Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Zoning, Planning & Land Use
by
At dispute in this case was a bridge located in Cuyahoga County on the border between Independence City and the village of Valley View and on a road that was neither a County road nor a state highway. The County and the City each claimed that the other was responsible for maintaining and repairing the bridge. The County’s duty to repair or replace such a bridge depended upon whether the road served by the bridge was a road of general and public utility. The Cuyahoga County Board of County Commissioners determined that the road was not a road of general and public utility. The common pleas court reversed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence supported the determination that the road was a road of general and public utility.View "City of Independence v. Office of the Cuyahoga County Executive" on Justia Law

by
East Georgia Land and Development Company, LLC sued Newton County and several of its officers for a writ of mandamus, arguing that a zoning ordinance adopted by the County in May1985 was invalid. The trial court agreed that the zoning ordinance is invalid, it awarded summary judgment to East Georgia. The County appealed. The zoning ordinance at issue referred to (and purported to incorporate by reference) a set of maps identified in the ordinance as the "Official Zoning District Maps for Newton County." These maps are an integral part of the zoning ordinance. The only such maps that appeared in the record, however, were adopted by the County on July 2, 1985, and nothing in the record showed that those maps even were in existence in May 1985. "A map not yet in existence cannot have been 'made a public record' and certainly is not 'accessible to members of the public who are, or may be, affected by it.'" The trial court found, and as a result, concluded that the ordinance was void at the moment of its enactment. The Supreme Court saw no error in the findings of the trial court on this point, nor in its conclusion that the ordinance was void from its inception.View "Newton County v. East Georgia Land & Development Cp., LLC" on Justia Law

by
32 Thomas Street, LLC applied to the Portland City Council for conditional rezoning of its property in Portland’s West End. The City Council ultimately approved the conditional zoning agreement (CZA) for the reuse and rehabilitation of the property. The superior court determined that the rezoning did not comply with the City’s comprehensive plan and state statutes limiting conditional rezoning. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded with direction to affirm the decision of the City Council, holding that the record before the City Council supported its legislative determination that the CZA was consistent with the comprehensive plan and therefore did not violate relevant state statutes.View "Remmel v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

by
Applicants sought approval from the Town of North Hempstead Board of Zoning and Appeals (the Board) to place a full-service restaurant in a storefront that had most recently housed a retail gift shop. Restaurants in this area were permitted subject to the issuance of a conditional use permit. The Board granted the conditional use permit and an area variance from the Town’s parking and loading/unloading restrictions. Colin Realty, LLC (Colin), the owner of a multi-tenant retail building next to the property at issue, commenced this action seeking to annul the Board’s determination and obtain a declaration that the proposed restaurant required a use rather than an area variance from the Town’s parking and loading/unloading restrictions. Supreme Court denied the petition and dismissed the action. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Board properly considered the application as a request for an area variance rather than a use variance.View "Matter of Colin Realty Co., LLC v. Town of N. Hempstead" on Justia Law

by
The Department of Environmental Protection (Department), acting through its office of Long Island Sound Programs (Office), ordered Plaintiffs, Gail and Thomas Lane, to remove a boardwalk and dock from their property because they had been installed without the statutorily required permits. The Office then denied Plaintiffs’ application for a certificate of permission to retain and maintain the structures and to install a new boardwalk pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-363b(a)(2). The Department upheld the Office’s rulings. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ administrative appeal. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court properly interpreted section 22a-363b(a) in concluding that the trial court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ administrative appeal.View "Lane v. Comm’r of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

by
Sara Crossfield appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Limestone County Commission in her action to reverse the Commission's decision to vacate a portion of Dogwood Flats Road in Limestone County. In early 2013, the Commission proposed to vacate a portion of Dogwood Flats Road. Crossfield's property did not abut the portion of Dogwood Flats Road proposed to be vacated; it abutted Dogwood Flats Road approximately 400 feet north of the portion of the road that the Commission proposed to vacate. At a hearing on the matter, Crossfield alleged that she was a "party affected by the vacation of a portion of Dogwood Flat[s] Road" and asked the trial court to set aside the vacation of the road. Crossfield alleged, among other things, that the Commission had obstructed her access to Piney Creek, east and south of Crossfield's property. The Commission moved to dismiss, arguing Crossfield was not affected by the vacation and therefore lacked standing to appeal the Commission's decision regarding Dogwood Flats. The trial court granted the Commission's motion for a summary judgment and dismissed Crossfield's appeal. Crossfield's evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to her as the nonmovant, did not create a genuine issue of material fact that would preclude a summary judgment for the Commission. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Commission. View "Crossfield v. Limestone County Commission " on Justia Law

