Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Lola Watkins appealed a final order entered in the circuit court, which affirmed a decision by the ALJ of the West Virginia Public Employees Grievance Board denying Appellant's grievance of her termination from employment as a teacher. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ's denial of Appellant's grievance was not clearly wrong, as (1) the ALJ properly concluded that the Board proved by a preponderance of the evidence the basis for Appellant's termination; (2) Appellant was afforded adequate notice that the Board intended to present matters relating to her employment history at the grievance hearing; and (3) Appellant failed to make a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge.

Defendant, Tudor's Biscuit World of America, appealed the circuit court's order denying its motion to alter or amend the court's order denying its motion to set aside the default judgment rendered against it in this workplace injury action. Tudor's asserted (1) the circuit court erred in its application of the "reasonable time" requirement set forth in W.V. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to its motion to set aside the default judgment, arguing that such timeliness requirement was inapplicable to void judgments; and (2) the circuit court improperly applied and weighed the factors set forth in Parsons v. Consolidated Gas Supply Corporation in denying its motion for relief from judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court should have properly set aside the default judgment, as (1) Tudor's motion to set aside the default judgment was filed within a reasonable period of time; and (2) the circuit court abused its discretion in its analysis of the Parsons factors to the extent that such analysis resulted in its denial of Plaintiff's motion for relief from default judgment, and therefore, to that extent, erred in denying Tudor's subsequent motion to alter or amend.

Ruling on a joint petition for declaratory order filed by Monongahela Power Company and Potomac Edison Company ("The Utilities"), The Public Service Commission of West Virginia held that the alternative and renewable energy resource credits attributable to energy purchases by the Utilities from Morgantown Energy Associates (MEA) and the City of New Martinsville ("the Generators"), were owned by the Utilities during the terms of electric energy purchase agreements between the entities. On appeal, the Generators contended that the Commission erred in its ruling and that the energy resource credits were owned by them. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not err in finding the credits at issue were owned by the Utilities; and (2) the Commission did not err in holding that it would deem MEA's Morgantown project as a certified facility under the Alternative and Renewable Energy Portfolio Act upon the submission of sufficient evidence by the Utilities.

After being stopped and arrested for DUI at a safety checkpoint established by state police, David Smith's license was administratively revoked. On administrative appeal, the DMV Commissioner found that the initial traffic stop failed to comply with the requirements set forth in State v. Sigler, but that failure affected only the criminal portion of the proceedings and did not impact the authority of the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to administratively revoke Smith's license in a separate civil proceeding. The circuit court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court, holding, inter alia, that the circuit court erroneously applied the exclusionary rule within the civil context. Remanded for entry of an order reinstating Smith's civil administrative license revocation.

Petitioner, J.S., was a thirteen-year-old boy who suffered from cerebral policy. Through his mother, J.S. submitted an authorization request for a power wheelchair with fifty-five accessories to the respondent, the state department of health and human resources (DHHR), which administers the Medicaid program in West Virginia. DHHR denied Petitioner's request on the basis that it exceeded the Medicaid policy of providing only the most economical equipment to meet a recipient's basic health care needs. The DHHR board of review upheld the denial. The circuit court upheld the decision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court applied an erroneous standard of review to the decision of the DHHR board of review. Remanded to the circuit court with direction to make an independent review of both the law and the facts of this case.

Respondent Christopher Toler's driver's license was revoked by the Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles after Respondent's vehicle was stopped at a vehicle equipment checkpoint and Respondent was arrested for driving under the influence. The circuit court reversed, concluding (1) Respondent was driving while under the influence of alcohol; but (2) the vehicle equipment checkpoint at which Respondent was stopped was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the judicially-created exclusionary rule is not applicable in a civil, administrative driver's license revocation or suspension proceeding; and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred in applying the exclusionary rule to exclude all evidence in this case. Remanded.

After the State Tax Commissioner (Tax Department) appraised Century Aluminum of West Virginia's aluminum plant, Century Aluminum objected to the valuations. The Jackson County Commission sitting as a Board of Equalization and Review advised the company that it would not make any adjustment to the Tax Department's valuations. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) upholding the Tax Department's policy of how it considers functional obsolescence and economic obsolescence for categories of assets other than machinery and equipment; and (2) ruling that the Tax Department's policy of artificially limiting its consideration of obsolescence to a fifty percent reduction in the case of machinery and equipment complied with the requirement that property be valued at fair market value.

The West Virginia Office of Tax Appeals rejected the challenge of ConAgra Brands, Inc. to assessments for unpaid corporation net income tax and business franchise tax. The assessments were imposed on apportioned royalties ConAgra received from the licensing of its intangible trademarks and trade names for use through the United States, including West Virginia. In setting aside the decision of the Office of Tax Appeals, the circuit court held that ConAgra's licensing transactions did not constitute doing business in West Virginia and that the assessments failed to meet the requirements of the due process and commerce clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The State Tax Commissioner sought reinstatement of the assessments for corporation net income tax and business franchise tax. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court, holding that the order setting aside the decision of the Office of Tax Appeals and invalidating the assessments should not be disturbed.

Michael Chenoweth was arrested for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Thereafter, Commissioner Joe Miller of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles issued an order revoking Chenoweth's privilege to drive a motor vehicle. The circuit court reversed and vacated the revocation of Chenoweth's driver's license based on its finding that the trooper improperly stopped Chenoweth's vehicle without an articulable reasonable suspicion. In so doing, the circuit court applied the exclusionary rule to an administrative driver's license revocation proceeding. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no illegal stop, and thus it was not necessary to reach the issue of whether the circuit court properly applied the exclusionary rule in this case.

After police officer stopped motorist Joe White at a sobriety checkpoint and directed White to perform a horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the officer arrested White for driving under the influence of alcohol. The Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles revoked White's license to operate a motor vehicle for six months, and the circuit court affirmed. White appealed, challenging the admissibility of the horizontal gaze nystagmus test as an indicator that he was intoxicated and the lawfulness of the sobriety checkpoint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the evidence concerning the horizontal gaze nystagmus test as a field sobriety test was admissible; but (2) White was entitled to a new administrative hearing based upon his challenge to the sobriety checkpoint, as the finding of the Commissioner that the checkpoint was set up in accordance with standardized guidelines was clearly wrong. Remanded.