Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Madison, Wis., Gen. Ordinances 3.14(4)(h) created the City of Madison’s Department of Transportation and Transit and Parking Commission and empowered the Commission to establish rules and procedures. In 2005, The Commission adopted a Rule prohibiting passengers from bearing weapons on the Metro Transit. Petitioners sought to harmonize the Rule with the Concealed-Carry Statute, Wis. Stat. 175.60, which authorized Wisconsin residents to carry concealed weapons upon obtaining the required license. Petitioners filed an amended complaint arguing that Madison, Wis., Gen. Ordinances 3.14(4)(h) offended the Local Regulation Statute, Wis. Stat. 66.0409. The circuit court dismissed the amended complaint, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Local Regulation Statute has withdrawn authority from the City, either through its governing body or its sub-units, to regulate the subjects identified in the statute in a manner more stringent than an analogous state statute; and (2) the Concealed-Carry Statute preempts the City’s authority to restrict a licensee’s right to carry concealed weapons on the City’s buses so long as the licensee complies with the statute’s requirements. View "Wisconsin Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison" on Justia Law

The circuit court dismissed an action brought by Vilas County District Attorney Albert Moustakis who sought to restrain the Wisconsin Department of Justice from releasing records pertaining to Moustakis in response to a public records request by The Lakeland Times, a newspaper located in Minocqua. The request sought records of any "complaints or investigations regarding Vilas County District Attorney Al Moustakis" and records "regarding any investigation of [Moustakis's] conduct or handling of cases while district attorney." The request also sought "information related to complaints and investigations regarding Mr. Moustakis that were completed or ended without any action taken against him[,]" as well as "any communications between Mr. Moustakis and [Department of Justice] since he took office in 1995." The court of appeals affirmed the order of the circuit court. Finding no error in the circuit or appellate courts' decisions, the Supreme Court also affirmed. View "Moustakis v. Wisconsin Department of Justice" on Justia Law

The Equal Rights Division of the Department of Workforce Development (DWD) concluded that Joell Schigur had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the Department of Justice (DOJ) took unlawful retaliatory action against her because she lawfully disclosed, or the DOJ believed that she lawfully disclosed, information under Wis. Stat. 230.81. The circuit court reversed the decision of the DWD. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an opinion alone, as to the lawfulness or appropriateness of government activity, is not “information” as defined in section 230.80(5); (2) the communication at issue in this case was not a “disclosure” under section 230.81 because the information was already known to the persons receiving the communication; and (3) Schigur’s assertion that the DOJ believed that she disclosed information rested on a misinterpretation of section 230.80(8)(c) and therefore failed. View "State Dep’t of Justice v. State Dep’t of Workforce Dev." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether unpaid interns are entitled to the anti-retaliation protections of Wis. Stat. 146.997, Wisconsin’s health care worker protection statute. In the instant case, Asma Masri’s position as an uncompensated intern at the Medical College of Wisconsin (MCW) was terminated after Masri reported “clinical/ethical” concerns to an MCW administrator. Masri filed a retaliation complaint against MCW with the Equal Rights Division (ERD) of the Department of Workforce Development (DWD). ERD determined that Masri was not entitled to anti-retaliation protection under section 146.997 because the statute is limited to employees, and Masri was not an employee where she received no financial compensation. The Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) affirmed. Granting due weight deference to LIRC’s decision, the circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) LIRC’s decision is accorded due weight deference because LIRC has experience interpreting the meaning of “employee” and various statutes and is charged with administering section 146.997; and (2) LIRC correctly found that section 146.997 applies only to employees, a category that does not include interns who do not receive compensation or tangible benefits. View "Masri v. State Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n" on Justia Law

Jeffrey S. Decker, a former student of the University of Wisconsin (UW), was suspended from campus. Decker subsequently trespassed on UW property four documented times to attend UW meetings. The UW Board of Regents (Board) petitioned the circuit court for a temporary restraining order against Decker. The circuit court granted a harassment injunction against Decker based on the Board’s petition. The court of appeals reversed, determining that Decker had a legitimate purpose for his actions, which was to protest university student fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Wis. Stat. 813.125 can extend injunctive protection to institutions as well as natural persons; (2) sufficient evidence existed for the circuit court to find that Decker’s conduct constituted harassment and lacked a legitimate purpose; but (3) the injunction in this case was overbroad. Remanded to the circuit court to refine the harassment injunction and clarify its terms. View "Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents v. Decker" on Justia Law

