Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The City of Palm Springs closed off one of its downtown streets to all vehicular traffic for a period of three years to allow a tourism organization to install and display a large statue of Marilyn Monroe in the middle of the street. A citizens’ group called the Committee to Relocate Marilyn ("the Committee") petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate challenging the street closure, alleging the City did not have the statutory authority to close the street. Additionally, the Committee alleged the City erroneously declared the street closure categorically exempt from environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The City demurred to the petition for writ of administrative mandate, arguing it had the authority to close the street for three years under Vehicle Code section 21101(e), and its local equivalent, Palm Springs Municipal Code section 12.80.010. The City claimed the street closure was temporary, and therefore permissible. Further, the City argued the CEQA cause of action was untimely. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of the City. After its review, the Court of Appeal concluded the Committee pleaded allegations sufficient to establish: (1) the City exceeded its authority under the Vehicle Code and Municipal Code; and (2) the timeliness of its CEQA cause of action. After the notice of exemption was filed, the City abandoned its plan to vacate vehicular access to the street and elected to close the street instead. Because the City materially changed the project after it filed its notice of exemption, and it did not afford the public an opportunity to consider the revised project or its environmental effects, the notice of exemption did not trigger a 35-day statute of limitations. Instead, the CEQA cause of action was subject to a default statute of limitations of 180 days, measured from the date the Committee knew or should have known about the changed project. The Court determined the Committee timely filed its CEQA cause of action. In light of these conclusions, the Court reversed the judgment of dismissal, vacated the demurrer ruling, and instructed the trial court to enter a new order overruling the demurrer as to these three causes of action. View "Committee to Relocate Marilyn v. City of Palm Springs" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court affirming the determination of the Planning Board that Amazon Services, LLC's's proposed use of property it owned in Prince George's County fell within the definition of "Warehouse" under section 27 of the Prince George's County Code and was, therefore, permitted by right at the property, holding that the district court did not err.Amazon sought approval to make certain modifications and improvements to its property, which the Planning Board approved, concluding that the proposed use of the property qualified as a "warehouse" use under the applicable zoning ordinance. The District Council for Prince George's County affirmed. On review, the District Council concluded that the Planning Board correctly determined that Amazon's proposed use of the property qualified as a "warehouse and distribution facility" use under the zoning ordinance. The circuit court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the decision of the District Council affirming the Planning Board's approval of Amazon's design plan for the property. View "Crawford v. County Council of Prince George's County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) denying the petition for a declaratory judgment filed by Block Island Power Company (BIPCo), holding that there were no grounds to overturn the PUC's decision.In 2009, the legislature enacted R.I. Gen. Laws 39-26.1-7 (the enabling act) authorizing the Town of New Shoreham Project. In 2017, BIPCo sought a declaratory judgment declaring that the enabling act required the costs for BIPCo's interconnection facilities and backup transformer to be socialized across all electric ratepayers in the state, not just those in the Town. The PUC issued a judgment against BIPCo. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the PUC's reading and application of the statute was without error. View "In re Block Island Power Co. Petition for Declaratory Judgment" on Justia Law

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission granted a license to Interim Storage Partners to store spent nuclear fuel near the New Mexico border. New Mexico challenged the grant of this license, invoking the Administrative Procedure Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act. The Commission moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Objecting to the motion, New Mexico invoked jurisdiction under the combination of the Hobbs Act, and the Atomic Energy Act. The Tenth Circuit determined these statutes could combine to trigger jurisdiction only when the petitioner was an aggrieved party in the licensing proceeding. This limitation applied here because New Mexico didn’t participate in the licensing proceeding or qualify as an aggrieved party. "New Mexico just commented to the Commission about its draft environmental impact statement. Commenting on the environmental impact statement didn’t create status as an aggrieved party, so jurisdiction isn’t triggered under the combination of the Hobbs Act and Atomic Energy Act." The Court found the Nuclear Waste Policy Act governed the establishment of a federal repository for permanent, not temporary storage by private parties like Interim Storage. And even when an agency acts ultra vires, the Court lacked jurisdiction when the petitioner had other available remedies: New Mexico had other available remedies by seeking intervention in the Commission’s proceedings. So the Commission’s motion to dismiss the petition was granted for lack of jurisdiction. View "Balderas, et al. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, et al." on Justia Law

Heritage Hunter Knoll, LLC (Heritage), appeals the circuit court’s dismissal of its appeal for a lack of jurisdiction. The Lamar County Board of Supervisors (Board) amended the Unauthorized Dumping and Litter Ordinance (waste ordinance) to discontinue the county’s garbage collection service to multifamily residences, duplex developments, apartment complexes, and commercial properties. Notably, the amendment advised that “[a]ny citizen who [wa]s affected or aggrieved by this Ordinance may apply to the Lamar County Board of Supervisors (at its regularly scheduled meetings) for a Variance to the terms, provisions and applications of this Ordinance.” Heritage, a limited liability company, owned three properties in Lamar County: Hunter Lane, Heritage Cove, and Knoll Cutoff. Heritage received notice of the Board’s amendment to the waste ordinance by letter dated July 23, 2018. In August 2018, the Board passed a second, clarifying amendment to the waste ordinance. In September 2018, the Board approved Heritage’s variance request for the Knoll Cutoff property, but it denied the variance requests for Hunter Lane and Heritage Cove. Heritage did not appeal the Board’s amendment to the waste ordinance or the Board’s denial of its variance requests. In January 2019, the county implemented the amended waste ordinance. On February 1, 2019, Heritage filed suit in federal court claiming that the Board’s amendment to the waste ordinance was unlawful and that it violated Heritage’s constitutional rights. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined Heritage’s appeal was untimely as to the amendment to the waste ordinance but timely as to the Board’s denial of Heritage’s variance requests. The circuit court’s judgment of dismissal was affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. View "Heritage Hunter Knoll, LLC v. Lamar County, Mississippi" on Justia Law

