Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Allco Renewable Energy Limited appealed a Vermont Public Utility Commission denial of its request for a certificate of public good (CPG) to construct a solar energy project in Bennington, Vermont. Under Vermont law, a company desiring to build an in-state electric generation facility may not begin site preparation or construction unless the Commission “first finds that the [project] will promote the general good of the State and issues a certificate to that effect.” Under the test used by the Commission, an adverse impact on aesthetics is undue if it “violate[s] a clear, written community standard intended to preserve the aesthetics or scenic, natural beauty of the area.” In 2015, petitioner applied for a CPG to construct a 2.0-megawatt solar electric generation facility. The project site was in a Rural Conservation District as defined in the Bennington Town Plan. The plan stated that development in Rural Conservation Districts “cannot be sited in prominently visible locations on hillsides or ridgelines.” Appellee Apple Hill Homeowners Association (AHHA) intervened in the CPG proceeding, as did the Town of Bennington. The Town initially argued that petitioner should not be granted a CPG because the project would violate clear, written community standards in the Town Plan, and would therefore interfere with the orderly development of the region and have an undue adverse impact on aesthetics. The Town later changed its position, voting not to oppose the project, and withdrew from the proceeding. Based in part on the Town’s decision not to oppose the project, the hearing officer issued a proposal for decision recommending the Commission conclude the project would not violate any written community standard, and would therefore not unduly interfere with the orderly development of the region or have an undue adverse effect on aesthetics. The Commission adopted the hearing officer’s findings and issued petitioner a CPG. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed, finding the Commission's conclusion was only based on the Town's decision not to oppose the project. The case was remanded to the Commission, who assigned it to a new hearing officer, who then reversed the prior decision, finding the project would therefore unduly interfere with the orderly development of the region and have an undue adverse impact on aesthetics. Ultimately the Commission concurred with this decision. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the Commission denied. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's last decision on this matter, upholding the denial of a CPG. View "In re Petition of Apple Hill Solar LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant City of Orange (the City) appealed an order denying an anti-SLAPP motion. The underlying lawsuit alleged a violation of the Ralph M. Brown Act (Brown Act). Plaintiff Mary’s Kitchen provided homeless services in the City of Orange. Prior to the filing of this lawsuit, the city manager for the City terminated Mary’s Kitchen’s license, citing safety concerns. Subsequently, the city council held an executive (i.e., closed) session to discuss potential unspecified litigation. Afterward, the city attorney exited the meeting and declared that the council had “unanimously confirmed” the termination of Mary’s Kitchen’s license. The Brown Act required that any contemplated action or topic of discussion be posted in an agenda at least 72 hours prior to the meeting; the meeting agenda pertinent here did not mention anything about Mary’s Kitchen’s license. Plaintiffs Mary’s Kitchen and Gloria Suess (chief executive officer and president of Mary’s Kitchen) filed a verified complaint/petition for writ of mandate against the City. The City filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that because the agenda described the meeting as discussing legal matters, the complaint/petition arose out of protected activity. The City took the position that no action was taken at the meeting, and that the unanimous approval described in the minutes simply reflected inaction—i.e., that the city council chose to do nothing to override the city manager’s decision to terminate the license. The court denied the motion, concluding the complaint targeted the City’s failure to provide adequate notice of the confirmation of the license termination rather than anything that was said at the meeting. To this the Court of Appeal agreed with this assessment and further concluded that the “unanimous confirm[ation]” was evidence of an action: ratification. View "Mary's Kitchen v. City of Orange" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Van Sant & Co. (Van Sant) owned and operated a mobile home park in Calhan, Colorado, for a number of years. In 2018, Van Sant began to publicly explore the possibility of converting its mobile home park to an RV park. In October 2018, Calhan adopted an ordinance that imposed regulations on the development of new RV parks, but also included a grandfather clause that effectively exempted the two existing RV parks in Calhan, one of which was connected to the grandparents of two members of Calhan’s Board of Trustees (Board) who voted in favor of the new RV park regulations. Van Sant subsequently filed suit against Calhan, several members of its Board, the owners of one of the existing RV parks, and other related individuals. asserting antitrust claims under the Sherman Act, as well as substantive due process and equal protection claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants successfully moved for summary judgment. Van Sant appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Van Sant & Co. v. Town of Calhan, et al." on Justia Law

