Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Elba Township brought an action against the Gratiot County Drain Commissioner seeking to enjoin the commissioner from consolidating the drainage districts associated with the No. 181-0 drain and its tributary drains. Elba Township argued that the consolidation proceedings had violated the Drain Code because the No. 181-0 drain petition for consolidation lacked the statutorily required number of freeholder signatures and the notice of the hearing by the board of determination had been deficient. Plaintiffs David Osborn, Mark Crumbaugh, Cloyd Cordray, and Rita Cordray intervened, similarly seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and claiming that the petition was defective and that the notice of the meeting of the board of determination was defective, resulting in a violation of their due process rights. With regard to the due process claim, plaintiffs’ primary complaint was that some of the property that would be affected by the drainage project lay outside the townships listed in the notice, although the notice stated that it was being sent to persons liable for an assessment. The drain commissioner moved for summary judgment, arguing that the appropriate number of signatures had been gathered and that the notice given appropriately informed those affected by the proposed consolidation of the date, time, and place of the board-of-determination hearing. Elba Township and plaintiffs filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court granted the drain commissioner’s motion, finding that only 5 freeholder signatures were required on the petition rather than the 50 signatures the township claimed. Elba Township and the Osborn plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s exercise of equitable jurisdiction, but reversed on the merits. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the lower courts improperly exercised equitable jurisdiction over the signature-requirement question but properly exercised such jurisdiction over the question of notice. "The former question is purely statutory and, as such, there were no grounds on which the lower courts could properly exercise equitable jurisdiction. Though the exercise of equitable jurisdiction over the latter question was proper, we conclude that constitutional due process did not entitle plaintiffs to receive notice of the 'board of determination' hearing. The trial court’s order granting summary judgment for defendant was reinstated. View "Elba Township v. Gratiot County Drain Commissioner" on Justia Law

Firebaugh claimed that a lack of adequate drainage in part of the Central Valley Project (CVP) caused poor quality water flow into its service area. Firebaugh argued that Interior should be ordered to provide the necessary drainage or, alternatively, to pay money damages. The court held that Interior's broad discretion in matters of drainage precluded both claims. Firebaugh's proposals did not involve discrete actions that Interior was legally required to take; rather, they involved matters of discretion and, as such were beyond the scope of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(1). Providing irrigation water without concomitantly providing adequate drainage for it was a discretionary function and, therefore, not actionable under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2674. View "Firebaugh Canal Water District, et al v. United States, et al" on Justia Law

Defendants, the city zoning board of review and the members of that board voted at a February 23, 2009 meeting to approve a request for an extension of time in which to substantially complete certain improvements to property. The request was referenced in one of the items contained in the agenda posted with respect to the board's meeting. Plaintiffs alleged that the agenda item violated the Rhode Island Open Meeting Act because it was a vague and indefinite notice to the public and one lacking in specificity. The superior court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that the agenda item provided sufficient notice and thus did not violate the Act. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the agenda item did not fairly inform the public of the nature of the business to be discussed or acted upon, and thus the agenda item did not comply with the standard established by the Act. Remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs with instructions that the action taken by the zoning board be declared null and void. View "Anolik v. Zoning Bd. of Review of City of Newport" on Justia Law

The Lloyds owned property abutting property owned by the Bardorfs. Both properties were zoned R-10. The Bardorfs filed an application for a special-use permit proposing the removal of a deck and an existing two-story addition on the rear of their home and the construction of an addition and a deck. The Lloyds objected to the application. The city's zoning board of review (board) granted the special-use permit. The superior court affirmed the board's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the board and trial justice did not err in applying the standard governing a special-use permit to the Bardorfs' application, as the appropriate form of relief for a party seeking to expand a dimensionally noncomforming structure is a special-use permit; (2) neither the superior court nor the board erred in allowing the Bardorfs to utilize expanded lot coverage authorized by a 1992 dimensional variance; (3) because the zoning ordinance does not contemplate a calculation of building mass or three-dimensional spaces in the criteria for alterations of dimensionally noncomforming structures, the trial justice did not err in finding the addition would intensify the nonconformity associated with lot building coverage; and (4) legally competent evidence supported the trial justice's findings. View "Lloyd v. Zoning Bd. of Review for City of Newport" on Justia Law

Appellants owned property in North Myrtle Beach bounded by water on the west and north. In early 2007, they applied to the Department of Health and Environmental Control ("DHEC") for a critical area permit to construct a replacement bulkhead. DHEC issued a Critical Area Permit to Appellants. The permit included a special condition: "Provided the proposed bulkhead is placed in the same location as the existing bulkhead." In response to a complaint, a DHEC Enforcement and Compliance Project manager inspected Appellants' property and observed the replacement bulkhead was partially constructed in a different location along the northern property line and that fill dirt had been placed in the area between the house and new bulkhead. DHEC issued Appellants various written warnings, including a Cease and Desist Directive and a Notice of Violation and Admission Letter. However, follow-up inspections revealed Appellants continued to alter the critical area and construct the replacement bulkhead in a different, unauthorized location. Accordingly, DHEC sent Appellants a Notice of Intent to Revoke the permit. Thereafter, (in 2010) DHEC issued a separate administrative enforcement order assessing against Appellants a civil penalty of $54,0002 and requiring Appellants to restore the impacted portion of the critical area to its previous condition. However, rather than requesting a contested case before the ALC, Appellants filed an action in circuit court seeking judicial review of the Enforcement Order de novo and requesting a final order "overturning [DHEC's] [Enforcement Order] and decision dated [. . .] 2010, with prejudice[.]" The circuit court granted DHEC's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court found section 48-39-180 did not confer jurisdiction on the circuit court to review administrative enforcement orders issued by DHEC. Rather, the circuit court held such orders were administrative in nature and governed by the APA. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court and affirmed dismissal of the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Berry v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law

