Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2012, the Federal Circuit ruled that the U.S. Border Patrol’s placement of motion sensors on five separate parcels of land owned by Otay Mesa adjacent to the Mexican border in Southern California constituted the taking of permanent easements over the parcels. On remand, the Court of Federal Claims held that Otay was entitled to no damages for the taking of an easement over land that could be developed for industrial use; that it was entitled to damages of $455,520 for the taking of an easement over land that could be used for environmental mitigation purposes; and that interest on the $455,520 damages award should run from August 28, 2008, the date Otay became aware of the taking as a result of the filing of a stipulation of liability by the government. The Federal Circuit then affirmed the denial of damages with respect to the industrial development property and the award of $455,520 with respect to the mitigation property. The court vacated the computation of interest; Otay is entitled to interest computed from when sensors were first placed on its property. View "Otay Mesa Prop., L.P. v. United States" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether Act 250 jurisdiction extended to the siting and related construction proposed for the Vermont Air National Guard Base at the Burlington International Airport to accommodate the anticipated arrival of eighteen F-35A jets. Following a request for a jurisdictional opinion, the Environmental Division concluded that there was no Act 250 jurisdiction because the development served no state purpose and there was no material change to any existing permit. The requesting individuals appealed that decision, arguing that the proposed changes are development for a state purpose and subject to Act 250 review. Those individuals further contended that the project amounted to a substantial change to preexisting development on the Guard base, which required a permit, and a material change to an existing Act 250 permit, which required application for an amended permit. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded there was no Act 250 jurisdiction, and affirmed. View "In re Request for Jurisdictional Opinion re: Changes in Physical Structure and Use at Burlington International Airport for F-35A" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted appellant Paul Kanitra’s application to address whether, as a holdover member of the City of Greensboro Planning and Zoning Board (the “Board”), he could only be removed for cause or whether the City Council of the City of Greensboro had the authority to replace him with a successor without regard to cause. After review, the Supreme Court concluded (as did the trial court) that the City Council had authority to appoint someone to replace appellant without regard to cause. View "Kanitra v. City of Greensboro" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review stemmed from attempts by the Water Users’ Association of the Broadford Slough and Rockwell Bypass Lateral Ditches, Inc. (Association) to collect assessments from Big Wood Ranch, LLC (BWR) for maintenance performed by the Association on the Broadford Slough (Slough) and Rockwell Bypass (Bypass), which were conduits for the delivery of surface water to property owned by BWR and some of its neighbors. The Association claimed it has a statutory right to collect assessments for its maintenance of this water delivery system. BWR disputed that claim. On summary judgment, the district court determined that the Association was validly formed pursuant to Idaho Code section 42-1301, and, after a bench trial, found BWR owed payment for these outstanding assessments. BWR appealed, challenging the validity of the Association’s formation under the statute, as well as the court’s alternative contract and equity-based theories for granting judgment in favor of the Association. Upon review, the Supreme Court found: (1) the Association was not qualified to operate pursuant to Idaho Code section 42-1301; (2)the district court erred by alternatively granting judgment to the Association on unpled contract and equity-based theories; and (3) BWR was entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal. View "Big Wood Ranch v. Water Users' Assn. of the Broadford Slough & Rockwell Bypass Lateral Ditches, Inc." on Justia Law

A county code compliance investigator issued Appellant a notice of violation regarding her property. The county zoning administrator then determined that Appellant had committed a violation. The Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) upheld that violation determination. Plaintiff subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari to seek judicial review of the BZA’s final decision. Appellant, however, did not name the Board of Supervisors or any other party. The circuit court granted the zoning administrator’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that Appellant failed to add the Board of Supervisors as a party to the proceeding within the thirty-day statutory period. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that compliance with the styling requirement in Va. Code 15.2-2314 is required to trigger the circuit court’s active jurisdiction, and no waiver to the thirty-day filing requirement occurred in this case. View "Frace v. Johnson" on Justia Law

This issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on a challenge under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) to certification of an environmental impact report (EIR) and approval of a project to build a new entertainment and sports center (ESC) in downtown Sacramento. The project, a partnership between the City of Sacramento (City) and Sacramento Basketball Holdings LLC to build a downtown arena at which Sacramento Kings would play. To facilitate the timely opening of a new downtown arena, the Legislature modified several deadlines under CEQA by adding section 21168.6.6 to the Public Resources Code. In a prior appeal, Adriana Saltonstall and 11 other petitioners argued section 21168.6.6 violated the constitutional separation of powers doctrine because the Legislature restricted the grounds on which the courts may issue a preliminary injunction to stay the downtown arena project. Saltonstall also argued the trial court erred by refusing to grant a preliminary injunction despite harm to the public and the environment due to demolition of part of the Downtown Plaza shopping mall and construction of the downtown arena in its place. The Court of Appeal concluded section 21168.6.6 did not violate separation of powers and the trial court properly denied Saltonstall’s request for a preliminary injunction. In this appeal, Saltonstall argued: (1) the City violated CEQA by committing itself to the downtown arena project before completing the EIR process; (2) the City’s EIR failed to consider remodeling the current Sleep Train Arena as a feasible alternative to building a new downtown arena; (3) the EIR did not properly study the effects of the project on interstate traffic traveling on the nearby section of Interstate Highway 5 (I-5); (4) the City did not account for large outdoor crowds expected to congregate outside the downtown arena during events; (5) the trial court erred in denying her Public Records Act request to the City to produce 62,000 e-mail communications with the NBA; and (6) the trial court erred in denying her motion to augment the administrative record with an e-mail between Assistant City Manager John Dangberg and a principal of Sacramento Basketball Holdings, Mark Friedman (the Dangberg-Friedman e-mail) and a 24-page report regarding forgiveness of a $7.5 million loan by the City to the Crocker Art Museum. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment dismissing Saltonstall’s challenge to the sufficiency of the City’s EIR and approval of the downtown arena project, and (2) the trial court’s order denying her motion to augment the administrative record. View "Saltonstall v. City of Sacramento" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the City of Bothell assumed responsibility for maintaining a drainage pipe installed in a residential subdivision in Snohomish County. The subdivision, Crystal Ridge, was developed from two residential plats that the County approved in 1997. The area was incorporated into the City in 1992. One of the plats contained a drainage easement within a tract owned by the Crystal Ridge Homeowners Association. The plat dedicated the drainage easement to the County. The City argued that the disputed drainage pipe was outside the scope of the drainage easement that the City inherited from Snohomish County. After review, the Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the only reasonable interpretation of the Crystal Ridge plat is that Snohomish County (and therefore the City) assumed responsibility for maintaining the drainage pipe. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of respondents. View "Crystal Ridge Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Bothell" on Justia Law

917 Lusk, LLC appealed the Boise City Council's decision to grant a conditional use permit to Royal Boulevard Associates, LP to build an apartment complex. Royal's predecessor in interest applied for permission to build a 352,000 square foot, five-story, multi-family apartment complex called River Edge Apartments. The site of the proposed construction was near Boise State University, adjacent to the Boise River, east of Ann Morrison Park, and west of property owned by Lusk. The site was zoned Residential Office with a Design Review Overlay (R-OD). Multi-family housing was an allowed use for this location. However, the Boise City Code (BCC) required a conditional use permit (CUP) in order to construct a building more than 35 feet tall in an R-OD zone. If constructed as planned, River Edge will have been between 59 and 63 feet tall. Lusk appealed the Boise Planning and Zoning Commission's decision to the City Council, contending that the Commission's decision failed to address the requirements for a CUP. The district court affirmed the City Council's decision and Lusk appealed. Lusk argued that because the Commission did not follow the correct procedure for granting a CUP, the City Council erred in affirming the Commission's decision. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed the district court's affirmance of the City Council's approval of the Commission's decision to grant the CUP to Royal. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "917 LUSK, LLC v. City of Boise" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the historical beneficial consumptive use calculation of an 1872 irrigation right in a change of water right and augmentation plan proceeding. Sedalia Water and Sanitation District was the owner of a portion of that water right which it acquired from Owens Brothers Concrete Company. When the company owned its portion of the appropriation, it obtained a change of water right decree quantifying an annual average of 13 acre-feet of water available for use as augmentation plan credit for replacement of out-of-priority tributary groundwater depletions from a well. Having acquired the concrete company's interest, Sedalia claimed a right to the same amount of historical consumptive use water for its well augmentation plan in this case. On competing motions for summary judgment, the water court ruled that the doctrine of issue preclusion prohibited the State and Division Engineers from relitigating the quantification question (because they had been parties to the concrete company's 1986 augmentation plan case). The court held that the Engineers could raise the issue of abandonment at trial if they chose to. The Engineers argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the Court should adopt a comprehensive rule that every change case triggered requantification of a water right. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part: issue preclusion applied to prevent relitigation of the historical beneficial consumptive use quantification; issue preclusion did not prevent the water court from inquiring into the alleged 24-year post-1986 non-use the Engineers alleged. View "Wolfe v. Sedalia" on Justia Law

The Labadie Environment Organization and several individuals (collectively, Appellants) filed a writ of certiorari challenging the legality of the Franklin County Commission’s adoption of zoning amendments allowing Ameren Missouri to build a coal-ash landfill adjoining its Labadie power plant. Count I of the petition alleged that the commission failed to conduct a legally sufficient hearing prior to adopting the zoning amendments, and Count II alleged that the zoning amendments were invalid for failing to promote public health, safety, and welfare. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of the commission and Ameren. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the trial court’s judgment of dismissal on Count I, as Appellants stated a viable claim that the zoning amendments were enacted without a legally sufficient public hearing; and (2) reversed the judgment upholding the merits of the commission’s decision to adopt the landfill zoning amendments, as the commission’s decision to adopt the amendments is premature until Count I is resolved on its merits by the trial court. View "Campbell vs. County Comm’n of Franklin County" on Justia Law