Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Town of Amherst (Town) appealed Housing Appeals Board (HAB) orders vacating the denial by the Town’s planning board (Board) of subdivision and site plan approval sought by the respondents, Migrela Realty Trust II and GAM Realty Trust (collectively, Applicant). In November 2020, Applicant filed a subdivision/site plan approval application with the Board for 54 age-restricted and unrestricted housing units. Applicant previously had been granted a conditional use permit (CUP) for “an increased project density” of up to 54 units under the Town’s since-repealed Integrated Innovative Housing Ordinance (IIHO). During the review process with respect to the subdivision/site plan application, the project’s density was reduced from 54 to 49 units. The composition of age-restricted and unrestricted units was also modified, with the final plan designating 14 units as age-restricted, 65-and-older units and the remaining 35 units as unrestricted. In April 2021, the Board denied the site plan because: (1) the Board perceived conflicts between the proposed project and federal law; and (2) “the proposed design does not protect and preserve the rural aesthetic the Town has consistently valued, as is required by Section 4.16A of the Zoning Ordinance.” Finding no reversible error in the HAB's orders, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed judgment in favor of Applicant. View "Appeal of Town of Amherst" on Justia Law

A Vermont trial court determined that both the Town of Isle La Motte and the road commissioner Shelby Turner were entitled to qualified immunity and granted their motions for summary judgment after concluding that decisions regarding road alterations were discretionary, “involv[ing] an element of judgment or choice,” rather than ministerial, meaning “prescribe[d].” The underlying tort action in this appeal followed an August 2016 motor vehicle accident in the Town: Plaintiff Paul Civetti was driving a propane truck on Main Street when he lost control of the vehicle causing it to roll over and come to rest on its roof. Plaintiff argued defendants were negligent in failing to widen Main Street in accordance with Vermont Town Road and Bridge Standards, causing his accident. The State of Vermont promulgated Town Road and Bridge Standards to serve as guidance for municipalities when they decide to construct or alter a town highway. Plaintiff filed a negligence claim against defendants the Town of Isle La Motte and Turner, in his capacity as road commissioner, seeking damages for plaintiff’s injuries. The parties disputed what authority, if any, the Town Selectboard delegated to the road commissioner to construct, lay out, and alter Town roadways. The Vermont Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that deciding whether to widen Main Street was discretionary, thus entitling both the Town and the road commissioner to qualified immunity. The Court therefore affirmed. View "Civetti v.Town of Isle La Motte, et al." on Justia Law

This matter involved permits issued by the Department of Environmental Protection (the Department) to Gibraltar Rock, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation seeking to operate a quarry on a 241-acre property in New Hanover Township (the Township). The Environmental Hearing Board (Board) rescinded the permits finding that their issuance was inconsistent with statutory and regulatory requirements. The Commonwealth Court reversed the Board’s decision for reasons that were never raised by the parties, including that the Board’s opinion effectuated an unconstitutional taking. Based on its review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the Commonwealth Court erred in considering issues not raised by Gibraltar and then by reversing the Board’s rescission of the permits. The Court therefore vacated the order of the Commonwealth Court and remanded for the Commonwealth Court to consider the issue raised in Gibraltar’s petition for review. View "Gibraltar Rock v. Dept. of Env. Protection" on Justia Law

Walker Commercial, Inc. (“Walker”) filed a Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 106(a)(4) complaint seeking review of the decision of Marshall Brown, the Director of Water of the City of Aurora (“Director”), to levy a storm drain development fee against Walker’s real property. Walker filed its Rule 106(a)(4) complaint in district court thirty days after the Director’s final decision—two days past Rule 106(b)’s twenty-eight-day filing deadline. Walker contended that C.R.C.P. 6(b) allowed the district court to extend Rule 106(b)’s filing deadline upon a showing of excusable neglect. The Director disagreed, arguing that Rule 6(b) did not apply to Rule 106(b) because Rule 106(b)’s deadline established a limitation period that was jurisdictional and that must be strictly enforced. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed with the Director and concluded that Rule 6(b) does not apply to extend Rule 106(b)’s twenty-eight-day filing deadline. The Court concluded the district court properly dismissed Walker’s Rule 106(a)(4) amended complaint as untimely. Because the original complaint was untimely, the trial court also properly dismissed Walker’s additional Claim 3 raised in its amended complaint. View " Brown v. Walker Commercial" on Justia Law

