Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, local exchange carriers such as Windstream must connect calls made to their customers by the customers of national telecommunications companies such as Sprint. Until 2009, Sprint paid Windstream state access charges for connecting non-nomadic intrastate long-distance VoIP calls-- made by cable telephone customers over the Internet in Iowa, delivered to Sprint for format conversion, and transferred to Windstream for delivery to its Iowa telephone customers. Beginning in 2009, Sprint withheld state access charges for these calls, claiming that VoIP calls were “information services” and that payment should be governed by a reciprocal compensation agreement, not by state access charges. In 2011, the Iowa Utilities Board found that the calls were telecommunications services subject to state regulation, not information services. Sprint sought state court review and filed a federal action, seeking to enjoin the Board’s decision. The district court abstained because of the parallel state proceedings. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed. By the time the case returned to the district court, the state court had upheld the Board’s decision. The district court dismissed Sprint’s complaint, holding that issue preclusion barred Sprint from raising the same arguments in federal court. The Eighth Circuit reversed, reasoning that Congress did not intend that issue-preclusion principles bar federal-court review of the issue of whether the non-nomadic intrastate long-distance VoIP calls at issue are information services, payment for which should be governed by a reciprocal compensation agreement, or telecommunications services subject to state access charges. View "Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. Jacobs" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was an order of the Maine Public Utilities Commission approving an alternative rate plan (ARP) for Bangor Gas Company, LLC. The Maine Office of the Public Advocate (OPA) and Bucksport Mill, LLC appealed from the Commission’s order. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not abuse its discretion or exceed its statutory authority in calculating the APR initial rate base by utilizing an unimpaired, “original cost” valuation of Bangor Gas’s assets rather than the impaired “acquisition cost” incurred by Bangor Gas’s parent company; and (2) the OPA’s argument that the Commission abused its discretion by including in its revenue requirement calculation a portion of the Bangor Gas’s regulatory proceeding expenses amortized over five years need not be addressed because the Commission’s decision to include the regulatory proceeding expenses in its revenue requirement analysis had no impact on its decision to approve the ARP. View "Office of Pub. Advocate v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Bay County Utilities provides water and sewer services. The County Commissioners establish rates. In 1966, the U.S. Air Force contracted with the County for water services at Tyndall Air Force Base. The parties entered into a sewer services contract in 1985. Both required the parties to renegotiate any new rates. In 1994, Federal Acquisition Regulations were amended to require standardized clauses in utility service contracts. When the government is contracting with an unregulated utility or the utility is subject to non-independent oversight, the parties must negotiate new rates. If the utility is overseen by an independent regulatory body, no further negotiations are required. In 2007 and 2009, Bay County increased water rates. The Air Force ignored those increases, but, in 2009 and 2010, unilaterally modified the water contract, with new rates, lower than the rates set by Bay County. In 2009 Bay County increased sewer rates. The Air Force refused to pay those higher rates, and instituted a unilateral contract modification to moderately increase sewer rates. Bay County submitted unsuccessful Contract Disputes Act claims to recover the unpaid balance of approximately $850,000. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal Claims, holding that Bay County is an independent regulatory body and may revise rates in utility contracts without resorting to negotiations with the Air Force. View "Bay Cnty., Fla. v. United States" on Justia Law

The City of Azusa, its municipal utility (Azusa Light and Water) and the successor agency to its redevelopment agency (collectively, City except as noted), appealed a judgment denying their amended mandamus petition. The petition sought to compel the director of the Department of Finance to recognize as enforceable certain obligations between the City and the Utility. These consisted of loans from the Utility to the City’s former redevelopment agency (RDA). The City argued the invalidation of these loans in effect harmed the Utility’s ratepayers and therefore was unlawful. The trial court rejected the City’s view, and the City appealed. Upon review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that once Utility money was loaned to the RDA, it ceased to be “ratepayer money.” Because the City’s legal claims hinged on a contrary view (whether or not explicitly acknowledged in its briefing)--each of the City’s claims failed. View "City of Azusa v. Cohen" on Justia Law