In 1908, the United States granted the railroad right-of-way to Pacific Railroad Company for railroad purposes. In 1976, the government conveyed 83.32 acres of land partially burdened by the right-of-way to Brandt’s parents, in fee simple, subject to the right-of-way. In 1987, WYCO acquired the railroad right-of-way and operated the rail line. In 1996, WYCO filed a Notice of Intent to Abandon Rail Service with the Surface Transportation Board. The STB approved abandonment in 2003, and, in 2004, WYCO notified the STB that it had completed abandonment. In 2006, the government sought declaratory judgment that title to the abandoned right-of-way had vested in the government under the National Trails System Improvements Act of 1988, 16 U.S.C. 1248(c). Brandt sought quiet title and argued that, to the extent the government acquired some interest in land formerly occupied by the easement, that interest would constitute a taking for which just compensation is owed. The Claims Court dismissed the takings claim for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1500. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that Brandt did not have claims “pending” for purposes of section 1500 when he filed his takings complaint. View "Brandt v. United States" on Justia Law

In a case consolidating the competing annexation petitions of Biloxi and D’Iberville, the chancellor ultimately awarded each city a reduced area from that requested, determining that it was unreasonable for either city to annex the entire area requested, and then determining that it was reasonable to award each city a smaller, reduced area. Both cities appeaedl this decision, and Biloxi raised jurisdictional issues for the first time on appeal. Because Biloxi raised personal jurisdiction on behalf of third parties, and because Biloxi failed to raise this issue at the trial-court level, the Supreme Court found that Biloxi not only lacked standing to raise this issue, it also waived it. Further, because the chancellor’s decision awarding each city a reduced area was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed the annexations as modified by the chancellor. View "In The Matter of the Enlarging, Extending and Defining the Corporate Limits and Boundaries of the City of Biloxi" on Justia Law

In 2007, Respondents John Karpinski, Clark County Natural Resources Council and Futurewise (challengers) filed a petition with the Growth Management Hearings Board alleging Clark County was not in compliance with the Growth Management Act (GMA). The Challengers specifically argued that under the Act's requirements, the various lands affected by a 2007 local zoning ordinance designated as agricultural land of long-term commercial significance (ALLTCS) could not be designated as an urban growth area (UGA) by the ordinance. The cities of Camas and Ridgefield began proceedings to annex certain parcels of the disputed lands designated UGA by the 2007 ordinance. The Challengers did not contest the annexations, nor did any party bring the annexation proceedings to the attention of the Board. The Board ultimately found that Clark County was not in compliance with the GMA, specifically finding that certain land designations from the 2007 ordinance were clearly erroneous, including designation of the annexed lands as UGA. Multiple parties were permitted to intervene, and the Board's decision was appealed. The superior court entered an order that resolved various claims on appeal, including claims related to the annexed lands. The court reversed the Board's finding that Clark County's designation of a portion of the annexed lands as UGA was erroneous. The Challengers thereafter appealed the superior court's order. The ultimate issue before the Supreme Court in this case was one of appellate procedure: whether the court of appeals erred by reviewing separate and district claims that had been resolved but were not actually raised on appeal. THe parties did not challenge the disposition of those claims, thus those claims were finally adjudicated. However, the appellate court addressed the abandoned claims sua sponte and reversed the lower court's unchallenged rulings. The Supreme Court vacated the appellate court's opinion reversing the superior court's unchallenged rulings. View "Clark County v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Review Bd." on Justia Law

The Fall River zoning board of appeals (Board) granted the C.B.L. Realty Trust (Trust) a variance for certain real property owned by it. The Fall River building inspector subsequently issued a notice of violation, ordering the trust to cease and desist from violating a Fall River zoning ordinance that concerned execution of the ordinance. The Board reversed the building inspector's order. Plaintiff, E & J Properties, LLC, commenced this action in the Land Court challenging the Board's decision. The Land Court affirmed the Board's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board properly considered whether the city ordinance had been violated, as alleged in the notice of violation, on account of the Trust's failure to comply with the Board's variance decision within some specified "reasonable time"; and (2) the Board's decision that the variance did not require demolition within a particular time period was both legally tenable and reasonable. View "E & J Props., LLC v. Medas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed to the superior court from the decision of the planning and zoning commission of the town of Clinton (Defendant), granting, subject to certain conditions, its applications for a special permit and for coastal site plan review. Plaintiff caused Defendant to be served with a complaint, but the complaint was not accompanied by a citation or a summons. The trial court dismissed the administrative appeal for lack of personal jurisdiction because the service of process did not conform to the requirements of Conn. Gen. Stat. 8-8(f)(2). Plaintiff appealed, claiming that, although the service of process was defective, it should have been allowed to add the citation and serve the corrected process pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-72. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's failure to attach a summons or citations to the complaint was a substantive defect in the service of process and, thus, was not the type of technical defect that was amendable pursuant to section 52-72. View "New England Road, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n" on Justia Law