Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant submitted a proposal to the City of Pine Bluff Planning Commission requesting a Use Permitted on Review permit to utilize certain premises in Pine Bluff as a foster-care facility for displaced children. The Planning Commission and City Council denied Appellant's request. On appeal, the circuit court granted summary judgment for the City, concluding that, although Pine Bluff City Ordinance 29-37 conferred standing on Appellant to bring the action, the ordinance was in conflict with Ark. R. Civ. P. 17, which requires that an action be brought by the real party in interest, and Rule 17 overrode the ordinance. Consequently, the circuit court ruled that, because Appellant was not the real party in interest, she lacked standing to bring suit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the record did not contain the ordinance, the record was inadequate for review. View "Coleman v. City of Pine Bluff" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants enforced two local ordinances in violation of the Eighth Amendment. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's order granting summary judgment to defendants. The court reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for retrospective relief because those claims were not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; the court reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for prospective relief because those claims have not been mooted by defendants' voluntary conduct; the court did not reach the merits of plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment challenges; and the court held that jurisdiction existed as to plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claims and remanded for a consideration of the merits in the first instance. View "Bell, et al v. City of Boise, et al" on Justia Law

Appellant Catherine Lakey and twelve other homeowners owned property that bordered a parcel owned by Puget Sound Energy, Inc. (PSE) on which there was an electrical substation. The homeowners sued PSE and the City of Kirkland after PSE constructed a new substation on PSE property. The homeowners sought review of the trial court's decision to exclude testimony of their expert under the "Frye" rule, and the court's ultimate decision to grant summary judgment on behalf of PSE. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court improperly excluded the expert's testimony under the "Frye" rule but properly excluded it under the Rules of Evidence ER702. Furthermore, the Court reversed the trial court's decision with respect to their Land Use Petition Act (LUPA) claims, finding that LUPA did not apply to the homeowners' inverse condemnation claim. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy" on Justia Law

Lowell and Deborah Fuller, and Ronald and Sheila M. Turner, appealed a circuit court judgment which found that, although the Town of Magnolia Springs held no riparian rights in and to the Magnolia River, the Town was entitled to construct improvements on the shores of the River and extending into the River for a boat launch, a boat dock, and/or a pier to be used in connection with Rock Landing, a public landing on the River, and that Rock Street, a public street in the Town that adjoined the lands owned by the Fullers and the Turners and that terminated at Rock Landing, could be used for temporary parking "for the purpose of launching a boat, kayak, canoe or other float at Rock Landing." The Town cross-appealed that part of the judgment that declared the Town was without authority to convert a portion of Rock Street from a public street to a parking facility and recreational area. On appeal, the Fullers and Turners argued that the remedy ordered by the circuit court was inconsistent with the underlying factual findings and conclusions of law. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the conclusions of law were indeed contradictory to the remedy the circuit court fashioned. The Court reversed the circuit court and remanded the case for the court to either revise its conclusions of law or the relief it ordered. Furthermore, because the Town's cross-appeal directly related to the issues raised on appeal, the Court ordered the cross-appeal to be reconsidered by the circuit court on remand. View "Fuller v. Town of Magnolia Springs " on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved the interplay between rulings and requirements relating to zoning in connection with a planned development and enforcement of restrictive covenants and deed restrictions applicable to property within the development. Plaintiff obtained municipal zoning approval to reconfigure the lot lines in her two-lot farmstead parcel within the Quechee Lakes subdivision, as well as to construct a dwelling on the second, yet-to-be-developed lot. The Environmental Division affirmed the zoning board's award of the latter permit. Notwithstanding that order, in a declaratory judgment action also initiated by plaintiff, the civil division concluded that plaintiff's proposed construction violated the applicable restrictive covenants and deed restrictions. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the Environmental Division's decision resolved the dispute, that the civil division improperly considered extrinsic evidence when the disputed deed restrictions were clear on their face, that defendants' challenge to plaintiff's right to build the proposed dwelling was time-barred, and that the character of the development had changed so much that the disputed deed restrictions are no longer valid. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiff's theory of the case was that the deed language was ambiguous; plaintiff was instrumental in framing the trial court's task as one of construing ambiguous deed language; and plaintiff led the way in introducing extrinsic evidence in support of plaintiff's own interpretation. "Given this record, plaintiff cannot now challenge the trial court's consideration of extrinsic evidence to interpret the documents." The Court concluded that plaintiff suffered no prejudice from the trial court's decision to consider the testimony about the context surrounding the disputed deed language - both that offered by plaintiff and by defendants. Finding no error in the trial court's decision to deny the motion for declaratory judgment, the Court reached no other issues plaintiff raised in her appeal and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Marsh Inter Vivos Trust v. McGillvray, et al." on Justia Law

