Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) establishing a regulatory framework for a certain renewable energy product, holding that the trial court correctly correctly determined that the reactions did not violate the dormant commerce clause.In 2020, PURA imposed a series of restrictions on retail electric suppliers offering Connecticut customers voluntary products, known as voluntary renewable offers (VROs), consisting of renewable energy credits (REC) bundled with electric supply. One of the restrictions at issue, the geographic restriction, prohibited VROs from containing RECs sourced outside of particular geographic regions. The other restriction, the marketing restriction, required suppliers to provide clear language informing consumers that a VRO backed by RECs is an energy product backed by RECs rather than a renewable energy itself. Plaintiffs argued that both restrictions violated the dormant commerce clause. The trial court rejected Plaintiffs' commerce clause arguments as to each restriction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error. View "Direct Energy Services, LLC v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Public Service Commission (PSC) denying in part and granting in part motions for reconsideration of an order it issued setting forth the inputs it would use to calculate the export credit rate (ECR), holding that this Court lacked jurisdiction as to certain issues and, as to the two remaining issues, the PSC did not exceed the bounds of its authority.The export credit rate system at issue in this case was created to eventually replace the "net metering" program for customers who generated electricity. The PSC engaged in a lengthy public process to decide what factors to consider in calculating the ECR. After the PSC issued an order setting forth the inputs to use for the ECR Appellants filed motions for reconsideration. The PSC granted in part the motions, agreeing to reconsider some of the ECR calculation's components. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition as to issues for which the Court lacked jurisdiction and otherwise denied the motion, holding that the PSC did not exceed the bounds of its authority. View "Vote Solar v. Public Service Comm'n" on Justia Law

EBMUD, a municipal utility, provides water and wastewater services to the residents of Alameda and Contra Costa counties. The plaintiffs have paid for EBMUD water service since before July 2018. In 2017, EBMUD adopted the water rates for fiscal years 2018 and 2019; in July 2019, EBUMD adopted the rates for fiscal years 2020 and 2021. The plaintiffs alleged EBMUD determines the cost of service based on the volume of water used. There are three tiers of water usage; each successive tier is charged a higher rate than the previous tier. They allege that this rate structure violates the requirement of the California Constitution article XIII D, 6(b)(3) that the amount charged for water service shall not exceed the proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcel.In July 2019, plaintiffs mailed EBMUD a claim under the Government Claims Act, seeking a refund of service charges collected in violation of section 6(b) since July 17, 2018. In January 2020, after the statutory time period for response had lapsed, plaintiffs filed suit. The court of appeal affirmed dismissal without leave to amend, citing the 120-day statute of limitations (Public Utilities Code section 14402). Plaintiffs cannot avoid the statute of limitations by characterizing their claim as merely seeking a refund of excess fees. The complaint frames a challenge to the “disproportionate rate structure.” Any time requirements imposed by the Government Claims Act did not extend the limitations period. View "Campana v. East Bay Municipal Utility District" on Justia Law

The Lifeline Program provides discounted telecommunications services to low-income Californians. The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) administers the program under Pub. Util. Code 871. A “third-party administrator,” qualifies applicants, and there are procedures for service providers to seek reimbursement from CPUC for “LifeLine-related costs and lost revenues.” TruConnect provides free wireless telephone service through LifeLine. CPUC changed the third-party administrator to Maximus. TruConnect claimed Maximus was “woefully unequipped” and asked CPUC to delay the rollout of new software. The launch nonetheless went forward. Maximus recruited TruConnect to assist. TruConnect allegedly invested hundreds of thousands of man-hours. Maximus subsequently subcontracted work to Solix. TruConnect claims it incurred losses of more than $14 million in connection with the launch. TruConnect sought reimbursement from CPUC, which paid some claims but denied compensation for “lost opportunities,” customers who wanted TruConnect’s services but were unable to enroll because of the flawed rollout.TruConnect sued Maximus and Solix. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. The court of appeal reversed and remanded for determination of whether the lawsuit is nonetheless barred because CPUC is an indispensable party or for other reasons. Section 1759 does not bar the lawsuit since recovery would not conflict with a CPUC order or interfere with its oversight of LifeLine. View "TruConnect Communications, Inc. v. Maximus, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's petition for judicial review of an order of the Iowa Utilities Board approving a regulated public utility's emissions plan and budget, holding that the Board erred in failing to consider certain intervenors' evidence in determining whether the "Emissions Plan and Budget" (EPB) met the statutory requirements.The utility submitted an EPB - its initial plan and budget and subsequent updates - requesting approval for operations and maintenance expenditures associated with emissions controls previously approved at four coal-fueled power plants. The Board granted several motions to intervene in the contested case proceeding, including three environmental parties. Prior to the contested case hearing, the Board approved the utility's EPB. The environmental parties petitioned for judicial review, and the district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board erred in rejecting the evidence brought by the intervening parties that the retirement of coal-fueled electric power generated facilities was more cost effective than the utility's plan and budget as outside the scope of Iowa Code 476.6 and thus not relevant. View "Environmental Law & Policy Center v. Iowa Utilities Bd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the Public Service Commission resolving City of Benwood's complaint about the City of Wheeling's increase in the wholesale rate it charged to Benwood for wholesale sewage treatment services by forty-five percent, holding that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority.At issue was whether the Commission exceeded its authority under the plain and unambiguous language of W. Va. Code 24-2-1(b)(6) when it elected to start the jurisdictional, 120-day clock on the date the Commission argued it received sufficient information from Wheeling to resolve the dispute between the two cities. The Supreme Court vacated the order below, holding that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority by entering its final order more than 120 days after Benwood filed its complaint. View "City of Wheeling v. Public Service Comm'n of W. Va." on Justia Law

