Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Michelle Falquero was employed by the state Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) when she filed a grievance alleging (1) that she had been constructively discharged due to a hostile work environment which spurred her to tender a letter of resignation, and (2) that when her working conditions improved she was wrongly denied the opportunity to rescind the voluntary resignation even though DEP had not formally accepted it. The state Public Employee's Grievance Board found merit in Falquero's contention that her job at DEP should not have been terminated because she could and did rescind her voluntary resignation before DEP had accepted it and ordered DEP to reinstate Falquero with back pay. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court, holding (1) acceptance of a tender of resignation of public employment may occur when the employer (i) clearly indicates acceptance through communication with the employee, or (ii) acts in good faith reliance on the tender; and (2) because the evidence showed that acceptance of the resignation did not occur, the circuit court did not err in upholding the ruling of the Grievance Board.

Employee injured his back while working for Employer. Employee ultimately received a permanent partial disability award for his back injury. Employee then sought a psychiatric consultation, which resulted in Employee being assessed with major depressive disorder. The claims administrator denied Employee's request to add depression as a compensable injury of his workers' compensation claim, and the Workers' Compensation Office of Judges and Workers' Compensation Board of Review (BOR) affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether a claimant must get prior authorization from a claims administrator before seeking an initial psychiatric consultation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) W. Va. S.C.R. 85-20-12.5(a), which states that an initial psychiatric evaluation must be authorized by a claims administrator, is an invalid administrative regulation; (2) W. Va. C.S.R. 85-12-12.4 sets forth a three-step process that must be followed when a claimant is seeking to add a psychiatric disorder as a compensable injury in his or her workers' compensation claim; and (3) in the instant case, Employee did not receive the process that he was entitled to under section 85-12-12.4. Remanded.

In two condemnation proceedings, the circuit court entered orders requiring the Department of Transportation, Division of Highways (DOH) to turn over to Defendants, three individuals who owned and leased condemned property, appraisal reports involving several properties condemned by DOH for its South Mineral Wells Project. The DOH filed petitions for writs of prohibition, contending that federal law did not permit the release of appraisal reports from properties not owned or possessed by Defendants. Defendants argued that the court's orders were consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in State ex rel. West Virginia Department of Transportation v. Cookman, which allowed appraisal reports to be discoverable. The Court consolidated the petitions and granted the writs of prohibition, holding (1) the decision in Cookman was expressly overruled in its entirety because it failed to consider controlling federal law; and (2) a real property appraisal report generated in compliance with 42 U.S.C. 4601 and W. Va. Code 54-3-1, et seq., and its accompanying regulations, was not discoverable in a condemnation proceeding by party who did not own or have any legally cognizable possessory interest in such real property.

This was a consolidated appeal of two cases wherein the circuit court dismissed two appeals filed by a corporation, Shenandoah Sales & Services (Shenandoah), disputing the county assessor's valuation of real estate owned by the corporation. The corporation failed to retain a lawyer to prosecute its appeals to the circuit court and instead appeared through its vice-president, David Tabb. The circuit judge ordered the corporation to appear through a lawyer in circuit court and stated that the court would not accept pleadings or motions from the corporation that were not signed by a lawyer. The corporation failed to retain a lawyer and the court dismissed the corporation's appeals. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err by ruling that Shenendoah was required to be represented by a lawyer in the circuit court; and (2) W. Va. Code 11-3-25(b) is unconstitutional insofar as the word "agent" allows an applicant's non-lawyer representative to appeal a decision of the board of equalization and review to a circuit court.

