Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

During its investigation of Ameriquest Mortgage Company's lending practices, the Washington State Office of the Attorney General (AGO) obtained a number of e-mail messages from Ameriquest that Ameriquest employees had created while processing consumer loans. The AGO wanted to disclose redacted versions of a subset of these e-mails to Melissa A. Huelsman, an attorney who has requested the records in accordance with the Public Records Act (PRA). Ameriquest claimed that the Supreme Court decided in the first appeal of this case that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA), 15 U.S.C. secs. 6801-6809, and its accompanying regulations, prohibited the disclosure of any e-mails containing nonpublic personal information, even after redaction. Ameriquest also claimed that the e-mails were shielded by the PRA's investigative records exemption, and the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), which shields materials produced in response to a civil investigative demand (CID). Additionally, Ameriquest claimed it should be afforded the opportunity to conduct discovery into why the AGO is not invoking the investigative records exemption. The trial court held that the GLBA did not prevent disclosure, that the PRA exemption and CPA shield were inapplicable, and that Ameriquest did not get discovery. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court in part, holding that the GLBA prevented the AGO from newly redacting and disclosing those e-mails that contained nonpublic personal information, even when the redaction process removed all of the nonpublic personal information. The Court affirmed the trial court's holding that the PRA investigative records exemption and the CPA's shield did not apply and that Ameriquest did not get discovery. View "Ameriquest Mortg. Co. v. Office of Att'y Gen." on Justia Law

Less than one year after Mayor Cy Sun took office, Donald Thomson started a recall petition alleging numerous acts of misfeasance and malfeasance, and violation of the oath of office. The superior court found two charges adequate for submission to voters, namely, that Sun attempted to use the city police department as his own personal police force and that Sun's actions jeopardized the city's liability insurance coverage. Sun appealed the superior court order finding these charges sufficient. Also at issue was Thomson's cross appeal asking the court to reinstate several charges that the superior court found insufficient. Finding no error or abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all respects. View "In re Recall of Sun" on Justia Law

While employed as a physician at Quincy Valley Medical Center (QVMC), Gaston Cornu-Labat was the subject of several complaints that raised doubts as to his competency to practice medicine. QVMC conducted two investigations that ended after the charges against Dr. Cornu-Labat were not substantiated. Nevertheless, QVMC requested that Dr. Comu-Labat be psychologically evaluated and ended the doctor's employment when he failed to consult the recommended provider. Dr. Cornu-Labat filed a Public Records Act (PRA) request asking for records related to the hospital's investigations. QVMC claimed the documents were exempt from disclosure. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Cornu-Labat, holding none of the PRA exemptions invoked by QVMC applied. The court concluded that the records of a peer review committee that contained nonphysicians could not qualify for the exemption. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that was error. The Court remanded because questions of material fact remained as to whether the records at issue were prepared for a regularly constituted peer review body. Further, questions remained as to whether any records were generated during a confidential meeting of agents of the QVMC board concerning Dr. Cornu-Labat's clinical or staff privileges. View "Cornu-Labat v. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 of Grant County" on Justia Law

he issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned a recall petition against Mayor Terecia Bolt and Councilman Dennis Jenson of the town of Marcus. The petition included ten charges against the mayor, and six against the councilman. THe superior court concluded that only one charge against the mayor and one against the councilman was legally sufficient to support a recall election. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that none of the charges were factually or legally sufficient, and accordingly reversed the superior court's decision on the one remaining charge. View "In re Recall of Bolt" on Justia Law

In 2007, Respondents John Karpinski, Clark County Natural Resources Council and Futurewise (challengers) filed a petition with the Growth Management Hearings Board alleging Clark County was not in compliance with the Growth Management Act (GMA). The Challengers specifically argued that under the Act's requirements, the various lands affected by a 2007 local zoning ordinance designated as agricultural land of long-term commercial significance (ALLTCS) could not be designated as an urban growth area (UGA) by the ordinance. The cities of Camas and Ridgefield began proceedings to annex certain parcels of the disputed lands designated UGA by the 2007 ordinance. The Challengers did not contest the annexations, nor did any party bring the annexation proceedings to the attention of the Board. The Board ultimately found that Clark County was not in compliance with the GMA, specifically finding that certain land designations from the 2007 ordinance were clearly erroneous, including designation of the annexed lands as UGA. Multiple parties were permitted to intervene, and the Board's decision was appealed. The superior court entered an order that resolved various claims on appeal, including claims related to the annexed lands. The court reversed the Board's finding that Clark County's designation of a portion of the annexed lands as UGA was erroneous. The Challengers thereafter appealed the superior court's order. The ultimate issue before the Supreme Court in this case was one of appellate procedure: whether the court of appeals erred by reviewing separate and district claims that had been resolved but were not actually raised on appeal. THe parties did not challenge the disposition of those claims, thus those claims were finally adjudicated. However, the appellate court addressed the abandoned claims sua sponte and reversed the lower court's unchallenged rulings. The Supreme Court vacated the appellate court's opinion reversing the superior court's unchallenged rulings. View "Clark County v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Review Bd." on Justia Law

