Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A public school teacher or other certificated employee discharged by a school district may obtain review by a hearing officer and appeal an adverse decision of the hearing officer to superior court. But the legislature did not give school districts the right to appeal an adverse hearing officer decision. When a hearing officer decided in favor of Petitioner David Vinson and against Respondent Federal Way School District, the school district sought review of the decision by statutory writ of certiorari. The superior court denied the writ, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding sufficient cause to terminate Vinson. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the statutory writ was not available to the school district. In contrast, the constitutional writ was always available to a party seeking relief from arbitrary, capricious, or illegal acts. However, the Court found that the hearing officer acted within the limits of his statutory authority, and his final decision was not arbitrary or capricious. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the attorney fees awarded by the superior court.

RCW 60.04.091(2) requires mechanics' liens to be "acknowledged pursuant to chapter 64.08 RCW." In other words, an authorized person must certify in writing that the signor executed the lien freely and voluntarily. RCW 60.04.091(2) also includes a sample claim of lien that the statute states "shall be sufficient" but that does not include language satisfying the acknowledgment requirement. Contractors Athletic Fields Inc. and Hos Bros.Construction Inc. each filed claims of lien that used the sample form and did not contain certificates of acknowledgment. In each case, the lower court concluded the lien was invalid. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with the trial courts and held that a claim of lien in the sample form is valid despite the absence of a proper acknowledgment.

The attorney general of Washington made the State a plaintiff in a multistate lawsuit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the health care reform legislation recently passed by Congress. The city of Seattle sought a writ of mandamus directing the attorney general to withdraw the State of Washington from the litigation. Upon review of the applicable statutory authority, the Supreme Court held that a writ of mandamus was not available because the attorney general had no clear duty to withdraw the State of Washington from the federal litigation: "[s]tatutory authority vests the attorney general with the discretionary authority to participate in the litigation at issue. [The Court] also determine[d], however, that this result is not constitutionally compelled; the Washington Constitution does not vest the attorney general with any common law authority. It is for the people of the state of Washington, through their elected representatives or through the initiative process, to define the role of the attorney general."

On certification from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, the Supreme Court considered whether the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act of 1973 (WISHA), and Washingtonâs laws prohibiting driving while under the influence (DUI) are inadequate to promote the public policies underlying them. Plaintiff Matthew Cudney, whose employment was terminated by ALSCO Inc., asserted a claim in federal court for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Plaintiff alleged that he was terminated in retaliation for reporting that a managerial employee drove a company vehicle during business hours while that employee was intoxicated. The issues presented for certification pertained to (1) whether WISHA adequately promotes the public policy of insuring workplace safety and protecting workers who report safety violations so as to preclude a separate claim by a terminated employee for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy; and (2) whether the DUI laws adequately promote the public policy of protecting the public from drunken drivers so as to preclude a separate claim by a terminated employee for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. In response, the Court held that both WISHA and the stateâs DUI laws adequately promote the stated public policies.

Commissioner of Public Lands Peter Goldmark sought a writ of mandamus to compel Attorney General Robert McKenna to pursue an appeal of a trial court decision in a condemnation action. Although Mr. McKenna provided representation at the trial court, he refused to pursue the appeal based on his evaluation of the merits of the case. The commissioner wished to appeal, which he discussed with his general counsel, an assistant attorney general. Then the commissioner and the attorney general exchanged correspondence and met on at least one occasion, but the attorney general refused to file the appeal for the commissioner. The attorney general also refused to appoint a special assistant attorney general (SAAG) to pursue the appeal for the commissioner. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the issue in this case was one of first impression: the Court had never been "squarely presented" with an instance of the attorney general refusing to represent a state officer on an appeal. "Under the statutes, the responsibility is clear." Because the Court found no discretion within the attorney generalâs statutory duty, the Court issued the writ and directed the attorney general to provide the commissioner with legal representation.

