Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellants Natural Resources Board and Applicant Two Rivers-Ottauquechee (TRO) Regional Commission appealed the Environmental Division’s award of an Act 250 permit to Applicant B&M Realty, LLC, to construct a large mixed-use business park near the Interstate 89 Exit 1 interchange in the Town of Hartford. The trial court concluded that the project satisfied Act 250, including the requirement that it conform with the 2007 TRO Regional Plan. The Natural Resources Board and the TRO Regional Commission argued on appeal that the project was inconsistent with mandatory and unambiguous provisions in the regional plan. Applicant cross-appealed, arguing that the 2007 Regional Plan did not apply, and that the Supreme Court need not consider the plan because the proposed development will not have substantial regional impact. The Supreme Court concluded that the 2007 Regional Plan applied and that the trial court’s conclusion that the project will have substantial regional impact is supported by the evidence, but held that the project was inconsistent with several provisions in the regional plan. The Court accordingly reversed. View "In re B&M Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

Claimant Richard Borja, was employed by St. Bernard Parish Government (“St. Bernard”) as a firefighter. In March of 2004, claimant filed a disputed claim for compensation alleging that he had injured his right knee and right thumb in an accident in 2002, and he also alleged he had an occupational disease. He described his injuries on the 2004 disputed claim for compensation as a “torqued knee” and “Heart and Lung,” indirectly referencing the Fireman’s Heart and Lung Act. After the accident, the claimant began receiving maximum workers’ compensation benefits, which continued until St. Bernard terminated them one year later. In the meantime, claimant had taken disability retirement in January 2003. The disputed claim form was filed within one year of the termination of the benefits. St. Bernard ultimately admitted that claimant had sustained an injury to his right knee, but disputed any thumb injury as well as any heart and lung claims as being related to his employment, stating that it did not know about the injuries, or that alternatively, they were prescribed. While St. Bernard conceded the claimant had been receiving the maximum benefits from the date of the accident until January 2003, it also maintained that because the claimant voluntarily retired in that month, he had removed himself from the workforce and was no longer entitled to future workers’ compensation benefits. Throughout the 2004 litigation, claimant had consistently argued that his heart and lung conditions were related to his employment. The dispute eventually went to mediation, which resulted in a compromise that claimant would receive back compensation payments in two lump sums, bringing him current to 2008, and that he would receive weekly indemnity benefits which were the maximum claimant could receive at that time. By October 2008, claimant moved dismiss the 2004 litigation noting “that this matter has been settled in full.” By 2013, St. Bernard, identifying the claimant’s benefits as Supplemental Earnings Benefits (“SEBs”), gave notice that it would terminate SEBs effective August 27, 2013, on the basis that he would have received the full 520 weeks of payments. In November 2013, claimant filed another disputed claim for compensation citing “knees, heart and lung” as his injuries. Specifically, he described his 2002 injury to the knee. St. Bernard filed exceptions of prescription and res judicata. A workers’ compensation judge granted the exception of res judicata for the knee injury, and granted the exception of prescription as to the claim under the “Heart and Lung Statute.” On appeal, a majority of the court of appeal affirmed in an unpublished opinion. After its review, the Supreme Court found the lower courts erred in concluding the claimant’s request for medical benefits under the heart and lung statute had prescribed because claimant timely filed his 2013 disputed claim asserting permanent and total disability as a result of his heart and lung condition. The Court reversed the court of appeal’s judgment affirming the workers’ compensation judge’s rulings sustaining the exception of prescription and the exception of res judicata. View "Borja v. Fara St. Bernard Parish Gov't" on Justia Law

Union of Medical Marijuana Patients, Inc. (UMMP) appealed a trial court judgment denying its petition for writ of mandate, which challenged the City of San Diego's enactment of an ordinance adopting regulations for the establishment and location of medical marijuana consumer cooperatives in the City. UMMP argued that the City did not comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) when enacting the ordinance. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded that the ordinance did not constitute a "project" within the meaning of CEQA, and accordingly the City was not required to conduct an environmental analysis prior to enacting the ordinance. View "Union of Med. Marijuana Patients v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

In 2002 the Enterprise Rancheria of Maidu Indians of California (Enterprise Tribe) submitted a request to the United States Department of the Interior (Department) to acquire a site in Yuba County for the purpose of establishing a casino/hotel resort complex. Pursuant to statute, the Secretary was authorized to acquire land, within or without an existing reservation, for the purpose of providing land for Indians. Land so acquired after October 17, 1988, could not, with some exceptions, be used for gaming. The exception at issue here was where the Secretary “after consultation with the Indian tribe and appropriate State and local officials, including officials of other nearby Indian tribes, determines that a gaming establishment on newly acquired lands would be in the best interest of the Indian tribe and its members, and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community, but only if the Governor of the State in which the gaming activity is to be conducted concurs in the Secretary’s determination.” The Governor indicated his official concurrence with the Assistant Secretary’s determination. Plaintiff Auburn Tribe owned and operated the Thunder Valley Resort and Casino, approximately 20 miles from the Yuba County site. The Auburn Tribe filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief, alleging: (1) the Governor was required to comply with California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) before concurring in the Secretary’s decision to take lands into trust for the Enterprise Tribe; and (2) the Governor performed a legislative act when he concurred with the Secretary and when he negotiated and executed the compact with the Enterprise Tribe, in violation of the constitutional mandate of separation of powers. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded the CEQA did not apply here, and that the Governor’s concurrence did not violate the separation of powers clause. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "United Auburn Indian Community of Auburn Rancheria v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Washington Supreme Court granted review of a challenge to the Western Washington Growth Management Hearings Board's decision on the validity of Whatcom County's comprehensive plan and zoning code under the state Growth Management Act (GMA). The County argued that the Board's conclusions were based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, and asked the Supreme Court to rule that the County's comprehensive plan protected the quality and availability of water as required by the Act. After review, the Supreme Court rejected the County's arguments, finding that the plan did not satisfy the GMA requirement to protect water availability, and that the remaining arguments made were unavailing. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals in part and remanded this case back to the Board for further proceedings. View "Whatcom County v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hr'gs Bd." on Justia Law

