Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed a superior court order affirming the University of Vermont's denial of his application for in-state tuition status. He raised a host of challenges to the court's ruling, arguing primarily that it was inconsistent with the court's finding that plaintiff was domiciled in Vermont. Plaintiff moved to Vermont in 2007 to enroll as an undergraduate at the University of Vermont ("University" or "UVM"). He paid the out-of-state tuition rate through the first three years of his undergraduate studies, and first applied for in-state tuition status in June 2010. In his application he stated that, although he first came to Vermont to attend UVM, he chose to permanently relocate to Vermont because he loved the area and intended to reside in Burlington after graduating. UVM denied the application, citing several pertinent provisions of UVM's In-State Status Regulations. In his administrative appeal, plaintiff reiterated that he came to UVM because of the reputation of its pre-medical program and medical school, and he explained that during his freshman year he was accepted into a premedical program that leads to automatic acceptance to UVM medical school for students who complete the program. Plaintiff also explained that, although he needed only one more course to complete his graduation requirements, he was seeking in-state tuition status to enable him to take additional electives in the fall of 2010 and spring of 2011 to become "a more diversified medical school applicant." UVM denied his administrative appeal. In light of the review standards the University used in denying Plaintiff's appeal, the Supreme Court concluded Plaintiff's reliance on the superior court's "finding" was misplaced: "[f]or our purposes here, the critical findings are those of the University, not the trial court. UVM was the adjudicator of the facts in this matter, and the record is clear that it employed the original version of Regulation 3, which both parties agree governed plaintiff's application." Moreover, UVM made no finding as to plaintiff's common-law domicile, but rather concluded on the basis of its review of the record that plaintiff did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that he was eligible for in-state tuition. The Court concluded that the record contained ample competent evidence to support the University's determination, and affirmed the superior court's judgment. View "Roberts v. University of Vermont" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal concerned whether the Vermont Public Service Board had jurisdiction to regulate interconnected Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services provided in Vermont. The Board concluded that fixed VoIP was a "telecommunications service" under Vermont law and Vermont regulation of VoIP was not preempted by federal law because intrastate calls could be separately identified. The Board deferred consideration of what type of regulation to impose to a separate phase of the proceeding. On appeal, Comcast Phone of Vermont, LLC argued that the Board erred in not addressing whether interconnected fixed VoIP was an information service or telecommunications service under federal law because, according to Comcast, VoIP is an information service and therefore any regulation is preempted by federal law. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the Board must reach this question and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Investigation into Regulation of Voice Over Internet Protocol" on Justia Law

New England Coalition, Inc. (NEC) filed a complaint to the Supreme Court seeking injunctive relief to enjoin Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy) from continuing to operate the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant. NEC alleged that Entergy was operating in violation of the Public Service Board’s final order approving the 2002 sale of the power plant to Entergy in Docket No. 6545. Finding no grounds to grant equitable relief, the Supreme Court dismissed NEC's complaint. View "In re Investigation into General Order No. 45" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, the Supreme Court addressed disputes over child support. The disputes were described as "so stale that the parties' children are in and approaching their thirties." The basic questions were whether father could register and enforce a child support order obtained in Oklahoma against mother and, inversely, whether mother could register and enforce an earlier child support order obtained in Georgia against father. Upon review, the Court concluded that mother's various jurisdictional challenges to the Oklahoma order were without merit and precluded by the unappealed adjudication in Oklahoma. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the Vermont court had personal jurisdiction over father with respect to mother's child support claims against him and a statutory immunity provision in the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) did not apply. As a result, the Court affirmed the superior court's dismissal of mother's enforcement action, affirmed the superior court's jurisdictional holdings with regard to the Oklahoma order. The Court remanded the adjudication of father's enforcement action for consideration of counterclaims raised by mother. View "OCS/Pappas v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved the interplay between rulings and requirements relating to zoning in connection with a planned development and enforcement of restrictive covenants and deed restrictions applicable to property within the development. Plaintiff obtained municipal zoning approval to reconfigure the lot lines in her two-lot farmstead parcel within the Quechee Lakes subdivision, as well as to construct a dwelling on the second, yet-to-be-developed lot. The Environmental Division affirmed the zoning board's award of the latter permit. Notwithstanding that order, in a declaratory judgment action also initiated by plaintiff, the civil division concluded that plaintiff's proposed construction violated the applicable restrictive covenants and deed restrictions. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the Environmental Division's decision resolved the dispute, that the civil division improperly considered extrinsic evidence when the disputed deed restrictions were clear on their face, that defendants' challenge to plaintiff's right to build the proposed dwelling was time-barred, and that the character of the development had changed so much that the disputed deed restrictions are no longer valid. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiff's theory of the case was that the deed language was ambiguous; plaintiff was instrumental in framing the trial court's task as one of construing ambiguous deed language; and plaintiff led the way in introducing extrinsic evidence in support of plaintiff's own interpretation. "Given this record, plaintiff cannot now challenge the trial court's consideration of extrinsic evidence to interpret the documents." The Court concluded that plaintiff suffered no prejudice from the trial court's decision to consider the testimony about the context surrounding the disputed deed language - both that offered by plaintiff and by defendants. Finding no error in the trial court's decision to deny the motion for declaratory judgment, the Court reached no other issues plaintiff raised in her appeal and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Marsh Inter Vivos Trust v. McGillvray, et al." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from litigation involving developer Stowe Highlands and its Resort Planned Unit Development (PUD) in the Town of Stowe. The Stowe Development Review Board (DRB) denied Stowe Highlands' application to amend the PUD by subdividing and then merging certain lots, including one designated for a hotel. The DRB concluded that the amendment amounted to a change in the permit conditions and that such amendment was not warranted because Stowe Highlands had not demonstrated an unanticipated change in factual circumstances beyond its control. Stowe Highlands appealed this denial to the Environmental Division of the Superior Court, which reversed, concluding that the application required no permit condition change and that denial on that basis was therefore unfounded. One of the PUD lot owners and the Town appealed that decision, arguing that the original DRB decision was correct. Finding no error in the superior court decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Stowe Highlands Merger/Subdivision Application" on Justia Law

