Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 1989, defendant-appellant City of San Clemente created the “Beach Parking Impact Fee” because the City anticipated that substantial residential development proposed for the City’s inland areas would significantly increase the demand for public parking at the City’s beaches. The City imposed the Beach Parking Impact Fee on all new residential developments outside the City’s coastal zone to defray the cost of acquiring and constructing new beach parking facilities. Between 1989 and 2009, the City collected nearly $10 million in Beach Parking Impact Fees and accrued interest, but the City spent less than $350,000 to purchase a vacant parcel on which it has not constructed any parking facilities. Plaintiffs and respondents Daniel Walker, as Trustee for the 1997 Walker Family Trust, and W. Justin McCarthy (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed this action to compel the City to refund the unused portion of the Beach Parking Impact Fee. Plaintiffs alleged the five-year findings the City made in 2009 failed to satisfy the Act’s requirements and did not justify the City’s continued retention of the unexpended Beach Parking Impact Fees because the increased parking demand had not materialized over the ensuing 20 years. The trial court agreed and entered judgment ordering the City to refund approximately $10.5 million in unexpended impact fees to the current property owners on which the fees were imposed. The City appealed, contending it satisfied the Mitigation Fee Act’s requirement of five-year findings when it “receive[d] and file[d]” a 2009 staff report. Upon review, the Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that the City failed to make the five-year findings as required. The Court found that the report’s findings were mere conclusions, not the specific findings required under the Act. Consequently, the City failed to justify its continued retention of the unexpended impact fees. View "Walker v. City of San Clemente" on Justia Law

Robert Hale, doing business as Bullwinkle Builders, Inc., ("Hale") appealed a district court order affirming a City of Minot Board of Appeals decision to affirm the denial of Hale's application for a building permit. In December 2013, after a series of conversations and exchanges of information between the City's building official and Hale and his representatives, the building official denied the permit application for failure to submit certain required documentation. At issue was the building official's determination under the 2009 International Building Code ("IBC"), as adopted by the City, that Hale's facility was an "assisted living facility" classified as Institutional Group I-1, rather than an apartment building classified as Residential Group R-2. An applicant for a Institutional Group I-1 building permit was required to submit additional documentation prepared by a registered design professional and had to install more expensive wiring. The Supreme Court concluded after its review, that the Board did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably in affirming a City building official's decision to deny the application and that substantial evidence supports the Board's decision. The Court therefore affirmed the district court order. View "Hale v. City of Minot" on Justia Law

Zimmer Development Company wished to construct on a parcel of property in Prince George’s County a small retail center and filed a proposed Comprehensive Design Plan (CDP) and Specific Design Plan (SDP) for the development of the property. The Planning Board approved the CDP and SDP subject to conditions. The District Council elected to review the approval and remanded the CDP and SDP to the Planning Board to consider specific areas of concern. On remand, the Planning Board again approved the CDP and SDP. The District Council elected again to review the Board’s revised decision and, after oral arguments, denied the CDP and SDP. The circuit court reversed and remanded to the District Council with directions to approve the CDP and SDP as approved by the Planning Board. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the District council was authorized to reverse the Planning Board’s decision regarding the CDP and SDP only if it was not supported by substantial evidence, was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal otherwise; (2) the District Council’s ultimate consideration of the Planning Board’s approvals was limited to the issues remanded to the Planning Board; and (3) the circuit court’s order reversing the decision of the District Council denying the CPD and SDP was appropriate. View "County Council of Prince George's County v. Zimmer Dev. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the Planning and Zoning Commission’s denial of its subdivision permit. Intervenor intervened in the appeal to the trial court pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-19(a), raising claims related to the environmental impact of the proposed development. After remanding the matter back to the Commission for further fact-finding relating to Intervenor’s claims, the trial court set aside the Commission’s findings and adjudicated the factual issues itself. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Intervenor and forbade Plaintiff’s proposed subdivision from going forward because of its potential environmental impact. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Environmental Protection Act does not empower a trial court to enter an injunction in an administrative appeal of a zoning decision involving an intervention under section 22a-19; and (2) the trial court could not have properly relied on Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-18(b) through (d) to remand the matter back to the Commission for consideration of Intervenor’s claims or to independently adjudicate the factual issues raised in those claims. View "Hunter Ridge, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n" on Justia Law

