Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff and his family filed suit against Lewisville for damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff and his family challenged the constitutionality of a Lewisville ordinance prohibiting registered child sex offenders from residing within 1,500 feet of "where children commonly gather." Plaintiff, a registered child sex offender, asserts that he and his family cannot find a house to rent or buy based on the challenged ordinance. The district court dismissed the claims based on lack of standing and, alternatively, as moot. The court concluded that the family's inability to find a home in Lewisville is fairly traceable to the challenged ordinance and it was likely that a judgment in the family's favor would at least make it easier for them to find a residence to rent or buy in Lewisville. Although the family has moved to another town, their claims for monetary relief are sufficient to defeat mootness. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the district court because the family has met the traceable and redressable requirements of standing and their claim is not moot. View "Duarte, et al. v. City of Lewisville, TX" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Archdiocese of Philadelphia filed an Application for Zoning/Use Registration Permit with the Philadelphia Department of Licenses and Inspections ("L&I") for conversion of the Nativity B.V.M. Elementary School into a 63-unit, one-bedroom apartment complex for low income senior citizens. The school was built in 1912 and operated by the Archdiocese in legal non-conformance with subsequently enacted zoning codes until 2008, when it had been closed due to declining enrollment and insufficient revenue. In 2009, the Archdiocese received funding under the Section 202 Supportive Housing for the Elderly program of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") to convert the school to senior housing. L&I denied the Archdiocese's Application for Zoning/Use Registration Permit as not in compliance with several provisions of the Philadelphia Zoning Code. The Archdiocese appealed to the City of Philadelphia Zoning Board of Adjustment ("ZBA") for use and dimensional variances. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether the Commonwealth Court applied an improper standard in reversing the ZBA's grant of a variance. After careful review of the Commonwealth Court's opinion the Court concluded that the court erred by relying on an improper standard for unnecessary hardship and by substituting its judgment for that of the ZBA, thereby applying an incorrect standard of review. View "Marshall v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Developer Vermont North Properties (VNP) appealed from the trial court’s decision in favor of the Village of Derby Center. The dispute centered on VNP’s rights, if any, to water and sewer allocations from the systems managed by the Village in connection with a VNP construction project. The trial court determined that: the Village could charge fees for reserved water and sewer allocations; the Village’s fees were reasonable; the Village could revoke VNP’s reserved allocations for nonpayment of fees; and the Village was not estopped from denying water and sewer connections to VNP on account of nonpayment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that VNP had enforceable reserved water and sewer allocations, but the Village could charge equitable fees for these reservations and may revoke the reservations for nonpayment. Furthermore, the Court concluded that VNP failed to meet its burden of demonstrating the unreasonableness of the Village’s reservation fees, and on that basis the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. View "Vermont North Properties v. Village of Derby Center" on Justia Law

Petitioners Catherine Babb, Beth King, and Robert King filed a Petition for Inclusion of certain real property into Oxford, Mississippi, pursuant to Mississippi Code Sections 21-1-45 to 47. The property was scheduled to become Baptist Memorial Hospital - North Mississippi, Inc. (BMH), a new, multi-million-dollar medical facility. Objectors Kenneth Ferrell and others filed an objection. The Chancery Court found the Petitioners met the statutory requirements for inclusion and approved the Petition. The Objectors appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Chancery Court. View "In the Matter of Inclusion into the City of Oxford" on Justia Law

In 2010, the City of Whitefish passed Resolution 10-46, which authorized the City to enter into an interlocal agreement with Flathead County concerning planning and zoning authority over a two-mile area surrounding the City. In 2011, voters in Whitehead passed a referendum repealing the Resolution. Plaintiffs, residents of the City and the County, filed the present lawsuit claiming that the citizens’ power of referendum and initiative did not extend to the Resolution. The district court agreed with Plaintiffs and granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs and the County. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by not dismissing the suit as untimely based upon the doctrine of laches; and (2) did not err by determining that the Resolution was not subject to the right of voter initiative and referendum because the Resolution was an administrative act by the City. View "Phillips v. City of Whitefish" on Justia Law

