Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This case required the Supreme Court to examine how Washington's juvenile justice laws interact with the Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA), also known as the "three strikes law." When Jorge Saenz was 15 years old, he agreed to waive juvenile court jurisdiction and transfer his case to adult court, where he pled guilty to two counts of felony assault in exchange for a moderately lower sentencing recommendation. As a result, seven years later he faced life in prison without the possibility of parole under the POAA. The issue for the Supreme Court's review concerned whether his waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction was valid and whether his case was properly transferred to adult court. The Court concluded that Saenz's waiver was invalid because there was virtually nothing in the record demonstrating that it was intelligently made or that Saenz was fully informed when he made it. Next, the Court held that Saenz's case was not properly transferred to adult court because the commissioner transferring the case failed to enter findings that transfer was in the best interest of the juvenile or the public as required by statute. On these facts, the Supreme Court held that Saenz's conviction could not be used as a "strike" to sentence him to spend the rest of his life in prison with no possibility of release. Instead, the Court affirmed the 561-month sentence imposed by the trial court. View "Washington v. Saenz" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether RCW 4.16.160 bars a quiet title action where the claimant alleges he adversely possessed property belonging to a private individual before a municipality acquired record title to the land. James Gorman IV, as general partner of Hollywood Vineyards Limited Partnership, claimed title to certain real property through adverse possession. The property at issue was dedicated to the city of Woodinville by a private owner in December 2005 for a roadway improvement project. Gorman owned adjacent property. In 2007, Gorman filed an action to quiet title claiming he acquired the adjacent property through a 10-year period of adverse possession that transpired while the land was still in private hands. The City moved to dismiss arguing Gorman’s claim was prohibited by RCW 4.16.160. The trial court granted the City’s motion and dismissed Gorman’s claim. The Court of Appeals reversed. It held Gorman’s claim was not barred because it is alleged the statute of limitations ran while the subject land was privately owned. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that RCW 4.16.160 does not bar such quiet title actions, and affirmed the appellate court's decision. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the validity of Gorman's claim of title. View "Gorman v. City of Woodinville" on Justia Law

David Ward and Michael Whittaker were commissioners for the Jefferson County Fire Protection No. 2 (the District). Two citizens of the District, Harry Goodrich and Linda Saunders (the petitioners), initiated a recall proceeding against Ward and Whittaker, alleging various counts of misfeasance. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the recall petition should advance to the signature-gathering phase of the recall process. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and held that one of the four charges against Ward and Whittaker may advance to the next phase of the recall process.

This case concerned the classification of workers as employees or independent contractors for purposes of the Washington Minimum Wage Act (MWA). A class of 320 former and current FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. (FedEx) delivery drivers (hereinafter Anfinson) filed suit seeking overtime wages under the MWA and reimbursement for uniform expenses under the industrial welfare act (IWA). The dispute with respect to both claims was whether the drivers were employees or independent contractors. The parties disagreed on the correct test to distinguish these categories under the MWA; FedEx argued that the common law right-to-control standard governs while Anfinson contended that the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) economic-dependence test controls. The trial court gave the jury a hybrid instruction, focusing the inquiry on FedEx's right to control in light of the economic-dependence factors. The jury determined that the drivers were independent contractors. Anfinson appealed, contending, among other things, that the jury instructions misinformed the jury about the standards for determining worker status and about the requirement that class status and evidence be "common to the class members." The Court of Appeals held that the jury instruction defining the standard for determining worker status was erroneous and prejudicial and reversed. The Court of Appeals further held that the jury instruction on the burden of proof was erroneous because it misled the jury and was prejudicial. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in both respects.

Christa Albice and Karen Tecca (hereinafter Tecca) inherited the property at issue in this case. In 2003, Tecca borrowed $115,500 against the property. The loan was serviced by Option One Mortgage Corporation (Option One), and Premier Mortgage Services of Washington (Premier) acted as the trustee. In 2006, Tecca defaulted on the loan and received a notice of trustee's sale. In July 2006, Tecca negotiated and entered into a forbearance agreement to cure the default. The trustee's sale originally set for September 8, 2006 was continued six times. Each continuance was tied to the payments Tecca made under the Forbearance Agreement. The foreclosure sale finally took place on February 16, 2007. Through an agent, Petitioner Ron Dickinson, successfully bid on the property. Tecca first learned the property was sold when Dickinson told Tecca they no longer owned it and needed to leave. Dickinson then filed an unlawful detainer action and sought to quiet title. Tecca countersued, seeking to quiet title in an action to set aside the nonjudicial sale. Tecca also brought suit against Option One and Premier, but the trial court dismissed the action based on an arbitration clause. Dickinson moved for summary judgment to establish that he was a BFP and entitled to quiet title. Tecca also moved for summary judgment, arguing the foreclosure sale should have been set aside because the sale occurred after the statutory deadline and Premier was not a qualified trustee with authority to conduct the sale. The trial court granted Dickinson's motion, ruling that Dickinson was a BFP and despite procedural noncompliance by the trustee. Following trial, the court concluded Premier was authorized to act as the trustee, quieted title in Dickinson, and awarded Dickinson damages. Tecca appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed, setting the sale aside. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals: the nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings were "marred" by repeated statutory noncompliance. The financial institution acting as the lender also appeared to be acting as the trustee under a different name; the lender repeatedly accepted late payments and, at its sole discretion, rejected only the final late payment that would have cured the default; and the trustee conducted a sale without statutory authority. The Court concluded the sale was invalid.