In 2003, JCJIC proposed a 312-unit apartment complex on 15.45 acres of vacant land along the Petaluma River. In 2008, after starting a draft environmental impact report (DEIR), for compliance with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code 21000), Petaluma adopted General Plan 2025. In response, JCJIC submitted an application for a 278-unit complex. After conducting site visits, the California Department of Fish and Wildlife, the Regional Water Quality Control Board, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries Service identified the issues the EIR should address. A “Habitat Mitigation Monitoring Plan” was incorporated. In 2018, the DEIR was published. JCJIC provided consultant studies regarding environmental impacts, including on “Special Status Species.” The Planning Commission considered traffic impacts, floodplain impacts, and decreased quality of neighborhood life. City Council members requested supplemental documentation and authorized the preparation of a final EIR. JCJIC further reduced the proposal to 205 units; reduced the height of buildings; increased setbacks from the River; and implement a “Traffic Calming Plan.” The Final EIR concluded the revisions eliminated or reduced several potential significant impacts. In 2020, JCJIC submitted another plan with 180 units.Objectors disputed the adequacy of the EIR’s special status species analysis and failure to analyze emergency evacuations. The City Council certified the EIR and approved zoning amendments. The trial court and court of appeal upheld the approvals. View "Save North Petaluma River and Wetlands v. City of Petaluma" on Justia Law

The property at issue was part of a larger tract purchased by Clarence Saloom in 1953 during his marriage to Pauline Womac Saloom. The entire tract was about 80 acres and became known as the “Pine Farm.” Plaintiffs were Clarence and Pauline’s three children: Patricia Saloom, Clarence Saloom Jr., and Daniel Saloom. Pauline died in 1973, and her one-half community interest in the Pine Farm was inherited by plaintiffs. A judgment of possession recognizing them as owners of Pauline’s one-half interest in the Pine Farm, subject to a usufruct in Clarence’s favor, was signed in 1974, and recorded in the public land records of Lafayette Parish. About two years later, the Louisiana Department of Highways (now the Department of Transportation and Development (the “state”)), contacted Clarence about purchasing a piece of the Pine Farm in connection with a project to widen and improve La. Highway 339. The instrument identifies Clarence as “husband of Pauline Womac Saloom” but does not mention Pauline’s death or plaintiffs’ inheritance of her interest in the property. Plaintiffs are not identified in the act of sale, did not sign it, and apparently were unaware of it for several years. In 1985, after learning of their father’s 1976 conveyance, plaintiffs hired an attorney who informed the state that plaintiffs owned an undivided one-half interest in the property. In 2015, about twenty years after Clarence’s death, the state began constructing improvements to Highway 339 on the property. Plaintiffs again contacted the state. In a May 18, 2016 letter, plaintiffs’ counsel confirmed the same information he had relayed to the state over thirty years earlier, specifically the state did not purchase all of the property in 1976 because Clarence only owned an undivided one-half interest. The state claimed to have acquired all interests in the property at issue and declined payment for plaintiffs' interest. Plaintiffs thereafter filed suit seeking damages for inverse condemnation. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal judgment reversing the trial court’s judgment and granting the state’s motion for summary judgment was vacated. Because the court of appeal did not consider the state’s remaining arguments in support of its motion and in opposition to plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the case was remanded the matter to the court of appeal for consideration of the state’s remaining assignments of error. View "Saloom v. Louisiana Dept. of Transportation & Dev." on Justia Law

