Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Old Golden Oaks LLC applied for an encroachment permit and a grading permit from Amador County for a housing development project. The county deemed the applications incomplete and requested additional information. Old Golden Oaks filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the county violated the Permit Streamlining Act by requesting information not specified in the submittal checklists for the permits.The Superior Court of Amador County sustained the county’s demurrer without leave to amend, finding that the encroachment permit checklist allowed the county to request additional information and that the county had statutory authority to seek information necessary for compliance with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Old Golden Oaks that the catch-all provision in the county’s encroachment permit submittal checklist violated the Permit Streamlining Act because it did not specify in detail the required information. However, the court found that the county could condition the completeness of the grading permit application on additional environmental information because the grading permit checklist informed Old Golden Oaks that the project must comply with CEQA. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment regarding the encroachment permit but affirmed the judgment regarding the grading permit. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs on appeal. View "Old Golden Oaks v. County of Amador" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between a railroad company and La Plata County over land use changes made by the railroad at its Rockwood Station. The railroad made several modifications to accommodate increased passenger traffic, including enlarging a parking lot and adding portable toilets and tents. The County claimed these changes violated its land use code and demanded compliance or corrective action.The railroad initially sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction in La Plata County District Court, arguing that the County lacked jurisdiction over its operations. While this case was pending, the County petitioned the Colorado Public Utilities Commission (PUC) for a declaratory ruling that the changes required compliance with the County's land use code. The PUC accepted the petition, and an administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that the changes constituted "extensions, betterments, or additions" under the relevant statute, thus requiring compliance with the County's code. The PUC upheld the ALJ's decision, and the district court affirmed the PUC's ruling.The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the case and addressed several issues raised by the railroad. The court concluded that the PUC had jurisdiction to interpret the relevant land use statute, the County had standing to petition the PUC, and the PUC did not violate the railroad's due process rights. The court also found that the PUC's determination that the changes constituted "extensions, betterments, or additions" was just and reasonable and supported by the evidence. Consequently, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment upholding the PUC's decision. View "Am. Heritage Ry.s v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

The case involves the City of Lava Hot Springs, which regulates short-term rentals based on whether they are occupied by an owner or manager. Non-owner-occupied short-term rentals are prohibited in residential zones and only allowed in commercial zones. John and Michelle Taylor applied for a business license to operate a non-owner-occupied short-term rental in a residential zone, but the City denied their application. The Taylors, along with the Idaho Association of Realtors, sued the City, claiming that its regulations violated the Short-term Rental and Vacation Rental Act, which limits municipal regulations on short-term rentals.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, finding that the City's regulations did not have the express or practical effect of prohibiting short-term rentals and were permissible under the health, safety, and welfare exception in the Act. The court concluded that because at least one type of short-term rental (owner-occupied) was allowed in residential zones, the City had not violated the Act. The Taylors and the Realtors appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Court held that the City's ordinance, which prohibited non-owner-occupied short-term rentals in residential zones, violated the Short-term Rental and Vacation Rental Act. The Act prohibits any city ordinance that has the express or practical effect of prohibiting short-term rentals. The Court found that the City's ordinance amounted to a prohibition rather than a regulation and thus invalidated the ordinance. The Court awarded costs on appeal to the Petitioners but did not grant attorney fees to either party. View "Idaho Association of Realtors, Inc. v. City of Lava Hot Springs" on Justia Law