The Supreme Court received a certified question from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The issue centered on whether under RCW 82.04.500 a seller may upon disclosure, recoup its business and occupation (B&O) tax by collecting a surcharge to recover gross receipts taxes in addition to its monthly service fee. The matter stems from Plaintiff-Appellant James Bowden's purchase of three cell phones and a monthly service plan for each phone at a kiosk. The phone company's monthly service fee did not include Washington's B&O tax. However, the tax was listed as a "State B and O Surcharge" on Plaintiff's monthly bills, for which he was charged various amounts for each of the phones. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the phone company's monthly service fee, the sales price of its service contract, did not include the B&O surcharge. Rather, on the Agreement, the surcharge was listed separately under the "Regulatory Recovery Fee" provision described as a gross receipts surcharge. Further, the company's billing statements listed the surcharge separately like it was a sales tax, and both the sales tax and B&O fee were added on to the service fee. The Court therefore answered "no": even if disclosed under RCW 82.04-500, a seller is prohibited from recouping its B&O taxes by collecting a surcharge in addition to its monthly service fee.

An Auburn city police officer arrested Defendant Dustin Gauntt for possessing marijuana and using drug paraphernalia. An Auburn city prosecutor brought charges against him in Auburn Municipal Court under state law. On appeal of his conviction, Defendant contended that the city did not have the authority to prosecute him for violating statutes the city had not adopted. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed, affirming the Court of Appeals and the superior court, and remanded the case back to the Auburn Municipal Court for dismissal.

Respondent Michael Gendler made a public records request for location-specific accident reports from the Washington State Patrol (WSP). The WSP refused to provide the records unless Gendler certified that he would not use the records in any litigation against the State, claiming a federal statute (23 U.S.C. sec. 409) protected the records sought. WSP claimed the records were shielded because they were located in an electronic database that the Department of Transportation (DOT) utilized for purposes related to the federal hazard elimination program. Respondent then brought a suit under the PRA and argued section 409 did not apply to the WSP because it did not compile or collect the information for the hazard elimination program's purposes. Rather, the information was collected pursuant to WSP’s statutory duty under RCW 46.52.060. The trial court agreed and on summary judgment ordered WSP to produce the requested accident reports. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed because section 409 does not extend to police accident reports generated and received by WSP pursuant to its own statutory duty.

The issue on appeal in this case involved a preelection challenge by Mukilteo Citizens for Simple Government to an initiative measure (Proposition 1) which repealed an ordinance governing the use of automated traffic safety cameras in the city of Mukilteo. The trial court declined to grant an injunction, and Proposition 1 was placed on the November 2, 2010 Snohomish County general election ballot. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that because the legislature expressly granted authority to the governing body of the city of Mukilteo to enact ordinances on the use of automated traffic safety cameras, the subject matter of Proposition 1 was not within the initiative power. The Court reversed the trial court's order that denied the Citizens declaratory relief.

The superior court granted Snohomish County's motion to dismiss Respondent-Cross Petitioner Scott Stafne's land use petition and complaint. The issue on appeal involved whether a landowner seeking review of a county's decision not to adopt a proposed comprehensive plan amendment must appeal to the growth management hearings board (growth board) before seeking a remedy in superior court. This case also centered on whether a party is entitled to a constitutional writ of certiorari or declaratory relief under the circumstances of this case. The Court of Appeals held that based on its conclusion that appeal to the growth board would be futile, the complaint was properly filed in superior court under the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA), chapter 36.70C of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW) but affirmed the dismissal on other grounds. Both parties were granted review. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, but held that decisions related to amendment of comprehensive plans must be appealed to the growth board under the procedures provided for in the Growth Management Act (GMA), chapter 36.70A RCW, and failure to do so precludes superior court review. The Court also held that a constitutional writ and declaratory relief are unavailable under the circumstances of this case.