Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Enbridge sought approval to construct a tunnel beneath the Straits of Mackinac to house a new segment of its Line 5 pipeline, as part of a negotiated agreement with Michigan aimed at decommissioning the existing dual underwater pipelines. The project would replace the above-lakebed pipelines with a 30-inch pipe inside a concrete-lined tunnel, with ownership of the tunnel transferring to the Mackinac Straits Corridor Authority (MSCA) and Enbridge receiving a long-term lease. Several environmental groups and tribal communities opposed the project, citing environmental and public trust concerns, while labor and propane associations supported it.The Michigan Public Service Commission (PSC) referred the matter to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who largely limited the scope of review to the tunnel project itself and excluded broader issues such as the overall public need for Line 5, its operational safety, and climate impacts beyond the new segment. The ALJ found that prior approvals in 1953 established Line 5’s public need indefinitely. The PSC affirmed the ALJ’s approach, restricted its environmental review under Michigan’s Environmental Protection Act (MEPA) to the replacement project, and approved Enbridge’s application, finding no feasible or prudent alternatives and declining to examine the common-law public trust doctrine. The Court of Appeals affirmed the PSC’s decision, applying a deferential review standard.The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that courts must review agency MEPA determinations de novo, regardless of procedural origin. The Court found the PSC erred by not considering whether the tunnel project would factually and proximately cause the continued operation of Line 5 and attendant environmental harms, by inconsistently comparing alternatives, and by failing to assess impacts on public trust resources. The Supreme Court vacated the PSC’s order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In Re Application Of Enbridge Energy To Replace & Relocate Line 5" on Justia Law

A nonprofit environmental organization challenged the Maui Planning Commission’s amended rules, which governed development in Maui’s Special Management Area (SMA), a protected coastal zone. The amendments created fifteen categorical exemptions from environmental assessment, some with monetary thresholds and some based on landowner declarations. The rules also allowed continuation, repair, or renovation of previously approved developments without new environmental review, and replaced the requirement for a final environmental assessment (EA) with a draft EA for permit applications.After the rules were enacted, the nonprofit filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, arguing that the commission’s rules unlawfully bypassed the Coastal Zone Management Act’s (CZMA) required assessment process, shifting the duty to regulated parties and undermining statutory and constitutional protections. The commission responded that its exemptions were within its rulemaking power, claiming they excluded non-development activities from the CZMA process. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the nonprofit, invalidating the relevant rule sections and restoring the final EA requirement.The Maui Planning Commission and County of Maui appealed. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the commission’s rules exceeded its statutory authority by creating categorical exemptions from the CZMA’s assessment process and unlawfully delegating assessment duties to private parties. The court also found that replacing the final EA with a draft EA undermined required environmental safeguards. The Supreme Court clarified that counties may streamline permitting but cannot eliminate the statutory assessment process or delegate it to applicants. The court affirmed the invalidation of the amended rules. View "Maui Tomorrow Foundation v. Maui Planning Commission" on Justia Law

A company owned a vacant shopping center located within a city. The city repeatedly identified the property as blighted and unsafe, urging the owner to submit an abatement plan and later ordering the property to be boarded up and fenced. Over time, city officials considered and ultimately planned for the demolition of the shopping center by means of a controlled burn, citing concerns over trespassing and public safety. The owner neither expressly agreed to the controlled burn nor provided an alternative abatement plan. The city proceeded with the demolition by fire, after notifying the owner, and later removed the resulting debris.The owner filed suit in the Circuit Court of the City of Hopewell, asserting claims against the city and contractors for intentional trespass, statutory business conspiracy, tortious interference with a business expectancy, waste, and a takings claim under the Virginia Constitution. The owner also sought declaratory relief concerning costs and penalties imposed by the city. The city raised sovereign immunity as a defense, filing a plea in bar to dismiss all claims except the takings claim. The Circuit Court denied the plea in bar, finding it could not determine whether the city’s actions were within its governmental function. The city then pursued an interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the denial of the plea in bar de novo, based on the pleadings and exhibits. It held that the city’s actions in demolishing the shopping center constituted a governmental function—blight abatement—which is protected by sovereign immunity, even if the city had additional motives or failed to comply with all statutory requirements. The court therefore reversed the circuit court’s judgment, holding the city immune from all tort and statutory claims, as well as most declaratory relief sought, but not from the constitutional takings claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the takings claim and claims involving third parties. View "City of Hopewell v. Shree Arihant Motel, Inc." on Justia Law

