Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

EQT Production Company was the lessee of an oil and gas lease. Matthew Hamblet was the surface owner of a parcel of property included within EQT's leasehold. EQT filed a permit application with the Office of Oil and Gas of the West Virginia EPA (DEP) for a shallow well targeting a Marcellus formation. The DEP issued the permit requested by EQT. Subsequently, Hamblet filed a petition for appeal of the issuance of the well permit in the circuit court. The DEP and EQT filed motions to dismiss the petition contending that Hamblet did not have the right to appeal the issuance of the permit. The circuit court denied the motions, concluding that Hamblet had the right to appeal the permit, but submitted its ruling to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held (1) upon consideration of the court of appeals' opinion in State ex rel. Lovejoy v. Callaghan and the relevant statutes, a surface owner is not permitted to seek judicial review of the DEP's issuance of a well work permit for a horizontal Marcellus well; and (2) given this fact, the Court had no basis to find Hamblet had a right to appeal the well work permitted issued by the DEP. View "Martin v. Hamblet" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed an order of the West Virginia Workers' Compensation Board of Review through which Petitioner's permanent total disability (PTD) award previously granted was suspended and vacated. Petitioner challenged the Board's determination, upon a reopening of his PTD claim, that he was capable of gainful employment. Petitioner argued that his former employer, Lowe's, violated the statute that authorized the claim reopening because Lowe's was involved in the reevaluation process, and therefore, the order vacating his PTD award was invalid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that notwithstanding statutory language that suggests otherwise, an order issued by the Board that modifies or vacates a previous award of PTD is not subject to challenge based on the involvement of a self-insured former employer in the reevaluation process, given that the participation of the self-insured former employer is clearly anticipated and authorized by the provisions of W. Va. Cod 23-4-16(d). View "Justice v. W. Va. Office Ins. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Petitioners, the Public Service Commission of West Virginia and the Wetzel County Solid Waste Authority, sought to compel Respondents, Lackawanna Transport Company and Solid Waste Services, Inc., to comply with an order entered by the Public Service Commission requiring them to produce certain information and financial records pertinent to an ongoing investigation concerning the Wetzel County Landfill. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ of mandamus, holding (1) a writ of mandamus is appropriate in this case, as Respondents were legally required to produce the requested information; and (2) while arguably there was another remedy available in this instance through the circuit court, that remedy was not adequate given the unique circumstances given here. View "State ex rel. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Lackawann Transp. Co." on Justia Law

In 2010, the Surface Mine Board ordered the State Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) to pay the Hominy Creek Preservation Association's attorney fees for work performed in two administrative appeals. Eighty-two days after the Board granted the fee award to the Association, the DEP appealed the Board's order to the circuit court. The circuit court reversed, finding that the Association was not entitled to recovery attorney fees from the DEP. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order reversing the fee award and reinstated the Board's order, holding that the DEP failed to file a timely appeal of the Board's 2010 order. View "Hominy Creek Pres. Ass'n v. W. Va. Dep't of Env't Prot." on Justia Law

Petitioners asked the circuit court to declare that the West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board could not impose disability re-certification requirements of an amended statute and new rule upon them. The circuit court determined that Petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and, therefore, dismissed the case. Petitioners appealed, contending the circuit court erred in not reaching the merits of their petition because the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was inapplicable to the facts of their case. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court properly dismissed Petitioners' statute-based claims; but (2) Petitioners' rule-based and letter-based claims were properly before the circuit court. Remanded. View "Hicks v. Mani" on Justia Law

John Epling was arrested for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The DUI charge against Epling was subsequently dismissed. Following an administrative hearing, the Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles ordered that Epling's privilege to drive a motor vehicle be revoked. The circuit court remanded the case for a new full evidentiary hearing, with directions to perform a proper analysis under Muscatell v. Cline and Choma v. W. Va. Division of Motor Vehicles. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, and in so ruling, expressly overruled syllabus point three of Choma, holding (1) when a criminal action for driving while under the influence results in a dismissal or acquittal, such dismissal or acquittal has no preclusive effect on a subsequent proceeding to revoke the driver's license, and moreover, in the license revocation proceeding, evidence of the dismissal or acquittal is not admissible to establish the truth of any fact; (2) the circuit court did not err in remanding the matter for a proper Muscatell analysis; and (3) the circuit court erred in remanding the case to the Office of Administrative Hearings, as the Commissioner had jurisdiction to conduct the new evidentiary hearing.

Infant was born with severe brain damage. Respondent, Infant's mother, on behalf of Infant, applied for and received Medicaid benefits from the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR). Respondent later filed a medical malpractice lawsuit on behalf of Infant. Subsequently, Respondent petitioned the circuit court for approval of the settlement, requesting that Medicaid not be reimbursed. DHHR intervened. The court granted the motion of Respondent for allocation of the $3,600,000 settlement, holding that, pursuant to Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, a proportional reduction of DHHR's recovery was required based on the ratio of the settlement to the "full value" of the case among the various damages categories. Using this allocation method, the court reduced DHHR's statutory reimbursement from the requested amount of $289,075 to $79,040 and directed that the net settlement proceeds be placed in a special needs trust for the benefit of Infant. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) a $500,000 cap on noneconomic damages was applicable in this case; and (2) under the formula applied in Ahlborn, the DHHR was entitled to approximately $98,080, less its pro rata share of attorney's fees and costs. Remanded.

These two consolidated appeals, brought by the Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles, challenged two separate orders of the circuit court holding that the nolo contendere pleas of Respondents did not constitute convictions, thus entitling Respondents to an administrative hearing prior to having their drivers' licenses revoked. The Commissioner argued that the circuit courts erred in granting extraordinary relief to Respondents and in prohibiting the Commission from automatically revoking Repondents' drivers licenses because the nolo contendere pleas constituted convictions under the applicable law. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court, holding (1) under the applicable law, a plea of no contest does not constitute a conviction, and thus Respondents were not convicted of the charge of DUI; (2) thus, the Commissioner lacked the authority to revoke Respondents' drivers' licenses without affording them the opportunity to be heard at an administrative hearing; and (3) therefore, the circuit courts correctly ordered that the Commissioner afford Respondents a hearing on the merits of their revocations. Remanded.

Petitioner was employed by the West Virginia Division of Culture and History (Division) as an at will employee. Petitioner was later terminated from his employment. Petitioner filed a grievance with the Public Employees Grievance Board. An ALJ denied the Division's motion to dismiss and authorized the filing of an amended grievance. Petitioner subsequently filed an amended grievance, which a succeeding ALJ dismissed. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Petitioner's grievance for failure to state a ground upon which relief may be granted, holding (1) the circuit court did not err by affirming the decision of the Board without a hearing before an ALJ; and (2) the second ALJ had authority to enter a dismissal order after the previous ALJ denied the Division's motion to dismiss.

This appeal was brought by Appellant following two separate orders of the circuit court granting summary judgment to Allied Warehousing Services, Inc., the Appellee, dismissing Appellant's workers' compensation fraud and common law fraud claims and granting summary judgment to Appellee, finding it to be a special employer of Appellant for the purpose of workers' compensation immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court properly granted summary judgment on Appellant's workers' compensation and common law fraud claims because there was no basis to conclude that the alleged fraudulent conduct had any prejudicial effect on the decision of the ALJ regarding the suspension of Appellant's temporary total disability benefits; and (2) the circuit court properly granted summary judgment to Appellee on Appellant's negligence claim on the basis that Appellee was Appellant's special employer, thus entitling Appellee to workers' compensation immunity from such a negligence claim.