Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Calvin Kendrick and K & D Automotive, Inc. sued the City of Montgomery, the City's employees Eddie Hill, Jr., Nathaniel Bracy, and Scott Adams, Tony's Automotive, L.L.C. and Tony's Automotive's owner Tony D. Brooks and manager Ellen F. Brooks asserting various due-process claims after, on two occasions, the City declared vehicles parked at K&D Automotive to be public nuisances under the City nuisance ordinance and authorized Tony's Automotive to abate the nuisances by removing the vehicles from the premises. The trial court thereafter entered a summary judgment in favor of the City defendants and the Tony's Automotive defendants on those claims; however, Kendrick and K&D have established on appeal that a judgment as a matter of law was not warranted on counts 5, 7, 8, 9, and 11 of their amended complaint. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment as to those counts. Kendrick and K&D did not establish, however, that the trial court erred by entering a summary judgment in favor of the defendants on count 10, and that judgment was accordingly affirmed. View "K & D Automotive, Inc. v. The City of Montgomery" on Justia Law

This case concerned a dispute over the paving of a parking lot located on park land leased to a restaurant. A formal agreement between the restaurant and a community organization restricted the paving of the property, and the restriction was incorporated in administrative zoning orders. Still, the lot was paved. Baltimore County was, in this case, landlord of the property, code enforcer, and final administrative adjudicator of disputes arising under local land use laws. As administrative adjudicator, the County forbade the paving. As landlord, the County directed its tenant, Oregon, LLC, to pave the lot. As code enforcer, it refrained from taking action in response to the apparent violation of a final administrative order issued by the Board of Appeals. Plaintiffs brought suit against the County and Oregon seeking declaratory and mandamus relief. The circuit court ruled against Plaintiffs. The court of special appeals affirmed, concluding that Plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Court of Appeals largely affirmed, albeit on different grounds, holding (1) Plaintiffs need not initiate an administrative proceeding to pursue enforcement of the Board’s orders; (2) the circuit court properly granted summary judgment with respect to the mandamus counts of the complaint; and (3) the circuit court has authority to issue a declaratory judgment as to whether the Board’s orders were violated. Remanded. View "Falls Road Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. Baltimore County" on Justia Law

Twelve individuals and the Ferrisburgh Friends of Responsible Growth, Inc. appealed the Environmental Division’s affirming the grant of a conditional use zoning permit to Champlain Oil Company. The permit allowed Champlain Oil to construct and operate a gasoline and diesel station with a retail convenience store and a drive-through food facility, including parking lot and overhead canopies for the gas and diesel pumps. Appellants argued that the proposed uses for a convenience, retail and drive-in facility are explicitly prohibited by the Ferrisburgh zoning ordinance and would not be consistent with the town plan. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division's decision. View "In re Champlain Oil Company Conditional Use Application" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the Superior Court, Environmental Division’s affirmance of the zoning board’s grant of a conditional use zoning permit to applicant Group Five Investments, LLC, to build and operate a Dollar General store in Ferrisburgh. Opponents claimed: (1) the trial court erroneously shifted the burden of proof by requiring opponents to show both that the proposed project would have an adverse impact on the area and that existing commercial development in the area already had an adverse impact; (2) the trial court erred in using the "Quechee" definition of undue adverse impact as guidance in interpreting the zoning ordinance; and (3) the trial court erred in failing to rule that the proposed use is prohibited under the applicable zoning ordinance, and that the trial court violated Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) by failing to make requested findings on the proposed use of the Dollar General store. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "In re Group Five Investments CU Permit" on Justia Law

John Ter Beek filed an action against the City of Wyoming, seeking to have a city zoning ordinance declared void and an injunction entered prohibiting its enforcement. Ter Beek was a qualifying patient and held a registry identification card under the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act (MMMA). He wanted to grow and use marijuana for medical purposes in his home and argued that section 4(a) of the MMMA, MCL 333.26424(a), preempted the ordinance. Both parties moved for summary judgment. Ter Beek argued that because the federal controlled substances act (CSA) prohibited the use, manufacture, or cultivation of marijuana, the ordinance likewise prohibited the use, manufacture, or cultivation of marijuana for medical use and therefore conflicted with and was preempted by the MMMA. The city argued instead that the CSA preempted the MMMA. The court granted the City's motion, agreeing that the CSA preempted the MMMA. Ter Beek appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the ordinance conflicted with sec. 4(a) of the MMMA and that the CSA did not preempt 4(a) because it was possible to comply with both statutes simultaneously and the state-law immunity for certain medical marijuana patients under 4(a) did not stand as an obstacle to the federal regulation of marijuana use. The City appealed. The Supreme Court concluded section 4(a) of the MMMA was not preempted by the federal controlled substances act, but 4(a) preempted the ordinance because the ordinance directly conflicted with the MMMA. View "Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming" on Justia Law

