Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court denying Appellants' Me. R. Civ,. P. 80B petition for review of government action and affirming the decision of the Portland Planning Board to approve 37 Montreal LLC's application to construct a multi-unit residential building, holding that the Planning Board did not err in approving the application.On appeal, Appellants argued that the proposed development failed to meet the City of Portland's Code of Ordinance's height, setback, and design-review requirements, and therefore, the Planning Board erred in approving the application. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment below and remanded the matter to the Planning Board for findings of fact, holding that judicial review was impossible because the Planning Board's decision did not contain any of the required findings. View "Murray v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Department of Transportation (“PennDOT”) began constructing a diamond interchange and installing a drainage system on property abutting Interstate 70 (“I-70”) in Washington County, Pennsylvania. The property’s owner, Appellant Donald Bindas, petitioned for the appointment of a board of viewers, seeking compensation for this encumbrance upon his land. PennDOT asserted that its predecessor, the Department of Highways (“DOH”), had secured a highway easement for the land in question in 1958. Both the trial court and the Commonwealth Court agreed, dismissing Bindas’ suit. Upon its review of the statutory authority that PennDOT invoked, as well as the record, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that DOH’s failure to comply with the requirements of 36 P.S. § 670-210 rendered that easement invalid. Accordingly, the Court vacated the Commonwealth Court’s order, and remanded with the instruction that PennDOT’s preliminary objections be overruled. View "Bindas. v. PennDOT" on Justia Law

Appellant Tanner Altizer suffered serious injuries when he ran into a suspended cable fence while riding his off-road motorcycle on an unpaved area in an unoccupied area of the desert. The owner of the property, respondent Coachella Valley Conservation Commission (the Commission), placed the cable fence around its property to stop illegal dumping and off-road vehicles in order to protect the sensitive habitat. Altizer sued the Commission, alleging that the cable fence created a dangerous condition on public property. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Commission, and Altizer appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the Commission was entitled to hazardous recreational activity immunity under Government Code section 831.71 and affirmed. View "Altizer v. Coachella Valley Conservation Com." on Justia Law

The County of Santa Barbara (County) appealed from the entry of a preliminary injunction prohibiting its Road Commissioner from removing unpermitted encroachments placed in the public right of way along a portion of East Mountain Drive in Montecito. The County filed a cross-complaint alleging causes of action for public nuisance and trespass against respondents. The trial court issued a preemptory writ that suspends all efforts by County to enforce the right-of-way encroachments.   The Second Appellate District concluded that the trial court erred because Respondents are not correct on the merits of their CEQA claim and will not be irreparably harmed by the removal of encroachments installed without permits in the public right of way of an existing road. The County Road Commissioner is authorized by statute and local ordinance to remove any encroachment on a public right of way. The court explained that Respondents will suffer no irreparable harm because a party suffers no grave or irreparable harm by being prohibited from violating the law. View "Anderson v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

The Day family and Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D. Day Family Trust appealed a district court’s decision to grant the Idaho Transportation Department’s (“ITD”) motion for involuntary dismissal. ITD cross-appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying its request for attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(3). In 1961, the Days learned that access to their property via public highways would be affected when the state highway converted to a controlled-access federal interstate highway, then known as Interstate 80. The Days entered into a preliminary agreement with the Idaho Department of Highways (“IDH,” predecessor to ITD) that allowed IDH to take possession of approximately nine acres of the Day Property for construction of the interstate. In 1967, the Days entered into a right-of-way contract with IDH in furtherance of the 1961 Agreement. The 1967 Contract included an agreement for IDH to provide access to a future frontage road from I-80 to the Day Property. In the 1990s, the State began construction on the Isaacs Canyon Interchange near the Day Property. The Interchange Project eliminated a portion of the original 50-foot right of way that provided access to the Day Property under the 1967 Contract. Because of this, ITD provided replacement access easements to the Day Property. These replacement access easements were located southwest of the Interstate. The Days informed ITD the family was dissatisfied with the replacement easements and did not think they afforded the Days equivalent access to what they had prior to the construction of the Interchange. The Days sold the property to Edmonds Groves Land Holdings Inc. (“Groves”) in 2005, with the purchase price secured by a mortgage held by the Day Family. Groves later defaulted in its mortgage agreement with the Days during the recession in December of 2008. As a result, ownership of the Day Property reverted to the Day Family by way of deed in lieu of foreclosure. After the Days reacquired the property, they had difficulty obtaining title insurance because of concerns that “the access easement was owned by ITD and [the Days] did not have any statement that the easement was for the benefit of the Days.” They sued alleging inverse condemnation, and breach of contract. Finding no reversible error in the district court's dismissal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Day v. Idaho Transportation Department" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court upheld the final determination of the Maryland Department of the Environment to reissue with revisions a general discharge permit to Animal Feeding Operations (AFOs), holding that the Department's final determination was reasonable and complied with applicable water quality standards.The most recent iteration of the general discharge permit the Department issued to AFOs was finalized by the Department pursuant to certain statutory requirements requiring the Department to review and issue or reissue water pollution control permits once every five years. The circuit court vacated the permit and remanded the matter with instructions to incorporate certain water quality standards into the permit. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court, holding (1) the Department's AFO general discharge permit framework was reasonable and consistent with federal and state law; and (2) the Department's decision to evaluate each AFO individually and to require appropriately-tailored best-management practices to control the emissions where they presented a risk of discharge was reasonable and not an abuse of discretion. View "Dep't of Environment v. Assateague Coastal Trust" on Justia Law

