Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2010, the Venezuelan government expropriated assets belonging to a Venezuelan subsidiary of a U.S.-based energy company. The subsidiary had provided drilling services to a state-owned Venezuelan energy company, but after a breakdown in their business relationship and significant unpaid invoices, Venezuelan authorities blockaded the subsidiary’s operations, issued public statements about nationalization, and ultimately transferred the subsidiary’s assets to the state-owned company, which began operating them. The U.S. parent company claimed that this expropriation rendered its ownership interest in the subsidiary worthless and deprived it of its rights to control the subsidiary’s assets.The U.S. parent company and its Venezuelan subsidiary filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against Venezuela and its state-owned energy company, alleging unlawful expropriation. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit initially affirmed. However, the Supreme Court vacated that decision, clarifying the standard for the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) expropriation exception. On remand, the D.C. Circuit found that only the U.S. parent company had a valid claim under international law, as the domestic-takings rule barred the subsidiary’s claim. The district court later dismissed Venezuela as a defendant, leaving the state-owned company as the sole defendant.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the state-owned company’s motion to dismiss. The court held that the FSIA’s expropriation exception applied because Venezuela indirectly expropriated the U.S. company’s property, the state-owned company owns and operates the expropriated assets, and it engages in commercial activity in the United States. The court also held that personal jurisdiction was proper and that the act-of-state doctrine, as limited by the Second Hickenlooper Amendment, did not bar the claim. View "Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co. v. Petroleos De Venezuela, S.A." on Justia Law

A German telecommunications company invested nearly $100 million in an Indian company through a Singaporean subsidiary, acquiring a significant minority stake. The Indian government, through its wholly owned space company, later terminated a contract with the Indian company, prompting the German investor to initiate arbitration in Switzerland under a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between Germany and India. The arbitral tribunal ruled in favor of the German company, awarding it over $93 million, and courts in Switzerland, Germany, and Singapore confirmed the award.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia was then asked to confirm the arbitral award. India moved to dismiss, arguing sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), forum non conveniens, and that the dispute did not fall within the scope of the BIT’s arbitration clause. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the FSIA’s arbitration exception applied, that forum non conveniens was unavailable in such proceedings, and that the parties had delegated questions of arbitrability to the arbitrators, thus precluding judicial review of those issues. The court also found that India had forfeited other merits defenses by not raising them earlier.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the denial of dismissal on immunity and forum non conveniens grounds, but held that the district court erred in refusing to consider India’s substantive defenses to enforcement of the award. The appellate court found that the BIT did not clearly and unmistakably delegate exclusive authority over arbitrability to the arbitrators, so the district court must consider India’s merits defenses under the New York Convention. The judgment confirming the award was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Deutsche Telekom, A.G. v. Republic of India" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization requested that the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) investigate an alleged policy by the Department of Justice (DOJ) that, according to the organization, improperly limited searches for emails in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. The organization believed that DOJ’s refusal to search employee emails without their consent was arbitrary and violated FOIA. After DOJ began producing some records in response to the FOIA request, the organization separately asked OSC to investigate DOJ’s policy under a statutory provision that directs OSC to investigate arbitrary or capricious withholdings of information prohibited by FOIA.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially found that OSC had misinterpreted its authority by refusing to investigate solely because certain statutory prerequisites were not met. However, the district court ultimately dismissed the case, concluding that the decision to investigate under the relevant statute was committed to OSC’s discretion and remanded the matter to OSC for further consideration. After OSC again declined to investigate, the district court dismissed the organization’s remaining claims, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo and determined that the organization lacked Article III standing to pursue its claims. The court held that the organization had not suffered a concrete and particularized injury traceable to OSC’s actions, nor was it likely that a favorable court decision would redress any alleged injury. The court found both of the organization’s standing theories—relating to the denial of FOIA records and to the lack of information from an OSC investigation—insufficient. As a result, the court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "America First Legal Foundation v. Greer" on Justia Law

