee was charged as a line item on Cal-Am’s bill and was collected by the Cal-Am on behalf of the District. In the underlying proceedings, Cal-Am filed an application with the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) for authorization to collect the District user’s fee. Before the PUC responded, Cal-Am, the District, and the PUC’s Division of Ratepayer Advocates entered into a settlement agreement under which the parties agreed that the District’s requested user fee was appropriate. The PUC denied Cal-Am’s application and rejected the settlement agreement. The Supreme Court set aside the PUC decisions rejecting Cal-Am’s application for authorization to collect the District’s user fee, holding that the PUC did not have the power to regulate the District’s user fee. View "Monterey Peninsula Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n" on Justia Law

The Federal Power Act authorizes the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to regulate “sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce,” including wholesale electricity rates and any rule or practice “affecting” such rates, 16 U.S.C. 824(b), 824d(a), 824e(a), leaving the states to regulate retail sales. To ensure “just and reasonable” wholesale rates. FERC encourages nonprofit entities to manage regions of the nationwide grid. These entities hold auctions to set wholesale prices, matching bids from generators with orders from utilities and other wholesale buyers. Bids are accepted from lowest to highest until all requests are met. Rates rise dramatically during peak periods and the increased flow of electricity can overload the grid. Wholesalers devised demand response programs, paying consumers for commitments to reduce power use during peak periods. Offers from aggregators of multiple users or large individual consumers can be bid into the wholesale auctions. When it costs less to pay consumers to refrain from use than it does to pay producers to supply more, demand response can lower prices and increase grid reliability. FERC required wholesalers to receive demand response bids from aggregators of electricity consumers, except when the state regulatory authority bars participation. FERC further issued Order 745, requiring market operators to pay the same price for conserving energy as for producing it, so long as accepted bids actually save consumers money. The D.C. Circuit vacated the Rule as exceeding FERC’s authority. The Supreme Court reversed. FERC has authority to regulate wholesale market operators’ compensation of demand response bids. The practice directly affects wholesale rates; FERC has not regulated retail sales. Wholesale demand response is all about reducing wholesale rates as are the rules and practices that determine how those programs operate. Transactions occurring on the wholesale market unavoidably have natural consequences at the retail level. View "Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass'n" on Justia Law

Newhall, a retail water purveyor, challenged a wholesale water rate increase adopted in February 2013 by the Agency. The trial court found the Agency's rates violated article XIII C of the California Constitution (Proposition 26), which defines any local government levy, charge or exaction as a tax requiring voter approval, unless (as relevant here) it is imposed “for a specific government service or product provided directly to the payor that is not provided to those not charged, and which does not exceed the reasonable costs to the local government of providing the service or product.” The court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the challenged rates did not comply with this exception because the Agency based its wholesale rate for imported water in substantial part on Newhall’s use of groundwater, which was not supplied by the Agency. The court concluded that the wholesale water cost allocated to Newhall did not, as required, bear a fair or reasonable relationship to Newhall's burdens on, or benefits received from, the Agency’s activity. View "Newhall Cnty. Water Dist. v. Castaic Lake Water Agency" on Justia Law

Appellant participated in a program called the Percentage of Income Payment Plan (“PIPP”) that provided assistance to low-income residential customers. Most PIPP customers pay a fixed percentage of their monthly income rather than the actual cost of service. Appellant later left PIPP but continued to receive gas service from Vectren Energy Delivery of Ohio, Inc. at the standard rate. Appellant was reinstated in PIPP seven months after her departure. Vectren subsequently informed Appellant that she had to pay the difference between the charges she paid during the time she was not in the program and the monthly PIPP installment payments that would have been due had she remained in PIPP. Appellant filed a complaint with the Public Utilities Commission alleging that Vectren’s attempt to charge her for the missed PIPP installments was unlawful and unreasonable. The Commission found in favor of Vectren. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to demonstrate that the Commission’s orders were unreasonable or unlawful. View "Toliver v. Vectren Energy Delivery of Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

Pilkington North America, Inc. entered into a social contract with Toledo Edison Company under which Toledo provided one of Pilkington’s facilities with discounted electric service. The Public Utilities Commission approved the special contract. Pilkington later filed a complaint alleging that Toledo Edison had unlawfully terminated the special contract. Five other companies that also had special contracts with the utility also filed complaints against Toledo Edison. The Commission consolidated the six complaints and dismissed them. With the exception of Pilkington, each of the industrial customers appealed the Commission’s decision. The Supreme Court reversed the Commission’s order, concluding that Toledo Edison had prematurely terminated the special contracts. Pilkington subsequently filed a Ohio R. Civ. P. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment with the Commission seeking relief from the Commission’s order dismissing its complaint and its order denying the application for rehearing that the other five complainants filed. The Commission denied Pilkington’s motion, concluding that Pilkington may not use Rule 60(B) as a substitute for appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Pilkington did not appeal the Commission’s adverse judgment, that judgment is final, and res judicata precludes the use of Rule 60(B) to obtain relief from that final judgment. View "In re Complaint of Pilkington N. Am., Inc." on Justia Law