Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) extending the construction deadline for the Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC (MVP) Southgate Project. Initially, FERC issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the Southgate Project in June 2020, setting a construction completion deadline of June 18, 2023. However, due to unresolved permitting issues for the Mainline, which Southgate extends from, the construction could not proceed as planned. MVP requested an extension shortly before the deadline, citing delays in Mainline permitting as the reason for not meeting the original deadline.The Commission granted MVP's extension request, finding that MVP had demonstrated good cause due to unavoidable circumstances, specifically the Mainline permitting delays. FERC also maintained that its previous assessments of market need and environmental impacts for the Southgate Project remained valid and did not require reevaluation.Eight environmental organizations petitioned for review, arguing that FERC's decision to extend the construction deadline and its refusal to revisit prior assessments were arbitrary and capricious. They contended that MVP had not made reasonable efforts to advance the Southgate Project and that the market need and environmental impact analyses were outdated.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that FERC reasonably found that MVP had satisfied the good cause standard for the extension, given the permitting and litigation delays with the Mainline. The court also upheld FERC's decision not to revisit its prior findings on market need and environmental impacts, concluding that the information presented by the petitioners did not constitute significant changes in circumstances. Consequently, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Appalachian Voices v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

A Nebraska county (Hayes) sought reimbursement from a neighboring county (Frontier) for half the cost of replacing a bridge under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-827 et seq. Hayes claimed the bridge was on a county line road, thus requiring shared expenses. Frontier's board of commissioners denied the claim, arguing the bridge was not on a county line road and that Frontier was not equally interested in the bridge. Hayes then filed a petition in error in the district court, seeking review of the board's decision.The district court reviewed the case and found that Hayes had not provided sufficient evidence to support its claim. Specifically, the court noted that Hayes did not request an evidentiary hearing before the Frontier Board, resulting in a lack of formal proof regarding the bridge's location. The court concluded that the only evidence in the record was Hayes' claim and its attachments, which were insufficient to establish the bridge's location as required by § 39-827. Consequently, the district court denied and dismissed Hayes' petition in error.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed whether the Frontier Board acted within its jurisdiction and whether its decision was supported by sufficient relevant evidence. The court found that Hayes failed to meet its burden of proof to demonstrate that the bridge was on a county line road as defined by § 39-1403. The court also noted that the Road Agreement between Hayes and Frontier did not conclusively establish the bridge's location for the purposes of the bridge statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment but modified the disposition from "denied and dismissed" to "affirmed." View "County of Hayes v. County of Frontier" on Justia Law

Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc., and its subentities sought an exemption from Wisconsin's unemployment compensation taxes, claiming they were controlled by the Roman Catholic Diocese of Superior and operated primarily for religious purposes. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied the exemption, ruling that the organizations did not engage in proselytization or limit their services to Catholics, and thus were not operated primarily for religious purposes.The Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development initially denied the exemption request, but an Administrative Law Judge reversed this decision. The Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Commission then reinstated the denial. The state trial court overruled the commission, granting the exemption, but the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed this decision. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that the organizations' activities were secular and not primarily religious, and that the statute did not violate the First Amendment.The United States Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the Wisconsin Supreme Court's application of the statute violated the First Amendment. The Court found that the statute imposed a denominational preference by differentiating between religions based on theological lines, subjecting it to strict scrutiny. The Court concluded that the statute, as applied, could not survive strict scrutiny because the State failed to show that the law was narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. The judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Commission" on Justia Law

Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. entered into a satellite-leasing agreement with Antrix Corporation Ltd., a company owned by the Republic of India. The agreement was terminated by Antrix under a force majeure clause when the Indian Government decided it needed more satellite capacity for itself. Devas initiated arbitration, and the arbitral panel awarded Devas $562.5 million in damages plus interest. Devas sought to confirm the award in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, which confirmed the award and entered a $1.29 billion judgment against Antrix.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's decision, finding that personal jurisdiction was lacking. The Ninth Circuit held that under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), personal jurisdiction over a foreign state requires not only an immunity exception and proper service but also a traditional minimum contacts analysis as set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington. The court concluded that Antrix did not have sufficient suit-related contacts with the United States to establish personal jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that personal jurisdiction under the FSIA exists when an immunity exception applies and service is proper. The Court determined that the FSIA does not require proof of minimum contacts beyond the contacts already required by the Act’s enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp." on Justia Law