Defendant Department of General Services and real party Joint Committee on Rules of the California State Senate and Assembly (collectively DGS) prepared an environmental impact report (EIR) to determine the environmental effects of a project they proposed that would "significantly" affect the California State Capitol Building in Sacramento (Historic Capitol). Plaintiffs Save Our Capitol! and Save the Capitol, Save the Trees filed petitions for writ of mandate contending the EIR did not comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The trial court denied the petitions. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing: (1) the EIR lacked a stable project description; (2) the EIR did not adequately analyze and mitigate the project’s impacts on cultural resources, biological resources, aesthetics, traffic, and utilities and service systems; (3) the EIR’s analysis of alternatives to the project was legally deficient; and (4) DGS violated CEQA by not recirculating the EIR a second time before certifying it. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed in part and affirmed in part. The Court found the EIR’s project description, analyses of historical resources and aesthetics, and analysis of alternatives did not comply with CEQA. View "Save Our Capitol v. Dept. of General Services" on Justia Law

In this real property dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court for Defendants following the court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants, holding that the trial justice did not err in ruling that the disputed land was a paper street and in finding that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.Plaintiff filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that certain property was a public road that ran to the boundary of Plaintiff's property and that Plaintiff had the right to use the full length of the property and the right of access to his property. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. View "Davis v. Town of Exeter" on Justia Law

Plaintiff TransFarmations, Inc. appealed a superior court decision to uphold the Town of Amherst Planning Board's (Town) decisions to deny TransFarmations' two successive applications for a conditional use permit (CUP). In May 2019, TransFarmations requested a “Conceptual Meeting” with the Town’s planning board (Board) concerning its proposed development of an approximately 130-acre property known as the Jacobson Farm. It stated that the “development will be designed to meet many of the desired attributes the Town . . . has articulated in [its] Master Plan and [Integrated] Innovative . . . Housing Ordinance (IIHO),” including workforce housing and over-55 housing. TransFarmations subsequently submitted a CUP application under the IIHO for a planned residential development containing 64 residential units. In its challenge to the decisions, TransFarmations argued both that the decisions failed to adequately state the ground for denial and that the Board acted unreasonably because the second CUP application was materially different from the first. The trial court concluded that the Board adequately provided the reason for its first decision on the record because “the Board members discussed, in detail, their reasons for concluding that no material differences [between the first and second applications] existed.” The court also concluded that “the Board acted reasonably and lawfully in reaching [that] decision.” Accordingly, the court affirmed both of the Board’s decisions. TransFarmations contended the trial court erred in affirming the Board’s decision not to accept the second application because TransFarmations submitted that application “at the Board’s invitation and with the information the Board requested.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded TransFarmations’ second application supplying the requested information was “materially different from its predecessor, thus satisfying Fisher.” Because the trial court’s decision concluding otherwise misapplied Fisher v. Dover, it was legally erroneous. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s order as to the second CUP decision and remanded. View "TransFarmations, Inc. v. Town of Amherst" on Justia Law

This appeal centered whether Section 6 of the California Constitution required the state to reimburse the defendant local governments (collectively permittees or copermittees) for costs they incurred to satisfy conditions which the state imposed on their stormwater discharge permit. Defendant-respondent Commission on State Mandates (the Commission) determined that six of the eight permit conditions challenged in this action were reimbursable state mandates. They required permittees to provide a new program. Permittees also did not have sufficient legal authority to levy a fee for those conditions because doing so required preapproval by the voters. The Commission also determined that the other two conditions requiring the development and implementation of environmental mitigation plans for certain new development were not reimbursable state mandates. Permittees had authority to levy a fee for those conditions. On petitions for writ of administrative mandate, the trial court upheld the Commission’s decision in its entirety and denied the petitions. Plaintiffs, cross-defendants and appellants State Department of Finance, the State Water Resources Board, and the Regional Water Quality Board, San Diego Region (collectively the State) appealed, contending the six permit conditions found to be reimbursable state mandates were not mandates because the permit did not require permittees to provide a new program and permittees had authority to levy fees for those conditions without obtaining voter approval. Except to hold that the street sweeping condition was not a reimburseable mandate, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Dept. of Finance v. Commission on State Mandates" on Justia Law