Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2003, appellant Fred Moran was an elected member of the Board of Commissioners of Haverford Township, Delaware County. The board decided to sell a 209-acre parcel of land on which the former Haverford State Mental Hospital was located. On December 19, 2005, the board held a special public meeting to address a looming revenue shortfall for the upcoming year. During the meeting, as Commissioner Andrew Lewis recalled in his trial testimony, appellant proposed accelerating the collection of real estate taxes as a way to raise revenue; particularly, he suggested having a consultant purchasing the a portion of the parcel, Goldenberg-Pohlig (GP) pre-pay $500,000 of the 2006 realty taxes on the parcel. The next day, Lewis and appellant had a phone conversation with Michael Lawry, a principal with GP. Lewis informed Lawry the board was addressing a budgetary shortfall and told him appellant had a proposal. Appellant then said to Lawry, “[C]all it extortion, call it what you will. We need $500,000, and we’ll accelerate the zoning. We’ll get you the zoning approvals you need and accelerate the process.” Lewis recalled Lawry asked whether the $500,000 was included in the $17.5 million, and appellant indicated it would be added to the purchase price. Lawry responded he was not in a position to answer but would discuss the matter with others at GP and get back in touch with appellant and Lewis. A few minutes later, Lewis called Lawry back and told him, “I want no part of that conversation. Haverford Township is not in the business of selling zoning.” Lewis testified he called appellant the next day and essentially told him the same thing. Appellant was charged with and later convicted for bribery in official and political matters. On appeal of that conviction, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him, and also raised the question of whether bribery (as charged) was a strict liability crime. The Supreme Court concluded after review that bribery in official and political matters was not a strict liability crime, and that there was sufficient evidence to support appellant's conviction.View "Pennsylvania v. Moran" on Justia Law

The Sacramento Kings have played at the Sleep Train Arena since 1988. In January 2013, the team’s then owners entered into a tentative agreement to sell the Sacramento Kings to a group of investors in Seattle, Washington. Seeking to keep the team in Sacramento, the City of Sacramento partnered with Sacramento Basketball Holdings LLC to build a new entertainment and sports center in downtown Sacramento at the site of a shopping mall with declining occupancy rates. In May 2013, the Board of Governors for the National Basketball Association (NBA) rejected an application to sell the team and move it to Seattle, and approved the sale of the team to Sacramento Basketball Holdings. The NBA’s board of governors also reserved the right to acquire the Sacramento Kings and relocate the team to another city if a new arena in Sacramento did not open by 2017. To meet the NBA’s deadline, the City and Sacramento Basketball Holdings developed a schedule that targeted October 2016 as the opening date for the downtown arena. To facilitate timely completion of the project, the Legislature added section 21168.6.6 to the Public Resources Code, which modified (only for construction of the downtown arena in Sacramento) several deadlines for review of the project under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (sec. 21050 et seq.). Other than deadlines for review, section 21168.6.6 did not substantively modify CEQA as it applied to the downtown arena project. Adriana Saltonstall and 11 other individuals sued to challenge section 21168.6.6’s constitutionality as well as the project’s compliance with CEQA requirements. Saltonstall moved for a preliminary injunction on grounds of imminent harm to the public caused by the demolition of the shopping mall and construction of the downtown arena. The trial court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. She appealed the denial of the preliminary injunction, arguing: (1) section 21168.6.6 represents an unconstitutional intrusion of the legislative branch on the core function of the courts; and (2) the preliminary injunction should have been granted because section 21168.6.6 “harms [the public] and the environment,” but not the respondents. The Court of Appeal rejected Saltonstall’s constitutional challenge on the merits because section 21168.6.6 did not materially impair a core function of the courts. Moreover, CEQA review did not implicate any constitutionally granted right.View "Saltonstall v. City of Sacramento" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Transportation Commission (MTC) procured some land from O.R. and Carylon Garretson via eminent domain in order to construct a bypass in Greene County. The Garretsons later filed a complaint against the Mississippi Department of Transportation (MDOT), alleging that the bypass construction had caused silt to flood onto their remaining land, damaging their timber. MDOT filed a motion for summary judgment and argued that it was immune under Mississippi Code Section 11-46-9(1), subsections (d) (discretionary-function immunity) and (p) (design immunity). The Supreme Court agreed that MDOT was immune from liability under subsection (p) and affirmed.View "Garretson v. Mississippi Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Land Use Commission (LUC) granted Horton-Schuler Homes LLC’s petition to reclassify certain lands in ‘Ewa District, O’ahu from agricultural to urban use subject to certain conditions. The Sierra Club filed a notice of appeal with the circuit court requesting judicial review of the decision, and Friends of Makakilo (FOM), a non-profit corporation, filed a notice of cross-appeal. FOM did not file its cross-appeal within thirty days after service of the certified copy of LUC’s final decision and order as required by Haw. Rev. Stat. 91-14(b). The circuit court held that FOM’s cross-appeal was not allowed by law because aggrieved parties have no right to cross-appeal and that FOM’s cross-appeal was untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of FOM’s cross-appeal as untimely, holding that an “aggrieved person” seeking judicial review of an administrative decision under the Hawai’i APA must institute review proceedings within thirty days after service of the final decision and order.View "Friends of Makakilo v. D.R. Horton-Schulder Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioners Daryl and Marcy Dembiec appealed a superior court order dismissing their petition for equitable relief. In October 2011, petitioners obtained a permit from the respondent, the Town of Holderness to construct a single family home. Before the permit was issued, the only structure on the property was a two-story boathouse with living quarters on the second floor. In April 2012, when construction of the home was substantially completed, the Town's compliance officer advised the petitioners that he would not issue a certificate of compliance for their new home because the existing boathouse contained a dwelling unit, and the applicable zoning ordinance allowed two dwellings on a lot only when they are in the same structure, such as in a duplex. The compliance officer informed petitioners that, before he could issue a certificate of compliance, they would need either to obtain a variance or remove "all plumbing" from the boathouse. Petitioners then applied to the zoning board of adjustment for an equitable waiver from the ordinance. Two intervenors objected to the petitioners' request. The board originally granted the waiver, but on rehearing, denied it. Petitioners later sought a variance. The board denied their application. The superior court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitioners' municipal estoppel claim because they had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Petitioners argued that the trial court had jurisdiction over their claim because they were not required to first raise it before the zoning board of adjustment. The Supreme Court was persuaded that appealing the compliance officer's decision to the zoning board would have been useless because the zoning board lacked the authority to grant the requested relief. Thus, exhaustion is not required. "The plain language of the pertinent statutes does not confer general equitable jurisdiction upon a zoning board. Nor could the zoning board have granted any relief to the petitioners under the applicable statutes or the Town's ordinance because their new home violated the ordinance, and they failed to meet the requirements for either a variance or an equitable waiver from dimensional requirements. Under those circumstances, we conclude that further pursuit of administrative remedies would have been futile, and, therefore, exhaustion of remedies is not required." Accordingly, petitioners' assertion of a municipal estoppel claim for the first time in the trial court was not barred by the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine. The superior court's decision was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.View "Dembiec v. Town of Holderness" on Justia Law