In April 2008, a particularly cold month in a dry year, young salmon were found fatally stranded along banks of the Russian River system, which drains Sonoma and Mendocino Counties. The deaths were caused by abrupt declines in water level that occurred when water was drained from the streams and sprayed on vineyards and orchards to prevent frost damage. After hearings and preparation of an environmental impact report (EIR), the State Water Resources Control Board adopted a regulation that is likely to require reduction in diversion of water for frost protection under certain circumstances. The regulation does not limit water use, but delegates regulatory authority to local governing bodies composed of the diverting growers. The regulation declares that any water use inconsistent with the programs, once they are approved by the Board, is unreasonable and prohibited. The trial court invalidated the Board’s action. The appeals court reversed. While authority to require a permit for water use by riparian users and early appropriators is beyond the authority of the Board, it has the power to prevent unreasonable use of water. In regulating unreasonable use of water, the Board can weigh public purposes, notably the protection of wildlife habitat, against the commercial use of water by riparian users and early appropriators. The court noted that its ruling was on a facial challenge and did not address the validity of any particular substantive regulation. The Board did not unlawfully delegate its authority and properly certified the EIR. View "Light v. State Water Res. Control Bd." on Justia Law

The Town of Charlestown appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA) dismissing its petition for reclassification of current use parcels owned by taxpayer TransCanada Hydro Northeast, Inc. The Town asserted that, "[b]ecause the three parcels are part of a development involving land use for the purpose of generating electricity, they have been improperly classified as open space land under" RSA chapter 79-A. As a result, the Town requested that the BTLA revoke the current use status of the three parcels and require the Town's assessing officials to reclassify the parcels. The Town further requested that the BTLA issue an order requiring the assessing officials to reassess taxes for tax years 2007 through 2012. TransCanada objected, arguing that the three parcels were not improperly classified as open space land. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the BTLA did not err in dismissing the Town's petition for reclassification on the ground that the Town could unilaterally reclassify the land. As the Town agreed at oral argument, the Court did not address whether the Town could apply the reclassification retrospectively. View "Appeal of Town of Charlestown" on Justia Law

The Moody County Board of Adjustment granted a conditional use permit (CUP) to allow Mustang Pass, LLC (Mustang) to construct a concentrated animal feeding operation in Moody County. Several citizens (Citizens) petitioned the circuit court for a writ of certiorari to invalidate Mustang’s CUP, asserting (1) the Moody County Board acted in excess of its jurisdiction because Moody County failed, in 2003, to property enact its zoning ordinances creating the Moody County Board of Adjustment; and (2) the statutory scheme applicable to the appeal procedure from a board of adjustment decision violates the Equal Protection Clause. The circuit court denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statutory scheme comports with the Equal Protection Clause because a rational relationship exists between a legitimate legislative purpose and classifications the statute creates among citizens; and (2) the 2003 ordinances were validly enacted. View "Tibbs v. Bd. of Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Pike Industries operated a quarry in the City of Westbrook. Smiling Hill Farm owned property and operated businesses near Pike’s quarry. After the City concluded that Pike did not have a grandfathered right to quarry and attempted to rezone the property and end Pike’s quarrying operations, Pike filed a complaint seeking to enjoin the City from enforcing its zoning ordinances. The City and Pike subsequently entered into a consent decree that allowed Pike to continue its quarrying operations subject and established a set of governing performance standards. Smiling Hill appealed. In Pike I, the Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions for the parties to formalize the performance standards. The parties then entered into a second consent decree. Smiling Hill appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the decree conformed to the requirements laid out in Pike I; and (2) the decree did not result in a forfeiture of the City’s enforcement power or an illegal contract zone. View "Pike Indus., Inc. v. City of Westbrook" on Justia Law

Roger Seherr-Thoss (RST) owned and operated a gravel operation since at least 1977. In 1978, Teton County enacted its first Land and Development Regulations (LDRs). In 2011, Teton County issued RST an amended "notice to abate" requiring RST to reduce his production levels to pre-1978 levels because the business had expanded in volume and footprint since the LDRs were adopted. After a contested case hearing, the Teton County Board of County Commissioners entered an order recognizing that all aspects of RST’s gravel crushing and extraction operations were grandfathered but requiring RST to reduce its operation to its 1978 extent. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board’s order was an improper agency determination and exercise of authority. View "Seherr-Thoss v. Teton County Bd. of County Comm'rs" on Justia Law