Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Fletcher Allen Health Care (FAHC) appealed a decision of the Vermont Employment Security Board finding claimant, Abdullahi Mohamed, eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. The Board found that claimant’s discharge for off-duty criminal conduct did not constitute gross misconduct disqualifying him from unemployment compensation benefits. On appeal, FAHC argued that the Legislature’s recent amendments to the Vermont Unemployment Compensation Act required the Board to disqualify claimants from receiving unemployment compensation benefits when an employer can no longer retain them as a result of off-duty criminal conduct. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Plaintiff Kevin Turnley appealed a trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Town of Vernon. Plaintiff, formerly the Town’s Chief of Police, claimed that he was entitled to receive overtime pay under the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which entitles nonexempt employees to overtime pay for time worked in excess of forty hours in a week. The trial court held that plaintiff was exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements because he was an "executive" employee. Upon review of the applicable legal standard and the trial court record, the Supreme Court agreed that Plaintiff was indeed exempt from receiving overtime pay.

Vermont Golf Association challenged the superior court’s dismissal of its appeal from a decision by the Department of Taxes assessing sales and use tax on prior activities. The court based its dismissal on Vermont Golf’s failure to provide security to the Commissioner of Taxes to perfect its appeal to the superior court. Finding no error in the superior court's disposition of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed.

The Windsor County State's Attorney filed an interlocutory collateral final order appeal seeking review on the question of whether 13 V.S.A. 4815(g)(1) violated the Vermont Constitution's separation-of-powers provision by divesting the trial court of the authority to order an inpatient mental health evaluation of a potentially incompetent defendant. The Attorney General intervened on behalf of the State, arguing that the appeal was improvidently granted, and that the statute is constitutional. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no justiciable claim because the necessity of an inpatient evaluation and the constitutionality of the statute were not decided below. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeal.

Hartford police officers responded to a report of a possible burglary in progress, and used considerable force in restraining the suspect. The alleged burglar turned out to be the homeowner, who was disoriented due to a medical condition. Journalist Anne Galloway requested records relating to the police contact with the homeowner from the chief of police. The chief denied Galloway's request, as did the town manager when Galloway appealed the chief's decision. After Galloway filed an action to compel production of the records, the superior court ruled that under the Public Records Act's (PRA) exemption for police investigations, the police did not need to provide Galloway with any records produced or acquired before the point at which the officers decided against charging the homeowner with a criminal offense. Galloway then appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that because the homeowner's detention amounted to an arrest, the records in question must be disclosed under the PRA's proviso that "records reflecting the initial arrest of a person . . . shall be public."

The Franklin County Sheriff's Office appealed the trial court's judgment in favor of the St. Albans City Police Department. The Sheriff's Office contended that the City Police Department engaged in an unfair method of competition with the intent to harm competition under the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act's (VCFA) predatory pricing provision. Specifically, the Sheriff's Office argued that the City Police Department submitted an "artificially low" bid in response to the Town of St. Albans's request for proposals for law enforcement services. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed. "Here, the 'competitors' are all statutorily created entities, meaning that one entity cannot lower its prices so as to put another out of business, nor can potential entrants be deterred from entering the 'market' because the statutory scheme allows no new entrants. Although there is competition within a limited sphere as between the statutorily empowered entities, there is no threat of monopolization by any one of them. Thus, the Sheriff's Office's injuries alleged in the complaint do not fall within the zone of interests to be protected by Vermont's predatory pricing statute. . . .the Sheriff's Office was not denied something in which it had a legally protected interest, nor is its claim within the zone of interests protected by the statute, and it therefore lack[ed] constitutional and prudential standing."

Plaintiff Richard Daniels wanted to foreclose on a mortgage on two parcels of real property owned by defendant Elks Club of Hartford, Vermont. Defendant creditors, who include the Vermont Human Rights Commission, four individual women, and the Watts Law Firm, all have junior security interests in the property at issue and opposed foreclosure. Creditors appealed a trial court decision granting plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment, concluding that plaintiff had standing to foreclose and was entitled to a judgment of foreclosure against all parties, and dismissing creditors' counterclaims. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision to include certain advances in the mortgage amount and the dismissal of the counterclaims.

Kayla Eaton's lawsuit against her former employer and supervisor for sexual assault was dismissed for failure to prosecute. She claimed that her ability to prosecute the case was thwarted by a licensed polygraph examiner, Leroy Prior, who determined that she did not tell the truth in responding to questions about the alleged assault. Ms. Eaton and her father Robert Eaton filed this action against Prior, claiming negligent administration of the polygraph examination, and against the Vermont State Police and Lt. Matthew Belmay, alleging that they improperly disclosed the examination results and conspired to cover up Prior's misconduct. The trial court entered judgment for defendants on the ground that the suit was barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to actions for "injuries to the person," under 12 V.S.A. 512(4), and the Eatons appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court correctly concluded the statute of limitations applied to this case, however, the court mistakenly failed to consider the applicability of 12 V.S.A. 511's general six-year limitation period to the claims for economic harm resulting from dismissal of the underlying lawsuit and other alleged economic costs.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Frank Hall, a longtime employee of the Agency of Transportation (AOT), sued the agency in 2007, alleging discrimination on the basis of a physical disability and retaliation for his having filed a workers' compensation claim. The jury found no disability discrimination, but awarded Plaintiff damages based upon its finding that the State had retaliated against him as alleged. On appeal, the State argued that: (1) Plaintiff's retaliation claim was precluded by a September 2003 Stipulation and Agreement signed by Plaintiff and AOT releasing the State from liability for any and all claims associated in any way with Plaintiff's reclassification and transfer stemming from hostile work environment allegations against him; (2) Plaintiff's retaliation claim was not supported by any causal connection linking his employment reclassification and transfer with his having filed a workers' compensation claim; (3) evidence of a video surveillance of Plaintiff connected with a second workers' compensation claim was insufficient as a matter of law to support his retaliation claim and the resulting damages award; and (4) even if the record supported his retaliation claim, the State's liability is limited to $250,000, as set forth in Vermont's Tort Claims Act during the relevant time period. Plaintiff cross-appealed, challenging the trial court's denial of his request for post-judgment interest and attorney's fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment against the State and remanded the matter for the trial court to rule on the potentially determinative issue of the scope of the September 2003 release.

Plaintiffs Vermont Human Rights Commission (HRC) and Ursula Stanley, an employee of the State Agency of Transportation, appealed the Washington Civil Division's decision to grant the State's motion to dismiss her complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Ms. Stanley complained that, under the Vermont Parental and Family Leave Act (VPFLA), 21 V.S.A. 472(c), which requires continuation of certain "employment benefits" during family leave, she was entitled to accrue, but was denied, paid vacation and sick time during the course of an unpaid parental leave. The trial court held that under section 472(c) an employee does not continue earning paid leave during unpaid parental leave. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss, finding that sections 472(a) and (b) of the VPFLA point to why the accrual of paid time-off and sick time are not benefits that employers must provide during unpaid leave. Section 472(a) states that an employee is "entitled to take unpaid leave." However, the statute permits employees to use already "accrued paid leave," such as vacation or sick leave, during parental leave. As the trial court noted, if an employee could demand accrual of paid leave from an employer under the VPFLA while on family leave, it must follow that at least a portion of the parental leave would be rendered paid leave, "a result not just inconsistent with, but contrary to, the employer's VPFLA obligation to provide unpaid parental leave only."