Several property owners and ranching entities challenged amendments adopted in 2023 by the Albany County Board of County Commissioners to the Aquifer Protection Overlay Zone (APOZ) regulations. The Casper Aquifer, which supplies drinking water to many residents of Albany County and the City of Laramie, had been the subject of prior regulatory efforts. The 2023 amendments included a 35-acre minimum lot size requirement and revised procedures for changing the APOZ boundaries. Appellants argued that the Board exceeded its authority, violated equal protection guarantees, and acted arbitrarily and capriciously in enacting the amendments.Previously, in Bienz v. Board of County Commissioners, County of Albany, 2024 WY 102 (Bienz I), the Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed whether amendments to the APOZ regulations were subject to direct judicial review under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA). The district court had concluded it lacked jurisdiction, finding the Board's actions legislative and not reviewable under the WAPA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that legislative agency actions are reviewable, and remanded the case for the district court to consider the merits. While litigation was pending, the Board further amended the APOZ regulations, requiring the district court to identify which amendments remained at issue. The district court ultimately upheld the Board’s authority and the amendments.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming addressed whether the Board exceeded its authority, whether the amendment procedures violated equal protection, and whether the arbitrary and capricious standard applied to agency legislative action. The Court held the Board acted within its statutory authority in protecting the Casper Aquifer, the distinct procedures for overlay zone amendments did not violate equal protection guarantees, and agency legislative actions are subject to the arbitrary and capricious standard. It concluded the 2023 APOZ amendments, including the 35-acre minimum lot size, were not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law, and affirmed the district court’s decision. View "Warren Livestock, LLC v. Board of County Commissione" on Justia Law

A special independent recreation district was established in 2018 to manage and improve recreational facilities within a residential community, including a country club and golf course. In 2019, the district issued $24 million in bonds to purchase and maintain these facilities, pursuant to a referendum and a master trust indenture. A provision in the first supplemental indenture for the 2019 bonds included bracketed language suggesting that no further bonds would be issued, except for certain purposes. However, in 2023, the district's Board proposed a new $21 million bond issue to fund additional improvements, which was approved by a majority of residents in a 2024 referendum. The Board subsequently amended the 2019 indenture, clarifying that the bracketed language was never formally adopted and authorized the new bonds.In the Twelfth Judicial Circuit Court for Manatee County, a resident who moved into the district in 2021 challenged the district’s authority to issue the new bonds, arguing that the language in the 2019 indenture barred further bond issues, and questioned whether the special assessments to repay the bonds provided sufficient special benefit to the properties. He also raised due process concerns about the proceedings. The circuit court admitted evidence, including expert testimony on property value benefits, and found for the district, validating the 2024 bond issue. The court found the district had authority to issue the bonds and that the special benefits exceeded the debt burden.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. The Court held that the district had statutory and referendum-based authority to issue the 2024 bonds, that the Board properly clarified and amended the indenture, and that legislative findings and expert testimony supported the conclusion that the special assessments conferred a special benefit. The Court also found no due process violation. View "Matt v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

A railroad company operating in Massachusetts sought to acquire a 155-acre parcel in the town of Hopedale to build a new transloading facility. The land had been classified as forest land under Massachusetts General Law Chapter 61, which gives municipalities a right of first refusal to purchase such land if the owner wishes to sell or convert it to another use. After an initial notice of intent to sell was deemed deficient by the town, the seller withdrew the notice. Without issuing a new notice, the seller then transferred beneficial ownership of the property to the railroad company through a transaction that attempted to circumvent the town’s rights. Hopedale asserted its rights under Chapter 61 and filed suit in Massachusetts Land Court to enforce its right of first refusal and prevent further site work by the railroad.After a failed settlement agreement—subsequently invalidated by the Massachusetts Superior Court and with state litigation ongoing—the railroad company petitioned the Surface Transportation Board for a declaratory order that the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA) preempted the town’s rights under Chapter 61. The Surface Transportation Board denied the petition, finding that Chapter 61 was a generally applicable property law not categorically preempted by ICCTA, and that the railroad had not established a valid property interest in the land. The Board also concluded that the town’s actions did not unreasonably burden or interfere with rail transportation.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the Board’s order. It held that ICCTA does not preempt Chapter 61’s right-of-first-refusal provisions, as they are generally applicable state property laws and do not directly regulate railroad operations. The court further found that, without a settled property interest, the railroad’s as-applied preemption arguments failed. The court denied the railroad’s petition for review and affirmed the Board’s order. View "Grafton & Upton Railroad Company v. Surface Transportation Board" on Justia Law