Article XIIIC was added to the California Constitution in 1996 after the passage of the Right to Vote on Taxes Act, or Proposition 218. Article XIIIC required that any new tax or increase in tax be approved by the voters. In 2010, article XIIIC was amended when Proposition 26 passed. Since then, “'tax' has been broadly defined to encompass 'any levy, charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by a local government.'” Several charges were expressly excluded from this definition, but at issue in this case are charges “imposed for a specific government service or product provided directly to the payor that is not provided to those not charged, and which does not exceed the reasonable costs to the local government of providing the service or product.” The government service or product at issue was electricity: Appellant was an individual residing in the City of Anaheim (the City) who claimed her local public electric utility approved rates which exceed the cost of providing electricity. She claimed the City has been transferring utility revenues to its general fund and recouping these amounts from ratepayers without obtaining voter approval. But because voters approved the practice through an amendment to the City’s charter, the Court of Appeal concluded the City has not violated article XIIIC, and affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the City on this basis. View "Palmer v. City of Anaheim" on Justia Law

In this class action, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment that certain sanitation fees constituted an illegal exaction and that the City of Fort Smith was unjustly enriched because the class paid money expecting to receive recycling services, holding that the circuit court clearly erred.Plaintiff, on behalf of the citizens and taxpayers of Fort Smith (class), brought this action against the City after discovering that Fort Smith was dumping almost all of its recyclables in a landfill, claiming that Fort Smith's collection of monthly sanitation charges, including recycling fees, was an illegal exaction and that the City had been unjustly enriched. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the action, holding (1) because Fort Smith used the sanitation fee to collect and dispose of sanitation, the circuit court's finding that the fee was an illegal exaction was clearly erroneous; and (2) the damages evidence Plaintiff presented was not a valid measure of restitution. View "City of Fort Smith v. Merriott" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) rejecting the power purchase agreement between Hu Honua and the Hawai'i Electric light Company, Inc., holding that there was no error in the PUC's decision to reject the power purchase agreement between the parties.At issue was the denial of Hua Honua's request for regulatory approval to supply energy to Hawai'i Island using a biomass power plant. In declining to approve the project on remand, the PUC found that the project would produce massive greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and significantly increase costs for rate-payers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the PUC understood its public interest-minded mission and properly followed this Court's remand instructions to consider the reasonableness of the proposed project's costs in light of its GHG emissions and the impact on Intervenors' right to a clean and healthful environment. View "In re Haw. Electric Light Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed the Episcopal Diocese or Rhode Island's challenge to an order of the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission (PUC) that permitted the Narragansett Electric Company to charge the diocese for electricity transmission costs associated with a proposed solar development project on diocese property in Glocester, holding that the matter was moot.On appeal, the diocese argued that the PUC's order was unlawful and unreasonable for several reasons, including the assertion that the PUC subjected the diocese to a biased proceeding in violation of state law. After the Supreme Court remanded the matter to the PUC for consideration of newly discovered evidence Narragansett determined that the diocese was not subject to the challenged interconnection costs. The Supreme Court declined to address the merits of the diocese's appeal, holding that the matter was moot. View "In re Petition of the Episcopal Diocese of R.I. for Declaratory Judgment" on Justia Law