Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Marjorie Johnson, the owner of farmland, was denied a permit by the Village of Polk to drill a new well for irrigating her farmland. She sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance requiring a permit for new wells in the village’s wellhead protection area was invalid, arguing it was preempted by the Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection Act (NGWMPA) and violated state law by interfering with her existing farming operations.The district court for Polk County denied her request for declaratory judgment and her petition in error. The court found that the ordinance was not preempted by the NGWMPA, as the Legislature intended for both local natural resources districts (NRDs) and municipalities to have control over water sources. The court also found that the ordinance did not interfere with Johnson’s existing farming operations, as the land was previously irrigated through an agreement with a neighbor, and it was the dispute with the neighbor, not the ordinance, that resulted in the land being dryland.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the ordinance was enacted under the necessary statutory grant of power to the municipality, as the Wellhead Protection Area Act and other statutes granted villages the authority to adopt controls to protect public water supplies. The court also found no field or conflict preemption by the NGWMPA, as the Legislature did not intend to deprive municipalities of their statutory authority to require permits for wells within wellhead protection areas. Finally, the court agreed that the ordinance did not interfere with Johnson’s existing farming operations, as the existing farming at the time of the permit request was dryland farming, and it was the neighbor’s actions, not the ordinance, that prevented irrigation. View "Johnson v. Village of Polk" on Justia Law

A real estate developer, HK Baugh Ranch, LLC, petitioned the Texas Public Utility Commission (PUC) to release its undeveloped land, River Bend Ranch, from the certificate of convenience and necessity (CCN) issued to Crystal Clear Special Utility District (Crystal Clear). Crystal Clear, a federally indebted utility district, sued the PUC’s Chair and Commissioners in federal court, alleging that Texas Water Code § 13.2541, which allows for decertification, was preempted by 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b). This federal statute protects certain federally indebted utilities from curtailment of their service areas while their loans are outstanding.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas issued a preliminary injunction preventing the PUC from decertifying River Bend Ranch. The district court applied the “physical ability” test from Green Valley Special Utility District v. City of Schertz, determining that Crystal Clear likely made its service available to HK Baugh and was thus entitled to the protections of § 1926(b). The court concluded that § 1926(b) likely expressly preempts Texas Water Code § 13.2541, resolving the remaining preliminary injunction factors in favor of Crystal Clear.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that Crystal Clear would likely satisfy the “physical ability” test. However, the appellate court found that the district court erred in holding that § 1926(b) expressly preempts Texas Water Code § 13.2541. The appellate court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether § 1926(b) otherwise preempts Texas Water Code § 13.2541 and to address all preliminary injunction factors as necessary. The preliminary injunction remains in place pending further proceedings. View "Crystal Clear v. HK Baugh Ranch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Mollie Marie Flinton applied for Social Security disability insurance and supplemental security income benefits in August 2015, citing mental health disabilities. Her application was initially denied, and she requested an administrative hearing. ALJ Mark Solomon, who was not properly appointed at the time, conducted the hearing and denied her benefits in March 2018. Flinton appealed, and the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York remanded the case for a new hearing in 2020. Despite the remand, Flinton appeared again before ALJ Solomon in August 2021, whose appointment had been ratified by then.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, presided over by Magistrate Judge Gary R. Jones, granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Commissioner of Social Security in September 2023. The court found that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and that remanding the case to a new ALJ was unnecessary, despite acknowledging the Appointments Clause challenge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and held that, pursuant to Lucia v. SEC, Flinton was entitled to a new hearing before a different, properly appointed ALJ. The court found that ALJ Solomon’s initial decision was invalid due to his improper appointment and that the subsequent hearing before the same ALJ did not cure the constitutional violation. The court vacated the district court’s decision and remanded the case to the Commissioner for a de novo hearing before a different, validly appointed ALJ. View "Flinton v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec." on Justia Law

