Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court determining that the Historic Alexandria Foundation lacked standing to pursue the claims asserted in this case, holding that there was no error in the circuit court's judgment.Vowell, LLC filed applications to obtain certain permits for the renovation of property located in the Old and Historic District of the City of Alexandria. The Old and Historic Alexandria District Board of Architectural Review (the BAR) approved Vowell's applications, and the City Council affirmed the BAR's decision. The Foundation appealed the City's Council decision. The circuit court dismissed the matter with prejudice, concluding that the petition did not establish that the Foundation was an aggrieved party with standing to pursue the appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Foundation lacked standing because the allegations of the petition failed to establish that the Foundation suffered particularized harm that differed from that suffered by the public in general. View "Historic Alexandria Foundation v. City of Alexandria" on Justia Law

Plaintiff New Hampshire Alpha of SAE Trust (SAE) appealed a superior court order ruling that the Town of Hanover Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) had subject matter jurisdiction to hear SAE’s administrative appeal in the related case of New Hampshire Alpha of SAE Trust v. Town of Hanover, 172 N.H. 69 (2019) (SAE I). Defendant Town of Hanover (Town) cross-appealed the trial court’s denial of its request for attorney’s fees. Dartmouth College notified the Planning and Zoning Office that the chapter of the New Hampshire Alpha Chapter of Sigma Alpha Epsilon was suspended by the national organization. The College officially derecognized the fraternity, which meant the facility became ineligible to operate as an “I” district student residence. Continued use of the property as a residence would have been a violation of the zoning ordinance. In subsequent proceedings, SAE challenged the ZBA’s jurisdiction to hear SAE’s appeal in the first instance. The Town argued it was entitled to attorney’s fees because SAE’s challenge in this case was frivolous with no good faith basis in fact or law, and asserted that it was only intended to waste time and needlessly delay final judgment in this matter. Finding no reversible error in the superior court’s judgment, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed judgment to SAE’s appeal and the Town’s cross-appeal. View "New Hampshire Alpha of SAE Trust v. Town of Hanover" on Justia Law

Neighbors appealed three Vermont Environmental Division rulings related to their appeal of the Agency of Natural Resources’ (ANR) decision to authorize Snowstone, LLC, to discharge stormwater at a proposed project site pursuant to a multi-sector general permit (MSGP). The court dismissed for lack of statutory standing most of neighbors’ questions on appeal and dismissed the remaining questions as not properly before the court. In addition, the court concluded that neighbors’ motion for a limited site visit was moot, given its dismissal of neighbors’ appeal. Finally, the court granted landowners Justin and Maureen Savage’s motion to intervene in the proceedings. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that neighbors had standing to appeal the ANR’s authorization to act under a MSGP, and that their motion for a limited site visit was not moot. Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded the court acted within its discretion to allow landowners to intervene. Accordingly, dismissal of neighbors’ appeal was reversed, as was the dismissal of the motion for a site visit, and the court’s decision to grant landowners intervention was affirmed. View "In re Snowstone Stormwater Discharge Authorization (Harrington et al., Appellants)" on Justia Law