Mark Howerton was convicted in 2010 of computer child pornography and three counts of internet stalking of a child, based on offenses committed in 2009. He received a total prison sentence of 24 years, with some sentences suspended. Howerton was paroled in 2017 but returned to prison in 2020 for a parole violation. He was denied parole in 2022 for two years and again in 2024 for another two years. Howerton filed a petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus, alleging that the chairperson of the Arkansas Post-Prison Transfer Board, Lona McCastlain, acted without legal authority in denying his parole, arguing that the denial was based on statutes applied ex post facto and an unauthorized “detriment to the community” rationale.The Pulaski County Circuit Court, Sixth Division, granted McCastlain’s motion to dismiss Howerton’s petition. The court found that Howerton failed to state sufficient facts to support his claims, noting that Arkansas parole statutes and regulations do not create a protectable liberty interest in discretionary parole decisions, and that parole eligibility is determined by the law in effect at the time the crime was committed. The court also found that Howerton did not demonstrate that the incorrect statute was applied or that the Board’s regulations were violated.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the dismissal for abuse of discretion and for the existence of a justiciable controversy. The court held that Howerton failed to present sufficient facts to establish that McCastlain acted outside her authority or violated applicable statutes or regulations. The court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal, concluding that Howerton’s allegations were insufficient to warrant declaratory or mandamus relief. View "HOWERTON v. MCCASTLAIN" on Justia Law

Horace Meredith worked as a coal miner for several decades, with his last employment at Hobet Mining, Inc. During Meredith’s tenure at Hobet, Arch Coal Company, Inc. was Hobet’s parent company and provided self-insurance for black lung liabilities. Years after Meredith left Hobet and after Arch had sold Hobet to Magnum Coal (which was later acquired by Patriot Coal Company), Meredith filed a claim for black lung benefits. By the time of his claim, both Patriot and Hobet were defunct, and the Department of Labor sought to hold Arch liable for Meredith’s benefits, despite Arch no longer owning or insuring Hobet.After Meredith filed his claim, the district director designated Hobet as the responsible operator and Arch as the insurance carrier. Arch and Hobet contested this designation, arguing that Arch was no longer responsible for Hobet’s liabilities and that the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund should cover the claim. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found Hobet to be the responsible operator and Arch liable as its self-insurer at the time of Meredith’s last employment. The Department of Labor’s Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision, holding Hobet and Arch liable for the claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision. The court held that neither the Black Lung Benefits Act nor its regulations imposed liability on Arch under these circumstances. Specifically, the court found that Hobet did not meet the regulatory requirements to be a financially capable responsible operator, and Arch could not be held liable as a self-insurer for claims filed long after it ceased to own or insure Hobet. The Fourth Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Hobet Mining, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs" on Justia Law

A dispute arose over the State of Hawai‘i Board of Land and Natural Resources’ (the Board) annual continuation of a revocable water permit issued to Kaua‘i Island Utility Cooperative (KIUC) for the diversion of water from state lands to power hydropower plants. The permit, first issued in 2003, was renewed yearly through 2022. In 2019, the diversion infrastructure was severely damaged, and KIUC ceased using the water for hydropower but continued to maintain the system. Petitioners, two organizations with members asserting native Hawaiian traditional and customary rights, requested contested case hearings in 2020 and 2021, arguing that the continued diversion and disrepair of the system harmed their rights and the environment. The Board denied these requests and continued the permit.Petitioners appealed to the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (Environmental Court), challenging the denial of contested case hearings, the permit’s continuation, and alleging violations of the Board’s public trust duties. While the appeal was pending, the permit expired at the end of 2022. The Environmental Court found that Petitioners had protected property interests under the Hawai‘i Constitution, that their due process rights were violated by the denial of contested case hearings, and that the Board’s failure to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law prevented meaningful review. The court vacated and reversed the Board’s 2021 and 2022 permit continuations.The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated the Environmental Court’s decision, holding that Petitioners had standing under the right to a clean and healthful environment, but that the case was moot and no exceptions applied. The ICA also found no due process violation and concluded the Environmental Court exceeded its jurisdiction in reviewing the merits of the permit continuations.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i held that exceptions to mootness applied, Petitioners had standing based on injury to traditional and customary rights, and that contested case hearings were required to protect their due process rights. The court vacated the ICA’s judgment and remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings. View "Kia'i Wai o Wai'ale'ale v. Board of Land and Natural Resources" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on the extension of a grading and grubbing permit issued by the Director of the Department of Public Works, County of Maui, to Maui Lani Partners for excavation work at a residential development site containing ancestral Hawaiian burial sites. In March 2018, an unincorporated association and its members challenged the validity of the permit extension, alleging violations of state and county laws requiring consultation with the State Historic Preservation Division and arguing that the Director exceeded his authority in granting the extension without good cause.The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit granted motions to dismiss the complaint on all counts without prejudice, finding no regulatory or statutory authority requiring consultation with the State Historic Preservation Division for permit extensions and that the Director acted within his discretionary authority. The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and later denied their HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) motion for reconsideration, concluding that the plaintiffs had not presented new law or argument. The plaintiffs appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), which affirmed the circuit court’s denial of costs and the motion for reconsideration but held that the notice of appeal was untimely because the Rule 60(b) motion was not filed within ten days of judgment and thus did not toll the appeal deadline.The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi reviewed the case and held that a motion for reconsideration filed under HRCP Rule 60(b) is a “tolling motion” under HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) if filed within a reasonable time and before the appeal deadline, thereby extending the time to file a notice of appeal. The court also held that the ICA did not err in affirming the circuit court’s denial of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kakanilua v. Director of the Department of Public Works" on Justia Law

