Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The State Corporation Commission issued to Virginia Electric and Power Company certificates of public convenience and necessity authorizing the construction of electric transmission facilities. BASF Corporation appealed, challenging the approval of the transmission line’s route across an environmental remediation site on its property along the James River. James City County, Save the James Alliance Trust, and James River Association (collectively, JCC) also appealed, challenging the approval of an overhead transmission line that will cross the James River and a switching station that will be located in James City County. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Commission did not err in its construction or application of Va. Code 56-46.1’s requirements that the power company reasonably minimize adverse environmental impacts on the area concerned, and the Commission’s findings were not contrary to the evidence or without evidentiary support; and (2) the Commission erred in concluding that the switching station was a “transmission line” under Va. Code 56-46.1(F) and therefore not subject to local zoning ordinances. Remanded as to the JCC appellants. View "BASF Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Casitas is a publicly owned water utility in western Ventura County. Its territory includes Ojai. Most of Ojai receives water from Golden State, which charges rates that are more than double those charged by Casitas. After failed attempts to obtain relief from the Public Utilities Commission, residents formed Ojai FLOW, which, supported by Ojai's city council, petitioned Casitas to take over water service in Ojai. Casitas is subject to the Brown Act and the California Public Records Act, Under Proposition 218, Casitas's rates can be reduced by a majority of voters in its service area. Using the Mello-Roos Act (Gov. Code, 53311) to finance the transaction, placing the financial burden on Ojai residents rather than on its existing customers, Casitas formed a community facilities district; passed resolutions; and submitted the matter to voters. A special tax would be levied to pay for bonds. Golden State sought to invalidate Casitas's resolutions. The trial court stayed the case. At the single-issue special election that drew more than half of eligible voters, 87 percent of the electorate approved the measure. The trial court then rejected claims that the Mello-Roos Act cannot be used to finance eminent domain or the acquisition of intangible property rights and cannot be used by one service provider to supplant another. The court of appeal affirmed. The Act applies regardless of whether the seller consents to the sale or is compelled under force of law. Financing the acquisition of intangible property incidental to tangible property is consistent with the Act's purpose. View "Golden State Water Co. v. Casitas Mun. Water Dist." on Justia Law

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) orders issued in 2013 and 2014 approved the New York Independent System Operator’s (NYISO) creation of a new wholesale electric power “capacity zone” comprising areas of Southeastern New York, including the lower Hudson Valley. The orders followed NYISO’s identification of areas in which customers received power from suppliers located on the other side of a “transmission constraint” in the electrical grid. Because of the way New York’s capacity markets work, NYISO concluded that financial incentives for capacity resources in the transmission‐constrained area that became the Valley Zone were inadequate, jeopardizing the reliability of the grid. FERC’s approval of the Zone, with a new “demand curve” to set capacity prices, were designed to address the reliability problem by providing more accurate price signals to in‐zone resources, but were expected to result in higher prices to customers. Utilities, the state, and the New York Public Service Commission alleged that FERC failed adequately to justify the expected higher prices, particularly without a “phase‐in” of the new zone and its demand curve, in violation of FERC’s statutory mandate to ensure that rates are “just and reasonable,” 16 U.S.C. 824d(a). The Second Circuit rejected the challenge. FERC adequately justified its decisions. View "Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

Great Oaks, a water retailer, challenged a fee imposed on water it draws from wells on its property. The power to impose such a fee is vested in the Santa Clara Valley Water Management District under the Santa Clara County Water District Act, to prevent depletion of the acquifers from which Great Oaks extracts water. The trial court awarded a refund of charges paid by Great Oaks, finding that the charge violated the provisions of the District Act and Article XIII D of the California Constitution, which imposes procedural and substantive constraints on fees and charges imposed by local public entities. The court of appeal reversed, finding that: the fee is a property-related charge for purposes of Article 13D and subject to some of the constraints of that enactment; it is also a charge for water service, and, therefore, exempt from the requirement of voter ratification; pre-suit claims submitted by Great Oaks did not preserve any monetary remedy against the District for violations of Article 13D; and the court failed to apply a properly deferential standard of review to the question whether the District’s setting of the fee, or its use of the resulting proceeds, complied with the District Act. View "Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law

The United Water Conservation District manages groundwater resources in central Ventura County. San Buenaventura (City) pumps groundwater from District territory and sells it to residential customers. The District collects a fee from groundwater pumpers, including the City, based on volume. The Water Code authorizes this fee (Wat. Code, 74508, 75522) and requires the District to set different rates for different uses. Groundwater extracted for non-agricultural purposes must be charged at three to five times the rate applicable to water used for agricultural purposes. The California Constitution (article XIIID) governs fees "upon a parcel or upon a person as an incident of property ownership, including a user fee or charge for a property related service." The City claimed that the fees violate article XIII D because they "exceed the proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcel[s]" from which the City pumps its water. The trial court found that the pumping charges violated article XIII D and ordered refunds. The court of appeal reversed: pumping fees are not property related taxes subject to the requirements of article XIII C. The charges are valid regulatory fees because they are fair and reasonable, and do not exceed the District's resource management costs. View "City of San Buenaventura v. United Water Conserv. Dist." on Justia Law