In the first appeal arising from Plaintiff-respondent Margaret McCann’s dispute with the City of San Diego over the City’s environmental review process of a project to convert overhead utility wires to an underground system in several neighborhoods, she alleged the City violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) by failing to properly consider the environmental impact of two underground projects. The Court of Appeal concluded the City’s review process was incomplete as to one project (MND Project) because the City failed to analyze whether they were consistent with the City’s Climate Action Plan. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for the trial court to issue a peremptory writ of mandate ordering the City of set aside three resolutions that approved the projects. After remand, the trial court also ordered it would retain jurisdiction over the matter until the City complied with the relevant provisions of the CEQA. The City rescinded the project approvals and asked the court to discharge the writ. McCann objected to the City’s return and argued the trial court should not discharge the writ because the City did not perform the relevant analysis or affirmatively indicate it abandoned the projects. The trial court sustained McCann’s objection and declined to discharge the writ. The City then appealed, arguing it fully complied with the courts’ mandates. After review, the Court of Appeal determined the City satisfied the writ, and therefore held the writ had to be discharged. View "McCann v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Three conservation groups challenged the U.S. Bureau of Land Management’s approval of Jonah Energy’s development project on state and federal land in Wyoming. The project was designed to drill exploratory wells on land for which Jonah possessed development rights. The conservation groups argued the district court erred in upholding the BLM’s approval under the National Environmental Protection Act and the Federal Land Polocy and Management Act. Specifically, they contended the BLM inadequately considered the impact of the project on the sage-grouse and pronghorn antelope migration and grazing patterns. The Tenth Circuit concluded the BLM adequately collected and considered information on the sage-grouse and pronghorn, and selected a development plan that met statutory requirements. View "Western Watersheds Project, et al. v. United States Bureau of Land Management, et al." on Justia Law

The Oklahoma Turnpike Authority (OTA) brought an original proceeding to the Oklahoma Supreme Court asking the Court approve revenue bonds to finance the construction of three turnpike projects, update and repair turnpike facilities and infrastructure, refund prior revenue bonds and notes, and pay other costs. Protestants challenged the proposed bonds on several grounds, arguing that the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority lacked legislative authority to construct the three turnpikes. Title 69 O.S.2021, § 1718 provided that if the Court was satisfied that the bonds have been properly authorized in accordance with Article 17 of the Oklahoma Highway Code of 1968, 69 O.S.2021, § 1701 et seq., the Court would render its written opinion approving the revenue bonds. The OTA properly exercised its authority to determine the route for the South Extension. Further, the OTA has legislative authority pursuant to 69 O.S.2021, §§ 1705(f) and 1709(A) to issue additional bonds to finalize the Loop. Accordingly, the Supreme Court approved the revenue bonds. View "In the Matter of the Application of the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of the Town of Exeter in this action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief challenging the Town's decision to amend its zoning ordinance, which prevented Plaintiff from developing three commercial solar-field projects in Exeter, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on its allegations of error.On appeal, Plaintiff challenged several aspects of the superior court's judgment denying Plaintiff's request to enjoin enforcement of an emergency moratorium ordinance preventing review of Plaintiff's solar-field projects and to declare that Plaintiff's solar-field projects were vested pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 45-24-44. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under this Court's understanding of the relevant law, the trial court properly entered judgment in favor of the Town. View "Green Development, LLC v. Town of Exeter" on Justia Law