Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

St. Jude’s Co. made a direct appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court a water court decision entered in favor of the Roraring Fork Club, LLC. With regard to the Club’s two applications for water rights, the water court granted appropriative rights, approved the Club’s accompanying augmentation plan, and amended the legal description of the Club’s point of diversion for an already decreed right. With regard to the separate action filed by St. Jude’s Co., the water court denied all but one of its claims for trespass, denied its claims for breach of a prior settlement agreement with the Club, denied its claims for declaratory and injunctive relief concerning its asserted entitlement to the exercise of powers of eminent domain, quieted title to disputed rights implicated in the Club’s application for an augmentation plan, and awarded attorney fees in favor of the Club, according to the terms of the settlement agreement of the parties. Upon review of St. Jude's arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded the Club failed to demonstrate an intent to apply the amount of water for which it sought a decree to any beneficial use. Accordingly, the Court reversed the water court with regard to appropriative rights. The Court found no other reversible errors in the water court's decision. The case was remanded for further proceedings, including a determination of the Club's request for appellate attorney fees. View "St. Jude's Co. v. Roaring Fork Club, L.L.C." on Justia Law

At issue in this case were two water court rulings upholding the Special Improvement District No. 1 (“Subdistrict”) of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District’s (“District”) and the State Engineer’s approval of the 2012 Annual Replacement Plan (“ARP”) developed pursuant to the Subdistrict’s decreed Plan of Water Management (“Amended Plan”). In "San Antonio, Los Pinos & Conejos River Acequia Preservation Association v. Special Improvement District No. 1" (“San Antonio”), (270 P.3d 927 (Colo. 2011)), the Supreme Court affirmed the water court’s May 2010 Decree that approved the Subdistrict’s Amended Plan and imposed additional decree conditions on that Plan. The 2012 ARP under review here was the first ARP prepared pursuant to the Subdistrict’s Amended Plan. Water levels in the unconfined aquifer within the Subdistrict declined significantly due to increased groundwater consumption and sustained drought. The Amended Plan required the Subdistrict to prepare, and obtain the State Engineer’s approval of, an ARP that prevented injury to senior water rights. Objectors San Antonio, Los Pinos and Conejos River Acequia Preservation Association Save Our Senior Water Rights, LLC, Richard Ramstetter, and Costilla Ditch Company were senior surface water right holders on the Rio Grande River and its tributaries. They appealed two pretrial rulings as well as a judgment and decree upholding the 2012 ARP. Upon review of the objections, the Supreme Court concluded that the 2012 ARP complied with the Amended Plan and 2010 Decree, and protected against injury. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the water court's pretrial orders, judgment and decree pertaining to the 2012 ARP. View "San Antonio, Los Pinos & Conejos River Acequia Preservation" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted a discretionary appeal of Elbert County, its Board of Commissioners, and the County Manager (collectively, “the County”) of a superior court order that, inter alia, granted a declaratory judgment to the effect that the Elbert County Solid Waste Disposal Ordinance was unconstitutional, denied the County’s motion to dismiss, and issued a writ of mandamus requiring the County to reasonably consider the site proposed by Sweet City Landfill, LLC and its members for a solid waste landfill. Taking each of the County's contentions of error in turn, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in its decision as to all. The case was remanded therefore for further proceedings. View "Elbert County v. Sweet City Landfill, LLC" on Justia Law

Teton LLC filed an application with the Grant County Board of Adjustment for a conditional use permit to construct a concentrated animal feeding operation. The Board ultimately approved Teton’s application. The circuit court concluded that the Board had jurisdiction over Teton’s application and pursued its authority in a regular manner. Grant County Concerned Citizens (GCCC) and Timothy Tyler appealed. Specifically, GCCC asserted that Teton’s proposed project violated the Zoning Ordinance for Grant County and, therefore, the Board’s decision was illegal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board regularly pursued its authority in granting Teton’s application for a conditional use permit; and (2) the circuit court did not err in striking Tyler’s affidavit from the record. View "Grant County Concerned Citizens v. Grant County Bd. of Adjustment" on Justia Law