Camden County, Georgia appealed a superior court's denial of its “Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Other Relief” concerning an order entered by Camden County Probate Judge Robert Sweatt, Jr., setting a special election for a referendum on whether resolutions authorizing the County’s purchase of land for a rocket launch facility should have been repealed (the “Referendum”). The County claimed the Referendum was not authorized under Subsection (b) (2) of Article IX, Section II, Paragraph I of the Georgia Constitution, which established home rule for counties (the “Home Rule Paragraph”) and that the results of the Referendum are a nullity. As a result, the County argued that the superior court erred in denying its petition for writs of prohibition and mandamus against Judge Sweatt and its petition for a judgment declaring that the Referendum was not authorized under the Constitution. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the superior court. View "Camden County v. Sweatt, et al." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court entering summary judgment for the Town of Pittsfield, New Hampshire and dismissing Plaintiff's allegation that the Town's zoning ordinance, as applied by the Town's Board of Selectmen, was unconstitutionally vague and violated his First Amendment and equal protection rights, holding that the district court did not err.Plaintiff applied for and received a permit to keep a trailer on his property for storage purposes. In 2016 and 2017, the Board granted Plaintiff permit extensions. In 2018, the Board denied Plaintiff's request for a third extension and required him to remove the trailer from his property. Plaintiff subsequently brought this action, invoking 42 U.S.C. 1983 and challenging the ordinance. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court provided the requisite notice that it would reach Plaintiff's claim of content or viewpoint discrimination at summary judgment and properly entered summary judgment on this claim; (2) the Town's application of the ordinance against Defendant did not violate Defendant's equal protection rights; and (3) the ordinance, as applied by the Town, was not unconstitutionally vague. View "McCoy v. Town of Pittsfield, NH" on Justia Law

In 2010, the City of Irvine adopted a plan to guide development of the Irvine Business Complex (the IBC), which covered roughly 2800 acres in the City. It also prepared and approved a program environmental impact report (the 2010 PEIR) that studied the effects of the development plan under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). Several years later, real party in interest and appellant Gemdale 2400 Barranca Holdings, LLC (Gemdale), submitted a plan to redevelop a 4.95-acre parcel in the IBC. The City determined all the environmental effects of the proposed project had been studied in the 2010 PEIR, and it found the project would have no further significant environmental effects. It approved the project over the objections of Hale Holdings, LLC, the managing member of plaintiff IBC Business Owners for Sensible Development (petitioner). Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of mandate. The trial court granted the writ and entered judgment in favor of petitioner. The City and Gemdale appealed, arguing the City correctly approved the project. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the contentions made on appeal: (1) there was insufficient evidence showing the project’s greenhouse gas emissions were within the scope of the 2010 PEIR; and (2) no exemption applied because the project involved unusual circumstances which could cause significant environmental effects. As such, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "IBC Business Owners for Sensible Development v. City of Irvine" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals reversing the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Wapello County in this property dispute, holding that the district court correctly concluded that the parties' agreement allowed the County to remove a group of vehicles on Landowners' property.Landowners were operating a vehicle repair and salvage business on residential property in Wapello County when the County notified Landowners of its' intent to clean up the alleged nuisance. The parties entered into a settlement agreement, under which Landowners agreed to allow the County to enter the property to remove any remaining "derelict vehicles" to the "satisfaction of the County" at the expiration of ninety days. At the conclusion of the ninety-day period, the County had the vehicles remaining on the property removed. Landowners brought this lawsuit, alleging breach of the agreement. The district court granted summary judgment for the County. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an objective standard applied to the County's determination of its satisfaction under the agreement; and (2) the removal of the vehicles did not breach that objective standard. View "McNeal v. Wapello County" on Justia Law

This case arises from major flooding events in the Houston area in 2016 and 2017. Local political subdivisions sued the United States Army Corps of Engineers, seeking compliance with alleged regulatory obligations. The district court dismissed with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The fundamental issue in the case is whether the Corps has violated any enforceable, legal obligation in the management of the relevant dams and reservoirs. A potential source for obligations imposed on the Corps is the 2012 Water Control Manual (“WCM”) adopted by the Corps for flood control in the relevant watershed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that Section 702 of the APA has been satisfied in that the complaint alleges Plaintiffs have been aggrieved by agency action, that the suit is not one for money damages, and that the injury arises from an officer or employee who has acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of law. Further, the court held that the Tucker Act does not provide an “adequate remedy” to the County’s claims within the meaning of Section 704. Further, the court wrote that since the regulation does not specify when such conditions require the Corps to update a WCM, the Corps must exercise discretion in deciding when updating a WCM is necessary. Such discretion is antithetical to a mandatory duty. Thus the court concluded there is no discrete, mandatory duty to revise. View "Ft Bend Cty v. US Army Corps" on Justia Law