James and Kim McCormick own a 128.75-acre tract in Bossier Parish, Louisiana, accessed by a private driveway from Modica Lott Road. The property was part of a larger tract subdivided without adhering to the Bossier Parish Subdivision Code, which requires a plat description for split-out tracts. The McCormicks' deed, recorded in 2014, did not comply with these regulations. After a fire damaged their home in 2018, they applied for a building permit in 2020, which was denied by the Bossier Parish Police Jury (BPPJ) due to non-compliance with subdivision regulations.The McCormicks filed a mandamus action against Joe E. Ford, the Parish Engineer, seeking a court order for the permit. The trial court ruled in favor of the McCormicks, requiring the BPPJ to issue the permit, subject to certain conditions regarding the driveway. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision to issue the permit but removed the conditions, stating that the five-year prescriptive period for enforcing subdivision regulations had expired, making the property non-conforming.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case to determine if the McCormick Tract enjoyed non-conforming status under La. R.S. 9:5625, which provides a five-year prescriptive period for enforcement actions. The Court held that the prescriptive period began when the deed was recorded in 2014, and since no action was taken within five years, the property attained non-conforming status. Consequently, the McCormicks were entitled to the building permit without additional conditions. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeal's decision, confirming that the McCormick Tract complied with relevant statutes and regulations. View "MCCORMICK VS. FORD" on Justia Law

A builder, PDT Holdings, Inc. and Phillip Thompson Homes, Inc., sought to construct a duplex townhome in Dallas. They met with city officials multiple times to verify applicable restrictions and were informed of a 36-foot maximum building height limit. The builder submitted a construction plan for a 36-foot-high duplex, which the city approved. During construction, the city issued a stop-work order due to a parapet wall exceeding the height limit, which the builder corrected. Later, the city issued another stop-work order, citing a violation of the residential-proximity-slope (RPS) ordinance, which limited the height to 26 feet. Despite this, the city lifted the stop-work order, allowing the builder to complete the duplex.The builder applied for a variance from the Board of Adjustment (BOA) but was denied. They then sued the city, seeking to estop it from enforcing the RPS ordinance. The trial court ruled in favor of the builder, finding that the city was estopped from enforcing the ordinance. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the city’s mistake in issuing the permit did not warrant estoppel.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the trial court's judgment was supported by legally sufficient evidence. The court found that city officials had affirmatively misled the builder about the height limit and that the builder had relied on these misrepresentations to their detriment. The court also determined that this was an exceptional case where estoppel was necessary to prevent manifest injustice and that estopping the city would not interfere with its governmental functions. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment, estopping the city from enforcing the RPS ordinance against the builder. View "PDT HOLDINGS, INC. v. CITY OF DALLAS" on Justia Law

The State of Wyoming, Board of Land Commissioners (State Board), granted Temporary Use Permits (TUPs) to permittees for the use of state land in Teton County. The Teton County Board of County Commissioners (County Board) issued abatement notices to the permittees, asserting violations of county land use regulations. The State Board sought a declaration that it and its permittees were not subject to these regulations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State Board, and the County Board appealed.The district court found that the State Board and its permittees were not subject to Teton County's land use and development regulations. The County Board argued that Wyoming statutes required compliance with local zoning laws for state lands under long-term leases and TUPs. The State Board countered that sovereign immunity protected it from such regulations and that the statutes did not apply to TUPs.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the State Board and its permittees operating under a TUP are not subject to county land use and development regulations. The court reasoned that while Wyoming statutes require compliance with local zoning laws for long-term leases of state lands, they do not impose the same requirement for TUPs. The court emphasized that the legislature's omission of TUPs from the statutory requirement for compliance with local zoning laws was intentional. Therefore, the County Board lacked the authority to enforce its land use regulations against the State Board and its permittees operating under a TUP. View "Teton County Board of County Commissioners v. State" on Justia Law

Sara Pearl Fahrmann filed a complaint against the City of Orange Beach and D.R. Horton, Inc., alleging that the City failed to ensure that Horton's construction of the Cypress Village subdivision complied with the City's zoning ordinance and the approved Planned Unit Development (PUD). Fahrmann claimed that this failure led to inadequate parking, which obstructed emergency services and delayed treatment for her husband, resulting in his death. She asserted wrongful-death claims based on wantonness and negligence.The Baldwin Circuit Court denied the City's motion for summary judgment, which argued that the City was entitled to substantive immunity from Fahrmann's claims. The City then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to grant its motion for summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and held that the City was immune from Fahrmann's wrongful-death claim alleging wantonness under § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, which limits municipal liability to injuries caused by neglect, carelessness, or unskillfulness, and does not include wanton conduct. The Court also held that the City was entitled to substantive immunity from the negligence claim, as the City's failure to enforce its zoning ordinance did not create a legal duty to individual plaintiffs. The Court granted the City's petition and issued a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to grant summary judgment in favor of the City. View "Ex parte City of Orange Beach" on Justia Law

