Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The City of Poway (Poway) was known as the "City in the Country." Harry Rogers had operated a horse boarding facility called the Stock Farm in Poway, but he decided to close the Stock Farm and build 12 homes in its place (the Project). Having the Stock Farm close down impacted members of the Poway Valley Riders Association (PVRA), whose 12-acre rodeo, polo, and other grounds were across the street from the Stock Farm. Over the objections of the PVRA and others, Poway's city council voted unanimously to approve the Project under a mitigated negative declaration (MND). Subsequently, project opponents formed Preserve Poway (Preserve) and instituted this litigation, asserting the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) required an environmental impact report (EIR) to be prepared instead of an MND. The trial court ruled an EIR was necessary because there was substantial evidence that the Project's elimination of the Stock Farm may have a significant impact on Poway's horse-friendly "community character" as the "City in the Country." The Court of Appeal reduced the real issue in this case to not what was proposed to be going in (homes with private horse boarding), but what was coming out (the Stock Farm, public horse boarding). Project opponents contended that because Rogers obtained a conditional use permit to operate horse stables they have enjoyed using for 20 years, the public had a right under CEQA to prevent Rogers from making some other lawful use of his land. "Whether the Project should be approved is a political and policy decision entrusted to Poway's elected officials. It is not an environmental issue for courts under CEQA." The trial court's judgment was reversed insofar as the judgment granted as to an issue of community character. The judgment was also reversed insofar as the judgment directed the City of Poway to "set aside its adoption of the Mitigated Negative Declaration for the Tierra Bonita Subdivision Project located on Tierra Bonita Road in the City of Poway ('Project')"; "set aside its approval of Tentative Tract Map 12-002 for the Project"; and "not issue any permits for the subject property that rely upon the Mitigated Negative Declaration or Tentative Tract Map for the Project." Additionally, the judgment was reversed to the extent the judgment provided that the trial court "retain[ed] jurisdiction over the proceedings by way of a return to the peremptory writ of mandate until the court has determined the City of Poway has complied with the provisions of CEQA." The trial court was directed to enter a new judgment denying the petition for writ of mandate as to community character. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. View "Preserve Poway v. City of Poway" on Justia Law

Developers obtained a conditional use permit to build a dairy on Owner’s property in Brookings County. The City of Hendricks and others (collectively, City) filed a petition for writ of certiorari in circuit court challenging the permit. The circuit court affirmed the grant of the permit. City appealed. Developers filed a notice of review to challenge City’s standing but did not serve their notice of review on Owner. City moved to dismiss Developers’ notice of review/cross-appeal, arguing that Owner was a party required to be served with the notice of review. The affirmed, holding (1) Owner was a party required to be served with Developers’ notice of review, and Developers’ failure to serve Owner required dismissal of their notice of review/cross-appeal; and (2) neither S.D. Codified Laws 15-6-5(a) nor Developers’ alleged alignment of interests with Owner excused Developers’ failure to serve Owner. View "Lake Hendricks Improvement Ass’n v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n" on Justia Law

Applicants Allen Brisson, Michael Brisson, and Brisson Stone, LLC, claimed that their application for a commercial gravel extraction permit was allowed under the Town of Monkton’s zoning regulations. The Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division’s denial of the application on the merits and held that, even if the application was deemed approved, the deemed approval remedy would not have stopped an interested party’s timely appeal to the Environmental Division on the permit’s merits. View "Brisson Stone LLC v. Town of Monkton" on Justia Law

At issue in this dispute between the Treetop at Stratton Condominium Association, Inc. and the Stratton Corporation, Treetop Development Company, LLC, Treetop Three Development Company, LLC, and Intrawest Stratton Development Corporation (collectively, Stratton) was an improperly constructed stormwater management system. The Association appealed District 2 Environmental Commission’s refusal to impose additional conditions on Stratton’s Act 250 permit, which the Environmental Division of the Superior Court determined to be invalid and unenforceable. Finding no reversible error after review of the arguments presented on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court. View "In re Treetop Development Company Act 250 Development" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court considered when a municipal agency’s decision constitutes a final action subject to immediate judicial review. The owner of the Camden Harbour Inn applied to the Town of Camden for authorization to increase the number of guest rooms and parking spaces for the Inn and to reduce the number of seats at the Inn’s restaurant. The Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) granted a special exception permit subject to conditions and allowed the Inn to proceed to the Planning Board for site plan review. Susan Bryant, an abutter, appealed the ZBA’s decision to the superior court before site plan review could occur. The superior court affirmed the ZBA’s decision. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded for dismissal of Bryant’s complaint, holding that, while the Town’s Zoning Ordinance expressly provided for Bryant’s appeal from the grant of the preliminary special permit, the ZBA’s decision was not a final action subject to appellate review in the courts because additional process was required by the Town’s Ordinance before a final decision on the Inn’s proposed changes is reached. View "Bryant v. Town of Camden" on Justia Law

The Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Meriden granted a variance to Mark Development, LLC to use a parcel of real property located in a regional development zone as a used car dealership on the grounds that the effect of applying the Meriden Zoning Regulations was so severe as to amount to a practical confiscation. Plaintiffs, the City of Meriden and two of its officers, appealed from the Board’s decision granting the variance. The trial court sustained Plaintiffs’ appeal in part and remanded to the Board for further proceedings. Both parties appealed. The Appellate Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court with direction to sustain Plaintiffs’ appeal, holding that substantial evidence did not support the Board’s conclusion that the property had been deprived of all reasonable uses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court correctly found that substantial evidence did not support the Board’s conclusion that the property had been practically confiscated. View "Caruso v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals" on Justia Law

