Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Casitas Water District operates the Ventura River Project, which is owned by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and provides water to Ventura County, California, using dams, reservoirs, a canal, pump stations, and many miles of pipeline. In 1997, the National Marine Fisheries Service listed the West Coast steelhead trout as an endangered species and determined that the primary cause of its decline was loss of habitat due to water development, including impassable dams. Casitas faced liability if continued operation of the Project resulted in harm to the steelhead, 16 U.S.C. 1538(a)(1), 1540(a)–(b). In 2003, NMFS issued a biological opinion concerning operation of a fish ladder to relieve Casitas of liability. Casitas opened the Robles fish ladder, then filed suit, asserting that the biological opinion operating criteria breached its 1956 Contract with the government or amounted to uncompensated taking of Casitas’s property. The Claims Court dismissed, citing the sovereign acts doctrine. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal of the contract claim, but reversed dismissal of Casitas’s takings claim. The court again dismissed, holding that Casitas had failed to show that the operating criteria had thus far resulted in any reduction of water deliveries, so a takings claim was not yet ripe. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2004, the Berkeley County Water District and Sewer District filed requests with the Public Service Commission (PSC) to charge capacity improvement fees (CIFs) due to rapid population growth in the county. The PSC approved the requested CIFs. Petitioners subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action in the circuit court, seeking relief from paying the CIFs. The circuit court found that the PSC lacked jurisdiction to establish the CIFs. However, the Supreme Court found Petitioners had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before the PSC and reversed. Subsequently, the PSC discontinued the CIFs, finding that the Sewer District and Water District no longer satisfied the criteria for charging the CIFs. Thereafter, the PSC granted Petitioners' motion to deny the Water and Sewer Districts' petitions for reconsideration. Petitioners appealed to challenge errors they alleged were contained in the PSC's final order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioners were judicially estopped from challenging the errors. View "Larry V. Faircloth Realty, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law

In 2008, the Public Utilities Commission approved a merger between FairPoint Communications-NNE (FairPoint) and Verizon Maine (Verizon). The merger order committed FairPoint to expanding DSL availability in Maine to certain percentages within certain periods of time. The merger order incorporated an amended stipulation presented by FairPoint and other parties. Approximately twenty months later, FairPoint filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The Commission agreed to reduce FairPoint's ultimate broadband buildout obligations from ninety percent addressability to eighty-seven percent. Fairpoint subsequently notified the Commission that it had expanded broadband buildout to the level of eighty-three percent. The Commission disagreed, concluding that FairPoint had used the wrong measure of addressability and therefore overstated its results. At issue on appeal was how "addressability" would be measured when calculating FairPoint's broadband buildout commitments in Maine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the merger order was an order of the Commission and not a consent decree, and therefore, the Commission did not err by failing to interpret the merger order in a manner consistent with the intent and understanding of the parties to the stipulation; and (2) the Commission did not err in its definition of "addressability." View "N. New England Tel. Operations LLC v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Petitioner objected to an order of the FERC that allowed certain rates to be reduced as a corrective to the exercise of "supply-side" market power, but which declined to resolve petitioner's call for a parallel intervention to protect suppliers from what petitioner called "buy-side" market power. Concluding that the court had jurisdiction to consider petitioner's arguments, the court concluded that it had no reason to think that "the total effect of the rate order" was unjust and unreasonable, but the court had affirmative reason to believe that petitioner would have an adequate opportunity to pursue remedies for possible uneconomic entry. The court further concluded that the Commission did not abuse its discretion; in struggling to address the complexities posed by regional integration and independent systems operators, the Commission has pursued an iterative process with the court's explicit approval at least in one case, TC Ravenswood v. FERC; the specific context of the mitigation orders here exemplified the iterative process; and the court rejected petitioner's argument that the Commission violated due process and other obligations by neglecting to answer petitioner's arguments and proposals. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "TC Ravenswood, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