Appellant Charter Communications and appellee Community Antenna, a smaller company, were competing cable services providers. For over a decade the parties had been litigating the issue of whether Charter was offering discounted rates to some but not all of its customers in violation of the West Virginia Cable Television Systems Act (Act) that prohibits unduly discriminatory rates for over a decade. On the parties' third time before the Supreme Court, at issue was a counterclaim filed by Community Antenna in the underlying lawsuit alleging that Charter was engaged in rate discrimination calculated to harm Community Antenna's business. The trial court concluded that Charter's buy-back plans constituted unduly discriminatory rates in violation of state law and that Charter tortiously interfered with Community Antenna's business relationships with its customers. The jury awarded Community Antenna compensatory and punitive damages. Charter appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there is a private cause of action under the Act against cable operators that illegally offer unduly discriminatory cable rates, (2) there was sufficient evidence that Charter's conduct was the proximate cause of harm to Community Antenna, and (3) the jury's award of damages was supported by the evidence.

Petitioner Jefferson Utilities, Inc. (JUI), a privately-held public utility authorized to provide water service to several areas of Jefferson County, filed a request with the Public Service Commission of West Virginia for a rate increase of approximately 72.2 percent. The ALJ recommended a rate increase of 22.4 percent, and the Commission reduced the rate increase recommended by the ALJ to 4.4 percent. JUI appealed, contending that the Commission erred by rejecting the recommended decision of the ALJ regarding the rate increase. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although the evidence in this case was controverted, it was clear that the Commission's decision was not arbitrary, did not result from a misapplication of legal principles, and was supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Janet Hornbeck appealed an order of the circuit court, arguing that the court erred by affirming the family court's ruling that the Bureau of Child Support Enforcement (BCSE) method of distributing child support arrearage payments between principal and interest is appropriate even though it deviates from the way those allocations are generally made for court-ordered money judgments not involving support. At issue was the validity of a procedure established and followed by an administrative agency. After concluding the procedure to be an interpretive rule under the APA, the Supreme Court held that the BCSE rule is within the authority granted the agency in W. Va. Code 48-11-105. Affirmed.

Jonathan Darby, who was employed by Kanawha County Board of Education (BOE) as a school bus driver, was terminated when the BOE concluded that Darby had violated the BOE's sexual harassment policy. Darby appealed his termination. After considering the evidence, the West Virginia Public Employees Grievance Board hearing examiner ordered the BOE to reinstate Darby to his previous position. The BOE appealed. The circuit court reversed, determining that the hearing examiner held the BOE to the wrong burden of proof. Darby appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the hearing examiner used the proper burden of proof in weighing the evidence; and (2) the circuit court improperly exceeded its scope of review, failed to give proper deference to the hearing examiner's factual findings, and wrongly substituted its own judgment on the credibility of the witnesses for that of the hearing officer.

The Clerk of the McDowell County Commission appealed an order of the Circuit Court of McDowell County pertaining to mandamus proceedings. The Commission was directed to reimburse the attorney fees of A. Ray Bailey who was the prevailing party in an election contest. The Commission argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the Commission to pay Mr. Bailey's fees when the Commission was not a party to the election contest. Furthermore, The Commission argued that there was no statutory authority to support the award. Upon review of the arguments and law governing this matter, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's order directing payment of attorney fees by the Commission.

Appellant Harpers Ferry appealed a circuit court order in favor of Appellee Ralph Taylor. Mr. Taylor asked the City for permission to create a path along a street so that a truck he used could access his property. At the time of Mr. Taylor's request, City Councilman Robert DuBose lived near the proposed path. The City approved Mr. Taylor's request on the condition that he got an authorization from the Mayor. Mr. DuBose abstained from voting on the request, but he participated in all discussions. Two days after the City approved Mr. Taylor's request, Mr. DuBose sent emails complaining about the request. In response, the Mayor imposed additional conditions to the request. Council held a special meeting for the sole purpose of discussing Mr. Taylor's project. At the meeting, Council added more conditions. Mr. Taylor filed a declaratory judgment against the City, arguing that the additional conditions were discriminatory. Mr. Taylor won the case, and the court awarded him attorney's fees. The City argued to the Supreme Court on appeal that Mr. Taylor was not entitled to attorney's fees. After careful review of the briefs, the record submitted on appeal and the oral arguments of the parties, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision.