Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The State appealed the Chittenden Criminal Division’s denial of its motion to seal search warrants and related materials generated during an ongoing investigation into a missing Essex couple. The court determined that the State failed to show with specificity that disclosure would cause “substantial harm to public or private interests.” The State asserted that there was neither a First Amendment nor a common law right of access to search warrant materials in an active, pre-arrest investigation, and argued that a presumptive right of access should not apply in such cases. Instead, the State urged the Supreme Court to hold that there is no right of access to such materials under the Vermont Rules for Public Access to Court Records (PACR Rules). Assuming that the pertinent case law applied to pre-arrest investigations, the State also claimed the criminal division erred by concluding that the standard for sealing was not satisfied. Finally, the State asserted that the court erred in turning down its request for an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, the Supreme Court saw no error in the court’s refusal to conduct a further hearing, but reversed its determination that the State failed to cite sufficiently specific reasons to seal the warrant information. View "In re Essex Search Warrants" on Justia Law

The Vermont Human Rights Commission appealed a trial court decision interpreting 9 V.S.A. section 4554 as requiring all lawsuits brought by the Commission against the State of Vermont to be filed within a six-month conciliation period. The trial court held that because the Commission failed to file within this six-month period, its suit against the State was time-barred. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision and dismissed the Commission's claim. View "Vermont Human Rights Commission v. Vermont Agency of Transportation." on Justia Law

Taxpayer World Publications distributes a free weekly newspaper in central Vermont called The World. Once a month, the newspaper includes a coupon book, produced and printed by taxpayer, that features coupons for local businesses. The Commissioner of Taxes concluded that the coupon books are not "component parts" of the newspaper, and therefore the cost of printing the coupon books is "not exempt from sales and use tax." The superior court affirmed. World Publications appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed too. View "World Publications, Inc. v. Vermont Department of Taxes" on Justia Law

Neighbors of a proposed affordable housing development appealed an Environmental Division decision affirming a decision of the Town of Woodstock Development Review Board (DRB) granting appellee-applicants Woodstock Community Trust and Housing Vermont (WCT) a zoning permit and a decision of the District 3 Environmental Commission, granting an Act 250 Land Use Permit. The Environmental Division had reversed an earlier decision of the DRB granting a permit, but upon WCT’s reapplication, and another favorable decision from the DRB, the Environmental Division affirmed, finding that the deficiencies of the first application had been corrected. Following the second DRB decision, WCT went to the Environmental Commission and obtained an Act 250 permit; the Environmental Division also affirmed the grant of this permit. Neighbors argued that: (1) the successive-application doctrine should have barred the submission of the second zoning permit application; (2) the second application failed to correct the problems of the first application; (3) certain of the Environmental Division’s findings with respect to the Act 250 permit were clearly erroneous; (4) the court erred by denying a motion to stay this proceeding; and (5) the Environmental Division erred by conditioning approval on a water easement’s location being drawn on the plan. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed. "It is entirely within the jurisdiction of the Environmental Division to impose conditions on permits. . . .the Environmental Division was sensitive to the concurrent litigation when it imposed the condition, requiring that the pending litigation be noted on the plan. The condition was based on the requirements of the Woodstock zoning ordinance, and it was within the court’s jurisdiction and discretion to require it." View "In re Woodstock Community Trust and Housing Vermont PRD" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the Lowell Mountains Group, Inc. (LMG), and the Towns of Albany and Craftsbury, challenged several Public Service Board orders related to the construction of a wind-electric-generation facility and associated facilities on Lowell Mountain in Lowell, Vermont. In May 2010, petitioners Green Mountain Power Corporation (GMP), Vermont Electric Cooperative, Inc. (VEC), and Vermont Electric Power Company, Inc. and Vermont Transco LLC (VELCO) requested a certificate of public good (CPG) to construct a wind-electric-generation facility on Lowell Mountain. On May 31, 2011, following testimony, site visits, a public hearing, and hearings, the Board issued a final order granting a CPG subject to forty-five conditions. Appellants and several other parties moved for reconsideration. On July 12, 2011, the Board modified its final order in certain respects. The Towns and LMG appealed that final order with modifications. The parties also raised compliance issues with the final order that the Board ultimately overruled. Upon review of the Board's orders, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion, and deferred to the Board's decisions with regard to the final order. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Board. View "In re Green Mountain Power Corp." on Justia Law