Lakeshore Camping, Gary Medler, and Shorewood Association petitioned for contested case hearings before an administrative-law judge (ALJ), to challenge permits and a special exception granted by the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (now the Michigan Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy (EGLE)) to Dune Ridge SA LP. In February 2014, Dune Ridge, a real estate developer, had purchased a 130-acre plot of land along the shore of Lake Michigan located in a critical dune area and therefore was subject to certain regulations under the sand dunes protection and management act (SDPMA). EGLE issued the requisite permits and special exceptions needed for development of the property to Dune Ridge, and in October 2014, Lakeshore Camping, Medler, and Shorewood filed their petitions under MCL 324.35305(1). Around September 2015, other individuals moved to intervene in the case as aggrieved adjacent property owners. The ALJ also allowed Lakeshore Group, an unincorporated nonprofit association, to intervene after determining that it had “representational standing” through Charles Zolper, one of its members. The ALJ denied intervention to some of these parties and ultimately dismissed the matter, concluding that the remaining petitioners and intervenors lacked standing. Lakeshore Camping and other petitioners were eventually dismissed from the case, leaving Jane Underwood, Zolper, and Lakeshore Group as the sole remaining petitioners. Dune Ridge then moved for partial summary disposition, seeking to dismiss Underwood because she no longer owned property immediately adjacent to Dune Ridge’s property. In July 2016, the ALJ granted the motion. In September 2016, Dune Ridge sold 15 acres of its property, including the land immediately adjacent to Zolper’s property, to Vine Street Cottages, LLC. Dune Ridge then moved for summary disposition as to Zolper, and the ALJ dismissed Zolper and Lakeshore Group, finding that they no longer had standing because Zolper was no longer an immediately adjacent property owner. Underwood, Zolper, Lakeshore Group, and others appealed the ALJ’s decision to the circuit court. The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the dismissed petitioners lost their eligibility for a contested hearing based on the facts presented. To this, the Supreme Court answered “no:” because the statute provides no means to deprive an eligible petitioner of a contested hearing, petitioners were entitled to a contested case hearing. Judgment was reversed and remanded to the administrative tribunal for a formal contested case hearing. View "Lakeshore Group v. Dept. of Enviro. Quality" on Justia Law

The Compassionate Use of Medical Cannabis Pilot Program Act took effect in 2014, 410 ILCS 130/999, “to protect patients with debilitating medical conditions, as well as their physicians and providers, from arrest and prosecution, criminal and other penalties, and property forfeiture if patients engage in the medical use of cannabis.” The Department of Agriculture (DOA), charged with enforcing the provisions of the Act related to registering and overseeing medical cannabis cultivation centers, adopted Administrative Rules.Medponics petitioned for administrative review of a DOA decision, awarding a permit to Curative, to operate a medical cannabis cultivation center in Aurora. Medponics alleged that the location of Curative’s proposed facility violated the Act because it was located within 2500 feet of the R-1 and R-5 districts in Aurora, both of which Medponics alleged were zoned exclusively for residential use. DOA found Curative’s proposed location satisfied the location requirement because multiple nonresidential uses were authorized in Aurora’s R-1 and R-5 districts. The circuit court reversed the DOA’s decision.The appellate court ordered the permit reinstated to Curative. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. DOA’s interpretation of the location requirement is not erroneous, unreasonable, or in conflict with the Act; the definition is reasonable and harmonizes with the purpose of the Act. View "Medponics Illinois LLC v. Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

The City of Burlington and the Vermont Agency of Transportation (VTrans) jointly constructed the Champlain Parkway, a roadway project intended to connect Interstate 189 to downtown Burlington, and planned to make numerous improvements to the surrounding area. Fortieth Burlington, LLC (Fortieth) owned property adjacent to the project and challenged the decision of the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources (ANR) to grant the project a renewed stormwater discharge permit. Fortieth argued before ANR and the Environmental Division that the agency unlawfully waived a filing deadline in its 2017 stormwater regulations and misinterpreted a provision of its 2017 Stormwater Management Manual. Finding no inconsistency with the governing statute or previous agency interpretations, “no unjust, unreasonable, or absurd consequences, and no compelling indications of error,” the Vermont Supreme Court concluded the City was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "In re Champlain Parkway SW Discharge Permit (Fortieth Burlington, LLC, Appellant)" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from two cases filed in the Chancery Court of Madison County, Mississippi, consolidated by the chancery court on its own order. Petitioners from the community of Gluckstadt sought incorporation of approximately 10.8 square miles of incorporated territory in Madison County. The City of Canton petitioned for annexation of approximately 6.7 square miles of unincorporated territory in Madison County, consisting of five proposed areas (Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5). The chancery court entered a final decree, granting, in part, the Gluckstadt Incorporators’ petition. The decree granted Canton’s proposed annexation of Areas 1 and 2 but denied Canton’s proposed annexation of Areas 3, 4, and 5. Canton and Ron Hutchinson (Incorporation Objectors) appealed the chancery court’s grant of incorporation, claiming the chancery court lacked jurisdiction over the incorporation petition because it did not include two-thirds of the signatures of the qualified electors residing in the proposed incorporation area. Various citizens (Annexation Objectors) appealed the chancery court's grant of annexation of Areas 1 and 2. Canton cross-appealed the chancery court's denial of annexation as to Areas 3, 4 and 5. Finding no manifest error with the chancery court's final decree in both cases, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of the Enlarging, Extending and Defining the Corporate Limits and Boundaries of the City of Canton, Mississippi" on Justia Law