Lafarge North America, Inc., the operator of a ready-mix concrete plant, sought a refund from the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission (WSSC) for allegedly improperly assessed and paid water and sewer service charges for operation of the plant. Large’s claim was deemed denied because of the WSSC’s failure to render a timely decision. The circuit court reversed the WSSC’s deemed denial of Lafarge’s claim and remanded the matter to the WSSC with directions to determine and issue an appropriate refund, concluding that the deemed denial was not supported by substantial evidence in the record and was arbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, given the legislative intent to provide for refunds when charges are erroneously assessed, it is appropriate to remand the case to the WSSC for calculation of the amount of the refund due. View "Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n v. Lafarge N.A., Inc." on Justia Law

Liberty Energy (Midstates) Corp. (Liberty), a public utility and a gas corporation, requested an increase to its Infrastructure System Replacement Surcharge (ISRS). After an evidentiary hearing, the Missouri Public Service Commission (PSC) approved the ISRS increase for Liberty. Accordingly, Liberty filed new ISRS tariffs in compliance with the PSC’s order, and the PSC approved the tariffs. The Office of Public Counsel, which is appointed by the director of the department of economic development and may represent the public interest in appeals from the PSC’s orders, appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the PSC failed to follow the plain language of its statutory mandates, and therefore, its order was unlawful. Remanded. View "Missouri Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Office of Pub. Counsel" on Justia Law

The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) approved a mechanism called a phase-in recovery rider (PIRR) for Ohio Power Company to recover fuel costs that were incurred under Ohio Power’s first electric-security plan (ESP) but were deferred for future collection. In approving Ohio Power’s PIRR application, PUCO modified part of the portion of its order approving Ohio Power’s first ESP that established the carrying-charge rate. The end result was the reduction of Ohio Power’s recovery of carrying charges by more than $130 million. The Supreme Court reversed PUCO’s order insofar as it reduced the carrying-charge rate, holding that the order violated Ohio Rev. Code 4928.143(C)(2)(a) by depriving Ohio Power of its right to withdraw the modified ESP. Remanded. View "In re Application of Ohio Power Co." on Justia Law

When a fire caused by NSTAR Electric and Gas Company employees damaged a building owned by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), two insurers paid the claims of the building’s tenants. The insurers then brought this complaint against NSTAR Electric Company and NSTAR Electric & Gas Company (collectively, NSTAR) seeking to recover for the claims paid. NSTAR moved for partial summary judgment, contending that, to the extent to which the insurers sought recovery for business interruption losses, the claims were barred by Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy Tariff No. 200A, filed with and approved by the Department of Public Utilities, and in effect when the explosion occurred. The tariff contained a limitation of liability clause that limited NSTAR from liability to nonresidential customers for special, indirect, or consequential damages resulting from the utility’s gross negligence. A judge of the superior court allowed NSTAR’s motion for partial summary judgment, concluding that a tariff filed with and approved by a regulatory agency may limit a public utility’s liability. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the limitation of liability clause in the tariff precluded Plaintiffs’ claims to recover for business interruption and other consequential or economic damages. View "Maryland Cas. Co. v. NSTAR Elec. Co." on Justia Law

In 2004, the Ninth Circuit decided California ex rel. Lockyer v. FERC, which held that FERC may authorize market-based energy tariffs so long as that regulatory framework incorporates both an ex ante market power analysis and enforceable post-approval transaction reporting. In the instant case, Petitioners, the people of the state of California and related parties, sought review of a series of orders issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) on remand following the Court’s decision in Lockyer, arguing that FERC failed to follow Lockyer and violated the Federal Power Act by requiring proof of excessive market share as a necessary condition for relief for transaction reporting violations. The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for judicial review, holding that FERC structured the remand proceedings in a manner contrary to the terms of the Lockyer decision. Remanded to FERC for further proceedings. View "People of State of Cal. v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has regulatory authority over interstate aspects of the nation’s electric power system, but not over “facilities used in local distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce,” 16 U.S.C. 824(a). FERC entered orders adopting standards and procedures for determining which power distribution facilities are subject to the agency’s regulatory jurisdiction and which facilities fall within the statutory exception for local distribution of electric energy. The state and the Public Service Commission of the State of New York challenged the standards and procedures as an unreasonable interpretation of the agency’s statutory grant of jurisdiction and as arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Second Circuit upheld the orders as reasonably interpreting the agency’s regulatory jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act as amended by the Electricity Modernization Act of 2005 and supported by sufficient explanation and substantial evidence as required by the Administrative Procedure Act. View "New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law