Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was the tax status of a 9.9-acre parcel of land containing an 11,500-square-foot garage that was owned and used by Zlotoff Foundation, Inc., a nonprofit charitable organization, for the purpose of storing and maintaining a collection of classic automobiles that it displayed at its nearby museum. The trial court ruled that the garage and the land were tax-exempt because they were used for a public purpose. However, it denied the Foundation’s request for a refund of property taxes paid to the Town of South Hero from 2016 to 2018 because the Foundation did not obtain a certificate of authority allowing it to transact business in Vermont until 2019. The Foundation and the Town both appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed judgment. View "Zlotoff Foundation, Inc. v. Town of South Hero" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming a county board of adjustment's decision affirming the zoning administrator's grant of a zoning permit for construction of a new residence within an agricultural intensive district, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.The zoning administrator approved a zoning permit for the new residence. Appellants appealed, arguing that the zoning permit was for a "non-farm residence," and therefore, the construction was not permitted under zoning regulations. The board affirmed the zoning administrator's decision, and the district court affirmed. At issue in this appeal was whether the proposed residence was a "non-farm residence" under the applicable zoning regulations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the board of adjustment correctly determined that the new residence was not a "non-farm residence." View "Hochstein v. Cedar County Board of Adjustment" on Justia Law

The jaguar is a large felid found in the southwestern United States, Mexico, Central America, and South America. Pertinent here, the jaguar was listed as a foreign endangered species in 1972. In 2014, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service published a final rule designating 764,207 acres in New Mexico and Arizona as critical jaguar habitat. Plaintiffs filed suit, contending the Service’s designation was arbitrary and capricious. The district court ruled in favor of the Service. After review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit concluded the agency did not comply with the regulation, and the Tenth Circuit's "resolution of this issue is beyond doubt. Further, the agency had a chance to rectify this error, but failed to do so. When an agency does not comply with its own regulations, it acts arbitrarily and capriciously. " The Court therefore reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "NM Farm & Livestock Bureau v. United States Dept of Interior" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the court of common pleas affirming the decision of the Harrison Township Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) denying Appellants' request seeking approval to engage in sand-and-gravel mining, holding that the BZA erred in denying the request.Appellants filed an application for a conditional use permit to conduct sand-and-gravel mining. The BZA denied the application based on general conditions applicable to all conditional uses set forth in a Harrison Township zoning resolution. The court of common pleas and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a general standard that does not relate to public health or safety may not be applied to deny an application to conduct mining as a conditional use. View "Columbus Bituminous Concrete Corp. v. Harrison Township Board of Zoning Appeals" on Justia Law

Defendants County of Sacramento and the County Board of Supervisors (the County) approved Cordova Hills, a large master planned community comprised of residential and commercial uses and including a university (the Project). Plaintiffs Environmental Council of Sacramento and the Sierra Club (Environmental Council) filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the Project, which the trial court denied. Environmental Council appealed, contending the Environmental Impact Report (EIR) contained a legally inadequate project description, an inadequate environmental impact analysis, failed to analyze impacts to land use, and the County failed to adopt feasible mitigation measures. Central to the Environmental Council’s appeal was the contention that the university was not likely to be built, and since the EIR assumed the buildout of a university, it was deficient in failing to analyze the Project without a university. We shall affirm the judgment. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court’s assessment, that the County, in drafting the EIR, was required to assume all phases of the Project, including the university, would be built. The Court affirmed the trial court in all respects. View "Environmental Council of Sacramento v. County of Sacramento" on Justia Law

Applicant, the Snyder Group, Inc., which initially obtained approval from the City of South Burlington Development Review Board (DRB) to construct a planned unit development (PUD), appealed an Environmental Division’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City, that the City’s governing zoning bylaw concerning the transfer of development rights (TDRs) with respect to PUD applications did not comply with two subsections of the enabling statute and was unconstitutionally vague. Neighbors, as interested parties opposing the PUD, cross-appealed with respect to the Environmental Division’s rulings that the TDR bylaw complied with three subsections of the enabling statute. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court upheld the rulings challenged by neighbors, reversed the rulings challenged by applicant, and remanded the matter for Environmental Division to enter summary judgment in favor of applicant. View "In re Snyder Group, Inc. PUD Final Plat" on Justia Law

