Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In this eminent domain proceeding, plaintiff Sacramento Area Flood Control Agency (SAFCA) acquired a fee simple interest in, a roadway easement over, and a temporary construction easement over a portion of defendant Ranjit Dhaliwal’s roughly 131-acre property in the Natomas Basin for use in connection with the Natomas Levee Improvement Program. The jury awarded Dhaliwal $178,703 for the property taken and $29,100 in severance damages. Brinderjit Dhaliwal and Gurdeep Dhaliwal, as co-executors of Dhaliwal’s estate, appealed the compensation award, arguing mainly that the trial court prejudicially erred in allowing SAFCA to introduce evidence concerning “future access” to the property. He claimed that such evidence was speculative because “[a]fter this case is concluded, the County and SAFCA would be able to deny Dhaliwal access to the property,” leaving him landlocked. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court did not err in admitting the challenged evidence because such evidence had the potential to affect the property’s market value, and was not conjectural, speculative, or remote, and did not contradict the scope of the taking as defined by the resolution of necessity. Dhaliwal also argued that the trial court erred in allowing SAFCA’s appraiser to critique his appraiser’s valuation of the property, and that SAFCA’s counsel committed misconduct during closing argument by commenting on Dhaliwal’s absence and referring to SAFCA’s inability to pay more than fair market value for the property. The Court of Appeal concluded that neither of these contentions had merit, and affirmed the trial court's ruling on those. View "Sacramento Area Flood Agency v. Dhaliwal" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Iowa City Board of Review reclassified eighteen properties from commercial to residential for property tax purposes because the properties had recently been organized as multiple housing cooperatives. Two Iowa corporations organized the cooperatives under chapter 499A of the Iowa Code. The City of Iowa City appealed, arguing that the Board’s reclassification was improper because two natural persons, not two corporations, must organize multiple housing cooperatives under the Code. The City also argued that the organizers did not properly organize the cooperatives because each cooperative had more apartment units than members and section 499A.11 requires a one-to-one ratio. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board and the intervening housing cooperatives. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) two Iowa corporations may organize a multiple housing cooperative under chapter 499A; and (2) the Code does not require a one-apartment-unit-per-member ownership ratio for a multiple housing cooperative to be properly organized. View "City of Iowa City v. Iowa City Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

Dolphin Residential Cooperative, Inc. owned an apartment complex in Iowa City that consisted of twenty-two buildings comprising four hundred residential units. The Iowa City assessor classified the multiunit apartment buildings as commercial property for tax assessment purposes. Dolphin challenged this classification, arguing that because it was a multiple housing cooperative, organized under chapter 499A of the Iowa Code, the property should have been classified as residential property. The Iowa City Board of Review denied Dolphin’s request to reclassify the property, determining that because Dolphin was not properly organized under chapter 499A, Dolphin failed the organizational test for residential cooperatives adopted by the Supreme Court in Krupp Place 1 Coop, Inc. v. Board of Review. On appeal, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Dolphin, concluding that Dolphin met the organizational test set forth in Krupp and ordering the Board to reclassify the subject property as residential property for tax assessment purposes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Dolphin was not properly established under section 499A.1(1), and therefore, the district court erred when it granted summary judgment to Dolphin and denied summary judgment to the Board. View "Dolphin Residential Coop., Inc. v. Iowa City Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

The City of Richland began enforcing a zoning ordinance that regulated nonconforming uses, and as a result, prohibited Cleveland MHC, LLC from replacing mobile homes that were removed from its property. The circuit court upheld the City’s decision, and Cleveland MHC appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed. The City petitioned for certiorari review. The Supreme Court found that the City’s interpretation of the nonconforming use ordinance in its July 2011 resolution was both arbitrary and capricious and violated Cleveland MHC’s constitutional right to enjoy its property. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The circuit court's decision was reversed and remanded. View "Cleveland MHC, LLC v. City of Richland" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a change-of-water-rights application filed by East Cherry Creek Valley Water & Sanitation District and the Colorado Water Network, Inc. (collectively, East Cherry Creek). East Cherry Creek submitted its application involving shares it owned in the Greeley Irrigation Company (GIC) for use in its water system. The "Poudre Prairie Decree" used a ditch-wide analysis for calculating the amount of historical consumptive use ascribable to each GIC share. East Cherry Creek asserted its ability to use the same Poudre Prairie pro-rata allocation of consumptive use water to its shares as occurred for previously changed shares in the ditch system. The water court denied East Cherry Creek's C.R.C.P. 56(h) motion. East Cherry Creek then sought an order entering the denial as a final judgment. The State and Division Engineers opposed the motion, but was overruled. East Cherry Creek then appealed its Rule 56(h) motion denial (raising three issues), and the Engineers cross-appealed (raising two issues). The Supreme Court agreed with the Engineers: that the trial court did not enter a final judgment on any claim for relief in this litigation. The water court's certification order was reversed, the appeal dismissed, and the case remanded for further proceedings at the water court. View "East Cherry Creek Valley v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