SWN Production Company, LLC sought to drill multiple horizontal natural gas wells on a 301-acre tract within the City of Weirton, West Virginia. The City required a conditional use permit for oil and gas extraction under its zoning ordinance. SWN applied for such a permit, and the City’s Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) held hearings where community members raised concerns about traffic, noise, and the effect on local development. The BZA denied SWN’s application, citing incompatibility with the City’s comprehensive development plan and other adverse impacts. Afterward, SWN obtained a drilling permit from the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (DEP).SWN filed two actions in the Circuit Court of Brooke County: a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the BZA’s decision and a complaint seeking a declaration that the City’s zoning ordinance was preempted by state law, especially the Natural Gas Horizontal Well Control Act. The circuit court rejected SWN’s preemption argument and affirmed the BZA’s denial of the permit. SWN appealed both rulings to the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia (ICA). The ICA reversed the circuit court on the preemption issue, finding the City’s ordinance conflicted with state law, but dismissed SWN’s appeal of the certiorari ruling for lack of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed both appeals. It held that there was no irreconcilable conflict between the City’s zoning ordinance and the state’s environmental statutes; rather, any overlap was incidental and not preempted. The Court reversed the ICA’s decision on preemption and reinstated the circuit court’s order dismissing SWN’s facial preemption challenge. Regarding the certiorari appeal, the Court affirmed the ICA’s dismissal, holding that the ICA lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review extraordinary remedies such as certiorari. View "City of Weirton v. SWN Production Company, LLC" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization applied for a special use permit to operate a residential addiction-recovery facility on a 27-acre parcel in a rural residential zoning district. The facility would house ten to sixteen residents in a converted single-family home. Local property owners adjacent to the site expressed concerns about increased traffic, potential for trespass, noise, privacy, and other impacts. The organization classified its application as an “Assisted Living Residence” (ALR) after consulting with the county zoning administrator, who advised that this was the appropriate category under the local land use code. During hearings before the county Board of Adjustment, both sides presented expert testimony on property values and traffic, though some opinions were excluded by the Board.After the Board granted the permit with certain conditions, the neighbors filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Henderson County Superior Court. The trial court reversed the Board’s decision, ruling that: (1) the facility should have been classified as a “Mental Health Facility” rather than an ALR; (2) the Board erred by excluding the petitioners’ expert testimony; and (3) the Board erred by admitting the respondent’s expert testimony. The trial court ordered the Board to revoke the permit and require any future application to be categorized as a Mental Health Facility.The North Carolina Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that the neighbors had standing due to special damages. The court determined the Board acted reasonably in categorizing the facility as an ALR, as this was consistent with the text of the county code and the code did not enumerate “Mental Health Facility” as a permitted use. The appellate court also found the Board did not err in its evidentiary rulings. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed the superior court’s order and reinstated the Board’s grant of the special use permit. View "Hall v. Henderson Cnty" on Justia Law

A group of individuals who own or reside in the Makila Plantation neighborhood in Launiupoko, Maui, sought to intervene in a public hearing concerning a special use permit (SUP) application submitted by Goodfellow Bros., LLC. Goodfellow had applied for the SUP to operate a temporary rock-crushing facility on nearby agricultural land, which would process rocks for use in local construction projects. The project had been the subject of community outreach and was publicized through required legal notices and additional informational meetings. The Appellants were not entitled to direct notice as they did not live within 500 feet of the project, but they became aware of the hearing through their homeowners association and submitted written testimony expressing concerns about the project’s impact.Despite knowing about the project and the public hearing, Appellants filed their petition to intervene less than 24 hours before the scheduled hearing, missing the deadline set by the Maui Planning Commission’s (MPC) rules. At the August 8, 2023 hearing, the MPC considered whether there was “good cause” for the untimely filing of the petition. After discussion and testimony from both sides, the MPC found that Appellants had sufficient notice and opportunity to file earlier but did not show good cause for their delay. The MPC voted unanimously to deny the petition to intervene and subsequently approved the SUP application with amended conditions, including prohibiting rock-crushing on the property.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi reviewed the matter on appeal. The court held that the MPC did not abuse its discretion in denying the untimely petition because Appellants failed to demonstrate good cause for their late filing. The court also found no evidence that the MPC’s decision was based on Appellants’ residency status, nor was the MPC required to hold a contested case hearing on the untimely petition. The court affirmed the MPC’s decision. View "Gutschmidt v. Maui Planning Commission" on Justia Law

A property owner sought permission from San Luis Obispo County to construct single-family homes on several lots in Los Osos, an already developed coastal community. The County granted the permit, concluding the homes were an appropriate use under local zoning. However, the California Coastal Commission appealed the County’s decision to itself and denied the permit, asserting that it had appellate jurisdiction because the proposed development was situated in a sensitive coastal resource area (SCRA) under the County’s local coastal program (LCP), and because the site was designated for more than one principal permitted use.After the Commission's denial, the property owner filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandate in San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, contending the Commission lacked appellate jurisdiction on both grounds. The superior court sided with the Commission on the SCRA issue but rejected the Commission’s alternative jurisdictional basis. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed, holding the Commission properly exercised appellate jurisdiction based on the SCRA designation and did not address the alternative argument.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and clarified several important principles. It held that courts must exercise independent judgment—not deferential review—when determining the Commission’s appellate jurisdiction if the matter turns on legal interpretation of an LCP. The court further held that, where the Commission and a local government offer conflicting interpretations of an LCP, judicial deference to either is unwarranted when no interpretive advantage is clearly established. Examining the LCP, the court found that the proposed development was not in an SCRA as designated by the LCP. It also ruled the Commission does not have appellate jurisdiction solely because a site has multiple principal permitted uses; jurisdiction arises only if the proposed use is not among those principal permitted. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed. View "Shear Development Co. v. Cal. Coastal Com." on Justia Law