Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge sought injunctive relief against defendant Stephen Myers to compel him to cease his alleged violation of the City-Parish’s Unified Development Code (the “UDC”), Title 7, Chapter 8, Section 8.201, Appendix H, entitled “Permissible Uses.” The City-Parish alleged that more than two unrelated persons were residing in a home owned by the defendant in an area zoned “A1” and restricted to “single-family dwellings.” The defendant answered the petition, admitting that he was the owner, but denying that he occupied the premises, as he had leased the property to other occupants. The defendant sought dismissal of the action for injunctive relief and asserted, both as an affirmative defense and as the basis for his reconventional demand for declaratory judgment: that the UDC zoning law’s restrictive definition of “family” was unconstitutional on its face and as applied, violating his state and federal constitutional rights of freedom of association; deprived him of his property without due process of law; denied him an economically viable use of his property; and violated his equal protection rights, contending the ordinance “impose[d] greater limitations on owners who choose to rent their homes . . . than it does on owners who choose not to rent their homes” and also by prohibiting “foster children and non-adopted stepchildren without a living biological parent from being able [to] reside with their respective foster parents and stepparents . . . while allowing an unlimited number of very distant relatives via blood, marriage or adoption to reside together.” The defendant also urged, along with defenses and/or matters not relevant hereto, that the zoning law’s definition of “family” should be declared void for vagueness because its prohibitions were not clearly defined and it does not contain an unequivocal statement of law. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in its rulings; therefore, the Court reversed the declaration of unconstitutionality and the denial of a suspensive appeal, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "City of Baton Rouge v. Myers" on Justia Law

Salt Creek Road is an unimproved 12.3-mile road intertwined with the creek bed in Salt Creek Canyon. The state and county wanted to use their claimed right-of-way to prevent the United States from closing the Salt Creek Road to vehicle traffic. The road is the primary way for tourists to reach several scenic sites within the Canyonlands National Park, including Angel Arch. Without vehicle access, the only way to access Angel Arch is to make the nine-mile trek by foot. The state and county based their claim on Revised Statute (R.S.) 2477: "[T]he right of way for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted." Congress enacted R.S. 2477 in 1866, and it remained in effect until 1976. Even then, however, Congress preserved the rights-of-way established under the statute. This Quiet Title Act case presented to the Tenth Circuit the issue of whether the district court erred in rejecting the claims of San Juan County and the State of Utah to Salt Creek Road. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "San Juan County, Utah v. United States " on Justia Law

The City of Fremont paved on block of a street and assessed the paving costs against abutting property owners. The City relied on Nebraska’s “gap and extend” law, which permits a city to “pave any unpaved street…which intersects a paved street for a distance of not to exceed one block on either side of such paved street” to authorize the paving. Appellees, legal titleholders of property that abutted upon and was adjacent to the street, filed a petition on appeal, alleging that the levy of special assessments was invalid. The district court sustained Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that the City did not comport with the limitations and restrictions required by the gap and extend law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plan language of the statute authorized the paving. Remanded with direction to enter judgment in favor of the City. View "Johnson v. City of Fremont" on Justia Law

Lessee leased property owned by Owners pursuant to a lease agreement. A billboard was located on the property that had been declared illegal because it exceeded the permitted height limitations. Lessee and Owners filed a joint application for a variance with the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) to allow the billboard to remain at its existing height. The BZA denied the variance. The circuit court upheld the BZA’s decision. Lessee appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred by applying an improper standard of review when considering the BZA’s decision to deny the request for a variance. Remanded. View "Lamar Co., LLC v. City of Richmond" on Justia Law

The City of Richmond brought an enforcement action against the owners of real property (Owners) and the lessee of the property (Lessee), seeking removal of a billboard that Lessee maintained on the property, or, in the alternative, an order requiring the billboard to be lowered to a conforming height. Owners and Lessee filed separate complaints for declaratory judgment against the City, alleging that the City could not require removal of the billboard if the City had been paid taxes for more than fifteen years pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 15.2-2307. The circuit court sustained the demurrers filed by the City and dismissed the complaint, concluding that section 15.2-2307 was “merely enabling” legislation and that private property owners did not have the statutory vested rights protections unless a local government chose to adopt an implementing ordinance thereunder. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred by holding that section 15.2-2307 was “merely enabling” legislation. View "Lamar Co., LLC v. City of Richmond" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether the "vested rights doctrine" applied to permit applications filed under plans and regulations that were later found to be noncompliant with the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA). In 2006, BSRE Point Wells LP asked Snohomish County to amend its comprehensive plan and zoning regulations to allow for a mixed use/urban center designation and redevelopment of the Point Wells site. BSRE wanted to redevelop the property by adding over 3,000 housing units and over 100,000 square feet of commercial and retail space. The petitioners, Town of Woodway and Save Richmond Beach Inc., opposed the project. They argued that the area lacked the infrastructure needed to support an urban center, namely sufficient roads and public transit. These nearby communities did not want to "bear the burden of providing urban services to the site." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the vested rights doctrine did apply to the permit applications filed in this case: local land use plans and development regulations enacted under the Growth Management Act (GMA), chapter 36.70A RCW, are presumed valid upon adoption. Should a valid plan or regulation later be found to violate SEPA, the exclusive remedies provided by the GMA affect only future applications for development-not development rights that have already vested. In this case, BSRE Point Wells LP (BSRE) submitted complete applications for development permits before the local land use ordinances were found to be noncompliant with SEPA. BSRE's rights vested when it submitted its applications. A later finding of noncompliance did not affect BSRE's already vested rights. View "Town of Woodway v. Snohomish County" on Justia Law