New York brought this action against the National Marine Fisheries Service—the federal agency responsible for the summer flounder fishery—and several related federal entities. New York argues the current quotas fail to account for the long-term movement of summer flounder northward, closer to New York’s shores. New York claims the quotas violate the Magnuson-Stevens Act as well as the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court rejected that argument; it granted summary judgment to the Fisheries Service.   The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that in setting each state’s summer flounder quotas, the Fisheries Service properly weighed the relevant statutory considerations. The court explained that the NMFS adopted a rule that sought to “balance preservation of historical state access and infrastructure at recent quota levels, with the intent to provide equitability among states when the stock and quota are at higher levels.” The court explained that it could not say that this adjustment to the previous rule—the result of balancing ten different national standards—lacked a rational basis articulated in the administrative record. The court therefore concluded that the NMFS did not violate the MSA or the APA when it set summer flounder quotas through the 2020 Allocation Rule. View "State of New York v. Raimondo" on Justia Law

Petitioners James Beal, Mary Beth Brady, Mark Brighton, Lenore Weiss Bronson, Nancy Brown, William R. Castle, Lawrence J. Cataldo, Ramona Charland, Lucinda Clarke, Fintan Connell, Marjorie P. Crean, Ilara Donarum, Joseph R. Famularo, Jr., Philippe Favet, Charlotte Gindele, Julia Gindele, Linda Griebsch, Catherine L. Harris, Roy W. Helsel, John E. Howard, Nancy B. Howard, Elizabeth Jefferson, Cate Jones, Robert McElwain, Mary Lou McElwain, Edward Rice, April Weeks, Michael Wierbonics, and Lili Wierbonics, appealed a Housing Appeals Board (HAB) order that reversed a decision of the Portsmouth Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA), which, in turn, had reversed certain approvals granted by the Portsmouth Planning Board (Planning Board) to respondent, Iron Horse Properties, LLC (Iron Horse). Iron Horse owned real property at 105 Bartlett Street in Portsmouth. In 2021, it requested various approvals from the Planning Board in connection with its proposed redevelopment of the site: three multi-family apartment buildings with a total of 152 dwelling units. Iron Horse sought a site review permit, lot line revision permit, conditional use permit (CUP) for shared parking, and a wetland CUP. The Planning Board granted the approvals, and the petitioners, describing themselves as “a group of abutters and other concerned citizens,” then filed an appeal with the ZBA. The ZBA granted the appeal, effectively reversing the Planning Board’s site plan and CUP approvals. Following denial of its motion for rehearing, Iron Horse then appealed the ZBA’s decision to the HAB. The HAB reversed the ZBA’s findings as to six of the petitioners’ claims and dismissed the remaining three claims. Petitioners took their appeal to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, raising a number of issues that were consolidated under two overarching questions: (1) whether Iron Horse’s proposed project met the six criteria for a wetland CUP set forth in section 10.1017.50 of the Portsmouth Zoning Ordinance; and (2) whether Iron Horse’s permit requests were barred under the doctrine of Fisher v. City of Dover, 120 N.H. 187 (1980). Finding no reversible error in the HAB’s decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Beal, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus ordering the Union County Board of Elections to place a referendum on the November 7, 2023 general election ballot in this expedited election case, holding that the Union County Board of Elections and Secretary of State based their discretion and acted in clear disregard of the applicable law when they removed the referendum from the ballot.On the same day that the Marysville City Council passed an ordinance to annex 263.25 acres adjoining Marysville it passed an ordinance to rezone the territory from agricultural use to a planned-unit development. Relators circulated referendum petitions for the annexation ordinance, and the board certified the referendum to the ballot. Respondent filed an election protest to the referendum. The Secretary of State sustained the protest and excluded the referendum from the ballot. Relators then brought this action for a writ of mandamus to compel the board to place the referendum on the November 2023 general election ballot. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that it was an abuse of discretion to remove the referendum from the ballot. View "State ex rel. Miller v. Union County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