The State of Vermont appealed a trial court's dismissal of a civil driver's license suspension complaint.  The trial court found that the statutory requirements for civil suspension had not been met. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, finding that indeed, the statutory requirements for civil suspension had not been met. View "Vermont v. Spooner" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Doctors Eitan and Vered Sobel, owners of a medical office building in Rutland, appealed the superior court's grant of summary judgment for defendant, City of Rutland. Plaintiffs sued the City for damages, claiming the City Tax Assessor (the Assessor) was negligent in providing allegedly inaccurate property tax estimates on the proposed, but not yet built, office. Plaintiffs also sought to enjoin the City from enforcing the tax assessment on the office building ultimately constructed. On appeal, they argued that the court erred in concluding that their negligence claim was barred by municipal immunity and that they failed to establish equitable estoppel against the City. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the City Assessor was immune from suit, and that plaintiffs could no establish estoppel with the facts of this case. Finding no error with the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City, the Supreme Court affirmed that decision. View "Sobel v. City of Rutland" on Justia Law

The issue in two consolidated cases concerned a public housing authority and three of its tenants.  Bennington Housing Authority (BHA) appealed two trial court decisions dismissing ejectment claims against tenants, and granting summary judgment to tenants on two counterclaims: (1) that BHA failed to properly advise tenants of their right to request a grievance hearing when it billed them for repairs and fines; and (2) that BHA’s policy of fining tenants for open windows in the winter is prohibited under federal regulations. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that that BHA violated federal regulations for insufficient notice of the grievance procedure in both the termination of lease notices and the bills for maintenance and repair costs sent to tenants. The Court agreed with the trial court that BHA’s window-fine policy was prohibited by federal regulations.  BHA’s ejectment claims were thus dismissed, and the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on tenants’ counterclaims was affirmed. View "Bennington Housing Authority v. Lake" on Justia Law

Petitioner Charlotte Rumsey appealed a decision by the Vermont Human Services Board which denied her Choices for Care (CFC) Services on a tie vote of the Board. The issue before the Board was whether petitioner met the eligibility requirements for either highest need or high need services. Petitioner was seventy-four years of age at the time of the Board's evidentiary hearing and lived alone. She suffers from chronic seizure disorder, osteoarthritis of the knees and ankles, cerebral vascular disease, depression, anxiety, and obesity. She applied for CFC benefits to obtain home-delivered services to allow her to remain safely in her home. To avoid being placed on a waiting list, she must meet eligibility requirements for highest need or high need services. The hearing officer issued her proposed findings of fact, a recommended decision to affirm the DAIL denial, and a statement of reasons. The Board met to consider this and other cases with six of seven members present. After hearing argument, the six members tied on whether to accept the hearing officer's recommendation. The Board did unanimously accept the hearing officer's findings of fact. It decided that in the case of a tie vote, the "Department's original decision stands." Following the Board decision, petitioner moved to reopen the case, seeking a Board decision based on the vote of all seven members. Petitioner also argued that the decision did not contain findings on the elements of the CFC eligibility standards. DAIL opposed the motion. The Board denied the motion. It concluded that the findings were complete. In response to petitioner's request for a vote by all seven members, the Board stated that, if the case were reopened, there would be no guarantee "that all seven members would be present." The Board noted that it was following the rule of courts for instances where there is a tie vote and that reopening would only delay an authoritative decision from the Supreme Court on the meaning of the CFC regulations. On appeal, both parties argued that the Supreme Court should reach the merits of the case; in the alternative, petitioner sought a remand for proper findings and to have all seven of the Board members decide the case. DAIL opposed the alternative and suggested that the Court instead declare the meaning of the regulations and remand for the Board to find the relevant facts and render a decision. The Board denied petitioner's motion to reopen in part because it did not want to delay the case reaching the Supreme Court for an authoritative interpretation of the CFC regulations. The Court did not agree with this reasoning. In its view, the quality of the Court's decision improved when it had "the informed analysis and decision of the Board. The decision before us has no reasoning or conclusions, and we do not know why either of the sides voted as it did." Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Rumsey" on Justia Law

Appellants John and Margaret Toor appealed a decision of the Superior Court, Environmental Division, which upheld a notice of violation issued by the Town of Grand Isle Zoning Administrator for changing the use of their single-family home in Grand Isle without obtaining a zoning permit. On appeal, appellants argued that renting their home did not constitute a change in use under the Town's zoning ordinance, and accordingly they were not required to obtain a zoning permit prior to renting. Upon review of the applicable zoning ordinances and the parites' briefs on appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with Appellants and reversed the Zoning Administrator's decision. View "In re Toor & Toor Living Trust NOV" on Justia Law