Ada County Highway District (ACHD) appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Terrie Rowley. This case arose from a dispute in the ownership of a ten-foot-wide walkway in a Boise subdivision and arose after Rowley sought an injunction to remove a shed her neighbor placed on that walkway. The district court held that: (1) the subdivision plats showed the original developers clearly and unequivocally dedicated the walkway to the public; and (2) ACHD owned the walkway. ACHD appealed, arguing no evidence in the record showed the original developers clearly and unequivocally intended a public dedication and no statutory provision authorized ACHD to own the walkway. Rowley contended that the original developers clearly intended a public dedication as the walkway was a public street’s corridor extension. Upon review of the facts in record, the Supreme Court agreed with ACHD's argument, finding that the district court erred in holding the subdivision's original owners demonstrated clear and unequivocal intent to dedicate the walkway to the public. The Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of ACHD. View "Rowley v. ACHD" on Justia Law

Plaintiff property owner sent a letter to a zoning enforcement officer for the Town of Darien, asserting that permits obtained by her adjoining neighbor had been illegally issued. Plaintiff received no response to that letter. Plaintiff filed an application to appeal. The town zoning board of appeals dismissed Plaintiff’s application for lack of a timely appeal and lack of a “decision” from which an appeal could lie. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal from the decision of the board, concluding that substantial evidence supported the board’s determination that the town zoning enforcement officer did not make a decision that could be appealed. Plaintiff appealed, contending that the zoning enforcement officer rendered a decision that could be appealed either because (1) he actually made a determination regarding the merit of the violations alleged in her letter that he declined to communicate, or (2) because town zoning regulations obligated him to respond to or act upon the illegality alleged in Plaintiff's letter. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the zoning enforcement officer’s action or inaction with respect to Plaintiff’s letter did not give rise to an independent “decision” from which an appeal to the board would lie. View "Reardon v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals" on Justia Law

In 2010, the City of Sandy Springs and two individual homeowners, John E. Balsam and Jerry Burnstein, filed suit against Fulton County, its Board of Commissioners, and its Director of Public Works. Sandy Springs sought a declaratory judgment, mandamus, and injunctive relief on whether Fulton County retained ownership of and responsibility for two drainage retention ponds and a dam located within Sandy Springs. Following a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of Sandy Springs, and Fulton County appealed, contending that it was prohibited from maintaining the detention ponds pursuant to the Georgia constitution. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court found that Fulton County retained current ownership of and responsibility for the easements it held over the dam and retention ponds located in Sandy Springs. However, any concomitant responsibility continued only until the easements at issue were legally transferred, terminated, or prospectively abandoned. As a result, to the extent that the trial court's order could be read to indicate that Fulton County had to maintain the easements in perpetuity, the Court reversed. View "Fulton County v. City of Sandy Springs" on Justia Law

The Anchorage Assembly passed an ordinance modifying the labor relations chapter of the Anchorage Municipal Code. Two citizen-sponsors filed an application for a referendum that would repeal the ordinance. The Municipality rejected the application, reasoning that the proposed referendum addressed administrative matters that were not proper subjects for direct citizen legislation. The sponsors filed suit in superior court and prevailed on summary judgment. The Municipality appealed, arguing that the referendum was barred because: (1) state and municipal law grants exclusive authority over labor relations to the Assembly; (2) the referendum made an appropriation; and (3) its subject was administrative, not legislative. Following oral argument, the Supreme Court issued an order on January 10, 2014, affirming the superior court's grant of summary judgment to the sponsors. This opinion explained the Court's reasoning. View "Municipality of Anchorage v. Holleman" on Justia Law