Casey Hoff applied for a building permit from the City of Burlington to add an addition to his home, which is located within the city's floodplain. Hoff, an experienced contractor, provided appraisals and plans to the city officials, who approved the permit based on the information provided. However, after Hoff began construction, it was later determined that the remodel constituted a "substantial improvement" under the city's floodplain ordinances, requiring additional compliance measures. The city subsequently refused to issue a certificate of occupancy, leading Hoff to sue the city.The District Court of Ward County held a bench trial and denied Hoff's claims for a writ of mandamus, declaratory judgment, injunction, and inverse condemnation. The court found that Hoff did not comply with the city's floodplain ordinances and that the remodel was a substantial improvement. The court also granted summary judgment dismissing Hoff's negligence claim, concluding that the city was immune under N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-03.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Hoff did not establish a clear legal right to a certificate of occupancy, as he did not comply with the city's ordinances. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying Hoff's declaratory judgment and injunction claims. Additionally, the court concluded that Hoff failed to establish a "special relationship" with the city, which is necessary to overcome the city's immunity from negligence claims. The court also rejected Hoff's inverse condemnation claim, finding no total regulatory taking occurred. View "Hoff v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law

In June 2015, Appalachian Materials submitted an application to the Ashe County Director of Planning for a permit to build an asphalt plant under the Polluting Industries Development Ordinance (PID Ordinance). The application included aerial images, topographical maps, a marked floorplan, and a pending state air quality permit application. The Planning Director initially indicated the application met the ordinance's requirements but could not issue a permit until the state permit was received. Public opposition led to a temporary moratorium on polluting industries in October 2015. Appalachian Materials received the state permit in February 2016, but the Planning Director denied the application in April 2016, citing proximity to commercial and residential buildings and other issues.The Ashe County Planning Board reversed the Planning Director's decision, finding the application was complete and met the PID Ordinance requirements. The Board determined the mobile shed and barn near the proposed site were not commercial buildings and that there were no material misrepresentations in the application. The superior court affirmed the Board's decision.The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the Board's decision, holding the application was not complete until the state permit was received, thus falling under the moratorium. The court also found the mobile shed and barn were commercial buildings, and the application did not meet the setback requirements.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the Court of Appeals, holding the application was complete when initially submitted in June 2015, triggering the Permit Choice statutes. The court found the mobile shed and barn were not commercial buildings under the PID Ordinance and upheld the Board's determination that there were no material misrepresentations. The court directed the Board to issue the permit under the PID Ordinance. View "Ashe County v. Ashe Cnty. Plan. Bd" on Justia Law

After Hurricane Harvey in 2017, the City of Houston amended its ordinances to increase elevation requirements for construction in floodplains. A developer, The Commons of Lake Houston, Ltd., sued the City, claiming the amendments caused a regulatory taking of its property under the Texas Constitution. The developer argued that the new requirements rendered a significant portion of its property undevelopable, leading to financial losses.The trial court denied the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, but the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas reversed and dismissed the case. The appellate court held that the developer could not establish a valid takings claim because the City amended the ordinance as a valid exercise of its police power and to comply with the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) criteria.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and disagreed with the appellate court's reasoning. The Court held that a regulation could cause a compensable taking even if it results from a valid exercise of the government’s police power or is designed to comply with the NFIP. The Court also found that the developer’s claim was ripe for adjudication, as the City had effectively made it clear that the developer could not obtain the necessary permits under the new ordinance. Additionally, the Court determined that the developer had standing to assert its claim, as it possessed a vested interest in the property affected by the ordinance.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings to determine whether the amended ordinance caused a compensable taking under the Texas Constitution. View "THE COMMONS OF LAKE HOUSTON, LTD. v. CITY OF HOUSTON, TEXAS" on Justia Law