Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2005, Ardonis Greer pled guilty to criminal charges and was sentenced to terms of imprisonment. In 2007, Greer began serving his period of probation. Subsequently, Greer was erroneously issued a discharge certificate stating that he was discharged from supervision. In 2010, Greer pled no contest to intimidating a witness. Thereafter, the Department of Corrections (DOC) discovered that Greer was still purportedly serving the probation term from his 2004 conviction and initiated revocation proceedings against Greer. The Division of Hearings and Appeals ordered Greer’s probation revoked. Greer filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, arguing that the DOC lost jurisdiction to revoke his probation when it issued the discharge certificate. The circuit court reversed the Division’s decision. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the erroneous issuance of a discharge certificate did not deprive the DOC of jurisdiction to revoke Greer’s probation because his court-ordered term of probation had not expired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the DOC retained jurisdiction over Greer despite the erroneous issuance of the discharge certificate; (2) Greer’s due process rights were not violated; and (3) the circuit court, sitting in certiorari, was not empowered to equitably estop the DOC from revoking Greer’s probation. View "Greer v. Wiedenhoeft" on Justia Law

The City of Oshkosh levied special assessments against a corner lot property owned by CED Properties, LLC (“CED”). The City issued two special assessments, one for the portion of CED’s property bordering Jackson Street and one for the portion running alongside Murdock Avenue. CED appealed the special assessments by filing a complaint with the circuit court. CED then filed an amended complaint well past the ninety-day time limit to appeal. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment to the City, holding that CED failed to appeal the Jackson Street special assessment within the required ninety-day time limit. The court of appeals affirmed but on different grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) CED’s original complaint, which was filed within the required ninety-day time period, was sufficient to appeal not only the Murdock Avenue special assessment but also the Jackson Street special assessment; and (2) CED’s complaint was sufficient to place the City on notice that CED intended to appeal both the Jackson Street and Murdock Avenue special assessments. View "CED Props., LLC v. City of Oshkosh" on Justia Law

The Town Assessor valued Taxpayer’s real property at $27,500, classified the property as “productive forest land,” and assessed the property at $27,500. Taxpayer claimed that the Assessor’s classification of his property was erroneous and that the Town Board of Review should change the classification to “undeveloped land,” which would result in an assessment of $13,750. The Board refused to lower the assessment. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in light of the evidence that the Board received, the Board could reasonably conclude that Taxpayer did not demonstrate that the classification was incorrect and that the assessment should be lowered. View "Sausen v. Town of Black Creek Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

After a hearing, the City of Wausau decided not to renew Thomas and Suporn Nowell's Class B alcohol license. The circuit court affirmed the City's decision after reviewing the municipal decision under Wis. Stat. 125.12(2)(d). The court of appeals reversed, concluding that section 125.12(2)(d) required the circuit court to employ a de novo standard of review rather than the certiorari review employed by the circuit court in this case. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that certiorari is the correct standard of review for a court to apply when, pursuant to section 125.12(2)(d), it reviews a municipal decision not to renew an alcohol license. View "Nowell v. City of Wausau" on Justia Law

Several entities filed a petition to raise the water levels of Lake Koshkonong designated by the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR). The DNR rejected the petition, and an ALJ affirmed. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the DNR's conclusions of law were subject to a de novo review; (2) the DNR has broad statutory authority to protect non-navigable wetlands and other non-navigable water resources and may consider the water level impact on all adjacent property under Wis. Stat. 31.02(1); (3) the DNR may consider Wis. Admin. Code NR 103 water quality standards when making a water level determination under section 31.02(1) that affects wetlands and may apply these standards when appropriate after weighing the factors in the statute; and (4) the DNR erroneously excluded most testimony on the economic impact of lower water levels in the lake on the residents, businesses, and tax bases adjacent to and near the lake. Remanded. View "Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. Wis. Dep't of Natural Res." on Justia Law

After receiving a work-related injury during his employment by Employer, Employee applied for worker's compensation benefits. An ALJ ordered that further medical procedures were required to determine whether Employee was permanently and totally disabled, but the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) proceeded to award benefits to Employee for his permanent total disability. Employer filed a complaint seeking judicial review of LIRC's decision. The circuit court affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court was required to dismiss Employer's complaint for lack of competency based on Employer's failure to name its insurer (Insurer) as an "adverse party" pursuant to Wis. Stat. 102.23(1)(a). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to affirm LIRC's decision, holding (1) the circuit court had competency to adjudicate Employer's complaint notwithstanding Employer's omission of Insurer because Insurer was not an "adverse party" for purposes of section 102.23(1)(a); and (2) LIRC did not exceed its authority in awarding Employee permanent total disability benefits, and its finding that Employee was entitled to benefits on an odd-lot basis was supported by credible and substantial evidence. View "Xcel Energy Servs., Inc. v. Labor & Ind. Review Comm'n " on Justia Law

Samuel J.H. was committed to the care and custody of the County Human Services Department. After Samuel's initial placement in outpatient care, the Department transferred him to an inpatient facility because of his erratic and delusional behavior. Samuel petitioned for a review of his transfer and a transfer back to outpatient status, contending that he was entitled to a hearing within ten days of his transfer to the inpatient facility. The circuit court denied Samuel's petitions, concluding (1) a patient is entitled to a hearing within ten days of his transfer to a more restrictive placement only when the transfer is based on a violation of treatment conditions; and (2) Samuel's transfer to the inpatient facility was not based on a violation of his treatment conditions but rather on reasonable medical and clinical judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Wis. Stat. 51-35(1)(e) does not require a hearing to be conducted within ten days of a transfer to a more restrictive placement when the transfer is based on reasonable medical and clinical judgment. View "Manitowoc County v. Samuel J. H." on Justia Law

Petitioner's child care license was revoked by the Department of Children and Families pursuant to Wis. Stat. 48.685(5)(br), the "caregiver law," which permanently bars those who have ever been convicted of specified predicate crimes from holding a child care license. An ALJ dismissed Petitioner's appeal of the revocation without a hearing based on her conviction on a guilty plea of violating Wis. Stat. 49.12(1) and (6) for a food stamp offense twenty years earlier. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that a remand for an administrative hearing was required to determine whether the facts underlying the conviction established it as a conviction barred under the caregiver law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) due deference should be accorded the Department's interpretation and application of the caregiver law; (2) Petitioner had a right to a hearing; and (3) because genuine issues of material fact existed, the ALJ erred in dismissing Petitioner's appeal without a hearing for factual development. View "Jamerson v. Dep't of Children & Families" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin (PSC) correctly concluded the Wisconsin Power and Light's (WPL) application to construct a large, out-of-state, electric generating facility was properly reviewed under Wis. Stat. 196.49(3), the certificate of authority (CA) statute, or whether Wis. Stat. 196.491(3), the certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN) statute, should have been applied. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order, which affirmed the PSC's interim order, holding that the PSC's interpretation of the CPCN law as applying exclusively to in-state facilities and its decision to analyze WPL's application under the CA law were reasonable, and there was not a more reasonable interpretation of the CA and CPCN laws.

The Town of Magnolia granted an application for a livestock facility siting permit submitted by Larson Acres, Inc., but imposed several conditions on the permit. The State Livestock Facilities Siting Review Board affirmed with modifications the permit, determining that certain conditions exceeded the Town's legal authority. The circuit court reversed and remanded the cause to the Siting Board, concluding that the Town acted within its lawful authority when it imposed the conditions. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Town impermissibly conditioned the terms of the siting permit without following the guidelines set forth by the legislature.