Appellants, Cleveland Clinic Foundation and Fairview Hospital, sought approval to build a helipad on the roof of a new two-story addition on the Hospital. The Cleveland Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) denied a permit to construct the helipad, determining that the Cleveland zoning ordinances did not permit the building of the helipad. The Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas reversed, concluding that the helipad was permissible under the ordinances. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals applied an incorrect standard of review in reversing the trial court; and (2) the trial court correctly found that under the current version of the Cleveland zoning ordinances, a helipad was a permitted accessory use for the Hospital.View "Cleveland Clinic Found. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Town of Arundel reissued a conditional use permit to Dubois Livestock, Inc. In 2012, the Town’s code enforcement officer issued to Dubois a notice of violation for failure to comply with the conditional use permit. The Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) upheld the code enforcement officer’s notice of violation because Dubois admitted to violating the conditions of the 2011 permit. Dubois appealed, arguing that the Town did not have the authority to regulate Dubois’s operation because the Town of Arundel Land Use Ordinance was preempted by state law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that state law does not preempt the Ordinance, and therefore, the Town’s action taken pursuant to the Ordinance in issuing Dubois a notice of violation for failure to comply with the conditional use permit was not ultra vires or beyond the Town’s jurisdiction.View "Dubois Livestock, Inc. v. Town of Arundel" on Justia Law

The Town of Madawaska filed an amended land use citation and complaint against Richard and Ann Cayer for violations of a shoreland zoning ordinance. The Cayers filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the land use citation was a retaliatory effort by the Town to punish them for exercising their right to petition local government. The trial court denied the special motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, except possibly in extraordinary circumstances not presented in this case, the anti-SLAPP statute cannot be invoked to thwart a local government enforcement action commenced to address the defendants’ alleged violations of law.View "Town of Madawaska v. Cayer" on Justia Law

Eastern Farmers Cooperative (EFC) applied for and was granted a conditional use permit to build and operate an agronomy facility on sixty acres of land near Colton, South Dakota. Appellants’ residence was directly across a county road from the proposed facility. Appellants appealed. The Minnehaha County Commission upheld the decision to grant the conditional use permit to EFC, as did the circuit court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the County Commission’s decision to uphold the approval of the permit was not arbitrary and capricious in violation of Appellants’ due process rights; and (2) any alleged due process concerns arising out of a certain commissioner’s participation in the County Commission’s action were remedied by invalidating that commissioner’s vote.View "Hanson v. Minnehaha County Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff J. Albert Lynch, Trustee of FIN-LYN Trust, appealed a superior court order granting a motion to dismiss his action seeking to enforce restrictive covenants contained in a deed between the Trustee and the Town of Pelham. The trial court ruled that the covenants at issue are appurtenant and personal, and that the Trustee lacked standing to enforce them. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the covenants at issue were gross and enforceable by the Trustee, and that the record established that he had a legitimate interest in enforcing them on behalf of the Trust. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Lynch v. Town of Pelham" on Justia Law