Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Deidre W. Lee and Samuel G. McKerall appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Town of Magnolia Springs Mayor Charles Houser and Town Councilman Robert C. Holk. The Town of Magnolia Springs and the Magnolia Springs Planning Commission (the remaining defendants in the underlying action), appealed a judgment entered on a jury award to Lee and McKerall. In 2005, Lee purchased 47 acres of property in Baldwin County. In 2006, she submitted an application for preliminary subdivision-plat approval detailing a 124-lot residential subdivision to the Baldwin County Planning Commission. The Town of Magnolia Springs incorporated in June 2006, six months before Lee submitted her plat application to the Baldwin County Planning Commission. The first mayor and council for the Town of Magnolia Springs were sworn in 13 days before Lee submitted her application to the Baldwin County Planning Commission. When Lee submitted her application, the Town of Magnolia Springs had no jurisdiction over Lee's property, and only the Baldwin County Planning Commission had the authority to consider Lee's application because her property was outside the town limits. The Baldwin County Planning Commission tabled Lee's application. The Town of Magnolia Springs' mayor informed the Baldwin County Planning Commission that the jurisdiction of Magnolia Springs would extend to include Lee's property and that Magnolia Springs intended to pass a moratorium on subdivision approvals because "a couple of [the town's] council members ... have been involved in ... trying to get [Lee's plat application] delayed." He also acknowledged that Magnolia Springs had "no rules and regulations" regarding applications for preliminary subdivision-plat approvals. Lee sued when the plan was ultimately denied. After careful review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in favor of Lee against the Town of Magnolia Springs and its planning commission, as well as the summary judgment in favor of Houser and Holk, and pretermitted any remaining issues. The Court held that McKerall's claims against the Town of Magnolia Springs and its planning commission were barred by his failure to timely file a notice of claim, and reversed the judgment in his favor. View "Lee v. Houser" on Justia Law

Petitioners appealed a 2012 trial court order that upheld the Town of Underhill's decision to reclassify a segment of Town Highway 26 from a Class 3 and Class 4 highway to a legal trail. Petitioners argued that: (1) the trial court should have appointed commissioners to make a report concerning the reclassification decision pursuant to 19 V.S.A. sections 740-743 rather than reviewing the reclassification decision on the record pursuant to Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75; (2) the court erred in declining to stay the appeal pending resolution of a related action concerning maintenance of the segment; and (3) the evidence did not support the Town's reclassification ruling. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Demarest v. Town of Underhill" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court centered on the question of how non-rental residential properties subject to housing-subsidy covenants should be valued for property-tax purposes. Taxpayers in two cases consolidated for the purposes of this opinion contended that the governing statute mandates an automatic reduction in valuation for properties subject to these covenants or, (what is effectively) equivalent, a mandatory tax exemption on a portion of the property's value. The towns in which these properties are located contended instead that the applicable statute requires that municipal listers give individualized consideration to the effect these covenants may have on the fair market value of a given property when they determine the appropriate assessed value for the allocation of property taxes. The Vermont League of Cities and Towns and the Vermont Assessors and Listers Association joined the towns as amici curiae. The Supreme Court agreed with the towns that the existence of a housing-subsidy covenant was but one of many factors listers and assessors must take under advisement in ascertaining a property's fair market value.  View "Franks v. Town of Essex" on Justia Law

Stark County appealed the dismissal of its case against the defendant vehicle and third-party defendant Ryan Strozzi. Stark County Road Superintendent Al Heiser was notified that an excavating machine was being used in a Dickinson subdivision. Heiser went to the subdivision and saw Ryan Strozzi loading an excavator onto a low-boy trailer. Heiser believed the tractor trailer unit carrying the excavator would exceed the 5-ton per axle and 60,000 pound maximum weight restrictions applicable to the roads leading out of the subdivision. Stark County brought an in rem action against the tractor trailer unit for extraordinary use of the highways under Chapter 39-12, N.D.C.C., alleging only that it violated the per axle weight restrictions. Strozzi responded as a third-party defendant. After a court trial, the district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, ruling the weight restrictions apply to vehicles moved on the road, and the statutory movement requirement had not been met because there was no testimony the tractor trailer unit carrying the excavator had been moved prior to issuance of the ticket. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court's finding the vehicle had not been moved was not clearly erroneous, and therefore affirmed the judgment dismissing the County's case. View "Stark County v. A motor vehicle" on Justia Law