Summit Carbon Solutions, LLC plans to build an interstate pipeline through Iowa, passing through Shelby and Story Counties. Both counties enacted ordinances imposing various requirements on pipelines, including setback, emergency response plan, and local permit requirements. Summit challenged these ordinances, arguing they were preempted by the federal Pipeline Safety Act (PSA) and Iowa law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Summit, permanently enjoining the enforcement of the ordinances.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa reviewed the case and ruled in favor of Summit, finding that the PSA and Iowa law preempted the counties' ordinances. The court issued a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the ordinances. The counties appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the PSA preempts the Shelby and Story County ordinances' setback, emergency response, and abandonment provisions. The court found that the ordinances were safety standards, which are preempted by the PSA. Additionally, the court held that the ordinances were inconsistent with Iowa law, as they imposed additional requirements that could prohibit pipeline construction even if the Iowa Utilities Commission (IUC) had granted a permit. The court affirmed the district court's judgment in both cases but vacated and remanded the judgment in the Story County case to the extent it addressed a repealed ordinance. View "Couser v. Shelby County" on Justia Law

The case involves several taxicab companies in Hillsborough County, Florida, which held certificates and permits issued by the Hillsborough County Public Transportation Commission (PTC). The PTC was a special district created by the Legislature to regulate taxicabs. In 2012, a law declared these certificates and permits to be the private property of their holders, allowing them to be transferred or devised. However, in 2017, the Legislature repealed the 2012 law, dissolved the PTC, and returned regulatory authority to Hillsborough County, which chose not to recognize the PTC-issued certificates and permits.The taxicab companies filed a lawsuit claiming that the repeal of the 2012 law and the dissolution of the PTC constituted a taking of their property without compensation, violating the Florida Constitution’s Takings Clause. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Hillsborough County, concluding that the certificates and permits had effectively vanished when the PTC was dissolved. However, the court denied the State's motion to dismiss, allowing the possibility of claims for damages against the State.The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Hillsborough County and reversed the denial of the State's motion to dismiss, holding that the taxicab companies did not have a property interest in the PTC-issued certificates and permits for purposes of the Takings Clause. The taxicab companies then sought review by the Supreme Court of Florida.The Supreme Court of Florida held that the 2017 repeal did not implicate the Florida Constitution’s Takings Clause. The Court concluded that the Legislature retained the discretion to revoke any property rights conveyed in the 2012 law, as the certificates and permits were revocable privileges rather than irrevocable property rights. Consequently, the repeal of the 2012 law did not constitute a taking requiring compensation. The Court approved the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal. View "Bojorquez v. State" on Justia Law

In October 2016, BAS, LLC purchased commercial property in Paragould, Arkansas, listing its mailing address as 3735 Winford Drive, Tarzana, California. BAS failed to pay property taxes for 2017 and 2018, leading the Greene County Clerk to certify the property to the Commissioner of State Lands for nonpayment. The Commissioner sent a notice of the upcoming tax sale to the Tarzana address via certified mail in August 2021, but did not receive a physical return receipt. USPS tracking data indicated the notice was delivered. In June 2022, the Commissioner sent another notice to the Paragould property, which was returned undelivered. The property was sold in August 2022, and BAS filed a lawsuit contesting the sale, alleging due process violations and unlawful taking.The Greene County Circuit Court denied the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the Commissioner violated BAS’s due process rights, thus preventing a determination on sovereign immunity. The Commissioner appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and concluded that the Commissioner’s efforts to notify BAS were constitutionally sufficient. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact and determined that the Commissioner’s actions met due process requirements. The court held that BAS failed to allege an illegal or unconstitutional act to overcome sovereign immunity. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the circuit court’s decision and granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner. View "Land v. BAS, LLC" on Justia Law