Thomas Blanton sought judicial review of certain rate increases approved by the Public Service Commission for Mississippi Power Company (“MPC”). An examination of controlling law and statutes, the Constitutions of the United States and Mississippi, and a comprehensive review of Commission proceedings revealed that Commission failed to comply with the language of the Base Load Act, inter alia, and exceeded its authority granted by the Act. The increased rates were achieved by including “mirror CWIP” in the rate base and rates. Following the inclusion of “mirror CWIP,” the Commission “approve[d] the retail revenue adjustment over 2013 and 2014 . . . allow[ing] the Company an annual rate designed to collect $125,000,000 for 2013, escalating to $156,000,000 in 2014. This represented a 15% and 3% increase, respectively.” The Supreme Court found that the increased rates on 186,000 South Mississippi ratepayers failed to comport with the Act or, otherwise, with Mississippi law. Accordingly, the order granting rate increases was reversed, and the matter remanded to the Commission for further proceedings. View "Mississippi Power Company, Inc. v. Mississippi Public Service Comm'n" on Justia Law

The gas company found stray voltage on Wilson’s gas meter the year after she moved into her house, and again two years later. Edison paid for measures that virtually eliminated the voltage on the meter. After Wilson remodeled her bathroom, she began felt low levels of electricity in her shower, which had metal pipes and a drain connected to the ground. Edison offered to replace the metal pipes with plastic, to eliminate the voltage in her shower, but Wilson refused and insisted that Edison eliminate all stray voltage on her property. A jury found in favor of Wilson on claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and nuisance, and awarded $1,050,000 in compensatory damages and $3 million in punitive damages. The court of appeal held that the Public Utilities Commission has not exercised its authority to adopt a policy regarding the issues in the lawsuit, and, therefore, does not have exclusive jurisdiction over Wilson’s claims. Wilson, however, failed to present sufficient evidence to support her IIED and negligence claims, or to support an award of punitive damages. The verdict on the nuisance claim cannot stand because the court refused to give Edison’s proffered instruction regarding causation of Wilson’s physical symptoms. The jury relied upon irrelevant evidence. View "Wilson v. Southern Cal. Edison Co." on Justia Law

This case arose from a longstanding issue between Public Utility District No. 1 of Okanogan County (PUD) and the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) over the installation of an electrical transmission line through school lands managed by DNR in the Methow Valley. At issue was whether PUD was statutorily authorized to condemn a right of way through school trust lands for the construction of a transmission corridor and, if so, whether the particular school lands were nonetheless exempt from condemnation as a result of their trust status as school lands or their then-present use for cattle grazing. The trial court and Court of Appeals concluded that PUD is statutorily authorized to condemn school lands and that the particular school lands at issue are subject to condemnation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Okanogan County v. Washington" on Justia Law

California voters adopted Proposition 13 in 1978 to require, among other constitutionally implemented tax relief measures, that any “special taxes” for cities, counties, and special districts be approved by two-thirds of voters. In 1996, voters adopted Proposition 218 with one of its aims being “to tighten the two-thirds voter approval requirement for „special taxes‟ and assessments imposed by Proposition 13.” To this end, Proposition 218 added article XIII C to require that new taxes imposed by a local government be subject to two-thirds vote by the electorate. Article XIII C was amended by the voters in 2010 when they passed Proposition 26. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether Proposition 26 applied to a practice by the City of Redding of making an annual budget transfer from the Redding Electrical Utility to Redding's general fund. Because the Utility was municipally owned, it was not subject to a one percent ad valorem tax imposed on privately owned utilities in California. However, the amount transferred between the Utility's funds and the Redding general fund was designed to be equivalent to the ad valorem tax the Utility would have to pay if privately owned. Redding described the annual transfer as a payment in lieu of taxes (PILOT). The PILOT was not set by ordinance, but was part of the Redding biennial budget. Plaintiffs in this case (Citizens for Fair REU Rates, Michael Schmitz, Shirlyn Pappas, and Fee Fighter LLC) challenged the PILOT on grounds it constituted a tax for which article XIII C required approval by two-thirds of voters. Redding argued the PILOT was not a tax, and if it was, it was grandfathered-in because it precedesd the adoption of Proposition 26. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded the PILOT was a tax under Proposition 26 for which Redding needed to secure two-thirds voter approval unless it proved the amount collected was necessary to cover the reasonable costs to the city to provide electric service. The Court rejected Redding's assertion the PILOT is grandfathered-in by preceding Proposition 26's adoption: "[t]he PILOT does not escape the purview of Proposition 26 because it is a long-standing practice." Because the trial court concluded the PILOT was reasonable as a matter of law, that judgment was reversed and the case remanded for an evidentiary hearing in which Redding would have the opportunity to prove the PILOT did not exceed reasonable costs under article XIII C, section 1, subdivision (e)(2). View "Citizens for Fair REU Rates v. City of Redding" on Justia Law

Sanitary and Improvement District No. 1, Butler County, Nebraska (SID #1) filed two class action lawsuits in Cass County, Nebraska, alleging that various county treasurers unlawfully deducted an incorrect percentage of assessments of municipal improvements collected on behalf of SID #1 and other sanitary and improvement districts. The county treasurers filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted those motions, concluding that the sanitary and improvement districts are not municipal corporations and therefore do not create municipal improvements. SID #1 appealed. The Supreme Court consolidated the appeals and reversed, holding that SID #1 stated a cause of action because a sanitary and improvement district can levy municipal taxes and make municipal improvements. Remanded. View "Sanitary & Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Adamy" on Justia Law