Respondent Town of Derry appealed a Superior Court decision granting the motion for summary judgment filed by petitioners, Accurate Transport, Inc. and 41 Ashleigh Drive, LLC (Ashleigh Drive), on the basis that an abutter’s appeal to the Derry Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) was untimely. In November 2012, Accurate Transport submitted a preliminary site plan application to the Derry Planning Board for approval to operate a “Dumpster Depot” business on property owned by Ashleigh Drive. The property is located within the Town’s Industrial III zoning district, which permits, among other uses, contractor’s yards and freight and trucking terminals. The Technical Review Committee (TRC) held a meeting to evaluate the proposed site plan and approved the proposed plan. Thereafter, petitioners filed a formal site plan application with the Planning Board. After numerous public meetings, the Planning Board ultimately approved the plan application. Several months later, an abutter to the property at issue, John O'Connor, appealed Planning Board's approval a few weeks after the Board's decision was issued. district, The ZBA concluded that the Town’s zoning ordinance did not permit the proposed use under any classification. After unsuccessfully moving for rehearing, petitioners appealed to the trial court and, subsequently, moved for summary judgment. Both parties moved for reconsideration, agreeing that the court erred by misapplying the time standards contained in the Town’s zoning ordinance. Observing that the written decision of the Planning Board was released on August 28, the court noted that O’Connor’s appeal (filed September 13) would be timely if he was appealing the final Planning Board site plan approval. However, the court concluded that O’Connor’s appeal did not challenge the Planning Board’s approval. Rather, the court found that O’Connor’s appeal challenged only the code enforcement officer’s determination that the proposed use of the subject property was permitted as a contractor’s yard. The court decided that the Planning Board accepted the code enforcement officer’s interpretation on June 19 when it voted to accept jurisdiction of the appeal. Because that vote was published on July 19, the court concluded that O’Connor had 20 days from July 19 to appeal to the ZBA. Given that his appeal was filed in September, the court determined that it was untimely. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the ZBA did not err by treating O’Connor’s appeal as an appeal of the August 21 decision. The trial court found, and the parties did not dispute, that the zoning ordinance provided a 20-day appeal period that began on the date of a written decision. Accordingly, the 20-day appeal period as to the August 21 decision began to run upon the issuance of the written decision on August 28. Because O’Connor’s appeal was filed September 13, it was within 20 days of August 28 and was, thus, timely. View "Accurate Transport, Inc. v. Town of Derry" on Justia Law

The issue central to consolidated appeals and cross-appeals was the question of whether property owners were violating a zoning ordinance by operating their property as an event venue. In 2010, East Beach residents began raising complaints to the community homeowners' association and local law enforcement regarding noise, traffic, and parking issues arising from events held at "Villa de Suenos." From that time, Glynn County police investigated more than 20 noise complaints related to the property, many resulting in the issuance of citations or warnings. The property was situated within a single-family residential zoning district classified as “R-6” under the Glynn County Zoning Ordinance. the trial court issued an order on December 20, 2013, adopting the County’s interpretation of its zoning ordinance and directing the owners, Thomas and Lee Burton, to comply with the ordinance, so interpreted, in their future use of the property. The court also denied the Burtons’ equal protection claim, finding that they had presented no evidence of other residential properties in Glynn County that were operated in the same manner as the Burtons’ property but were treated differently by the County. The Burtons appealed, challenging the trial court’s interpretation of the zoning ordinance and its rejection of their equal protection claim; the County cross-appealed, seeking to clarify the nature of the relief the trial court had granted. Subsequently, with the appeal and cross-appeal pending, the County filed a motion for contempt in the trial court, alleging that the Burtons were continuing to promote Villa de Suenos as an event venue and accept bookings for this purpose, in violation of the trial court’s order. Upon review of the arguments made on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly found that the owners were violating the ordinance, and that the court properly issued a declaratory judgment to that effect. View "Burton v. Glynn County" on Justia Law

The Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Monroe approved the application of Handsome, Inc. for a special exception permit to construct an industrial building in the Town, subject to thirty-six conditions. After the permit’s expiration date passed, the Commission denied Handsome’s application for a permit extension. The trial court concluded that the Commission must approve the application for a permit extension. The Commission ultimately granted Handsome’s application to extend the permit, subject to five other “requirements” and several “clarifications” relating to the original permit approval. Handsome and its principal officers appealed, challenging the imposition of conditions they alleged had not been part of the original permit. The trial court directed the Commission to approve the special exception permit conditioned only upon the conditions as recited by the Commission in its original decision. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the trial court, holding that Plaintiffs were not aggrieved by the Commission’s decision and therefore did not have standing to bring the appeal. View "Handsome, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n" on Justia Law

This case was the third of a string of appeals before the Court of Appeal concerning the City of Irvine's attempt to stop a proposed expansion of the James A. Musick Jail Facility. In "Musick I," the cities of Irvine and Lake Forest challenged the 1996 certification of an environmental impact report, "EIR 564," involving a proposed expansion of the Facility from about 1200 inmates to 7,584 inmates. In Musick I, the Court overturned a trial court decision finding EIR 564 inadequate, finding that EIR 564 did indeed adequately disclose the impacts of the project. The 1996 project, however, did not go forward because the County did not consider it had the financial resources for it. Approximately ten years later, Realignment Act of 2011 was passed, which shifted responsibility for the custodial housing and post-release supervision of some felons from the state prison system to local jails and probation departments. Concomitant with realignment, legislation was passed making it easier for local government agencies to obtain state funds to build more local jail cells. The County revived its plans for the Musick jail expansion, and the County applied for state funds for the project. Irvine challenged the County's application for state funding of the expansion without a new EIR, even though the County, at roughly the same time as the application, had certified a supplemental EIR ("SEIR 564") dealing with the project in light of planned intervening changes in surrounding land uses. In "Musick II," the Court of Appeal concluded there was no need to prepare an EIR (or other appropriate environmental impact document) prior to merely applying for funds. In this case, "Musick III," Irvine directly challenged SEIR 564. There was one big intervening change in surrounding land use since the initial proposed expansion, which was the scrapping of a proposed international airport at the former El Toro Base in favor of a "Great Park," with some adjacent housing development. Irvine presented several challenges to SEIR 564 that centered on two environmental effects: impacts on local traffic intersections and the loss of agricultural land. Taking Irvine's arguments into consideration, the Court of Appeal concluded that SEIR 564 was legally unobjectionable, and denied Irvine the relief it requested. View "City of Irvine v. County of Orange" on Justia Law

Thane and Nicole Dockter appealed a judgment affirming a Burleigh County Board of County Commissioners' decision to rezone a 311 acre tract of land in Menoken Township from agricultural to industrial use. In affirming the Commissioners' decision, the Supreme Court concluded the County Commissioners' decision did not constitute impermissible spot zoning, and the decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable and was supported by substantial evidence. View "Dockter v. Burleigh Cty. Bd. of Cty. Commn'rs" on Justia Law

This case arose when Henry and Mary Lou Black and Blackball Properties, LLC (collectively, the “Blacks”), challenged the Department of Land Use's decision to grant a change of use certificate to neighboring property owners, Gary Staffieri and Adria Charles-Staffieri, to the New Castle County Board of License, Inspection and Review. The Staffieris had rented out the property for use as office space for approximately ten years before deciding to open an automobile detailing shop on the premises, which required them to obtain a change of use certificate from the Department. When the Staffieris first received their certificate from the Department, the Blacks successfully appealed and the Board reversed the Department's decision. But the Staffieris reapplied, the Department once again issued their certificate, and this time, the Board affirmed the Department's decision. The Blacks were unable to appeal the Board's decision to a reviewing court because the General Assembly chose not to provide that right to parties aggrieved by a Board decision. The Blacks therefore sought review by writ of certiorari filed at the Superior Court. The Superior Court granted the writ and affirmed the Board. The Supreme Court, after its review, found no reversible error and affirmed the Superior Court. View "Black v. New Castle Cty. Bd. of License, Inspection & Review" on Justia Law