Appellants Kim Koenig, Lawrence Koss and Althea Paulson sought review of two separate superior court orders that enjoined disclosure of investigative records compiled by the Cities of Puyallup and Mercer Island. The records contained results of internal police department investigations whereby Appellants complained of gross officer misconduct. Appellants argued the records were wrongfully withheld. The appellate court affirmed withholding the records, interpreting case law that held police investigative records relating to an arrest was exempt from retention and copying under state law. The Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's interpretation: "the statute does not exempt information relating to the conduct of the police during the investigation." The Court reversed the trial courts with direction that the trial courts redact the offending officers' identities, but that the description of the police department's investigation should have been produced.

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether RCW 82.02.020, which generally prohibits local governmental bodies from imposing taxes or fees on development, applied to shoreline master programs (SMP) created pursuant to the Shoreline Management Act of 1981. Members of the Citizens for Rational Shoreline Planning (CRSP) owned land regulated under Whatcom County's SMP. The group filed a complaint alleging, in part, that the regulations contained in the SMP constituted a direct or indirect tax, fee or charge on development in violation of RCW 8202.020. The superior court dismissed the claim for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. The appellate court affirmed. Upon review of the implicated legal authorities, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court: "[w]hile local jurisdictions play a role in tailoring SMPs to local conditions, the Shoreline Management Act dictates that the Department of Ecology retains control over the final contents and approval of SMPs. Therefore, SMP regulations are the product of state action and are not subject to RCW 82.02.020."

King County sought ways to provide legal defense services to indigent criminal defendants. The County settled on a system of using nonprofit corporations to provide services funded through and monitored by the County's Office of the Public Defender (OPD). Over time, the County took steps to improve and make these nonprofit organizations more accountable to the County. In so doing, it asserted more control over the groups that provided defender services. Respondents are employees of the defender organizations who sued the County for state employee benefits. They argued the County's funding and control over their "independent" organizations essentially made them state employees for the purposes of participating in the Public Employees Retirement System (PERS). Applying the pertinent statues and common law principles, the Supreme Court agreed that employees of the defender organizations are "employees" under state law, and, as such, are entitled to be enrolled in the PERS.

Petitioners Jack and Delaphine Feil appealed the issuance of development permits for the construction of a pedestrian and bike trail by the Washington State Parks and Recreation Commission. "Rocky Reach Trail" was scheduled for development entirely on public property. The Feils are orchardists and members of the Right to Farm Association of Baker Flats. Their property abuts the public property on which the proposed trail would be sited. They contended a developed trail would force the removal of mature fruit trees within the right-of-way, and that the trail violated multiple zoning ordinances that governed the area at issue. The Feils brought several unsuccessful appeals through the Commission and state development-management boards before taking their appeal to the superior court. The superior court dismissed their claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the site's comprehensive plan supported the proposed Rocky Reach Trail and affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss the orchardists' claims.

Respondents Harold and Jane Elyea, owners of Frog Mountain Pet Care (Frog Mountain) applied to Jefferson County (County) for a conditional use permit and variance to expand their dog and cat boarding facility. Petitioner Martin Mellish, owner of an adjoining property, opposed the application, arguing that the proposed expansion would increase noise from the facility. A County hearing examiner granted Frog Mountain's application. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but did not notify Frog Mountain that he had filed the motion. The hearing examiner denied Petitioner's motion and mailed notice of that denial to all interested parties including Frog Mountain. Petitioner then filed a land use petition at superior court. This filing occurred twenty days after the County mailed notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration, and fifty days after entry of the hearing examiner's decision that granted Frog Mountain's application. Frog Mountain moved to dismiss the land use petition as untimely, asserting that the 21-day time limit on filing the petition ran from the date of the hearing examiner's original decision. Petitioner and the County, on opposite sides of the underlying lawsuit, opposed Frog Mountain's motion, contending that the time limit for filing the lawsuit ran from the date of Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. The superior court agreed with Petitioner and the County, and denied Frog Mountain's motion to dismiss. The court then reached the merits of Petitioner's land use petition and reversed the County's decision to grant the permit. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the hearing examiner's original decision was the "final determination" that triggered the time limit for filing the land use petition. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the motion for reconsideration Petitioner filed with the hearing examiner tolled the finality of the hearing examiner's initial decision.