Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2011, the Granite County Commissioners (County) created a Georgetown Lake zoning district and adopted Georgetown Lake zoning regulations. Plaintiff filed this action to declare void the County's resolution to create the zoning district and to adopt the zoning regulations. The district court entered summary judgment that the County had properly enacted the Georgetown Lake zoning and determined Plaintiff to be a vexatious litigant. The Supreme Court affirmed except for the portion of the judgment requiring Plaintiff to pay the County's attorneys' fees, holding that the district court (1) correctly ruled that the County properly enacted the zoning; (2) did not err in determining that Plaintiff was a vexatious litigant; but (3) erred in its award of attorneys' fees to the County, as this case was not a case in which extraordinary circumstances justified the award of attorneys' fees. View "Motta v. Granite County Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Respondents New Hampshire Fish & Game and the New Hampshire Council on Resources and Defelopment (CORD) appealed a superior court decision that granted summary judgment to petitioners Town of Newbury and Lake Sunapee Protective Association. Petitioners challenged CORD's decision to approve Fish & Game's design of a boat launch. The trial court held that CORD lacked authority to approve the launch because it was a class III public highway, and could not approve "new highway projects." Disagreeing with the trial court's interpretation of RSA 162-C:6, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Town of Newbury v. New Hampshire Fish & Game Dept." on Justia Law

Applicants challenged a Department of Development and Environmental Services order declaring the use of the property at issue here was not compliant with King County zoning ordinances. The assertion was that the use was established before the ordinances were revised and characterized as non-conforming. The hearing examiner found for the landowner (and county) on all relevant issues, but the superior court reversed. The appellate court reversed the superior court, and the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. The Supreme Court held that the landowner's use was not established within the meaning of the county code. View "King County Dep't of Dev. & Envtl. Servs. v. King County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kane Properties, LLC contracted to purchase a piece of property in Hoboken zoned for industrial use. It applied for the necessary variances to construct a residential building. The Zoning Board granted the requested variances. The principal objector to plaintiff's proposal, Skyline Condominimum Association, Inc. appealed to the Hoboken City Council. Before the hearing, Skyline's attorney accepted an appointment as the City Council's attorney. Plaintiff objected to the attorney's participation in the appeal, and the attorney recused himself. Council reversed the zoning board's decision. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the attorney's involvement in the Skyline appeal in spite of a conflict of interest had irreparably tainted the City Council’s decision. The trial court affirmed the City Council’s decision. Plaintiff then appealed to the Appellate Division. After applying an appearance-of-impropriety standard and finding a conflict of interest, the panel concluded that the attorney's participation in the appeal tainted the City Council’s action. The matter was remanded to the City Council for a proceeding de novo. But Plaintiff filed a petition for certification to the Supreme Court, arguing that a remand back to the City Council was inappropriate. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court set aside the City Council's decision because the Court found it was tainted by its new attorney's conflict of interest. View "Kane Properties, LLC v. City of Hoboken" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that in a case involving issues for zoning variances under the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), evaluation of the suitable standard is a fact-specific and site-sensitive matter requiring a finding that the general welfare would be served because the proposed use was peculiarly fitted to the particular location. Although the availability of alternative locations is relevant, it does not bar a finding of particular suitability. View "Price v. Himeji, LLC" on Justia Law

The Town of Hartford and Marc and Susan Wood have been involved in a property dispute for over a decade. At issue: the construction of a large concrete retaining wall along the Woods property. They appealed the latest superior court decision in the matter. In 1999, the Town approved the Woods' application for a zoning permit to construct the wall. In early 2000, Woods began stockpiling recycled concrete slab sections in order to construct it. The Town served Woods a Notice of Violation (NOV) and filed an enforcement action, arguing that the concrete was not what was specified in the zoning permit. A court determined that Woods failed to meet the specifications for the permit. Woods appealed, and thus began the litigation that ultimately wound up before the Supreme Court in this case. In 2011, the superior court concluded that Woods still had not adhered to the permit's specifications. Woods raised thirteen claims of error on appeal, mostly challenging the sufficiency of evidence and errors in interpretation of the zoning code. Finding no error in the superior court's 2011 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Wood NOV, Town of Hartford v. Wood" on Justia Law

The Town of Fairfax cited homeowner Leon Beliveau for changing the use of his property from a single-family dwelling to a rooming-and-boarding house without obtaining the necessary zoning permits. Beliveau argued on appeal that the trial court erred in finding his property was used as a boarding house, and that the Town's zoning laws were unconstitutionally vague. Finding no error in the trial court's view of Beliveau's property, and that the town's zoning laws were not unconstitutionally vague, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Beliveau NOV, Town of Fairfax v. Beliveau" on Justia Law

The congressionally-sanctioned Red River Compact allocates water rights among Oklahoma, Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana. The governed area is divided into five "Reaches," each divided into smaller subbasins. Because Louisiana lacks suitable reservoirs to store water during high flow periods and the upstream states were unwilling to release stored water to benefit the downstream state, Reach II granted control over the water in upstream subbasins 1 through 4 to the states in which each subbasin is located and gives the states equal rights to subbasin 5 waters when the flow is 3,000 cubic feet per second (CFS) or more, "provided no state is entitled to more than 25 percent of the water in excess of 3,000" CFS. States are entitled to continue intrastate water administration. Tarrant is a state agency providing water to north-central Texas. After unsuccessfully attempting to purchase water from Oklahoma and others, Tarrant sought a permit from the Oklahoma Water Resources Board (OWRB) to take surface water from a tributary of the Red River in Oklahoma’s portion of subbasin 5. Knowing that Oklahoma effectively prevents out-of-state applicants from taking or diverting water from within Oklahoma, Tarrant sought to enjoin enforcement of state statutes on grounds that they were preempted by federal law (the Compact) and violated the Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce in unallocated water. The district court granted summary judgment for the OWRB; the Tenth Circuit affirmed. A unanimous Supreme Court affirmed. The Compact does not preempt the Oklahoma statutes. Interstate compacts are construed under contract law principles; the Compact, silent on the topic, is ambiguous regarding cross-border rights, so the Court looked to "the well-established principle that States do not easily cede their sovereign powers," the fact that other interstate water compacts have treated cross-border rights explicitly, and the parties’ course of dealing. The Oklahoma statutes do not violate the Commerce Clause; the water is not unallocated. View "Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v. Herrmann" on Justia Law

A group of Dewey Beach property owners appealed the dismissal of their lawsuit against the Town. They sued to challenge the town's authority to enter into what they characterized as a "private zoning arrangement" to violate certain longstanding zoning requirements. The Court of Chancery dismissed the complaint finding it was not filed within 60 days of the notice given following approval of the developer's record plan. Finding that the Court of Chancery lacked jurisdiction, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Murray v. Town of Dewey Beach" on Justia Law

James and Christine Garner sought side and rear yard variances in connection with a proposed single family home on their property. The City Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) voted to approve the Garners' application and grant the variances. H. Curtiss Martin and Virginia Drewry, whose property adjoined the Garners' property to the west, appealed. The circuit court upheld the decision of the BZA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in its judgment because the BZA's decision was contrary to law. Specifically, the Court held that none of the conditions asserted by the Garners to justify their request for a variance satisfied the requirements of section 9.18(b) of the City Charter, which enumerates the conditions and justifications the property owner must show in order for the BZA to authorize a variance. View "Martin v. City of Alexandria" on Justia Law