In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which held that the U.S. Constitution does not protect the right to abortion, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration that Wisconsin Statute § 940.04(1), which criminalizes the intentional destruction of an unborn child, does not ban abortion. The plaintiffs included the Attorney General, the Department of Safety and Professional Services, the Medical Examining Board, and three physicians. They argued that the statute either does not apply to abortion or has been impliedly repealed by subsequent legislation.The Dane County Circuit Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs stated a claim upon which relief could be granted because § 940.04 does not prohibit consensual medical abortions. The court later issued a declaratory judgment that the statute does not prohibit abortions.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The central question was whether § 940.04(1) bans abortion. The court concluded that comprehensive legislation enacted over the last 50 years, which regulates various aspects of abortion, impliedly repealed the 19th-century near-total ban on abortion. The court held that the legislature's detailed regulation of abortion was meant as a substitute for the earlier statute, and therefore, § 940.04(1) does not ban abortion in Wisconsin.The court affirmed the circuit court's judgment and order, holding that the comprehensive legislative framework governing abortion impliedly repealed the near-total ban on abortion in § 940.04(1). View "Kaul v. Urmanski" on Justia Law

The case involves the Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund (MIIF) seeking cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) payment reimbursements from the Workers' Compensation Trust Fund (trust fund). MIIF, a nonprofit entity created by statute, administers and pays certain claims against insolvent insurers. Between 1989 and 2013, MIIF paid workers' compensation benefits, including COLA payments, on behalf of several insolvent insurers. MIIF filed claims with the trust fund for reimbursement of these payments, but the trust fund denied the claims, arguing that MIIF is not an "insurer" under the relevant statutes and does not participate in the trust fund.The Department of Industrial Accidents (DIA) administrative judge denied MIIF's claims, and the Industrial Accident Reviewing Board (board) affirmed the decision. The board relied on the Appeals Court's decision in Home Ins. Co. v. Workers' Compensation Trust Fund, concluding that MIIF, like the insolvent insurers, does not collect and transmit assessments to the trust fund and is therefore not entitled to reimbursement.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and concluded that MIIF is eligible for COLA-payment reimbursements. The court determined that MIIF, when taking on an insolvent insurer's covered claims, is "deemed the insurer" and has "all rights, duties, and obligations" of the insolvent insurer under G. L. c. 175D, § 5 (1) (b). The court also found that the plain language of the relevant statutes does not exclude MIIF from reimbursement eligibility and that the trust fund's funding mechanism, which is paid for by employers, supports MIIF's entitlement to reimbursement.The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the board's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund v. Workers' Compensation Trust Fund" on Justia Law

Upper Missouri Waterkeeper and seven Broadwater County residents challenged the approval of a subdivision by 71 Ranch, LP, arguing it did not meet the "exempt well" exception for a water rights permit. They sought attorney fees under the Montana Water Use Act, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA), and the Private Attorney General Doctrine. The District Court denied their request for fees under all three claims.The First Judicial District Court found that the subdivision's environmental assessment was inadequate and that the County abused its discretion in approving the subdivision. The court ruled in favor of Upper Missouri on most claims but denied their request for attorney fees. The plaintiffs appealed the denial of fees.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed with the District Court that the Water Use Act did not authorize fees. However, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of fees under the UDJA, finding that the District Court abused its discretion. The Supreme Court held that the equities supported an award of attorney fees and that the declaratory relief sought by Upper Missouri was necessary to change the status quo. The case was remanded to the District Court to determine a reasonable amount of fees and their apportionment. The Supreme Court did not address the private attorney general claim. View "Upper Missouri v. Department of Natural Resources and Conservation" on Justia Law

The City of Dallas amended an ordinance regulating the short-term lending industry, which TitleMax of Texas, Inc. claimed severely harmed its business. TitleMax sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the amendment was preempted by state law and violated its due course of law guarantee under the Texas Constitution. TitleMax requested a preliminary injunction to halt enforcement of the amendment until a trial on the merits, but the district court denied this request.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas reviewed the case and denied TitleMax’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The magistrate judge found that while TitleMax demonstrated potential irreparable harm, it did not show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its claims. The district court accepted this recommendation, leading TitleMax to appeal the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court concluded that TitleMax did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on its preemption and due course of law claims. The court found that the amended ordinance did not prohibit all Credit Services Organizations (CSOs) or Credit Access Businesses (CABs) from operating, but rather regulated their business models. Additionally, the court determined that TitleMax did not have a constitutionally protected interest in operating its business profitably under the due course of law guarantee. The court held that the ordinance was rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest in protecting low-income borrowers. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. View "TitleMax of Texas v. City of Dallas" on Justia Law

