Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner James Boyle, as trustee of the 150 Greenleaf Avenue Realty Trust, appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Transportation Appeals Board (TAB) affirming the denial of his application for a permit to construct a driveway onto a state highway. The TAB based its decision upon sections 7(a) and 7(e) of the New Hampshire Department of Transportation’s (DOT) “Policy for the Permitting of Driveways and Other Accesses to the State Highway System.” Although the TAB concluded that petitioner’s proposed driveway would adequately protect the safety of the traveling public, because it also determined that there was sufficient support for the hearings examiner’s conclusion that the proposed driveway would cause an unreasonable hazard to the traveling public, it upheld the hearings examiner’s denial of the petitioner’s permit application. On appeal, petitioner challenged the finding of an unreasonable hazard, arguing that it was impossible for a driveway to adequately protect the safety of the traveling public and simultaneously cause an unreasonable hazard to the traveling public. Thus, petitioner argued that the TAB erred in denying his permit application. The Supreme Court agreed with petitioner, and, therefore, reversed. View "Appeal of Boyle" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs (landlords), challenged San Francisco Planning Code 317(e)(4) as conflicting with the Ellis Act of 1985, Government Code section 7060, which protects property owners’ right to exit the residential rental business. The ordinance was enacted in 2013 in response to a growing concern by the Board of Supervisors (and others) about the shortage of affordable local housing and rental properties. Under section 317(e)(4), certain residential property owners (those undertaking no-fault evictions) including “Ellis Act evictions” were subject to a 10-year waiting period after withdrawing a rental unit from the market before qualifying to apply for approval to merge the withdrawn unit into one or more other units. The trial court found that the ordinance impermissibly penalized property owners for exercising their rights under the Ellis Act and was facially void on preemption grounds. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Section 317(e)(4) is preempted by the Ellis Act to the extent it requires a landlord effectuating a no-fault eviction to wait 10 years before applying for a permit to undertake a residential merger on the property. View "San Francisco Apartment Ass'n v. City & Cnty.. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Township of Franklin (the Township) adopted an ordinance revising its regulation of signs, including billboards. The ordinance permits billboards, subject to multiple conditions, in a zoning district proximate to an interstate highway but expressly prohibited digital billboards anywhere in the municipality. A company seeking to install a digital billboard challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance. The Law Division declared unconstitutional that portion of the ordinance barring digital billboards. The trial court viewed the Township's treatment of such devices as a total ban on a mode of communication. In a reported opinion, the Appellate Division reversed. Applying the "Central Hudson" commercial speech standard and the "Clark/Ward" time, place, and manner standard to content-neutral regulations affecting speech, the appellate panel determined that the ban on digital billboards passed constitutional muster. The Supreme Court disagreed: "simply invoking aesthetics and public safety to ban a type of sign, without more, does not carry the day." The Court declared the 2010 ban on digital billboards as unconstitutional and reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division. View "E&J Equities v. Board of Adjustment of Franklin Township" on Justia Law

H&G Land Company, L.P. entered into a lease agreement with APAC-Mississippi, Inc. (“APAC”), whereby APAC would operate an asphalt plant and mining operation on H&G’s land for a period of twenty years. H&G then filed an application for a special exception to extract sand and gravel on its property. The application included documentation concerning property, including ownership, government permits, insurance, a bond for reclamation of the property, and site proposals. Thereafter, the Panola County Land Development Commission held a series of hearings to consider H&G’s application. At the last hearing, the Commission denied the application and informed H&G that it could appeal to the Board, which reversed the Commission. At its next regularly scheduled meeting, the Board held a hearing to consider H&G’s request. Several local businesses and residents attended the meeting to oppose H&G’s request, so the Board permitted each side time to present their arguments. Following the presentations, the Board voted to approve H&G's application. The businesses and residents appealed. But finding no reversible error in the Board's approval, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Como Steak House, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors of Panola County" on Justia Law

The LaBerges appealed the Environmental Division’s affirmance of a Notice of Violation (NOV) issued by the Town of Hinesburg Zoning Administrator (ZA) for violation of a Town noise ordinance arising from use of a motocross track on their property. On appeal, the LaBerges argued the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and that the Environmental Division’s conclusion that the LaBerges violated the ordinance is clearly erroneous. Finding no such error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re LaBerge NOV" on Justia Law

Neighbor Mary Bourassa appealed the Environmental Division’s affirmance of a zoning permit application by Philip and Barbara Wagner and Christopher Guay, who wanted to build a single family residence and detached garage on two merged lots of a six-lot subdivision in Grand Isle. Bourassa, an owner of another lot in the subdivision, opposed development, chiefly on the ground that the proposed house would not be constructed within the “tree line” on the property, as required by the subdivision plat plan. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Wagner & Guay Permit" on Justia Law