Petitioner Daniel Flaherty attempted to file a motion to vacate his 2005 conviction for conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance with the Spokane Superior Court. In 2009, Petitioner was considered a "career offender" and subject to an increased sentence for a federal conviction. Petitioner tried to file his motion on the grounds that his attorney failed to advise him that pleading guilty would contribute to the "career offender" determination. The court refused the file the motion as untimely. Petitioner appealed, and the appellate court dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court reversed: "it is plainly not part of the clerk's ministerial function to determine whether a collateral challenge is timely." View "Washington v. Flaherty" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the adjudication of water rights in the Yakima River Basin. The parties brought various challenges to the conditional final order of the trial court determining their water rights. The Court of appeals transferred the case to the Supreme Court for direct appeal. Upon review, the Court reversed the trial court's decision concerning the quantification of irrigable land on the Yakama reservation, and reversed the trial court's determinations regarding the Nation's right to store water. The Court affirmed the trial court's conclusions regarding the rights of nontribal claimants to excess water, but reversed the application of the "future development excuse" under RCW 90.14.140(2)(c) for nonuse of a water right. Finally, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of several individual water rights claims. View "In re Rights to Waters of Yakima River Drainage Basin (Acquavella)" on Justia Law

Appellant Catherine Lakey and twelve other homeowners owned property that bordered a parcel owned by Puget Sound Energy, Inc. (PSE) on which there was an electrical substation. The homeowners sued PSE and the City of Kirkland after PSE constructed a new substation on PSE property. The homeowners sought review of the trial court's decision to exclude testimony of their expert under the "Frye" rule, and the court's ultimate decision to grant summary judgment on behalf of PSE. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court improperly excluded the expert's testimony under the "Frye" rule but properly excluded it under the Rules of Evidence ER702. Furthermore, the Court reversed the trial court's decision with respect to their Land Use Petition Act (LUPA) claims, finding that LUPA did not apply to the homeowners' inverse condemnation claim. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was a challenge to two provisions of the voter-enacted RCW 43.135.034 (2011) (Initiative 1053). The first provision required that any bill containing tax increases be passed by a two-thirds majority vote of the legislature, and the second provision required that any tax bill increasing state spending above a prescribed limit be approved by the voters. The Court addressed only whether the challenges to the provisions were justiciable and whether they violated the Washington Constitution. A superior court found both provisions justiciable but that the supermajority requirement and referendum requirement both violated the Constitution. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court affirmed the superior court's holding that one provisions were justiciable, and that justiciable provision, the supermajority requirement, violated Article II, section 22 of the state Constitution. However, the Court reversed the superior court's decision that the referendum provision was justiciable. Accordingly, the Court made no determination as to its constitutionality. View "League of Educ. Voters v. Washington" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned an arbitration award arising out of a collective bargaining agreement. The arbitration award in this case reinstated Port of Seattle (Port) employee Mark Cann with a 20-day unpaid suspension after he was terminated for hanging a noose in the workplace for nonracial reasons. The reviewing trial court found this punishment so lenient that it violated the public policy against racial harassment in the workplace and imposed a six-month unpaid suspension instead. The arbitrator found that Cann intended the noose as a joke toward an older white co-worker. The arbitrator determined that Cann's impression of a noose was "not racial" and that in this situation, Cann was "more clueless than racist." The arbitrator also noted that the white employee targeted by the "joke" was not offended, and an African-American employee who observed the noose was angry but did not feel harassed. In light of these facts, the arbitrator determined that a 20-day unpaid suspension was the appropriate discipline. Given that Cann's 20-working-day unpaid suspension amounts to a month without pay, and given that so many working families live month to month, the Supreme Court found that to be a substantial penalty. "As we are bound by the arbitrator's findings of fact, we cannot find that a 20-day suspension was insufficient to deter such conduct in the future. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's decision to vacate the arbitrator's award. We also take this opportunity to clarify that a trial court that properly vacates an arbitration award does not have authority to impose its own remedy. Instead, trial courts facing such a situation should remand for further proceedings." View "Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 286 v. Port of Seattle" on Justia Law