Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on what the State must prove when seeking to terminate parental rights. The Court of Appeals interpreted language from the Court's decision in "In re Dependency of J.C.," (924 P.2d 21 (1996)), to mean that when the State presents evidence sufficient to prove the element codified in RCW 13.34.180(1)(e), it necessarily proved the element codified in RCW 13.34.180(1)(f). Consequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of the parental rights of K.D.S.'s father, Derek Gladin, because the State proved RCW 13.34.180(1)(e). Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with this interpretation and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision to affirm on these grounds. However, because the trial court properly found that the State had proved each element, the Court affirmed the decision to terminate Gladin's parental rights. View "In re Dependency of K.D.S." on Justia Law

Brandon Afoa was paralyzed in an accident while he was working at Sea-Tac Airport and sought to recover from the Port of Seattle on three theories the Supreme Court applied in other multiemployer workplace cases: as a business invitee; for breach of safety regulations under the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act of 1973 (WISHA); and the duty of a general contractor to maintain a safe common area for any employee of subcontractors. The Court concluded that the same principles that apply to other multiemployer workplaces apply to Sea-Tac and that a jury could find the Port (which owns and operates the airport) liable under any of these three theories. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court’s summary judgment dismissing Afoa's claims, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Afoa v. Port of Seattle" on Justia Law

The City of Seattle and Officers Kevin McDaniel and Pohna Lim challenged an appellate court's decision affirming the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment. Respondent Elsa Robb, on behalf of her deceased husband Michael Robb, alleged that law enforcement acted negligently by failing to pick up and remove shotgun shells lying near Samson Berhe after stopping him on suspicion of burglary. After the stop, Berhe returned to retrieve the cartridges, and shortly thereafter used one of them to kill Michael Robb. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 302B may create an independent duty to protect against the criminal acts of a third party where the actor’s own affirmative act creates or exposes another to the recognizable high degree of risk of harm. However, the Court also held that in this case, the police officer’s failure to pick up shotgun shells lying near defendants in a "Terry" stop was not an affirmative act as contemplated by the Restatement. Therefore the Court reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Robb v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

This action stemmed from a contract for construction of a baseball stadium and home field for the Seattle Mariners baseball team. In its first trip to the Supreme Court, "Washington State Major League Baseball Stadium Public Facilities District v. Huber, Hunt & Nichols-Kiewit Construction Company," (202 P.3d 924 (2009) (PFD I)), the Court held that the statute of limitations did not bar the owner’s suit against the general contractor because the action was brought for the benefit of the State, and therefore the exemption from the statute of limitations set out in RCW 4.16.160 applied. This case raised questions about whether the construction statute of repose barred suit against the general contractor and, if not, whether the general contractor may pursue third party claims against two of its subcontractors. The trial court granted summary judgment of dismissal in favor of the general contractor and the subcontractors on statute of repose grounds. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court: "the statute of repose does not bar suit against the general contractor. In accord with several provisions in the subcontracts, the subcontractors are subject to liability to the same extent that the general contractor may be liable for any defective materials or work under the subcontracts. Thus, the trial court erred in holding that the statute of repose bars Hunt Kiewit’s third party claims against the subcontractors." View "Wash. State Major League Baseball Stadium v. Huber, Hunt & Nichols-Kiewit Constr. Co." on Justia Law

The issue in this case concerned a challenge to a trial court's order denying a motion to compel arbitration of an insurance coverage dispute. James River Insurance Company issued two "surplus line" insurance policies under which the Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) claimed coverage. James River sought to compel arbitration of the coverage dispute pursuant to the insurance policies' arbitration clauses. WSDOT opposed arbitration and filed a motion for declaratory judgment, arguing that the arbitration clauses are unenforceable under RCW 48.18.200(1)(b), which prohibits insurance contracts from "depriving the courts of this state of the jurisdiction of action against the insurer," and under RCW 48.15.150(1), which requires that "an unauthorized insurer must be sued in the superior court of the county in which the cause of action arose." In addition, WSDOT argued that the McCarran-Ferguson Act (15 U.S.C. 1012), shields the statutes from preemption by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. secs. 1-14). The trial court agreed with WSDOT and denied James River's motion to compel arbitration. James River appealed and the Supreme Court granted direct review. The Court affirmed: "RCW 48.18.200(1)(b) is not merely a forum selection provision as James River maintain[ed], but rather a provision prohibiting binding arbitration agreements in insurance contracts. As such, we hold that this provision regulates the 'business of insurance' because it is aimed at protecting the performance of an insurance contract by ensuring the right of the policyholder to bring an action in state court to enforce the contract." The Court concluded that RCW 48.18.200(1)(b) was shielded from preemption by the FAA under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. View "Dep't of Transp. v. James River Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The King County Superior Court relied on "Waples v. Yi," (234 P.3d 187 (2010)) in invalidating RCW 7.70.100(1) as applied to lawsuits against the State, including governmental agencies such as Harborview Medical Center. This case stemmed from a paragliding accident Petitioner Glen McDevitt suffered, for which he underwent surgery at Harborview. Petitioner sued Harborview for malpractice in relation to his treatment. Harborview moved for summary judgment based on the fact that Petitioner failed to comply with the 90 day presuit notice requirement of RCW 7.70.100(1). Harborview requested that Petitioner's lawsuit be dismissed with prejudice. In response, Petitioner argued that our decision in "Waples" invalidated the presuit notice requirement against both private and public defendants. Harborview then argued that the Supreme Court did not have occasion to consider the constitutional validity of the presuit notice requirement as applied to lawsuits against the State. The King County Superior Court denied Harborview’s motion for summary judgment. Harborview then appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court on the grounds that the legislature could establish conditions precedent, including presuit notice requirements, to inform the State of future cost and delay associated with court resolution of an issue. "[W]e hold that the presuit notice requirement of RCW 7.70.100(1) as applied to the State is a constitutionally valid statutory precondition for suit against the State because it was adopted by the legislature as provided in article II, section 26 of the Washington Constitution. View "McDevitt v. Harborview Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

