Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This case arose from the Preservation Society of Newport County’s (the Society) application for the construction of a Welcome Center near the entrance of a well-known Newport mansion. Bellevue-Ochre Point Neighborhood Association (BOPNA) initiated a declaratory judgment action seeking various declarations that the Welcome Center was prohibited under the City of Newport Zoning Ordinance. The Society filed a motion to dismiss. The hearing justice granted the motion, concluding that the issues presented in the complaint were within the jurisdiction of Newport zoning officials to determine and were inappropriate for a declaratory judgment action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice correctly determined that the issues raised in BOPNA’s complaint were within the zoning board’s authority and jurisdiction and were therefore inappropriate for resolution in an action seeking declaratory judgment. View "Bellevue-Ochre Point Neighborhood Ass’n v. Preservation Society of Newport County" on Justia Law

21 Seabran, LLC applied for two permits necessary to renovate a garage on a lakefront parcel. The Town of Naples Code Enforcement Officer denied the permits, concluding that the parcel would have insufficient shore frontage to comply with state and local law. The Town of Naples Board of Appeals denied 21 Seabran’s appeal, concluding that the proposed renovation would add to the parcel a second “residential dwelling unit” for purposes of the Town of Naples Shoreland Zoning Ordinance, which would render the parcel noncompliant. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) the Board’s determination that the proposed structure was a residential dwelling unit was erroneous; and (2) the Board’s conclusion that the parcel failed to comply with the minimum lot size law and rules was erroneous. View "21 Seabran, LLC v. Town of Naples" on Justia Law

Appellants appealed the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment and the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Board of the Local Improvement District No. 1101 and the Ada County Board of Commissioners (the Boards) in a case regarding assessments levied on properties within the Sage Acres Local Improvement District. Appellants also appealed the district court’s award of attorney fees to the Boards. Ada County Ordinance No. 780 established the Ada County Local Improvement District No. 1101, known as Sage Acres Local Improvement District (LID). The ordinance was adopted in 2011. The purpose of the LID was to construct a water delivery system for residential and irrigation use by properties within the Sage Acres Subdivision (Sage Acres) in Boise. water system was completed in 2014. Appellants challenged the creation of the LID and Ada County Ordinance No. 809, which confirmed the assessments levied on properties affected by the LID. In 2013, Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal from Assessments; the district court set the matter for trial in 2014, and ordered the parties to mediate no later than 90 days prior to trial. Prior to mediation, the Boards moved for summary judgment, arguing that Appellants’ claims were not legally or factually supported. Finding no reversible error in the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Boards, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hoffman v. Bd of Local Improvement Dist No. 1101" on Justia Law

Western Petroleum, LLC, and Maxum Petroleum Operating Company, Inc., doing business as Pilot Logistics Services (Pilot), appealed a district court order affirming their appeal of the Williams County Board of County Commissioners' decision to penalize Pilot for violating the county's temporary housing regulations. In September 2011 the Williams County Board of County Commissioners adopted temporary housing regulations relating to the use of "man camps" or "crew housing facilities" in the county. The use of temporary housing on property within the county was prohibited without a conditional use permit. In 2014 the Board became aware that Pilot was using its property for temporary housing after Western Petroleum's permit expired. Pilot was out of compliance on 40 RVs since September 6, 2012, and on seven mobile home units since September 6, 2013. Pilot also had two two-story framed houses on the property that were not permitted under Western Petroleum's conditional use permit. At its July 2014 meeting, the Board assessed a $29,635,000 penalty against Pilot for violating the temporary housing regulations. The Board calculated the penalty by treating each non-permitted use as a violation subject to a $1,000 penalty per day. The Board calculated the $1,000 penalty on a per housing unit, per day basis. The Board offered Pilot a reduced penalty of $1,885,000 if paid within 10 days. Pilot did not pay the reduced penalty and the Board imposed the full penalty. The district court affirmed the Board's decision, concluding the penalty against Pilot was supported by the evidence and was not an unreasonable interpretation of the temporary housing regulations. The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed, reversed and remanded because the Board unreasonably interpreted the regulations. View "Western Petroleum, LLC v. Williams Cty. Bd. of Commissioners" on Justia Law

In "Property Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court," (1 Cal.5th 151 (Property Reserve I- 2016)), the California Supreme Court reversed a Court of Appeals decision and remanded the matter for the appellate court to consider issues not addressed. The Department of Water Resources petitioned the trial court for orders authorizing it to enter onto various properties to conduct precondemnation studies and surveys. Before the trial court convened a hearing on the matter, the landowners requested to conduct discovery. The trial court denied the request, ruling the proceeding was exempt from discovery. The landowners also objected to the Department not naming allegedly indispensable parties. The trial court held the rules governing indispensable parties did not apply to this matter, but it ordered the parties to notify all the persons and entities the landowners claimed were indispensable parties. The landowners both petitioned for writ relief against, and appealed the trial court’s award of an entry order, challenging the constitutionality of the precondemnation entry statutes and attacking the court’s decisions to deny discovery and not order the joinder of indispensable parties. "Property Reserve I" resolved the constitutional issues, but the high court directed the Court of Appeal to address the landowners’ claims against the trial court’s rulings on discovery and indispensable parties. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in holding the proceeding was exempt from discovery, but the Court also found the landowners did not show prejudicial error. The Court also concluded the landowners’ contention regarding indispensable parties was moot, because the trial court gave the landowners all of the relief they sought and which the Court could have provided. View "Property Reserve, Inc. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