Monika McCallion, Brandan McCallion, and Old Bears, LLC (collectively, the McCallions) appealed a judgment affirming the Bar Harbor Board of Appeals' decision to uphold the issuance of a 2023 short-term rental registration to W.A.R.M. Management, LLC. The Town of Bar Harbor requires annual registration of short-term rental properties, classifying them as either VR-1 or VR-2. W.A.R.M. Management, LLC owns two VR-2 properties, one of which is central to this dispute. The property in question is in a district where VR-2s are generally prohibited unless they were registered before December 2, 2021. W.A.R.M. submitted renewal applications and fees for both properties in January 2023, but due to a malfunction in the Town's online portal, one application was lost, and the registration was not renewed by the May 31 deadline. The Town's code enforcement officer (CEO) later issued a registration for the property in October 2023 after determining that W.A.R.M. had timely submitted its renewal application.The McCallions filed an administrative appeal with the Bar Harbor Board of Appeals, arguing that the CEO could not renew the registration after the deadline. The Board upheld the CEO's actions after a de novo hearing. The McCallions then filed a Rule 80B complaint in the Superior Court, which affirmed the Board's decision without addressing the Town's mootness argument. While the case was pending, W.A.R.M. received a 2024 registration for the property, which the McCallions did not contest.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and determined that the appeal was moot because the 2023 registration had been superseded by the 2024 registration, which was not appealed. The court concluded that even if it ruled in favor of the McCallions regarding the 2023 registration, it would have no practical effect since the 2024 registration was final and not subject to review. The court dismissed the appeal as moot, noting that no exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied in this case. View "McCallion v. Town of Bar Harbor" on Justia Law

Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. (ISS), a proxy advisory firm, challenged the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) interpretation of the term “solicit” under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act of 1934. The SEC had begun regulating proxy advisory firms by treating their voting recommendations as “solicitations” of proxy votes. ISS argued that its recommendations did not constitute “solicitation” under the Act.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia agreed with ISS and granted summary judgment in its favor. The court found that the SEC’s interpretation of “solicit” was overly broad and not supported by the statutory text. The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), an intervenor supporting the SEC’s position, appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the ordinary meaning of “solicit” does not include providing proxy voting recommendations upon request. The court concluded that “solicit” refers to actively seeking to obtain proxy authority or votes, not merely influencing them through advice. The SEC’s definition, which included proxy advisory firms’ recommendations as solicitations, was found to be contrary to the statutory text of section 14(a) of the Exchange Act. View "Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. v. SEC" on Justia Law

Dr. John Doe, a federal public servant with a security clearance, was convicted of two felonies in Ohio in the early 1990s. He received a pardon from the Ohio governor in 2009, and his felony convictions were sealed by an Ohio court. In 2022, Dr. Doe applied for a position at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), but his application was denied due to a statutory bar against hiring individuals with felony convictions. Dr. Doe then filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of this hiring prohibition and sought to proceed under a pseudonym to avoid public association with his sealed convictions.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Dr. Doe's motion to proceed under a pseudonym. The court acknowledged Dr. Doe's privacy concerns and the lack of unfairness to the government but concluded that the privacy interest in felony convictions does not warrant pseudonymity. The court emphasized the importance of transparency in judicial proceedings, especially in cases involving constitutional challenges against the government.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's ruling, agreeing that Dr. Doe's privacy interest in his sealed felony convictions was insufficient to overcome the presumption against pseudonymous litigation. The court highlighted the public's significant interest in open judicial proceedings, particularly when the case involves a constitutional challenge to a federal statute. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the relevant factors and denying Dr. Doe's motion to proceed under a pseudonym. View "Doe v. McKernan" on Justia Law