Homer Gibson applied to Kittitas County for a conditional use permit (CUP) that would allow him to conduct rock crushing and other gravel and cement production related activities on his agricultural-zoned property. Kittitas gave notice that it would hold a public hearing on the CUP. Ellensburg Cement Products, Inc. objected to the CUP application and appealed Kittitas's SEPA Determination of Non-Significance (DNS) under the county's administrative appeal procedures. Kittitas first considered the SEPA appeal in a "closed record" hearing, and upheld the DNS. It then held an "open record" public hearing on the CUP, and granted Gibson's application over Ellensburg Cement's objections. Ellensburg Cement appealed both decisions to the superior court, which affirmed, and then to the Court of Appeals, which reversed. The Court of Appeals held that Kittitas was statutorily required to hold an "open record hearing" on the appeal of the SEP A DNS and that rock crushing was not a permissible conditional use under Kittitas's relevant zoning regulations. After its review, the Supreme Court found no error with the appellate court's decision and affirmed. View "Ellensburg Cement Prods., Inc. v. Kittitas County" on Justia Law

The Board of Aldermen for the City of Ridgeland denied Baymeadows, LLC's proposed repair plans to correct 1,478 cited code violations, and Baymeadows appealed. Upon review of the Board's decision, the Supreme Court held that the Board did not adequately state its rationale for denying the proposed plans. Therefore, the Court remanded the case back to the Board either to issue Baymeadows a permit or provide an appropriate factual basis for its denial. View "Baymeadows, LLC v. City of Ridgeland" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over title to a 7.63 acre parcel of land located in Bacon County. The parcel was originally part of a 95-acre parcel owned by H.S. Carter that was taken by Bacon County via eminent domain proceedings commenced in 1973. As a result of the condemnation proceedings, Bacon County acquired over 2500 acres for creating a public recreation project known as Lake Alma and the Carter parcel was just one of the parcels condemned for that purpose. The proposed Lake Alma was part of a larger urban development project so that the City of Alma and Bacon County could execute a development plan that included, among other things, an industrial park, a waste water treatment plant, and improvement of the local airport, in addition to construction of Lake Alma. The other projects were completed but the Lake Alma project was abandoned and never constructed. After the project was abandoned, at the request of the city and county, the General Assembly passed an amendment to OCGA 36-9-3 that permitted counties to sell back to the original owners land that had been acquired for development, but the legislation failed to provide for repurchase of land by the heirs of the original owners. By that time, H.S. Carter was deceased and his original parcel was one of the only parcels condemned for construction that was not repurchased by the original owner. In 2010, OCGA 36-9-3 was amended again to grant the heirs of the original landowners the right to repurchase the land. Heirs of H. S. Carter sought to repurchase the original 95-acre parcel. The City of Alma executed a quit claim deed to Bacon County conveying its undivided interest in the 95 acres and, that same day, Bacon County executed a quit claim deed conveying all of its undivided interest in the property to the heirs. The heirs then filed a petition to quiet title and for ejectment against Darling and Southeastern Maintenance with respect to the 7.63 acres. Darling asserted it was entitled to summary judgment with respect to the quiet title and claim for ejection because, as a result of the county’s previous conveyance of the disputed property to the Development Authority and the subsequent chain of conveyances by which Darling ultimately obtained title, the heirs did not have title to that property. Without addressing Darling’s bona fide purchaser argument, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the heirs along with a decree that title to the property vested in them and was superior to Darling’s claim of title. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in concluding that the heirs’ title was superior to that of Darling’s as a result of Bacon County’s failure to comply with the requirements of OCGA 36-9-2 with respect to a 2003 conveyance of its interest in the property to the Bacon County Development Authority. Furthermore, the trial court erred in finding the 2003 conveyance to Southeastern Maintenance was invalid as a result of the governing authorities’ failure to formulate a new economic development plan. The trial court’s order granting summary judgment to the Carter heirs was reversed and the decree establishing title was vacated. View "Darling International, Inc. v Carter" on Justia Law

Shelby Land Partners, LLC and Alabaster Land Company, LLC each own a 50% undivided interest in a parcel of undeveloped real property located within the municipal limits of the City of Alabaster. At the request of Shelby Land, the property was initially zoned as a "community business district," permitting only commercial uses. In 2009, Shelby Land petitioned the City to rezone the land to permit multifamily residential use in order to pursue the development of a low-income apartment complex for senior citizens on the property. The Alabaster City Council denied Shelby Land's rezoning application. Shelby Land and Alabaster Land then brought this action to appeal the denial of the rezoning request. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Shelby Land and Alabaster Land and ordered the City and the City Council to rezone the land to permit multifamily residential development. The City and the members of the City Council, who were sued in their official capacities, appealed. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "The City of Alabaster v. Shelby Land Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

Applicant Alan Bjerke appealed the Environmental Division's affirmance of the Burlington Development Review Board's decision to deny his application for a zoning permit to alter the exterior of his house. Applicant argued that his zoning permit application was "deemed approved" because the municipal zoning administrator did not act upon it within thirty days. Furthermore, he claimed the Environmental Division erred by admitting the municipal zoning ordinance into evidence after trial and putting the burden of proof of compliance with that ordinance on applicant. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the permit denial. View "In re Bjerke Zoning Permit Denial" on Justia Law