McGinnis Auto & Mobile Home Salvage, LLC salvaged discarded and dilapidated mobile homes on its property in Kent County, Delaware. According to the Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control (DNREC), a large and unsightly waste pile, possibly contaminated with asbestos, had accumulated over time. DNREC cited McGinnis for environmental violations and for operating a reclamation facility without a permit. DNREC gave McGinnis a chance to bring the property into compliance, but McGinnis failed to do so. DNREC responded by issuing a cease and desist order requiring McGinnis to remove the waste pile from the property in an environmentally responsible manner. McGinnis appealed the order to the Environmental Appeals Board, arguing that DNREC could order the illegal activity to stop, but could not order McGinnis to take affirmative action to remove the waste pile from the property. The EAB agreed with McGinnis, finding that the order exceeded the scope of its authority. The Superior Court affirmed the EAB’s decision, finding that DNREC did not have the authority under its cease and desist power to require McGinnis to remove the waste pile, direct how the waste had to be removed, or demand documentation. On appeal, DNREC contended that the EAB and Superior Court took too narrow of a view of DNREC’s cease and desist authority. The Delaware Supreme Court agreed: "it follows that the only way to cease and desist from the violation is to remove the contaminated debris from the site. ... the Secretary can require a violator to cease and desist from continuing the illegal storage of solid waste. If the violator ignores the Secretary’s order, Section 6005 provides the possible remedies for a violation of 'any order of the Secretary.' The Secretary may impose monetary penalties. The Secretary may seek injunctive relief in the Court of Chancery. And, in his discretion, the Secretary may opt for conciliation. None of the possible remedies is mandatory or inconsistent with the Secretary’s authority to enter a cease and desist order." View "DNREC v. McGinnis Auto & Mobile Home Salvage, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioners, consisting of several citizens groups and neighborhood associations, sought a contested case hearing in the administrative law court (ALC) to challenge the propriety of state environmental authorizations issued by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) for a project relocating and expanding the passenger cruise facility at the Union Pier Terminal (the Terminal) in downtown Charleston. Petitioners contended they had standing to seek this hearing as "affected persons" under section 44-1- 60(G) of the South Carolina Code (2018). The ALC concluded Petitioners did not have standing and granted summary judgment to Respondents. The ALC terminated discovery and also sanctioned Petitioners for requesting a remand to the DHEC Board. The court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court, however, concluded Petitioners did have standing, and thus reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the matter to the ALC for a contested case hearing. View "Preservation Society v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law

The City of San Diego (the City) appealed a judgment in a lawsuit filed by Citizens for South Bay Coastal Access (Plaintiff), which challenged the City's issuance of a conditional use permit allowing it to convert a motel that it recently purchased into a transitional housing facility for homeless misdemeanor offenders. Specifically, the City contended the trial court erred by ruling that the City was required to obtain a coastal development permit for the project because the motel was located in the Coastal Overlay Zone as defined in the City's municipal code. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in concluding that a coastal development permit was required under state law regulations promulgated by the California Coastal Commission (the Commission). Because the Commission certified the City's local coastal program, those provisions applied here rather than the Commission's regulations. "Under the City's local coastal program, the project is exempt from the requirement to obtain a coastal development permit because it involves an improvement to an existing structure, and no exceptions to the existing- structure exemption are applicable." Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment. View "Citizens for South Bay Coastal Access v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Junaid Lateef appealed a judgment entered in favor of the City of Madera (city) and the Madera City Council (city council) (collectively, respondents), which denied his petition for administrative mandamus and requests for declaratory and injunctive relief. At issue was the meaning of Madera Municipal Code section 10-3.1310(E), which set forth the minimum number of council votes required to overturn the Madera Planning Commission’s (commission) denial of an application for a conditional use permit: “A five-sevenths vote of the whole of the Council shall be required to grant, in whole or in part, any appealed application denied by the Commission.” Lateef appealed the denial of his application to the seven-member city council, which voted four-to-one to grant his appeal; however, one councilmember recused himself and another council seat was vacant. The city council denied Lateef’s appeal, ruling that he needed five votes (five-sevenths times the total membership of the council) to prevail. Arguing to the Court of Appeal, Lateef contended the city council was required to grant his appeal because the ordinance requires a five-sevenths vote of those councilmembers present and voting, and he received five-sevenths of the five votes that were cast, namely four votes. He also contended he was denied a fair trial because the recused councilmember and vacant seat were included as councilmembers when determining the number of votes needed to grant his appeal. Finding no merit to Lateef’s contentions, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Lateef v. City of Madera" on Justia Law