801 Skinker Boulevard Corporation (801), a corporation operating as a residential cooperative, sought a refund for sales taxes under Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.030.2, which indicates that utilities purchased for residential units for common areas and facilities shall be deemed to be for domestic use. The refund request concerned state sales tax charged and paid on electric and natural gas utilities purchased from 2006 through 2009. 801 filed for a refund of sales tax on its Union Electric (Ameren) and Laclede Gas Company (Laclede) bills. Ameren and Laclede also filed for refunds on behalf of 801. Ameren and Laclede's applications were denied. 801, Ameren, and Laclede (Taxpayers) subsequently filed a request for a refund of sales tax with the Administrative Hearing Commission, alleging that the utilities were purchased for domestic use by the individual owners and residents of 801 in accordance with section 144.030.2. The Commission denied the request. The Supreme Court reversed and ordered a full refund of the sales tax paid, holding that Taxpayers were entitled to the exemption and refund of their sales taxes pursuant to section 144.190.2, as 801's utility purchases were deemed by statute to be for "domestic use" and, thus, were exempt from sales tax. View "801 Skinker Boulevard Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Petitioners filed a complaint with the Montana Public Service Commission (PSC), alleging that Northwestern Energy had been overcharging consumes for its street lighting services. The PSC dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed but remanded with instructions to remand the case to the PSC for a redetermination of whether to allow the filing of an amended complaint. On remand to the district court, Petitioners filed a motion seeking $1,137 in costs incurred while responding to objections before the PSC and courts. Petitioners also renewed a motion asking the district court to initiate an immediate rate reduction pending the PSC's final decision. The district court denied both of the Petitioners' requests and remanded to the PSC. The Supreme Court affirmed that order, holding that the district court did not err in (1) denying Petitioners their costs for the initial proceedings in district court and first appeal to the Supreme Court, and (2) denying Petitioners' request for a temporary rate decrease, pending the PSC's decision on remand. View "Williamson v. Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Electric distribution utilities that opt to provide service under an electric security plan must undergo an annual earnings review. If their plan resulted in "significantly excessive earnings" compared to similar companies, the utility must return the excess to its customers pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4928.143(F). In the case below, the Public Utilities Commission found that Columbus Southern Power's 2009 earnings were significantly excessive by over $42 million. There were three appeals from the order. Columbus Southern Power asserted that section 4928.143(F) was unconstitutionally vague, and the Ohio Energy Group and the Office of the Ohio Consumers' Counsel (collectively, OEG) and Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) raised different arguments that the commission erred in applying the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed the commission's order, holding (1) the statute was not unconstitutionally vague, and (2) neither OEG nor IEU showed that the commission unreasonably interpreted or applied section 4928.143(F). View "In re Columbus S. Power Co." on Justia Law

Two public utilities (the companies) were wholly owned subsidiaries of appellant FirstEnergy Corporation. Appellees were residential customers of the companies. The customers filed a class-action complaint against FirstEnergy and the companies in the county court of common pleas. The complaint raised four causes of action: declaratory judgment, breach of contract, fraud, and injunctive relief. The trial court granted FirstEnergy's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) had exclusive jurisdiction over the allegations in the complaint. The court of appeals affirmed in all respects except with regard to the customers' fraud claim. The appellate court determined on two separate grounds that the trial court had jurisdiction over the fraud claim and remanded that claim to the trial court. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding (1) the customers' fraud claim was not a pure tort action, but rather, was a claim that the companies were overcharging the customers for electric service; and (2) because the complaint was challenging the rates charged for utility service, it fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the PUCO. View "DiFranco v. FirstEnergy Corp." on Justia Law

The City of Reynoldsburg was a municipal corporation governed by a charter. Intervening appellee, Columbus Southern Power Company (CSP), was a public utility and provided electric power to the City and its residents. At issue in this case was whether the City or CSP bore the cost to relocate overhead power lines underground. Specifically, the City sought a ruling that its right-of-way ordinance requiring all overhead power lines to be relocated underground at the sole cost of the public utility took precedence over CSP's commission-approved tariff, which provided that municipalities shall pay the costs whenever they required CSP to relocate overhead electrical distribution lines underground, in this particular aspect. The City filed a complaint with the Public Utilities Commission, contending that its ordinance superseded CSP's tariff and that the tariff was unjust, unreasonable, and unlawful. The commission found in favor of CSP. The Supreme Court affirmed the commission's orders, holding that the commission correctly found that the City was required to pay CSP's entire costs for relocating the power lines underground. View "In re Complaint of Reynoldsburg " on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals arose from a final determination of the State Corporation Commission in a mandated biennial review of the rates, terms, and conditions for the provision of generation, distribution and transmission services of an electric utility. As pertinent here, commencing in 2011, the Virginia Electric Utility Regulation Act required the Commission to conduct biennial reviews of an electric utility's performance during the two successive twelve-month periods immediately prior to such reviews pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 56-585.1(A). At issue in this appeal was whether in the 2011 biennial review of the performance of Virginia Electric and Power Company in the 2009-2010 test period the Commission erred in determining that the utility's authorized fair rate of return on common equity of 10.9 percent would apply to the entire 2011-2012 test period in the next biennial review in 2013. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission's construction of Code 56-585.1 was based upon the proper application of legal principles, and the Commission did not abuse the discretion afforded to it under that statute. View "Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n" on Justia Law