At issue in this matter was a development by Sunroad Enterprises and Sunroad Centrum Partners L.P. (together, Sunroad) of an office, residential, and retail project in the Kearny Mesa area of San Diego. Since 1997 the City of San Diego (the City) Council has approved the area for development under a master plan and over the ensuing years has thrice assessed the project for environmental impacts as required by CEQA. In 2012, Sunroad obtained a permit from the City to begin certain phases of residential development, including constructing several multilevel buildings over parking and ground level retail space. By the next year, Sunroad modified its design plans, ostensibly to meet real estate market demands, and sought the City's approval of the modified plans through a process known as substantial conformance review (SCR). The City's staff found that the modified plans substantially conformed with the conditions and requirements of the previously issued development permit and there was no need for further environmental impact documentation under CEQA. San Diegans for Open Government and CREED-21 (together, plaintiffs) appealed the staff's decision to the City Planning Commission. Following a public hearing, the Planning Commission voted to uphold the SCR decision. The City denied plaintiffs' appeal to the City Council. Plaintiffs argued they were entitled to appeal the SCR decision to the City Council under CEQA and the San Diego Municipal Code (SDMC). The Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the judgment. View "San Diegans for Open Govt. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

The Dyersville City Council voted to rezone the area containing the Field of Dreams movie site from agricultural to commercial in order to facilitate the development of a baseball and softball complex. Community members filed writs of certiorari, arguing (1) since the city council acted in a quasi-judicial function, the city council’s act of passing the ordinances was invalid; and (2) there was sufficient opposition to the rezoning to trigger a unanimous vote of the city council contained in the city code. The district court annulled the writs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the city council acted in its proper legislative function when it rezoned the subject property, and both ordinances were validly passed; and (2) no procedural or substantive errors affected the city council’s rezoning decisions. View "Residential & Agricultural Advisory Committee, LLC v. Dyersville City Council" on Justia Law

Friends of the Motherhouse, a nonprofit corporation and two individuals (collectively, Friends) filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the Portland City Council’s rezoning of a parcel owned by Sea Coast at Baxter Woods Associates, LLC and Motherhouse Associates LP (collectively, Sea Coast) was invalid. Sea Coast successfully moved to intervene and then moved for summary judgment. The superior court granted summary judgment for Sea Coast. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the Council acted within its broad legislative authority, and therefore, the superior court did not err in finding that Sea Coast was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Friends of the Motherhouse v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal in this case centered on the potential effects on the territory of school systems and the ownership of school property stemming from the annexation of parts of Fulton County by the City of Atlanta. In 1950, the Georgia General Assembly passed a local constitutional amendment addressing these issues (1950 LCA). In 1950, the independent school system of Atlanta (APS) was part of the City’s municipal government, not a separate political entity. In 1973, however, the General Assembly separated APS from the City’s municipal government by enacting separate charters for the two entities and removing most educational powers and responsibilities from the City government. In 2015, the City initiated this case by filing a declaratory judgment action in which it sought guidance on whether: (1) the City could annex Fulton County property without also expanding the boundaries of APS to cover the newly annexed area; and (2) the City could exercise its own delegated authority to determine if it wanted to expand the boundaries of APS after the City annexed new property. The City argued that HB 1620 (the pertinent legislation) did not properly continue the 1950 LCA, and, as a result, it stood repealed. The Fulton County School District (“FCS”) intervened, then the City moved for summary judgment, APS moved for judgment in its favor on the pleadings, and FCS moved to dismiss the City’s action. The trial court entered a final order denying the City’s motion, granting APS’s motion, and granting FCS’s motion, treating all of them as summary judgment motions. Ultimately, the trial court determined that: (1) the City’s declaratory action, in part, was not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity; and (2) the 1950 LCA was properly continued by HB 1620. The City appealed the trial court’s ruling that the 1950 LCA was properly continued, and APS has cross-appealed to contend that the trial court erred by not finding that the City’s declaratory judgment action was barred in its entirety by sovereign immunity. Because this matter was not ripe for consideration at the time that the trial court considered the City’s action, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s opinion. View "City of Atlanta v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys." on Justia Law

Brookside filed suit against the City alleging that the City Council's actions in proposing and advocating repeal of a 1990 ordinance - that prohibited the El Monte City Council from passing any form of mobilehome park rent control - violated an express prohibition of such activity in that ordinance. The superior court granted the City's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the trial court properly granted summary judgment for the City. The court rejected Brookside's arguments concerning the scope of the prohibitory language in the 1990 ordinance and arguments that the City Council’s actions violated the California Constitution’s implicit withholding of authority for a local government to propose initiative measures that amend or repeal earlier voter-approved ordinances. View "Brookside Investments v. City of El Monte" on Justia Law