Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Evercom Systems provided telephone services to inmates in correctional facilities throughout the country. When Evercom billed a customer for collect calls he did not accept, the customer lodged a complaint to the Iowa Utility Board. The Board imposed a civil penalty for a "cramming" violation based on improper billing for collect telephone calls under Iowa Code 476.103 and Iowa Admin. Code r. 199-22.23. The district court reversed the agency's decision and imposition of the civil penalty, concluding that the Board misinterpreted the law and that no cram occurred. The court of appeals reversed the district court and reinstated the civil penalty. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the district court, holding that Evercom's actions did not constitute a cram under rule 199-22.23. Remanded for dismissal.

This case stemmed from FERC's statutory mandate set out in the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 824-824w, to ensure that all rates and charges made, demanded, or received by power wholesalers were just and reasonable. Petitioners subsequently sought review of FERC's final order (Order 697), contending that the order violated FERC's governing statutes. In Order 697, FERC codified the existing limited market-based policy, along with multiple enhancements, in a final rule. At issue was whether the market-based regulatory policy established by FERC's order was permissible under the law. Taking into account Chevron deference, the law of the circuit, other relevant precedent, and the direction of the Supreme Court as to how the court should approach such administrative law issues concerning federal agencies, the court concluded that Order 697 did not per se violate the FPA.

This case stemmed from a challenge by environmental groups to a proposed incremental drawdown of water from Lake Roosevelt in eastern Washington. At issue was whether the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) took a "hard look" and genuinely scrutinized the environmental consequence of its proposed action. The court held that, under its precedents and the circumstances presented, Reclamation's actions did not violate the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. The court also held that its review revealed no other deficiencies in the substance of the Environmental Assessment (EA), and although Reclamation took several steps toward implementing the drawdown project before drafting the EA, it scrupulously adhered to NEPA's timing requirements. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff, an environmental organization, filed this administrative mandamus action to challenge the issuance of a federally required permit authorizing the Moss Landing Powerplant (MLPP) to draw cooling water from the adjacent Moss Landing Harbor and Elkhorn Slough. This case presented issues concerning the technological and environmental standards, and the procedures for administrative and judicial review, that apply when a thermal powerplant, while pursuing the issuance or renewal of a cooling water intake permit from a regional board, also sought necessary approval from the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission (Energy Commission), of a plan to add additional generating units to the plant, with related modifications to the cooling intake system. The court held that the superior court had jurisdiction to entertain the administrative mandamus petition here under review. The court also held that the trial court erred when it deferred a final judgment, ordered an interlocutory remand to the board for further "comprehensive" examination of that issue, then denied mandamus after determining that the additional evidence and analysis considered by the board on remand supported the board's reaffirmed findings. The court further held that recent Supreme Court authority confirmed that, when applying federal Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1326(b), standards for the issuance of this permit, the Regional Water Board properly utilized cost-benefit analysis. The court declined to address several other issues discussed by the parties. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Florida Water Environment Association Utility Council and South Florida Water Management District (appellants) appealed the district court's order approving a consent decree between the EPA and a group of environmentalist organizations (plaintiffs). The consent decree settled a suit by plaintiffs against the EPA that alleged that the agency failed to promulgate timely new water-quality standards for the State of Florida. Appellants claimed that the consent decree was substantively and procedurally unreasonable and that the district court abused its discretion in approving the decree. The court held that because appellants have not demonstrated a live case or controversy that would give the court jurisdiction over their case, the court dismissed their appeal.

Appellant TW Telecom of New Mexico (TW Telecom) appealed a final order issued by the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (PRC) in "In the Matter of the Development of an Alternative Form of Regulation Plan for Qwest Corporation" (AFOR III Final Order). TW Telecom claimed that the PRC (1) adopted certain conclusions from a previous final order, lacking justification in the AFOR III record; (2) deregulated Qwest Corporation's (Qwest) rates in violation of the New Mexico Telecommunications Act and the separation of powers doctrine in the New Mexico Constitution; and (3) deprived TW Telecom of proper due process. The claims raised in this appeal involved three cases before the PRC that concerned the development of various alternative forms of regulation plans issued by the PRC, and Qwest's compliance with the terms and conditions therein.  The cases addressed various issues, including pricing provisions and detailed requirements for the filing of tariff changes, tariffs for new services, promotional offerings, packaged services, and individual contracts for services. Upon review, the Supreme Court annulled and vacated AFOR III Final Order and remanded the case back to the PRC for further proceedings. The Court concluded that the PRC indeed violated TW Telecom's due process because it adopted conclusions from a previous proceeding without affording the parties an opportunity to be heard. The Court did not address TW Telecom's second claim.

Three state and local governmental units, along with individual citizens, petitioned the court for review of and other relief from two "determinations" made by the Department of Energy (DOE) and the other respondents: the DOE's attempt to withdraw the application it submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for a license to construct a permanent nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada; and the DOE's apparent decision to abandon development of the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste depository. The court concluded that the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 10101-270, set forth a process and schedule for the siting, construction, and operation of a federal repository for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. At this point in that process, the DOE had submitted a construction license application for the Yucca Mountain repository and the NRC maintained a statutory duty to review that application. Therefore, the court held that unless and until petitioners were able to demonstrate that one of the respondents had either violated a clear duty to act or otherwise affirmatively violated the law, petitioners' challenges to the ongoing administrative process was premature. Accordingly, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction over petitioners' claims and dismissed the petitions.

Appellants, nonprofit environmental organizations, appealed from a judgment of dismissal entered by the district court in an action against the EPA under the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq., challenging the EPA Administrator's failure to take action to prevent the construction of three proposed pollution-emitting facilities in Kentucky. The court held that the validity of the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) permits issued under the noncompliant State Implementation Plan (SIP), and the possible invalidity of the amended SIP, sufficiently raised a current controversy to save the litigation from mootness. The court also held that the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., did not provide a cause of action to review the EPA Administrator's failure to act under section 7477 of the CAA because her decision was an agency action "committed to agency discretion by law." Therefore, the EPA Administrator's decision was discretionary and not justiciable and thus, appellants failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Although the district court dismissed the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court affirmed the district court's action because dismissal would otherwise have been proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Petitioner Jefferson Utilities, Inc. (JUI), a privately-held public utility authorized to provide water service to several areas of Jefferson County, filed a request with the Public Service Commission of West Virginia for a rate increase of approximately 72.2 percent. The ALJ recommended a rate increase of 22.4 percent, and the Commission reduced the rate increase recommended by the ALJ to 4.4 percent. JUI appealed, contending that the Commission erred by rejecting the recommended decision of the ALJ regarding the rate increase. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although the evidence in this case was controverted, it was clear that the Commission's decision was not arbitrary, did not result from a misapplication of legal principles, and was supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Plaintiff, operator of an electricity plant, sued defendant ("the county"), seeking to enjoin Expedited Bill 29-10, which imposed a levy on large stationary emitters of carbon dioxide within the county, on the ground that it violated the United States and Maryland Constitutions. At issue was whether a Montgomery County exaction on carbon dioxide emissions, levied only upon plaintiff's electricity-generating facility, was a tax or a fee. The court held that the carbon charge, which targeted a single emitter and was located squarely within the county's own "programmatic efforts to reduce" greenhouse gas emissions, was a punitive and regulatory fee over which the federal courts retained jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.