Mother appealed a CHINS decision by the superior court based on a finding that she repeatedly induced the child to make false allegations of abuse against father. On appeal, Mother contended the judgment was unsupported because there was no evidence or finding that the allegations of abuse were the product of intentional coaching or mental illness. Finding the evidence sufficient to support the superior court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re M.A." on Justia Law

A Mother appealed a superior court's decision that terminated her parental rights to her son, D.C. D.C. spent the first years of his life with both parents, who at the time were not married. When his parents separated, the father took D.C. to stay with him. Although a child-custody order granted mother parental rights, she allowed father to take the child because she had difficulty finding a residence, and she knew that father had the support of his mother in caring for D.C. This arrangement lasted for a few years longer when mother obtained police help to assert her custodial rights to D.C. Mother moved into a motel with D.C., and the Department for Children and Families (DCF) petitioned that D.C. was a child in need of care due to a lack of proper parental care. The affidavit in support of the petition stated that: (1) five years earlier mother’s parental rights had been terminated with respect to an older child because of unsafe and unsanitary living conditions and the child’s exposure to the risk of being sexually abused; (2) mother had a relationship with a known, untreated sex offender who had been seen frequently with mother at her motel room; (3) the motel room was filthy and unsanitary; (4) D.C. was suffering from an untreated respiratory illness; and (5) school officials had reported D.C. arriving at school hungry and not dressed properly for the cold. On appeal, mother argued that the termination order is invalid because the court failed to: (1) consider whether the State had met its burden of showing changed circumstances, which was required because the State’s termination petition sought modification of the initial disposition order; (2) determine by clear and convincing evidence that mother was presently unfit to care for D.C.; and (3) find that DCF had made reasonable efforts to prevent the unnecessary removal of D.C. from his home. Finding that the record supported the family court’s undisputed findings that during the lengthy period when mother played a limited role in D.C.’s life and agreed to other family members assuming custody of the child, she made no progress in reaching a point where she could care for the child.  The Court concluded that Mother could not challenge the TPR order through a belated claim that DCF failed to make reasonable efforts to prevent D.C.’s removal from his home. Accordingly, the Court affirmed termination of Mother's rights. View "In re D.C." on Justia Law

This decision resolved two consolidated appeals related to family division proceedings involving juvenile C.P. First, mother and father appealed termination of their parental rights to their son C.P. Father argued the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the termination proceeding. Mother joined father's jurisdictional argument and contended that the evidence and findings did not support the conclusion that termination was in C.P.'s best interests. Second, father challenged the court's post-termination order striking a sentence of the termination decision, and finding that the Department for Children and Families (DCF) made reasonable efforts toward achieving the permanency plan goal of reunifying C.P. with his parents. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no merit to either of the parents' arguments on appeal and affirmed the trial court's decisions. View "In re C. P." on Justia Law

Applicant Marilyn Clifford appealed the denial of long-term home-care benefits under the Medicaid-funded Choices for Care program, arguing that a second home on an adjacent piece of property should have been excluded from the financial-eligibility calculation. Given the language of the regulation, the legislative history that led to its promulgation, and the policy considerations attending the Medicaid program, the Supreme Court concluded that the Secretary correctly interpreted the home-exclusion rule when he reinstated the determination of the Department of Children and Families denying the benefits. Thus, the Court found no compelling indication of error in the Secretary’s determination and affirmed. View "In re Marilyn Clifford" on Justia Law