In August 2014, the First Western Bank and Trust (Bank) applied for two variances from City of Minot zoning regulations for off-street parking after incorrectly calculating the size of an addition to its bank building. The Bank's application sought to reduce the required number of off-street parking spaces for its building from 131 to 110 and to reduce the required width of each parking space from 10 to 9 feet. After notice to the Bank's neighbors, the Minot Planning Commission met to consider the application, and several neighbors appeared to oppose the application. The Planning Commission approved the application, finding the existence of an exceptional topographical hardship and the variances could be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and without impairing the general purpose and intent of Minot's comprehensive zoning plan. The Planning Commission affirmed its earlier decision approving the application. The City Council later affirmed the Planning Commission's decision. Sixteen Minot residents living near the Bank appealed a judgment dismissing their appeal of the City Council’s decision to grant the Bank's application for zoning variances. The residents argued the district court erred in ruling they lacked standing under N.D.C.C. 40-47-12 to appeal the City Council's decision granting the variances. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in applying N.D.C.C. 40-47-12 as grounds for its standing decision. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court concluded the residents were not aggrieved applicants authorized to appeal a variance decision under N.D.C.C. 40-47-11. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment dismissing their appeal. View "Schmidt v. City of Minot" on Justia Law

The City of Springfield filed suit against the City of Papillion, and Sarpy County, seeking to enjoin Papillion from annexing land which had been indicated as Springfield’s area of future growth in a map adopted by the County in 1995. The district court for Sarpy County found that Springfield lacked standing; Springfield appealed. After review, the Nebraska Supreme Court found that Springfield asserted an infringement of its statutory governmental functions and rights under the County Industrial Sewer Construction Act. That infringement was sufficient to grant standing. The Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "City of Springfield v. City of Papillion" on Justia Law

Plaintiff owned a 105-acre tract of land in Wakefield. Approximately 68 acres of the tract was used for recreational vehicle campsites. In 1994, plaintiff obtained approval from the planning board to build 16 seasonal cabins on the remaining 37 acres of the tract. Each approved cabin was to be built on two acres. In 2001, the planning board decided that each cabin could be 600 square feet. Plaintiff then began creating the cabin development and as of 2007 it had constructed four cabins. In 2007, plaintiff consulted with the planning board about increasing the size of the remaining 12 cabins to approximately 850 square feet. Plaintiff’s request was denied and, despite the previous approval of 600 square feet per cabin, the permissible size of each of plaintiff’s remaining cabins was reduced to a maximum of 400 square feet. The matter was litigated and the Trial Court ordered that, because the plaintiff had relied upon the planning board’s prior approval in creating the cabin development, plaintiff was allowed to construct 600-square-foot cabins. In April 2011, plaintiff sought permission from the planning board to increase the size of the remaining 12 cabins to approximately 850 square feet. The request was again denied, and plaintiff appealed to the superior court. When the superior court upheld the planning board's decision, plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing: (1) nothing in the language of RSA chapter 216-I precluded it from constructing “890 square foot” cabins; (2) the planning board lacked the authority to enforce compliance with RSA chapter 216-I; and (3) its rights to procedural due process were violated by confusion about which town entity defendant's attorney represented at a May 2011 planning board hearing. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in ruling that, to comport with RSA chapter 216-I, the plaintiff’s “cabins must be less than 400 square feet.” The case was remanded for the superior court to vacate the planning board’s decision and for the planning board to address plaintiff’s request to increase the size of the remaining cabins. View "Lake Forest R.V. Resort, Inc. v. Town of Wakefield" on Justia Law

In order to receive federal housing funds (42 U.S.C. 2000d; the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601; and “42 U.S.C. 608(e)(5), 5304(b)(2), and 12705(b)(15)), the City of Chicago must certify that it is in compliance with federal requirements related to reducing the city’s admitted racial segregation. Hanna filed a qui tam suit, alleging that the city violated the False Claims Act because its policies, particularly “aldermanic privilege” and strategic zoning of relatively wealthy neighborhoods, have actually increased segregation, making its certifications false. Under “aldermanic privilege,” the City grants each alderman the “full authority to determine whether and where affordable, multifamily rental housing will be built and renovated in the ward.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Hanna did not allege the circumstances of the purported fraud with sufficient particularity to satisfy Federal Rule of Procedure 9(b). Hanna apparently had no insider information. He did not allege the “time, place, … and the method by which the misrepresentation was communicated” to him. Hanna’s complaint gave no information about which regulatory provisions Hanna thinks the city violated; it does not draw a link between the statutes Hanna cited and any particular alleged false certification. View "Hanna v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law