Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners asked the Supreme Court to take jurisdiction of an original action challenging rules adopted by the Government Accountability Board (GAB). Before the Court accepted the original action, four justices voted to enjoin the GAB from enforcing the rules Petitioners were challenging. The Court then accepted the original action, leaving the injunction in place. The participating justices then unanimously agreed that the order enjoining Respondents from enforcing the rules should be vacated. However, the court was equally divided on the rationale: half of the justices would conclude that the GAB had the authority to promulgate the amendments, and half of the justices would dismiss the action on the ground that an original action was improvidently granted. The action was subsequently dismissed, and the order enjoining Respondents from enforcing the rules was vacated.

This case required the Supreme Court to answer a threshold question concerning whether an appeal in this insurance company rehabilitation case could go forward. The court of appeals granted the motion of the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance to dismiss the appeal by the United States. The Commissioner had argued that the appeal should be dismissed either on the grounds that the notice of appeal was fundamentally defective such that the court of appeals had no jurisdiction or on the grounds that the United States had waived its right to appeal issues by failing to appear in the circuit court. The court of appeals concluded that the notice of appeal did not include a signature of an "attorney of record" as Wis. Stat. 802.05 required and dismissed on jurisdictional grounds without deciding the waiver issue. The Supreme Court affirmed on the basis of waiver, holding that the U.S.'s failure to litigate any issues involved in the circuit court precluded the U.S. from pursuing relief in the court of appeals.

In 2005, after the Town of Linwood assessed property owned by Stupar River for property tax purposes, Stupar River filed an objection with the town Board of Review, arguing that the 2005 assessment was significantly higher than its fair market value in violation of Wis. Stat. 70.32(1). The Board affirmed the assessed value. The circuit court remanded the action to the Board with instructions to reassess the subject property. The circuit court then affirmed the Board's determination. The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the circuit court. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the assessment upheld by the Board was made according to law and was supported by a reasonable view of the evidence.

Respondents, Dale and Gudrun Dawson and Edward Thomas, applied to the town boards of Cedarburg and Jackson to vacate part of a jointly owned public highway, which was surrounded by land Respondents owned. At a joint meeting of the town boards, the Jackson board members voted in favor of the application to discontinue the road, but the Cedarburg members voted against it. Respondents sought a declaratory judgment that the joint action of the town board resulted in discontinuance of the road. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Respondents, and the court of appeals affirmed. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding (1) the approval of both governing bodies is necessary to approve a joint application like the one from Respondents; (2) Respondents should have proceeded under Wis. Stat. 68.13 to seek a determination that Cedarburg's refusal to issue a highway order was not in accordance with law; and (3) the fact that the circuit court should have dismissed Respondents' request for a declaratory judgment as untimely under section 68.13 did not deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to address an issue of law.

Plaintiff filed an appeal and complaint against defendant where defendant claimed outstanding special assessments that were due and payable in full upon the sale of plaintiff's property. At issue was whether Wis. Stat. 66.0703(12)(a)'s 90-day appeal period applied where the special assessments were contingent, were levied after construction of the improvements were completed, or in the alternative, were fraudulent. Also at issue was whether Wis. Stat. 893.72 permitted plaintiff's appeal irrespective of the 90-day period of appeal in section 66.0703(12)(a). The court held that the circuit court properly dismissed the action where plaintiff's appeal and complaint were governed by the 90-day period in section 66.0703(12)(a) and that section 893.72 was inapplicable to the case and where it was undisputed that plaintiff filed its notice of appeal and complaint years after the 90-day period had passed.