Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Power Survey Company sought a writ of certiorari before the Supreme Court contending that the Public Utilities Commission improperly interpreted and applied the Contact Voltage Statute when it approved the portion of the Narragansett Electric Company’s (NEC) contact voltage program providing for the issuance of a request for proposal for the purpose of choosing a vendor to provide the technology for the NEC’s contact voltage testing. The Supreme Court issued the writ. Respondents, the NEC and the Division of Public Utilities and Carriers, moved to quash the writ on the grounds that it was not timely filed. The Supreme Court granted Respondents’ motions, holding that, under the facts of this case, Power Survey’s petition was untimely. View "In re Proceedings to Establish a Contact Voltage Detection & Repair Program" on Justia Law

The Iowa Utilities Board (IUB) allowed an independent transmission company, ITC Midwest, to use the pay-and-go procedure of Iowa Code 476.27, the railroad-crossing statute, to run electrical power lines across a railroad at three locations, at the objection of the Hawkeye Land Company. Hawkeye Land owned the railroad-crossing easement but did not own or operate a railroad. An administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the use of the pay-and-go procedure and denied compensation beyond the $750 standard per crossing fee the utility pays to the owner of the railroad right-of-way under the crossing statute. After concluding that it had interpretive authority over the crossing statute, the IUB issued a final order that reached the same conclusions as the ALJ. The district court affirmed on judicial review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the IUB lacked interpretive authority over the terms of the crossing statute; and (2) the crossing statute applied to Hawkeye Land, but because ITC Midwest was not a public utility, it was not allowed to use the pay-and-go procedure. View "Hawkeye Land Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd." on Justia Law

Buckeye Energy Brokers, a certified provider of competitive retail electric service a competitive retail natural-gas service, filed an amended complaint with the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio against Palmer Energy Company, an energy-management and consulting firm. Buckeye claimed that Palmer, one of its alleged competitors, violated Ohio Rev. Code 4928.08 and 4929.20 by acting without a certificate as a broker in arranging for the supply of competitive retail electric and natural-gas services in Ohio. The Commission held that Buckeye failed to prove its allegations, concluding that Palmer had provided services to clients as a consultant, not as a broker. The Supreme Court dismissed Buckeye’s appeal without reaching the merits, holding that Buckeye failed to show that it suffered prejudice or harm from the Commission’s orders. View "In re Complaint of Buckeye Energy Brokers v. Palmer Energy Co." on Justia Law

The Department of Public Utilities imposed on Petitioners, electric companies, monetary assessments for the Storm Trust Fund (“assessment”) pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 25, 12P, 18, which specifically prohibited Petitioners from seeking recovery of the assessment in any rate proceeding. Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the recovery prohibition, both as required by the statute and impose by the Department’s order, claiming it was an unconstitutional taking. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Department’s order, holding (1) the mere obligation to pay the assessment, regardless of whether recovery was permitted or precluded, did not rise to the level of a compensable per se taking; (2) Petitioner’s claim that the assessment constituted a taking by way of a confiscatory rate was inadequate on the facts as presented to the Court; and (3) the Department’s order imposing the assessment and articulating the recovery prohibition did not constitute a regulatory taking because the order simply required Petitioners to pay an assessment that served a legitimate public purpose and did not interfere with Petitioners’ overall property rights. View "Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Utils." on Justia Law

The Public Utilities Commission found that, from 2008 to 2010, Central Maine Power Company (CMP) had applied approximately $2.6 million worth of customer deposits to debts owed on its own transmission-and-distribution services when that portion of the deposits should have been applied to debts owed for standard-offer service. Accordingly, the Commission ordered CMP to remedy its misallocation of deposits between its separate receivables accounts. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision, holding (1) the Commission correctly interpreted the governing statutes and regulations; (2) under the circumstances of this case, the Commission’s retroactive application of its new interpretation did not offend concepts of due process or reasonable notice; and (3) the Commission’s decision did not constitute improper retroactive ratemaking. View "Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Connecticut Siting Council approved a proposed project of the Connecticut Light and Power Company. Plaintiffs appealed the siting counsel’s decision while the power company’s motion for reconsideration of the decision, with regard to the denial of a second project, was still pending. The siting council subsequently granted the motion for reconsideration and approved the second project. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ appeal. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiffs had not appealed from a final decision of the siting council. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court did not err in its judgment. View "Citizens Against Overhead Power Line Constr. v. Conn. Siting Council" on Justia Law