Appellant sought to develop a subdivision consisting of forty-four single-family homes on property zoned R-1 residential. Appellant applied to Granger Township Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) for variances for each of the forty-four proposed lots. The BZA denied the variance application. The county court of common pleas affirmed. Appellant filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that Granger’s zoning resolution establishing the R-1 zoning classification was unconstitutional and beyond Granger’s authority because Granger enacted the zoning resolution without enacting a separate comprehensive plan. The trial court denied Appellant’s claims, declaring that Granger had complied with Ohio Rev. Code 519.02’s requirement that a zoning resolution be adopted in accordance with a comprehensive plan. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a comprehensive plan pursuant to section 519.02 may be included within a township’s zoning resolution and need not be a separate and distinct document. View "Apple Group, Ltd. v. Granger Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Richard Grabowsky filed a complaint against the Township of Montclair, challenging the validity of an ordinance adopted by the Township to permit the construction of an assisted living facility on a site located next to the Unitarian Universalist Congregation Church of Montclair. Plaintiff asserted that a statement made by Township Mayor Jerry Fried, a member of the Township Council and Planning Board, demonstrated that Fried had a direct personal interest in the development and that he should have been disqualified from voting on the zoning issue. He also alleged that Fried and a second member of the Council, Nick Lewis, shared a disqualifying indirect personal interest in the development project because of their membership in the Unitarian Church. The Township, its Planning Board and the developers seeking the opportunity to build the assisted living facility denied the existence of any conflict. Plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction barring the Township and Planning Board from considering or approving development applications for the assisted living facility. Although no party filed a motion for any form of dispositive relief, the trial court sua sponte granted summary disposition, and dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. An appellate panel concluded that the trial court's summary judgment was procedurally improper, but concurred with the court's determination that the two Township officials had no conflict of interest, and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff s claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Appellate Division that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment, but did not concur with the panel's conclusion that, on the limited record developed in the trial court, plaintiff's claim was properly dismissed because the Unitarian Church was neither an applicant nor an objector in the redevelopment application at issue. The Court held that when a church or other organization owned property within 200 feet of a site that is the subject of a zoning application, public officials who currently serve in substantive leadership positions in the organization, or who will imminently assume such positions, are disqualified from voting on the application. View "Grabowsky v. Township of Montclair" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of associations representing builders, contractors, and plumbers, filed suit against the city of Troy, claiming that the City's building department fees violated section 22 of the Single State Construction Code Act (CCA), MCL 125.1522, as well as a provision of the Headlee Amendment, Const 1963, art 9, section 31. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the City, holding that the court lacked jurisdiction over the matter because plaintiffs had failed to exhaust the administrative procedure outlined in section 9b of the CCA, MCL 125.1509b. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded: the plain language of MCL 125.1509b provided that the director may conduct performance evaluations of defendant’s “enforcing agency” and did not provide any administrative procedure relative to the entity responsible for establishing fees pursuant to MCL 125.1522(1). Because the administrative proceedings in section 9b did not purport to provide the director with the authority to evaluate defendant’s legislative body, the circuit court erred by granting summary disposition to the City on the basis of plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust their administrative remedies. View "Michigan Ass'n of Home Builders v. City of Troy" on Justia Law

These proceedings involved a development project spearheaded by K. Hovnanian’s Four Seasons at Kent Island, LLC (Appellee). Appellee obtained all of the necessary permits and approvals from state and local agencies, except one. At issue in these proceedings was Appellee’s application for a State wetlands license. Appellee filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief and for a writ of mandamus against the Board of Public Works seeking an order compelling the Board to vote promptly on Appellee’s long-outstanding application for the wetlands permit following delays resulting from a perceived appearance of impropriety. The circuit court granted the requested relief and ordered the Board to vote promptly on the application. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment, holding that the circuit court’s order was improper for want of a prior final administrative decision and because mandamus was unavailable under the circumstances. View "Bd. of Pub. Works v. K. Hovnanian's Four Seasons at Kent Island, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a change of water rights filed by applicants East Cherry Creek Valley Water and Sanitation District and Colorado Water Network, Inc. (collectively, East Cherry Creek). East Cherry Creek submitted an application for change of water right involving shares it owned in the Greeley Irrigation Company (GIC) for use in its system. The Poudre Prairie Decree employed a ditch-wide analysis for calculating the amount of historical consumptive use ascribable to each GIC share. Subsequent decrees relied on the ditch-wide historical consumptive use determination made in the Poudre Decree. In making its application, East Cherry Creek asserted its ability to use the same Poudre pro-rata allocation of consumptive use water to its shares as occurred for previously changed shares in the ditch system. East Cherry Creek sought an order from the water court entering the court's denial of its Rule 56(h) motion as a final judgment, and the State and Division Engineers opposed the motion. The order was made final, and East Cherry Creek appealed denial of its Rule 54(b) motion to the Supreme Court. After review, the Court agreed with the Engineers that the water court's order did not constitute a final judgment on any claim for relief in the underlying change case. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's certification order, dismissed the appeal, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "East Cherry Creek Valley v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

Oneida Seven Generations Corporation proposed a renewable energy facility and sought a conditional use permit to install the facility in the City of Green Bay. The City voted to approve the conditional use permit but later voted to rescind the permit on the grounds that it was obtained through misrepresentation. The circuit court affirmed the City’s decision to rescind. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the City’s decision that the permit was obtained through misrepresentation was not supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on the evidence presented, the City could not reasonably conclude that the statements by Oneida Seven’s representative regarding the facility’s operations were misrepresentations. View "Oneida Seven Generations Corp. v. City of Green Bay" on Justia Law