A four-year-old child suffered severe brain damage due to a massive air embolism during surgery in July 2018. The child's parents, John and Amelia Tullis, sued the healthcare providers, including the University of Utah, in 2019, alleging negligence and seeking damages for pain, anguish, and future medical expenses estimated to exceed $22 million.The University of Utah sought to limit the potential recovery by invoking the 2017 Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (GIA), which capped damages at $745,200. The Third District Court of Salt Lake County denied the University's motion for partial summary judgment, reasoning that the decision in Condemarin v. University Hospital, which found a different damages cap unconstitutional as applied to University Hospital, necessarily determined that the 2017 GIA’s damages cap was also unconstitutional as applied to the University.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether Condemarin controlled the current issue. The court concluded that Condemarin, a plurality decision with a narrow holding, did not control the case. The court noted that Condemarin’s holding was limited to the specific statutes at issue in that case, which imposed a $100,000 cap, whereas the 2017 GIA set a higher limit and included a mechanism for adjusting for inflation. The court emphasized that Condemarin’s holding did not automatically apply to the revised statute with different terms.The Utah Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, noting that the district court should consider the Tullises' request for discovery on the applicability of the damages cap. View "University of Utah Hospital v. Tullis" on Justia Law

Two Italian pasta manufacturers, La Molisana S.p.A. and Valdigrano Di Flavio Pagani S.r.L., challenged the United States Department of Commerce's final results from the twenty-third administrative review of an antidumping order on certain pasta from Italy. The dispute centered on Commerce's methodology for determining the protein content of pasta, which affects the classification of pasta as either standard or premium quality. Commerce used the protein content listed on product labels, which is subject to U.S. FDA rounding rules and different nitrogen-to-protein conversion factors in the U.S. and Italy. La Molisana argued that this methodology caused inaccuracies in comparing pasta products.The United States Court of International Trade sustained Commerce's final results, concluding that La Molisana had not demonstrated that the alleged flaws in Commerce's methodology were commercially significant. The court found that Commerce's reliance on packaging labels for protein content fostered transparency and consistency, and that La Molisana's evidence, including a market report and a new definition from the Bologna Grain Exchange, was insufficient to compel a change in the protein breakpoint from 12.5% to 13.5%.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and found that Commerce's methodology failed to compare products based on identical physical characteristics, as required by statute. The court held that the FDA rounding rules and different nitrogen conversion factors introduced inaccuracies that Commerce could not dismiss as commercially insignificant. However, the court agreed with Commerce and the Trade Court that La Molisana's evidence did not provide a compelling reason to change the protein breakpoint. The Federal Circuit vacated the Trade Court's judgment regarding the rounding rules and nitrogen conversion factors, affirmed the judgment on the protein breakpoint, and remanded for further proceedings. View "La Molisana S.p.A. v. United States" on Justia Law

A public interest law firm, TPM, requested certain budget-request documents from the Mayor of the District of Columbia under the D.C. Freedom of Information Act (D.C. FOIA). TPM sought documents related to the budget requests of the D.C. Public Schools (DCPS) and the Office of the State Superintendent of Education (OSSE) for fiscal year 2019, as well as other related documents. The Mayor refused to produce the draft submissions, claiming they were protected by executive privilege. TPM then filed a complaint in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia seeking the documents and their online publication.The Superior Court denied the Mayor's motion to dismiss and granted TPM's motion for summary judgment. The court ordered the Mayor to produce the requested documents and to comply with the publication requirements of D.C. Code § 2-536. The Mayor appealed, arguing that the documents were protected by executive privilege and that TPM lacked standing to enforce the publication provision.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court rejected the Mayor's claim of executive privilege, stating that the budgetary process involves overlapping responsibilities between the Mayor and the Council, and thus does not fall under the exclusive purview of the executive branch. The court also found that TPM had standing to seek enforcement of the publication provision, as the failure to disclose the documents caused a concrete and particularized injury to TPM.The court affirmed the Superior Court's order requiring the production and online publication of the requested budget documents for fiscal years 2019 to the present. However, it vacated and remanded the portion of the order requiring the publication of other documents under D.C. Code § 2-536, instructing the lower court to clarify the scope of the required publication. View "District of Columbia v. Terris, Pravlik & Millian, LLP" on Justia Law