The Public Utilities Commission (Commission) approved, with multiple conditions, two petitions for reorganization filed by two regulated electrical utilities in Maine. The reorganization would allow changes in the corporate ownership of specific entities that transmit and distribute electricity in Maine such that they would be held in common ownership with generators of electricity in Maine, primarily, generators of electricity from wind power. Several intervenors appealed the Commission's approval of the petitions, arguing that the proposed union under a single ownership of transmission-and-distribution utilities and electricity generators was prohibited by the Electric Industry Restructuring Act. The Supreme Court vacated the order of the Commission, holding that the Commission incorrectly interpreted the Act in making its determination. Remanded for reexamination of the proposals to determine whether the Act permits the reorganization proposed in this case. View "Houlton Water Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n " on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is a federal agency that, under the Federal Power Act, regulates rates charged by public utilities for transmission and sale of energy in interstate commerce, and rules pertaining to such rates, 16 U.S.C. 824d. In 2006, FERC approved a new tariff (rules governing interstate sale of electricity and electric capacity) for the PJM market, covering 13 states and the District of Columbia, as a result of an extensively negotiated settlement between power providers, utility companies, government authorities and others. The order required that load serving entities (LSEs) in the market procure a certain amount of energy capacity for access during peak load; included a rule that offers for the sale of capacity in the markets at artificially low prices would, with some exceptions, be required to be raised to a competitive level (mitigation). In 2011, FERC altered the 2006 Order: eliminating a mitigation exemption for resources built under state mandate; eliminating a provision that guaranteed that LSEs would be able to use “self-supply” to satisfy capacity obligations; and changing factors used in determining whether an offer was subject to mitigation. Objectors argued that the changes amounted to direct regulation of power facilities in violation of the FPA, and that FERC arbitrarily eliminated the mitigation exemption for state-mandated resources. Electric utilities challenged elimination of self-supply assurances for LSEs. Others challenged new rules governing calculation of a resource’s net cost of new entry (for determining whether an offer for sale of capacity will be mitigated) and FERC’s determination that a new generation resource must clear only one capacity auction to avoid further mitigation. The Third Circuit rejected all of the challenges. View "NJ Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. Fed Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Public Utilities Commission ("PUCO") approved of the first electric security plan of American Electric Power operating companies (collectively, “AEP”). The Supreme Court held that the Commission committed reversible error on three issues, including (1) approving the recovery of carrying costs associated with environmental investments without proper statutory authority, and (2) authorizing the provider-of-last-resort (“POLR”) charge without sufficient evidence. On remand, the Commission determined that the environmental-investment carrying costs were lawful but determined that the AEP had not presented evidence of its actual POLR costs and directed the company to deduct that charge from its tariff schedules. Following rehearing, the Office of Consumers’ Counsel (OCC) and Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) filed an appeal raising several challenges to the Commission’s remand orders. The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the Commission, holding that OCC and IEU did not carry their burden of showing reversible error in the Commission’s remand orders. View "In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a territorial dispute between two utilities, Choctawhatchee Electric Cooperative, Inc. and Gulf Power Company, both of which sought the right to serve Freedom Walk, a proposed multi-purpose development. The Florida Public Service Commission resolved the dispute in favor of Gulf Power, concluding that because the multiple factors it considered were substantially equal, customer preference, which favored Gulf Power, would determine the outcome of the dispute. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s order granting Gulf Power the right to serve the Freedom Walk development, holding that the Commission’s findings and conclusions were supported by competent substantial evidence and were not clearly erroneous. View "Choctawhatchee Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Graham" on Justia Law