Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Hawkes wishes to mine peat from wetland property owned by affiliated companies in northwestern Minnesota. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issued an Approved Jurisdictional Determination (JD) that the property constitutes “waters of the United States” within the meaning of the Clean Water Act, requiring a permit to discharge dredged or fill materials into the “navigable waters,” 33 U.S.C. 1344(a), 1362(7). The district court dismissed a challenge, holding that an approved JD, though the consummation of the Corps’ jurisdictional decision-making process, was not a “final agency action” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 704. While the appeal was pending, a panel of the Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that both courts misapplied the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision, Sackett v. EPA. A “properly pragmatic analysis of ripeness and final agency action principles compels the conclusion that an Approved JD is subject to immediate judicial review. The Corps’s assertion that the Revised JD is merely advisory and has no more effect than an environmental consultant’s opinion ignores reality.” View "Hawkes Co., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs" on Justia Law

In 2005, the Shinnecock Indian Nation filed suit to vindicate its rights to land in the Town of Southampton, claiming that 1859 New York legislation allowed thousands of acres of the Nation’s land to be wrongfully conveyed to the town. The district court dismissed, holding that laches barred the claims. An appeal to the Second Circuit remains pending. In 2012, the Nation filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, seeking $1,105,000,000, alleging that the United States, “acting through the federal court system . . . denied any and all judicial means of effective redress for the unlawful taking of lands” in violation of trust obligations arising under the Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. 177, and the “federal common law.” The Claims Court dismissed on alternative grounds: that the claims were not ripe because they were predicated upon the district court’s judgment in the prior suit, which was on appeal, or that, even if the claims were ripe, it had no jurisdiction because they did not fall within the Indian Tucker Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity. The court refused to allow amendment to allege a judicial takings claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed that the breach of trust claims are not ripe for review, vacated the jurisdiction ruling, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the breach of trust claims without prejudice. View "Shinnecock Indian Nation v. United States" on Justia Law

St. Marys makes portland cement at a plant in Charlevoix. The Michigan Department of Natural Resources and Environment deemed the plant’s pollution controls sufficient and excused St. Marys from the retrofitting requirement under the Clean Air Act’s Regional Haze Rule, 40 C.F.R. 51.308–.309, which requires the states to determine which facilities within their borders create visibility-impairing pollutants that may “be emitted and transported downwind” to a federal park or wilderness area. States then must decide which of those sources are eligible for “Best Available Retrofit Technology.” The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency disagreed with the state and required the plant to add more stringent pollution controls. The Second Circuit upheld the EPA decision, rejecting challenges to EPA’s scientific and technological assertions concerning the plant’s nitrous oxide emissions, and a claim that St. Marys was exempt from the retrofitting requirement. View "St. Marys Cement Inc. v. Envtl. Protection Agency" on Justia Law

RDNT, LLC, which provided assisted living and skilled nursing services, owned a campus consisting of two buildings. RDNT submitted an application to the City of Bloomington for a conditional use permit, seeking to expand its services by adding a third building to the campus. The City Council denied RDNT’s application, giving four reasons for its decision. The district court reversed the denial of RDNT’s application, holding that the City misapplied certain standards, misrepresented the impact of certain studies, and ignored certain evidence. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the City appropriately exercised its discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the City’s decision was not unreasonable arbitrary or capricious, as the City based its decision on a legally and factually sufficient ground, and the City properly considered RDNT’s proposed traffic-mitigating conditions. View "RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington" on Justia Law

Wayne and Michelle McClellan applied for a conditional use permit to build a disc-golf course in the City of Saco on property abutting a campground owned by Fred Fitanides. The Saco Planning Board voted to grant conditional approval for the project and issued the conditional use permits. The Saco Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) affirmed the Planning Board’s decision. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) the Planning Board issued the permits in compliance with the City of Saco Zoning Ordinance; and (2) Fitanides was not prejudiced by any procedural irregularities in the administrative process. View "Fitanides v. City of Saco" on Justia Law