The Court consolidated two cases in this opinion. Plaintiffs in both cases complained they were denied due process when the Board of County Commissioners of Elbert County (the Board) required them to rezone their properties before they could subdivide them. They argued that after the Board lost the documents reflecting the prior comprehensive zoning ordinance, it created new documents without following proper procedures for enacting an ordinance and covered up their misconduct. "Perhaps these allegations state a claim under Colorado law." After review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that were not deprived of their right to due process under the United States Constitution. View "Onyx Properties v. Elbert Board of County Commissioners" on Justia Law

In 2015, the City of Atlanta proposed to annex property in unincorporated Fulton County that the City recently had acquired, but the County objected. The property at issue was part of the Fulton County Industrial District, and the County pointed the City to a local constitutional amendment, which prohibited the annexation of property within the District. The City then filed a lawsuit against the County, alleging: (1) that the local amendment was never constitutionally adopted; (2) it was repealed in any event by operation of the Constitution of 1983; and (3) local laws purporting to continue the amendment were themselves unconstitutional. The City sought a declaratory judgment that its proposed annexation would be lawful. The trial court entered a declaratory judgment for the City, and the County appealed. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court vacated the declaratory judgment for the City, and remanded for the trial court to dismiss the case as nonjusticiable. View "Fulton County v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law

Charles Breland, Jr., and Breland Corporation (collectively, "Breland") appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of the City of Fairhope in Breland's declaratory action based on alleged negligent conduct by Fairhope in relation to real property owned by Breland. In 2000, Breland filed applications for permits and certifications from the United States Army Corps of Engineers and the Alabama Department of Environmental Management ("ADEM") in order to fill approximately 10.5 acres of wetlands on the property. Fairhope opposed the fill project. Breland purchased the mitigation credits required by the Corps permit, and hired engineers and consultants for the project sometime before he began actual filling activity. Eight years later, actual work on the fill project began, but the City issued a stop-work order that halted operations. Because his Corps permit would expire in late 2008, Breland sued Fairhope for declaratory relief and an injunction against the effects of multiple City ordinances passed in attempts to stop Breland's work. Fairhope moved to dismiss the complaint. Charles Breland testified that he dismissed his lawsuit against Fairhope when both his Corps permit had been extended (to 2013), and that "there [were] conversations that the city [initiated] about buying the property." According to Breland, by late 2011, he got the impression that Fairhope had been negotiating with him to buy the remainder of the property under false pretenses and that Fairhope actually was trying to delay Breland from resuming the fill project until the Corps permit expired. In early 2013, Breland sued again seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against Fairhope's attempts to stop the fill project. The trial court dismissed Breland's case on statute of limitations grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that each time Fairhope enforced its ordinances to stop Breland from filling activity on his property, Fairhope committed a new act that served as a basis for a new claim. Fairhope's last stop-work order was issued in November 2011; Breland filed this action on August 7, 2013. Accordingly, the two-year statute of limitations did not bar a claim for damages stemming from the 2011 stop-work order. View "Breland v. City of Fairhope" on Justia Law

In 2013, City of Los Angeles planning officials approved Kalnel’s proposed project to tear down a two-story, three-unit apartment building in the Venice area. After the City decided to halt the project, Kalnel petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate seeking to overturn the City's decision. The trial court denied the petition and Kalnel appealed. The court dismissed the appeal in part as to Kalnel's cause of action based on the Housing Accountability Act (HAA), Gov. Code, 65590, because Kalnel did not seek appellate review by way of a writ petition as required by that statute. The court affirmed as to the remaining causes of action because there is substantial evidence that the proposed project violated the visual and scenic elements requirement of the California Coastal Act, Pub. Resources Code, 30000, et seq., and because the Coastal Act takes precedence over statutes awarding density and height increase bonuses for proposed residential developments that include affordable housing units. View "Kalnel Gardens v. City of L.A." on Justia Law

The Department of Transportation petitioned to acquire property owned by Amerco Real Estate Co. and occupied by U-Haul Co. by eminent domain, asserting that the property in question was necessary for a highway expansion project. U-Haul opposed the petition, asserting that the Department lacked authority to condemn its land on grounds that the statutory perquisites for acquiring land in the manner the Department used, were not met. The district court declined to dismiss the petition and instead granted the Department's motion for immediate possession. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the transportation commission's enabling legislation, to the extent that it purported to delegate to the Department the choice of particular properties to be taken for highway projects and the manner of their taking, was an unlawful delegation of the commission's statutorily imposed obligation. The case was remanded back to the district court for dismissal of the Department's original petition. View "Colorado Dept. of Transportation v. Amerco Real Estate" on Justia Law