El Dorado County voters adopted Measure E in June 2016. Measure E’s stated purpose was to end the practice of “paper roads.” Prior to Measure E, if a project requiring discretionary approval would increase traffic beyond certain thresholds, the project could be approved so long as the developer contributed its proportional share of traffic impact fees to cover the cost of future road improvements, and so long as the necessary traffic-mitigating improvements were included in the County’s 10- or 20-year (depending on the project type) Capital Improvement Program. Measure E sought to end the practice of developments going forward, while traffic-mitigating road improvements remained on paper. Soon after Measure E passed, plaintiff-appellant Alliance For Responsible Planning petitioned for a writ of mandate as well as declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking to have Measure E declared invalid. Alliance argued, among other things, that Measure E violated the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Defendants Sue Taylor et al. (Taylor) appealed a judgment granting in part Alliance’s petition for a writ of mandate. On appeal, Taylor contended the trial court erred in: (1) prematurely considering the facial challenge; (2) granting Alliance’s petition as to certain policies implemented by Measure E; and (3) granting Alliance’s petition as to Measure E’s eighth implementation statement. Finding no reversible error in the trial court’s decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed judgment. View "Alliance For Responsible Planning v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Developers submitted an application for a Berkeley mixed-use development with 135 apartments over 33,000 square feet of retail space and parking, pursuant to Government Code section 65913.4, which provides for streamlined, ministerial approval of affordable housing projects meeting specified requirements. The site is the location of the West Berkeley Shellmound, “believed to have been one of the first of its kind at the Bay’s edge, built ca 3,700 B.C.,” part of a City of Berkeley Landmark. Shellmounds were “sacred burial sites for the average deceased mound-dweller,” slowly constructed over thousands of years from daily debris and artifacts. The city denied the application.The court of appeal ruled in favor of the developers. There is no evidence that the project “would require the demolition of a historic structure that was placed on a . . . historic register.” Remnants and artifacts could be disturbed, but that is not the issue under section 65913.4(a)(7)(C). With regard to tribal cultural resources, the project’s draft environmental impact report concluded impacts on the Shellmound would be reduced to “a less-than-significant level” by agreed-upon mitigation measures. Given the Legislature’s history of attempting to address the state’s housing crisis and frustration with local governments’ interference with that goal, and the highly subjective nature of historical preservation, the intrusion of section 65913.4 into local authority is not broader than necessary to achieve the legislation's purpose. View "Ruegg & Ellsworth v. City of Berkeley" on Justia Law

In order to fund construction of an underground parking garage and other improvements in Balboa Park, the City of San Diego entered into a “lease revenue bond” transaction. This type of transaction was approved by the California Supreme Court in Rider v. City of San Diego, 18 Cal.4th 1035 (1998) and by the Court of Appeal court in San Diegans for Open Government v. City of San Diego, 242 Cal.App.4th 416 (2015) (SanDOG). After these cases, San Diego voters approved several amendments to the San Diego City Charter regarding bond issuance. Plaintiff San Diegans for Open Government (SanDOG) challenged the Balboa Park lease revenue bond transaction based on these amendments. In SanDOG’s view, one newly-amended provision restricted the ability of the City to use the Financing Authority to issue bonds without voter approval. The trial court disagreed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the court’s judgment on this issue. "The provision in question reflects a limitation on City-issued bonds; it does not cover bonds issued by the Financing Authority. Moreover, even if the provision were not limited to City-issued bonds, it would not cover the lease revenue bonds contemplated here. The additional challenge asserted by SanDOG (regarding a cooperation agreement) was moot; accordingly, that portion of the judgment was reversed and remanded for the trial court to dismiss the challenge as moot. View "San Diegans for Open Gov. v. Pub. Facilities Financing etc." on Justia Law