In this appeal, Mary DiFebo argued that the Superior Court erred by dismissing her amended petition seeking review of a Board of Adjustment decision that granted a variance application for two land plots located near DiFebo's home to be subdivided into four flag lots. The Superior Court had two related reasons for dismissing the amended petition: (1) that DiFebo had not named the owners of the two properties that were the subject of the Board's proceeding within the thirty-day statute of limitations for commencing a petition challenging a Board decision, and for that reason alone she was foreclosed from proceeding; (2) alternatively, the court found that DiFebo had not met the requirements for relation back under Superior Court Civil Rule 15(c)(3). The Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court correctly determined that DiFebo did not satisfy all of Rule 15(c)(3)'s requirements to have her amended petition relate back to her initial filing. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of DiFebo's amended petition. View "DiFebo v. Board of Adjustment of New Castle County, et al." on Justia Law

Richard and Betty B. Chesnut petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion affirming the Madison Circuit Court's summary judgments in favor of the City of Huntsville, the Board of Zoning Adjustment of the City of Huntsville, Denton-Niemitz Realty, LLC, and Guild Building and Remodeling, LLC. In 1983, the Chesnuts purchased a house and the adjacent lot to the east of their house, which was in a Huntsville neighborhood that had been established in 1908. The neighborhood was zoned as a 'Resident 1-B' district. In October 2012, Denton-Niemitz purchased the house on the west side of the Chesnuts' house. Subsequently, Denton-Niemitz obtained a permit to raze the house it purchased. Denton-Niemitz hired Guild Building & Remodeling, LLC to demolish the Denton-Niemitz house. The city issued the permits and construction began on the new house. Richard Chesnut was concerned the new house did not comply with the applicable set-back line requirement, and requested the zoning code be enforced. When no action was taken, the Chesnuts filed suit. The Chesnuts argued that the Circuit Court erred in entering a summary judgment in the civil action because, they said, Jim McGuffey (the zoning-enforcement coordinator for the City) incorrectly interpreted Articles 12.2.4 and 73.7.4 of the City's zoning code; that, when McGuffey issued the permits, he used an "extralegal dictionary definition" of "developed" and "undeveloped"; that McGuffey ignored a mandate of the Huntsville City Council that he did not have the power to permit construction that did not conform with the zoning code; and that McGuffey and the City ignored well established rules of statutory construction and ignored their statutory mandate to administer ordinances according to their literal terms. After review, the Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals because the zoning enforcement coordinator's interpretation of the zoning ordinance was unreasonable. The Supreme Court affirmed in part the appellate court's judgment because the summary judgment and the Court of Civil Appeals' affirmance of that judgment was appropriate, not because the Chesnuts' appeal was untimely but because the Chesnuts' administrative appeal was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Ex parte Richard and Betty Chesnut." on Justia Law

Cuyahoga County filed an exemption to a tract of real property it acquired in 2004. The property consisted of a marina/restaurant that operated in conjunction with an adjacent public park. The tax commissioner granted the application as to the the public park portion but denied the application as to the remainder constituting the marina and restaurant. In doing so, the Commissioner invoked his authority to order a split between the taxable and exempt portions. The County appealed, arguing that the Commissioner erred by finding that the property was not used exclusively for a public purpose. The Board of Tax Appeals affirmed primarily on the ground that the marina and restaurant were operated “with a view to profit.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when the marina and restaurant are considered separately from the park, the denial of the exemption was neither unreasonable nor unlawful. View "Cuyahoga County v. Testa" on Justia Law

The Town of Underhill appealed a trial court order that affirmed a decision of the County Road Commissioners requiring the Town to maintain a segment of Town Highway 26 (TH 26), a Class 4 highway. TH 26 has existed, in some form, for nearly 150 years. In 2001, the Town sought to reclassify a segment of TH 26 between Irish Settlement Road and Pleasant Valley Road as a legal trail, and the remainder of the roadway as a Class 4 highway. Following protracted litigation, these changes became effective in June 2010, and TH 26 became part of the Town’s six miles of Class 4 highways. Prior to the reclassification of TH 26, the Town performed periodic maintenance and repair work to both the roadway and the twenty-two culverts that were installed along and under TH 26 over the past thirty years. Although the ditches along TH 26 do not appear to have been maintained since 2010, the Town has continued to do some work, primarily the addition of base material to the roadway. Appellees David Demarest, Jeffrey Moulton, and Jonathan Fuller owned property on TH 26 in the Town of Underhill. Appellees Fuller and Demarest resided at their properties full time, while two additional residents along the road were part-time residents. In 2012, appellees filed a notice of insufficiency pursuant to 19 V.S.A. 971 requesting maintenance of TH 26, which had been largely deferred following the roadway reclassification. The Town denied appellees’ allegations, asserting that TH 26 was being maintained to the extent required by the necessity of the Town, the public good, and the convenience of the inhabitants of the Town. Appellees then brought an action for the appointment of County Road Commissioners pursuant to 19 V.S.A. 971 et seq. to compel the Town to undertake repairs of TH 26. Specifically, appellees sought repairs and maintenance to drainage, culverts, and the road surface, so as to make it reasonably safe and accessible for appellees’ use as residents of the Town. The Town contended on appeal that the trial court misconstrued and incorrectly applied the statutory provisions for the maintenance of Class 4 roads and erroneously established its own maintenance standard. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Town and reversed. View "Demarest v. Town of Underhill" on Justia Law