The United Water Conservation District manages groundwater resources in central Ventura County. San Buenaventura (City) pumps groundwater from District territory and sells it to residential customers. The District collects a fee from groundwater pumpers, including the City, based on volume. The Water Code authorizes this fee (Wat. Code, 74508, 75522) and requires the District to set different rates for different uses. Groundwater extracted for non-agricultural purposes must be charged at three to five times the rate applicable to water used for agricultural purposes. The California Constitution (article XIIID) governs fees "upon a parcel or upon a person as an incident of property ownership, including a user fee or charge for a property related service." The City claimed that the fees violate article XIII D because they "exceed the proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcel[s]" from which the City pumps its water. The trial court found that the pumping charges violated article XIII D and ordered refunds. The court of appeal reversed: pumping fees are not property related taxes subject to the requirements of article XIII C. The charges are valid regulatory fees because they are fair and reasonable, and do not exceed the District's resource management costs. View "City of San Buenaventura v. United Water Conserv. Dist." on Justia Law

The issue this appeal presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on a superior court's validation of roughly $200 million in municipal bonds (the "2014 NSP Bonds") that were to be issued by the Atlanta Development Authority d/b/a Invest Atlanta ("Invest Atlanta"). Invest Atlanta and the Geo. L. Smith II Georgia World Congress Center Authority (collectively, the "New Stadium Entities") proposed to have the 2014 NSP Bonds issued for the purpose of funding a portion of the cost of developing, constructing, and operating a new stadium facility in downtown Atlanta for the Atlanta Falcons professional football team. Additional funding for the NSP would have been provided by the Atlanta Falcons Stadium Company, LLC ("StadCo"), a company associated with the Atlanta Falcons Football Club, LLC, as well as through the sale of personal seat licenses. On February 4, 2014, the State filed a Petition for Bond Validation in the superior court to authorize the issuance of the 2014 NSP Bonds. Several individuals moved to intervene in the proceedings to file objections to the bond validation, and the trial court allowed them to do so. Among other things, the intervenors contended that OCGA 48-13-51 (a) (5) (B) was an unconstitutional special law. The trial court ultimately entered a Validation Order and Final Judgment validating the 2014 NSP Bonds and overruling all objections. One of the intervenors appealed that ruling. However, finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Cottrell v. Atlanta Dev. Authority" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Federal Circuit ruled that the U.S. Border Patrol’s placement of motion sensors on five separate parcels of land owned by Otay Mesa adjacent to the Mexican border in Southern California constituted the taking of permanent easements over the parcels. On remand, the Court of Federal Claims held that Otay was entitled to no damages for the taking of an easement over land that could be developed for industrial use; that it was entitled to damages of $455,520 for the taking of an easement over land that could be used for environmental mitigation purposes; and that interest on the $455,520 damages award should run from August 28, 2008, the date Otay became aware of the taking as a result of the filing of a stipulation of liability by the government. The Federal Circuit then affirmed the denial of damages with respect to the industrial development property and the award of $455,520 with respect to the mitigation property. The court vacated the computation of interest; Otay is entitled to interest computed from when sensors were first placed on its property. View "Otay Mesa Prop., L.P. v. United States" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether Act 250 jurisdiction extended to the siting and related construction proposed for the Vermont Air National Guard Base at the Burlington International Airport to accommodate the anticipated arrival of eighteen F-35A jets. Following a request for a jurisdictional opinion, the Environmental Division concluded that there was no Act 250 jurisdiction because the development served no state purpose and there was no material change to any existing permit. The requesting individuals appealed that decision, arguing that the proposed changes are development for a state purpose and subject to Act 250 review. Those individuals further contended that the project amounted to a substantial change to preexisting development on the Guard base, which required a permit, and a material change to an existing Act 250 permit, which required application for an amended permit. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded there was no Act 250 jurisdiction, and affirmed. View "In re Request for Jurisdictional Opinion re: Changes in Physical Structure and Use at Burlington International Airport for F-35A" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted appellant Paul Kanitra’s application to address whether, as a holdover member of the City of Greensboro Planning and Zoning Board (the “Board”), he could only be removed for cause or whether the City Council of the City of Greensboro had the authority to replace him with a successor without regard to cause. After review, the Supreme Court concluded (as did the trial court) that the City Council had authority to appoint someone to replace appellant without regard to cause. View "Kanitra v. City of Greensboro" on Justia Law