The Historic Architecture Alliance and the Laguna Beach Historic Preservation Coalition (collectively, the Alliance) appealed the denial of their petition for mandamus relief. The action involved a decision by the City of Laguna Beach and its City Council (collectively, the City) to approve real parties in interest Ian Kirby and Cherlin Kirby’s (the Kirbys) application to renovate and build an extension on an existing single-family dwelling listed in the City’s “Historic Resources Inventory.” Because of this listing, the Kirbys’ residence was considered a presumptive historical resource under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The Alliance asserted the showing it made before the City was sufficient to support the historical resource exception, which stated: “A categorical exemption shall not be used for a project which may cause a substantial adverse change in the significance of a historical resource.” The Alliance asserted the project caused a substantial adverse change in the significance of a historical resource and preparation of an EIR or a mitigated negative declaration was required. The Court of Appeal concluded substantial evidence supported the City’s finding the project was exempt under the historical resource exemption because it was consistent with the Secretary’s Standards. The Court further concluded the fair argument standard did not apply where application of the historical resource exemption and the historical resource exception depended on the same issue—whether the project complies with the Secretary’s Standards. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Historic Architecture Alliance v. City of Laguna Beach" on Justia Law

This case arose from the California Department of Water Resources’s (DWR) release of water from Lake Oroville down the Oroville Dam’s gated flood control spillway and emergency spillway in February 2017. The Butte County District Attorney filed suit under Fish and Game Code section 5650.11 on behalf of the State seeking civil penalties and injunctive relief against DWR. The statute authorized civil penalties against any “person” who deposited harmful materials into the waters of the state. The statute also authorized injunctive relief. The trial court granted summary judgment for DWR, finding DWR was not a “person” under section 5650.1. On appeal, the State contended the trial court erred in granting DWR’s motion because DWR was a “person” under section 5650.1. Alternatively, the State argued that, even if DWR was not a “person” under this provision, DWR did not negate the State's cause of action with respect to injunctive relief. The Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the judgment. View "Oroville Dam Cases" on Justia Law

Petitioners Debbie Leo d/b/a Miller Lake Retreat, LLC, Larinda McClellan, Louise Redman Trust, Walter Myrl Redman, and Kenneth Roberts appealed a district court's order affirming the Oklahoma Water Resources Board's (the OWRB) final order granting a permit to The City of Oklahoma City (the City) to divert stream water from the Kiamichi River in Pushmataha County, Oklahoma. The City cross-appealed the district court's order denying its motion to dismiss Petitioners' petition for judicial review for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The City contended Petitioners' failure to name the City as a respondent in their petition for judicial review of the OWRB's order was a fatal, jurisdictional flaw under the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act, (OAPA). The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that 75 O.S.2011, § 318(B)(2) required that the agency (here, the OWRB) be named as a respondent in the caption of the petition for review for the district court to acquire jurisdiction to review a final agency order. However, Section 318(B)(2) of the OAPA did not require the City be named as a respondent in the petition. Therefore, the district court's order finding it had jurisdiction to review the final agency order was affirmed. The Supreme Court further held the district court properly applied the Four Points of Law in O.A.C. § 785:20-5-4, including using the OWRB's calculation of available stream water and evaluation of beneficial use, which was based on substantial evidence in the record, with no findings of prejudicial error. Therefore, the district court's order affirming the OWRB's order was affirmed. View "Leo v. Oklahoma Water Resources Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim under the Open Meetings Act, Ohio Rev. Code 121.22 and denying Plaintiff's request for an award of statutory damages under the Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43(C)(2), holding that the court of appeals erred in its analysis of the statutory damages issue.In an earlier appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' grant of summary judgment for the Portage County Board of Commissioners, the Portage County Solid Waste Management District Board of Commissioners (SWMD) and the Portage County Court of Common Pleas and remanded the case with instructions that the court of appeals to determine whether Plaintiff was entitled to relief under the Open Meetings Act and Public Records Act. The court of appeals granted summary judgment for the board and the SWMD and denied statutory damages. The Supreme Court remanded the matter, holding that Plaintiff was entitled to an award of statutory damages. View "State ex rel. Ames v. Portage County Bd. of Commissioners" on Justia Law