This case concerned Washington Constitution article II, section 40’s refund provision. Specifically at issue is the legislature’s statutory refund program, which places one percent of fuel tax revenues into a special fund to benefit off-road vehicle (ORV), nonmotorized, and nonhighway road recreational users for fuel consumed on nonhighway roads. In 2009, the legislature appropriated a portion of this special fund for the Parks and Recreation Commission’s (Parks) general budget. The Washington Off Highway Vehicle Alliance (WOHVA), Northwest Motorcycle Association (NMA), and four individuals representing ORV users, contended that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the appropriation was a refund within the meaning of article II, section 40. WOHVA argued that the appropriation was not sufficiently targeted to affected taxpayers to constitute a refund despite legislative findings to the contrary. Finding no error with the appellate court's analysis of the refund provision, the Supreme Court affirmed its judgment. View "Wash. Off Highway Vehicle Alliance v. Washington" on Justia Law

Appellants Vicki Parker, James Johnson, and Marie Clarke appealed a superior court order directly to the Supreme Court. The lower court's order denied them relief in an action challenging the candidacy of Christine Schaller for the office of judge of the Thurston County Superior Court. Appellants argued that Schaller was not statutorily eligible for the office because she did not reside in, and therefore was not a qualified elector of, Thurston County. Upon review, the Court held that Schaller was not required to reside in or be an elector of Thurston County to be eligible for the office. View "Parker v. Wyman" on Justia Law

William Munich was shot and killed by his neighbor, Marvin Ballsmider, approximately 18 minutes after he placed his first phone call to the Skagit Emergency Communications Center. The two had been in a property dispute related to access to a driveway and Ballsmider's property. Norma Smith, a Skagit 911 operator, took the call. Smith assured Munich that law enforcement was on the way. Smith entered the call as a priority two weapons offense rather than a priority one emergency call. Based on the code, the dispatched deputy, Dan Luvera, did not activate his emergency lights and only traveled slightly over the speed limit. About seven minutes later, Munich again called 911. Tammy Canniff took the second call, and Munich told her that he was running away from Ballsmider who was following and shooting. The dispatcher informed Deputy Luvera of these facts and the deputy consequently activated his emergency lights and siren and increased his speed. The second call ended with the sound of Munich being fatally shot on the highway. Deputy Luvera arrived two minutes later and arrested Ballsmider for Munich's murder. Munich was running toward the direction from which Deputy Luvera arrived. Munich's estate sued Skagit County, the Skagit County Sheriff's Office, and Skagit Emergency Communications Center (County) for wrongful death, alleging the County negligently responded to the incident. The County moved for summary judgment dismissal of the Estate’s claims asserting it was not liable for Munich's death under the public duty doctrine, specifically that the "special relationship" exception because the County provided no inaccurate or false information that Munich had detrimentally relied on. The trial court denied summary judgment, ruling the special relationship exception did not require false or inaccurate assurances. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that where the express assurance promises action there is no falsity requirement because the assurances may be superficially correct but negligently fulfilled. The accuracy, or lack thereof, of an assurance has no bearing on the issue of whether an actionable duty was established. View "Munich v. Skagit Emergency Commc'n Ctr." on Justia Law

The Washington constitution limits municipal indebtedness to protect taxpayers from legislative and voter improvidence. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether the city of Wenatchee (City) would exceed its debt limit by entering into a "contingent loan agreement" (CLA) with appellant Greater Wenatchee Regional Events Center Public Facilities District (District) to help the District finance a regional events center. The District argued that the CLA was not subject to the City's debt limit because it created a "contingent" liability, triggered only if the District is unable to make payments on the District's bonds. Upon review, the Supreme Court rejected this argument because the City was unconditionally obligated to service the District's debt if the District could not and because the risk of loss fell upon the City and its taxpayers: "[o]ur decision accordingly places the approval of the CLA in the hands of the voters." View "In re Bond Issuance of Greater Wenatchee Reg'l Events Ctr." on Justia Law