Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In this appeal, Appalachian Power Company (APCO) sought rate adjustment clause recovery of $33.3 million in environmental compliance costs that the State Corporation Commission denied. The Supreme Court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded, holding (1) APCO was entitled to a rate adjustment clause for recovery of actual costs it directly incurred for environmental compliance in 2009 and 2010 but did not recover through its base rates, and the portion of the Commission's decision denying recovery of environmental compliance costs on the basis that those costs were connected with projects included in APCO's base rates which APCO had the opportunity to recover was reversed; and (2) the portion of the Commission's decision denying APCO recovery of environmental compliance costs alleged to be embedded in the capacity equalization charges APCO paid to its affiliates in 2009 and 2010 was affirmed. Remanded. View "Appalachian Power Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Petitioners, the Public Service Commission of West Virginia and the Wetzel County Solid Waste Authority, sought to compel Respondents, Lackawanna Transport Company and Solid Waste Services, Inc., to comply with an order entered by the Public Service Commission requiring them to produce certain information and financial records pertinent to an ongoing investigation concerning the Wetzel County Landfill. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ of mandamus, holding (1) a writ of mandamus is appropriate in this case, as Respondents were legally required to produce the requested information; and (2) while arguably there was another remedy available in this instance through the circuit court, that remedy was not adequate given the unique circumstances given here. View "State ex rel. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Lackawann Transp. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioners, a group of municipal and federal government entities, which sold electricity in the affected markets at issue but who were outside of FERC's refund jurisdiction, appealed FERC's order of refunds for electricity rates that were above what FERC determined to be the just and reasonable rate. The court did not agree with FERC's assertion that it had broad authority under section 206 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 824e, to retroactively reset rates that were charged in the California electricity markets during the time in question. Nonetheless, the court concluded that the specific FERC Orders that were challenged in the current petitions for review did not exceed the limits on FERC's authority. Consequently, the court denied the petitions. View "Modesto Irrigation District, et al. v. FERC" on Justia Law

County filed a claim for reimbursement with City, alleging that City had overcharged County for sewer and water services. Following consideration at a city council meeting, City denied County's claim. County subsequently sued City in district court. City moved for summary judgment, asserting that review of its decision was limited to certiorari review under Minn. Stat. 606 and that County's failure to bring a timely certiorari petition deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) City's decision to deny the refund was a quasi-judicial decision, and therefore, the exclusive method for reviewing City's decision was through a writ of certiorari under chapter 606; and (2) accordingly, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear County's claim.

The United States petitioned the district court for an order enforcing a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) subpoena served on Golden Valley Electric Association (Golden Valley) for power consumption records concerning three customer residences. The court granted the petition and ordered compliance. Golden Valley complied with the subpoena but appealed the order. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Golden Valley's compliance with the district court's enforcement order did not moot the appeal; (2) the DEA's subpoena sought information relevant to a drug investigation, was procedurally proper, and was not overly broad; and (3) the subpoena complied with the Fourth Amendment.

Kelly and Paul Rosberg challenged the results of elections for seats on the Public Service Commission (PSC). The Rosbergs lost in the primaries to Gerald Vap and Rod Johnson, respectively. After the general election, the Rosbergs filed suit in the district court, claiming that Vap and Johnson were ineligible for the seats because both Vap and Johnson were not "in good standing" with their professions and were therefore ineligible for the seats. The district court rejected the Rosbergs' claims and granted summary judgment to Vap and Johnson. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the Legislature did not intend service on the PSC to be read as a profession for which one must be "in good standing according to the established standards of" that profession, the district court was correct in dismissing the Rosbergs' challenges.

Ed Friedman and others (collectively, Friedman) appealed the Maine Public Utilities Commission's dismissal of their complaint against Central Maine Power Company (CMP) regarding CMP's use of smart-meter technology. Friedman also appealed the Commission's dismissal of those portions of the complaint that were directed at the Commission and raised constitutional concerns regarding orders previously issued by the Commission. Friedman asserted, among other issues, that the Commission erred because its dismissal of his complaint ignored the Commission's statutory mandate to ensure the delivery of safe and reasonable utility services. The Commission and CMP contended that the complaint was properly dismissed in all respects. Because the Supreme Court agreed with Friedman that the Commission should not have dismissed the portion of the complaint against CMP addressing health and safety issues, the Court vacated that portion of the judgment and otherwise affirmed.

The Minnesota Public Utilities Commission entered an order requiring Qwest Corporation, a successor Bell operating company, to submit for review and approval a price list and supporting rationale for certain telecommunication network facilities Qwest was required to provide to its Minnesota competitors under 47 U.S.C. 271. Qwest sought judicial review and declaratory relief in the district court, arguing the Commission's order was preempted by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The district court concluded federal law and regulations did not preempt the Commission's order. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the Commission's order impermissibly intruded on federal authority to regulate rates for elements required under section 271 and interfered with the purpose and objectives of Congress and the FCC; and (2) therefore, the order was preempted by the Act and the FCC's implementing regulations and rulings.

At issue in this case was whether the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin (PSC) correctly concluded the Wisconsin Power and Light's (WPL) application to construct a large, out-of-state, electric generating facility was properly reviewed under Wis. Stat. 196.49(3), the certificate of authority (CA) statute, or whether Wis. Stat. 196.491(3), the certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN) statute, should have been applied. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order, which affirmed the PSC's interim order, holding that the PSC's interpretation of the CPCN law as applying exclusively to in-state facilities and its decision to analyze WPL's application under the CA law were reasonable, and there was not a more reasonable interpretation of the CA and CPCN laws.

Ruling on a joint petition for declaratory order filed by Monongahela Power Company and Potomac Edison Company ("The Utilities"), The Public Service Commission of West Virginia held that the alternative and renewable energy resource credits attributable to energy purchases by the Utilities from Morgantown Energy Associates (MEA) and the City of New Martinsville ("the Generators"), were owned by the Utilities during the terms of electric energy purchase agreements between the entities. On appeal, the Generators contended that the Commission erred in its ruling and that the energy resource credits were owned by them. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not err in finding the credits at issue were owned by the Utilities; and (2) the Commission did not err in holding that it would deem MEA's Morgantown project as a certified facility under the Alternative and Renewable Energy Portfolio Act upon the submission of sufficient evidence by the Utilities.