Appellant was a real estate firm that owned a vacant four-story building (the property) and sought to develop it into an office building. Before the Minneapolis City Council approved Appellant's site plan application, the Minneapolis Heritage Preservation Commission (Commission) nominated the property for designation as a local historic landmark. Appellant subsequently submitted an application for a certificate of appropriateness to the Commission. The City Council denied the application and subsequently designated the property as a local historic landmark. Plaintiff commenced this action against the City, alleging that the City violated Minn. Stat. 15.99(2)(a) by failing to approve or deny the application for a certificate of appropriateness within sixty days. The district court granted summary judgment for the City, concluding that section 15.99(2)(a) did not apply to an application for a certificate of appropriateness. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that an application for a certificate of appropriateness is a "written request relating to zoning" under section 15.99(2)(a), and because the City failed to approve or deny Appellant's application within sixty days, summary judgment for the City was not proper. Remanded. View "500, LLC v. City of Minneapolis" on Justia Law

In 1998, Norfolk approved the Hampton Boulevard Redevelopment Project created by the Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority pursuant to Code § 36-49, which authorizes such an authority to "adopt a redevelopment plan for a designated redevelopment area to address blighted areas" and Code § 36-51(A), which authorizes localities to approve redevelopment plans. The approval was based on a redevelopment study which determined that the area was blighted due to incompatible land uses, disrepair, environmental risks, demographic changes, and high crime rates. Properties were classified as good, fair, or poor; about 20 percent were classified as poor. The area was selected to assist in the expansion of Old Dominion University, immediately adjacent to the Redevelopment Project. Challenges to individual condemnations were rejected and a trial court upheld the finding of blight. In 2010 the Authority initiated condemnation of PKO’s apartment building. PKO appealed the adverse decision. The Virginia Supreme Court held that the court erred in permitting the Authority to acquire PKO's property after the effective date of the statutory limitation added by Code § 1-219.1, which provides that property taken for condemnation must itself be blighted at the time the petition for condemnation is filed. The limitation applies to all redevelopment and housing authorities operating pursuant to redevelopment plans adopted prior to January 1, 2007. It does not refer to the filing of a petition for condemnation or the institution of the acquisition of property, but instead limits the "ability of a redevelopment and housing authority ... to acquire property." View "PKO Ventures, LLC v. Norfolk Redev. & Housing Auth." on Justia Law

George and Catherine Dickens appealed the City of Statesboro's Zoning Board of Appeals denial of their application to construct a 2,160-square-foot detached garage on their property. The Dickenses then filed a petition for mandamus and damages at superior court to compel the City to issue their building permit. The City moved for summary judgment, which the superior court summarily denied. The trial court issued a certificate of immediate review, and the City applied for interlocutory appeal. Because the Dickenses were required to seek judicial review at superior court by way of a petition for a writ of certiorari rather than a petition for mandamus, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case back to the trial court for dismissal. View "City of Statesboro v. Dickens" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the City of Milton's decision to deny T-Mobile's applications for permits to build three cell phone towers. At issue was the writing requirement of the Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(7)(B)(iii), which stated that "[a]ny decision by a State or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or modify personal wireless services shall be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record." The court concluded that T-Mobile had access to documents - including transcripts of the planning commission's hearings, letters the city sent to T-Mobile, and detailed minutes of the city council hearings- before its deadline for filing the lawsuit and collectively, these documents they were enough to satisfy the writing requirement of section 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Milton, Georgia" on Justia Law

The City of Lorena approved a subdivision plat. The City, however, subsequently enforced a moratorium against the property, citing the municipality's additional sewage system capacity requirements. The landowner sued for a declaratory judgment that the moratorium did not apply against its approved development and for damages, alleging a regulatory taking under an inverse condemnation claim. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the moratorium could not apply to the property because the property had been approved for development before the moratorium took effect. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the moratorium did not apply to the property because the City approved the property for subdivision before it enacted the moratorium; and (2) in regards to the inverse condemnation claim, the trial court needed to resolve factual disputes before the merits of the takings claim could be judicially addressed. Remanded. View "City of Lorena v. BMTP Holdings, LP" on Justia Law

Landowners protested pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 76-2-205(6) to block the Board of County Commissioners of Missoula County from establishing a special zoning district north of Lolo, Montana. Landowners effectively blocked the zoning proposal pursuant to section 76-2-205(6). L. Reed Williams filed a complaint against Commissioners, challenging the constitutionality of the statute. Landowners intervened in the action. The district court denied Landowners' motion to dismiss and granted summary judgment to Williams and Commissioners, concluding that section 76-2-205(6) was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and an unconstitutional violation of the right to equal protection and the right to suffrage. The Supreme Court upheld the Commissioners' adoption of the special zoning district and affirmed the district court, holding that the district court did not err in (1) denying Landowners' motion to dismiss Williams' complaint for failure to join them as necessary parties; (2) determining that section 76-2-205(6) was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power; and (3) ruling that section 76-2-205(6) was severable from the remainder of the statute. View "Williams v. Bd. of County Commr's" on Justia Law