Donald Paradis applied for and obtained a building permit to construct a two-car garage on property in the Town of Peru. After Paradis constructed the garage, the Town sent Paradis a notice of violation, stating that the garage violated multiple ordinance provisions. The Board of Appeals concluded that the appeal was properly denied. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the Board of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider Paradis’s appeal, which deprived the courts of jurisdiction to consider it, as the notice of violation was not an appealable decision. Remanded. View "Paradis v. Town of Peru" on Justia Law

Wayne Perkins applied to the Ogunquit Planning Board seeking site plan review and design review approval to convert his garage into a lobster pound. The Board approved Perkins’s application without requiring Perkins to comply with certain mandatory provisions in the Ogunquit Zoning Ordinance and without making necessary factual findings. The Hartwells, abutting landowners, sought judicial review. The superior court vacated the Board’s approval of Perkins’s site plan review application. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board did not have the power to waive any of the mandatory provisions of the Ordinance in this case; and (2) there were inadequate factual findings from the Board regarding Perkins’s use of the property, and therefore, the cause must be remanded for further factual findings regarding the lobster pound’s proper use classification. View "Hartwell v. Town of Ogunquit" on Justia Law

The Town of Starks Planning Board approved an application for site plan approval to build and operate a cellular telephone tower in Starks. Harry and Cindy Brown appealed the decision. The Town of Starks Board of Appeals (SBA) denied the Browns’ appeal after determining that it was limited to reviewing the Planning Board’s decision in an appellate capacity. The Browns appealed the SBA’s decision to the superior court, arguing for the first time that the SBA should have reviewed the Planning Board’s decision de novo. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because the Browns failed to challenge the SBA’s standard of review determination at the municipal level, the issue was not preserved for appellate review. View "Brown v. Town of Starks" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of a decision by the Town of Middlebury Development Review Board (DRB) to approve appellee Jolley Associates, LLC's application for a Planned Unit Development (PUD) to add a car wash to an existing gas station and convenience store within the Town limits. Appellant MDY Taxes, Inc. operated an H&R Block tax franchise in property rented in a shopping center adjacent to the Jolley lot. Appellant Village Car Wash, Inc. operated a car wash located approximately one-quarter of a mile from the Jolley lot. Appellants did not participate in the DRB proceeding, but sought to challenge the approval of the PUD through an appeal to the Environmental Division of the Superior Court. The environmental court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that appellants did not have standing, to appeal the DRB decision because they had not participated in the proceedings before the DRB as required by statute, and because they did not meet any of the exceptions to that statutory requirement. On appeal, appellants argued that a procedural defect prevented them from appearing before the DRB, and that it would be manifestly unjust if they are not afforded party status to appeal. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Appeal of MDY Taxes, Inc., & Village Car Wash, Inc." on Justia Law

The Planning Director of the County of Hawaii approved the application of Michael Pruglo to consolidate and resubdivide the pre-existing lots on his forty-nine-acre parcel of land. Mark Kellberg, who owned land adjacent to the subject property, objected to the approval. Kellberg brought suit against the Planning Director and the County of Hawaii seeking to have the subdivision declared void. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) ruled that the Planning Director’s approval of Pruglo’s subdivision was invalid because it increased the number of lots. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the ICA, holding that the ICA erred in ruling on the merits of Kellberg’s claims without addressing whether the owners of the lots within the subject property were required to be joined as parties under Haw. R. Civ. P. 19. Because the lot owners were necessary parties under Rule 19(a), the Court remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to order the joinder of the lot owners under Rule 19. View "Kellberg v. Yuen" on Justia Law