Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2001 Millview County Water District began diverting water from the Russian River under the authority of a pre-1914 appropriative water right assigned to Millview by plaintiffs Hill and Gomes. Following a citizen complaint, the State Water Resources Control Board issued a cease and desist order substantially restricting Millview’s diversion of water under the right, finding it had been largely forfeited by a period of diminished use from 1967 through 1987. Millview argued that the Board lacked jurisdiction to limit appropriation under a pre-1914 water right and that the evidence did not support the Board’s finding of forfeiture because there was no evidence of a timely adverse claim of use. The trial court accepted Millview’s arguments. The appeals court affirmed. While the Board did have jurisdiction under Water Code section 1831 to issue a an order precluding excessive diversion under a pre-1914 right to appropriate and the Board properly determined the original perfected scope of the claim, it applied an incorrect legal standard in evaluating the forfeiture of Millview’s claimed water right. Applying the proper legal standard, the evidence before the Board was insufficient to support a finding of forfeiture. View "Millview Cnty. Water Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd." on Justia Law

Dissatisfied with the stock and reliability of power-generating facilities in New Jersey, the state adopted the Long Term Capacity Pilot Program Act (LCAPP), instructing New Jersey’s Board of Public Utilities to promote construction of new power-generating facilities in the state. Rather than pay for the construction of these plants directly, the Board of Public Utilities crafted a set of contracts, called Standard Offer Capacity Agreements, which assured new electric energy generators 15years of revenue from local utilities and, ultimately, New Jersey ratepayers. LCAPP guaranteed revenue to new generators by fixing the rates those generators would receive for supplying electrical capacity, that is, the ability to make energy when called upon. The district court found LCAPP invalid. The Third Circuit affirmed. With the Federal Power Act, Congress placed “the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce” under federal control, 16 U.S.C. 824(a). When New Jersey arranged for LCAPP generators to receive preferential capacity rates, the state entered into a field of regulation beyond its authority. Federal law preempts, and invalidates, LCAPP and the related Standard Offer Capacity Agreements.View "PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Solomon" on Justia Law

After electrical outages arising from Tropical Storm Irene on August 28, 2011 and a snowstorm two months later, the Department of Public Utilities entered orders against three utility companies - National Grid, NSTAR Electric Company (NSTAR), and Western Massachusetts Electric Company (WMEC) - that imposed monetary penalties for the utilities’ failure to restore service to their customers “in a safe and reasonably prompt manner.” The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Department applied the appropriate reasonableness standard in finding that the utilities violated their duty to restore service in a safe and reasonably prompt manner; (2) the Department’s findings regarding National Grid and WMEC were supported by substantial evidence, but its finding that NSTAR failed timely to respond to priority two and three wires-down calls was not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) with two exceptions, the Department made the necessary findings and did not abuse its discretion in its imposition of monetary penalties. Remanded.View "Mass. Elec. Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Utils." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the Public Utilities Commission’s first annual review of the fuel-adjustment clause (FAC) mechanism that was part of the first electric security plan (ESP) for two American Electric Power operating companies, Columbus Southern Power and Ohio Power Company. The FAC allowed the companies to recover fuel costs for providing generation service as those costs were incurred without being required to file a new rate case. An auditor found that the companies had underrecovered fuel costs through the FAC in 2009. After review, the Commission concluded (1) all of the proceeds that AEP had received from a 2008 contract settlement agreement with a coal supplier should be offset against Ohio Power’s FAC underrecovery; and (2) only the share of the settlement proceeds allocable to Ohio retail customers must be credited. Ohio Power appealed, and Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) cross-appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s orders, holding that Ohio Power and IEU did not carry their burden of showing reversible error in the Commission’s orders.View "In re Fuel Adjustment Clauses for Columbus S. Power Co. & Ohio Power Co." on Justia Law

Florida Power & Light (FPL) filed an application for a rate base increase. Three intervenors to the proceedings and FPL reached a negotiated settlement agreement. After evidentiary hearings pertaining exclusively to the settlement agreement, the Florida Public Service Commission (Commission) approved the settlement agreement, finding that it established fair, just, and reasonable rates and that it was in the public interest. Citizens of the State of Florida (Citizens) appealed the decision of the Commission. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not violate the essential requirements of the law or commit a material error in procedure by approving the negotiated settlement agreement over Citizens’ objection; (2) the procedures followed by the Commission did not violate Citizens’ due process rights; and (3) the Commission’s findings and conclusions were support by competent, substantial evidence and were not clearly erroneous. View "Citizens of the State of Fla. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n" on Justia Law

This appeal concerns the Texas PUC's interpretation and implementation of a federal statutory and regulatory scheme governing the purchase of energy between public utilities and certain energy production facilities known as Qualifying Facilities. Exelon, qualifying wind generation facilities, challenged a state rule and order which prohibited it from forming Legally Enforceable Obligations when selling power. The court vacated the portion of the judgment regarding Exelon's challenge to the PUC's order and directed the district court to dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction. The court reversed as to the remaining challenges to the rule and remanded because PUC acted within its discretion and properly implemented the federal regulation at issue. View "Exelon Wind 1, L.L.C., et al. v. Nelson, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against defendants alleging that defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., and New York statutory and common law. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants obtained unauthorized attorneys' fees and costs in connection with actions to foreclose liens on plaintiffs' properties arising out of unpaid municipal property taxes and water and sewer charges. The court held that liens for mandatory water and sewer charges imposed by New York City as an incident to property ownership, which are treated as akin to property tax liens, are not subject to the FDCPA because they do not involve a "debt" as that term is defined in the statute. The court also held that the district court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Boyd v. J.E. Robert Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The Corporation, asserting its power under section 215(e) of the Federal Power Act, 16U.S.C. 824o, assessed a monetary fine against Southwestern, a federal government entity that markets hydroelectric power. The Commission upheld the penalty. The court held that section 215(b)(1) generally subjects federal government entities to the Commission's jurisdiction to enforce compliance. But to authorize a monetary award against the federal government, the statute must do more than generally bring the government within the Commission's enforcement jurisdiction - it must unequivocally subject the government to monetary liability. Neither section 215(b) nor section 215(e), nor the two consolidated in combination, speaks with the requisite clarity to waive the federal government's sovereign immunity from monetary penalties. Therefore, the court vacated the Commission's order. View "Southwestern Power Admin., et al. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Duke Energy Progress filed an application with the North Carolina Utilities Commission requesting authority to increase its retail electric service rates and that rates be established using a return on equity (ROE) of 11.25 percent. The Commission entered an order approving an ROE of 10.2 percent. The Attorney General, who had intervened in the proceedings, appealed the Commission’s order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission made sufficient findings of fact regarding the impact of changing economic conditions upon customers and that these findings were supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in view of the entire record. View "State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Montana-Dakota Utilities Company (MDU) was ordered by the Wyoming Public Service Commission to make refunds of the amounts MDU had overcharged its customers because of improper calculations and adjustments to its commodity balancing account. MDU filed a petition for review, challenging the legal authority of the Commission to order refunds. The district court affirmed the Commission’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the rule against retroactive ratemaking did not preclude the Commission from ordering the refund; (2) the Commission’s refund order did not violate the file rate doctrine; (3) the Commission was not subject to a statute of limitations in this case; (4) MDU failed to show that the Commission was equitably estopped from ordering a refund; and (5) the Commission’s action was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or unlawful. View "Montana-Dakota Utils., Co. v. Wyo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law