In 2005, Ardonis Greer pled guilty to criminal charges and was sentenced to terms of imprisonment. In 2007, Greer began serving his period of probation. Subsequently, Greer was erroneously issued a discharge certificate stating that he was discharged from supervision. In 2010, Greer pled no contest to intimidating a witness. Thereafter, the Department of Corrections (DOC) discovered that Greer was still purportedly serving the probation term from his 2004 conviction and initiated revocation proceedings against Greer. The Division of Hearings and Appeals ordered Greer’s probation revoked. Greer filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, arguing that the DOC lost jurisdiction to revoke his probation when it issued the discharge certificate. The circuit court reversed the Division’s decision. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the erroneous issuance of a discharge certificate did not deprive the DOC of jurisdiction to revoke Greer’s probation because his court-ordered term of probation had not expired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the DOC retained jurisdiction over Greer despite the erroneous issuance of the discharge certificate; (2) Greer’s due process rights were not violated; and (3) the circuit court, sitting in certiorari, was not empowered to equitably estop the DOC from revoking Greer’s probation. View "Greer v. Wiedenhoeft" on Justia Law

The City of Oshkosh levied special assessments against a corner lot property owned by CED Properties, LLC (“CED”). The City issued two special assessments, one for the portion of CED’s property bordering Jackson Street and one for the portion running alongside Murdock Avenue. CED appealed the special assessments by filing a complaint with the circuit court. CED then filed an amended complaint well past the ninety-day time limit to appeal. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment to the City, holding that CED failed to appeal the Jackson Street special assessment within the required ninety-day time limit. The court of appeals affirmed but on different grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) CED’s original complaint, which was filed within the required ninety-day time period, was sufficient to appeal not only the Murdock Avenue special assessment but also the Jackson Street special assessment; and (2) CED’s complaint was sufficient to place the City on notice that CED intended to appeal both the Jackson Street and Murdock Avenue special assessments. View "CED Props., LLC v. City of Oshkosh" on Justia Law

The Town Assessor valued Taxpayer’s real property at $27,500, classified the property as “productive forest land,” and assessed the property at $27,500. Taxpayer claimed that the Assessor’s classification of his property was erroneous and that the Town Board of Review should change the classification to “undeveloped land,” which would result in an assessment of $13,750. The Board refused to lower the assessment. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in light of the evidence that the Board received, the Board could reasonably conclude that Taxpayer did not demonstrate that the classification was incorrect and that the assessment should be lowered. View "Sausen v. Town of Black Creek Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

After a hearing, the City of Wausau decided not to renew Thomas and Suporn Nowell's Class B alcohol license. The circuit court affirmed the City's decision after reviewing the municipal decision under Wis. Stat. 125.12(2)(d). The court of appeals reversed, concluding that section 125.12(2)(d) required the circuit court to employ a de novo standard of review rather than the certiorari review employed by the circuit court in this case. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that certiorari is the correct standard of review for a court to apply when, pursuant to section 125.12(2)(d), it reviews a municipal decision not to renew an alcohol license. View "Nowell v. City of Wausau" on Justia Law

Several entities filed a petition to raise the water levels of Lake Koshkonong designated by the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR). The DNR rejected the petition, and an ALJ affirmed. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the DNR's conclusions of law were subject to a de novo review; (2) the DNR has broad statutory authority to protect non-navigable wetlands and other non-navigable water resources and may consider the water level impact on all adjacent property under Wis. Stat. 31.02(1); (3) the DNR may consider Wis. Admin. Code NR 103 water quality standards when making a water level determination under section 31.02(1) that affects wetlands and may apply these standards when appropriate after weighing the factors in the statute; and (4) the DNR erroneously excluded most testimony on the economic impact of lower water levels in the lake on the residents, businesses, and tax bases adjacent to and near the lake. Remanded. View "Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. Wis. Dep't of Natural Res." on Justia Law