A fatal traffic accident occurred when a tractor trailer, driven by Andre Hill, ran a stop sign and collided with a vehicle driven by Olivia Mendoza, resulting in her death. Prior to the accident, Hill had picked up produce from Irigoyen Farms for delivery to a Walmart distribution center. The transportation of the produce involved several intermediaries: Irigoyen Farms contracted with a freight broker, who in turn contracted with other logistics companies, ultimately resulting in Hill being hired as an independent contractor by the motor carrier. Law enforcement determined that Hill’s extreme fatigue contributed to the crash.The decedent’s mother, Christina Casarez, filed suit in the Superior Court of Fresno County against Irigoyen Farms and Walmart, alleging motor vehicle negligence, general negligence, and wrongful death. She claimed that both defendants were directly negligent in their roles: Walmart for imposing contractual requirements that allegedly incentivized unsafe conduct, and Irigoyen Farms for loading the truck and sending Hill on his way despite knowledge of his fatigue. Both defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) preempted Casarez’s claims. The superior court agreed, granting summary judgment in favor of both defendants.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the superior court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that the FAAAA expressly preempts state law negligence claims against parties whose actions relate to the price, route, or service of a motor carrier with respect to the transportation of property, regardless of whether the party is a motor carrier, broker, or shipper. The court further held that the FAAAA’s safety exception did not apply because the claims did not directly concern the safety of the motor vehicle itself. The appellate court affirmed the superior court’s judgments in favor of Irigoyen Farms and Walmart. View "Casarez v. Irigoyen Farms" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that the City of Berkeley violated the Ralph M. Brown Act during three city council meetings in late 2023 and early 2024. At each meeting, disruptions from attendees made it impossible for the council to conduct business. The mayor determined that order could not be restored by removing disruptive individuals but did not order the meeting room cleared. Instead, the meetings were recessed and reconvened in a different, smaller room, which could not accommodate all nondisruptive members of the public. The press was allowed to attend in person, and the public could participate by video, but the council did not return to the original meeting room or attempt to remove only the disruptive individuals.The Alameda County Superior Court sustained the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, finding that section 54957.9 of the Brown Act did not require the city council to first attempt to remove disruptive individuals before determining that order could not be restored. The court also concluded that the city council complied with the statute by recessing and reconvening the meetings in a different room with the press present. The action was dismissed with prejudice, and plaintiffs appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case de novo. The court held that section 54957.9 requires a legislative body to order the meeting room cleared and continue in session in the same room, not to recess and reconvene in a different location. The statute does not authorize relocating the meeting as a response to disruption. Because plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the city council did not clear the meeting room but instead moved the meeting, the court found that a claim for relief was properly stated. The judgment was reversed. View "Berkeley People's Alliance v. City of Berkeley" on Justia Law

Colorado established a Universal Preschool Program (UPK) following a 2020 voter-approved proposition and subsequent legislation. The program provides public funding for voluntary, universal preschool and requires participating preschools to sign a nondiscrimination agreement. This agreement mandates that preschools offer equal enrollment opportunities regardless of characteristics such as race, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, gender identity, income, or disability. The plaintiffs—two Catholic parishes, their preschools, the Archdiocese of Denver, and two parents—challenged the nondiscrimination requirement, arguing that it conflicted with their religious beliefs, particularly regarding sexual orientation and gender identity, and violated their rights under the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado held a three-day bench trial. The court found that the nondiscrimination requirement did not violate the First Amendment, denied the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief, and dismissed the Archdiocese for lack of standing. However, the court did enjoin the state from enforcing the nondiscrimination requirement as to religious affiliation for as long as a congregation preference existed, a ruling not challenged on appeal. The plaintiffs appealed the denial of injunctive relief and the dismissal of the Archdiocese.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Tenth Circuit held that the nondiscrimination requirement is a neutral law of general applicability and does not target religious status or use. The court found no evidence of religious hostility or individualized exemptions that would undermine general applicability. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ expressive association claim, distinguishing the facts from Supreme Court precedents. Applying rational basis review, the court concluded that the requirement is rationally related to the legitimate government interest of ensuring equal access to preschool. The district court’s denial of injunctive relief was affirmed. View "St. Mary Catholic v. Roy" on Justia Law