by
Columbia, an interstate natural gas company subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), seeks to replace a portion of a natural gas pipeline that runs in and around York County, Pennsylvania. Because the original location of the pipeline has become heavily populated, the replacement will not track the original line but will be outside the existing right of way. To obtain easements necessary to complete construction of the replacement, in 2013, Columbia filed Complaints in Condemnation against four Landowners in federal court. The district court held that Columbia did not have the right of eminent domain required to condemn the easements, reasoning that 18 C.F.R. 157.202(b)(2)(i), was ambiguous. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that the regulation clearly anticipates replacement outside the existing right of way and contains no adjacency requirement. The district court erroneously adopted its own definition of “replace” and concluded that a “notice” of “proposed rulemaking” for “Emergency Reconstruction of Interstate Natural Gas Facilities” promulgated by FERC after 9/11 was relevant.View "Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 1.01 Acres in Penn Twp" on Justia Law

by
In 2009, the Newtown Township Board of Supervisors enacted a Planned Residential Development Ordinance. This appeal centered on challenges to the validity of that ordinance and to the approval of a Tentative PRD Plan pursuant to it. Intervenors BPG Real Estate Investors (BPG) submitted an application under the anticipated PRD Ordinance for approval of a Tentative PRD Plan, proposing multi-use development of an approximately 218-acre tract of land that it owned. The Township Board orally approved BPG's Tentative PRD Plan, and later issued a written decision granting approval. Newtown Square East, L.P. (NSE), which owned a two-acre tract of land adjacent to BPG's tract, filed a challenge to the validity of the PRD Ordinance with the Newtown Township Zoning Hearing Board, and filed an appeal of the Township Board's approval of BPG's Tentative PRD Plan with the court of common pleas. With regard to its validity challenge before the Zoning Board, NSE argued, inter alia, that the PRD Ordinance violated Article VII of the MPC by, allegedly, failing to require that a tentative plan identify the uses of buildings and other structures, and permitting the location of buildings to be subject to free modification between the time of tentative plan approval and final plan approval. Following several hearings, the Zoning Board upheld the validity of the PRD Ordinance, finding that its minor textual variations from the relevant provisions of the MPC, Article VII, did not create an inconsistency or conflict with the enabling legislation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the validity of the ordinance. View "Newtown Square East v. Twp. of Newtown" on Justia Law

by
The Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government Board of Adjustment (Board) filed a motion for a temporary injunction pursuant to Ky. R. Civ. P. 65.04 seeking to enjoin Boone Creek Properties, Inc. (Boone Creek) from operating certain commercial recreational activities on property in Fayette County. The circuit court granted the temporary injunction, finding that the activities were in violation of a zoning ordinance and a conditional use permit issued by the Board. The court of appeals concluded that the circuit court had properly granted the injunction. Boone Creek appealed, arguing that the Board failed to satisfy the “irreparable harm” prong of rule 65.04. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when a governmental entity charged with enforcement of a civil law seeks an injunction restraining an ongoing violation of the law, irreparable harm is presumed; and (2) under the circumstances of this case, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by granting the requested injunction.View "Boone Creek Props., LLC v. Bd. of Adjustment" on Justia Law

by
In 2001 Millview County Water District began diverting water from the Russian River under the authority of a pre-1914 appropriative water right assigned to Millview by plaintiffs Hill and Gomes. Following a citizen complaint, the State Water Resources Control Board issued a cease and desist order substantially restricting Millview’s diversion of water under the right, finding it had been largely forfeited by a period of diminished use from 1967 through 1987. Millview argued that the Board lacked jurisdiction to limit appropriation under a pre-1914 water right and that the evidence did not support the Board’s finding of forfeiture because there was no evidence of a timely adverse claim of use. The trial court accepted Millview’s arguments. The appeals court affirmed. While the Board did have jurisdiction under Water Code section 1831 to issue a an order precluding excessive diversion under a pre-1914 right to appropriate and the Board properly determined the original perfected scope of the claim, it applied an incorrect legal standard in evaluating the forfeiture of Millview’s claimed water right. Applying the proper legal standard, the evidence before the Board was insufficient to support a finding of forfeiture. View "Millview Cnty. Water Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd." on Justia Law