A real estate developer (Developer), purchased property contained within a proposed sudivision. The County issued to Developer a total of fifty-two building permits, for which Developer paid a proffer fee of $12,000, which was $4,000 more than Developer expected to pay. In 2007, Developer filed an action asking the trial court to declare that the County could not lawfully assess the $4,000 fee. In 2011, after the fee had been paid on all fifty-two permits, the court found that the $4,000 fee was unlawful. In 2008, Developer instituted a restitution action seeking reimbursement of the fees. The trial court consolidated this restitution action and the declaratory judgment action for a bench trial. After ruling in Developer's favor in the declaratory judgment action, the court ruled in the restitution action that Developer was barred from being awarded reimbursement of the unlawful fees because it paid them "voluntarily" within the meaning of the voluntary payment doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in holding that Developer's action for reimbursement of the disputed fees was barred under the voluntary payment doctrine. View "D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case arose from an administrative law court's (ALC) decision authorizing Respondent Kiawah Development Partners to construct a bulkhead and revetment on Captain Sam's Spit (the Spit) on Kiawah Island. In 1999, the Office of Coastal Resource Management (OCRM) established a baseline and building set back line twenty feet landward based on information that the Spit had accreted, and had not been subject to any significant, measurable erosion between 1959 and 1999. The movement of the baseline prompted Respondent to consider development of the Spit. On February 29, 2008, Respondent submitted an application to DHEC for a permit to construct a combination bulkhead and revetment in the area. On December 18, 2008, DHEC issued a conditional permit approving the construction of the erosion control structure for a distance of 270 feet. DHEC refused the permit request for a remaining 2,513 feet based on its concerns regarding cumulative negative impacts, including interference with natural inlet formation and possible adverse effects on wintering piping plovers. DHEC also determined that the project was contrary to the policies set forth in the Coastal Zone Management Program (CZMP). Respondent requested a final review conference by the DHEC Board, but the Board declined to hold a review conference. Respondent then requested a contested case hearing before the ALC, and challenged the denial of the construction of a bulkhead and revetment along the remaining 2,513 feet. The Coastal Conservation League (CCL) opposed the construction of any bulkhead or revetment on the Spit, and also requested a contested case hearing challenging the decision to authorize the 270 foot structure, but supporting denial of the remainder. The cases were consolidated. The ALC granted Respondent's permit to construct the bulkhead and revetment, subject to certain conditions reducing and altering its size. DHEC and CCL (collectively, Appellants) appealed the ALC's order. The Supreme Court reversed the ALC and remanded the issue in a decision published in late 2011. The Court subsequently granted Respondent's petition for rehearing, and accepted an amicus brief from the Savannah River Maritime Commission (the SRMC). The Court then withdrew its initial opinion, and issue this opinion, affirmed the decision of the ALC. "The essence of Appellants' argument is rooted in dissatisfaction with the verbiage and structure of the ALC's order, and not in actual errors of law or the absence of substantial evidence. The ALC acted within the permissible scope of its authority in modifying the existing permit to include a structure no larger than that requested by Respondent or initially reviewed by DHEC. On appeal of a contested case, we must affirm the ALC if the findings are supported by substantial evidence." View "Kiawah Development v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law

Petitioners Stephen Bartlett and others, appealed a superior court order that vacated a City of Manchester Zoning Board of Adjustment decision which granted intervenor Brookside Congregational Church a variance. Although petitioners asked the trial court to reverse the ZBA's decision, they appealed the court's order because it ruled that Brookside's proposed use and similar uses of its property were permitted as accessory uses under the Manchester Zoning Ordinance (ordinance) as a matter of right. Brookside cross-appealed, asking the Supreme Court to reinstate the ZBA's grant of the variance. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the superior court order and remanded the case to the ZBA for further proceedings. View "Bartlett v. City of Manchester " on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the closure of the Franklin Shelter, an overnight facility for homeless men in downtown Washington D.C. On appeal, plaintiffs alleged that the closure violated federal and D.C. antidiscrimination statutes. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal on res judicata grounds because plaintiffs could have raised these claims in two prior Superior Court cases. View "Sheptock v. Fenty" on Justia Law

Good News appealed from the district court's determination on remand from the Ninth Circuit that the Town's ordinance restricting the size, duration, and location of temporary directional signs did not discriminate between different forms of noncommercial speech in an unconstitutional manner. In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the court held that the ordinance was not a content-based regulation and was a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction. Accepting the court's opinion in Reed as law of the case, the court concluded that the Sign Code was constitutional because the different treatment of types of noncommercial temporary signs were not content-based as that term was defined in Reed, and the restrictions were tailored to serve significant government interests. Good News' other challenges did not merit relief. Further, the court determined that the amendments to the Sign Code made by the Town during the pendency of the appeal did not moot this case and that Good News could file a new action in the district court should it wish to challenge the new provisions of the Sign Code. View "Reed, et al v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, et al" on Justia Law