Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2021, the Montana Legislature passed House Bill 407 (HB 407), which preempted local ordinances, resolutions, initiatives, or referendums regulating the use, sale, or taxation of certain containers, including single-use plastics. Bozeman, which adopted a self-government charter in 2000, was affected by this bill. In 2023, a member of the Cottonwood Environmental Law Center submitted a local ballot initiative to regulate single-use plastics in Bozeman. The Gallatin County Election Administrator rejected the petition, citing the prohibition under § 7-5-131(2)(f), MCA. Cottonwood and other plaintiffs filed a complaint challenging the constitutionality of HB 407.The First Judicial District Court granted Cottonwood's motion for partial summary judgment, finding § 7-5-131(2)(f), MCA, unconstitutional under Article XI, Section 8, of the Montana Constitution. The court certified its order as final, allowing the initiative to be placed on the 2024 general election ballot, where it passed.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the Legislature may place limits on the powers of local government, including the power of local initiatives, as long as these limits do not infringe on other constitutional rights. The court found that § 7-1-111(21), MCA, which prohibits local government units with self-government powers from regulating auxiliary containers, is constitutional. Consequently, the court reversed the District Court's decision, holding that § 7-5-131(2)(f), MCA, is not facially unconstitutional under Article XI, Section 8, of the Montana Constitution. View "Cottonwood v. State" on Justia Law

Jerry L. Blankenship applied for living miner benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, claiming he suffered from coal dust-induced pneumoconiosis and was totally disabled. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found Blankenship entitled to a rebuttable presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis under 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4) and determined that his former employer, Island Creek Coal Company, failed to rebut this presumption. Consequently, Blankenship was awarded benefits. The Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision.Island Creek petitioned for review, arguing that the ALJ improperly conflated the presence of pneumoconiosis and disability causation with the separate total disability analysis. Additionally, Island Creek contended that the ALJ failed to adequately explain his decision to credit the opinions of Blankenship’s medical experts over those of Island Creek’s experts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with Island Creek. The court found that the ALJ improperly relied on the presence of pneumoconiosis and the causation of Blankenship’s impairment in concluding that he was totally disabled. The court also determined that the ALJ failed to provide a sufficient explanation for crediting the medical opinions of Drs. Nader and Green over those of Drs. McSharry and Sargent, violating the duty of explanation under the Administrative Procedure Act.The Fourth Circuit granted Island Creek’s petition for review, vacated the decision of the Benefits Review Board, and remanded the case with instructions for the Board to return Blankenship’s case to the ALJ for reconsideration consistent with the court’s opinion. View "Island Creek Coal Co. v. Blankenship" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Larissa Marland, individually and as administratrix of the estate of Norman Marland, filed a medical malpractice claim against the University of Connecticut Health Center and related entities. The decedent had been treated at the hospital and was later admitted to the intensive care unit, where he fell and subsequently died. The plaintiff alleged that the hospital staff breached the standard of care owed to the decedent.The plaintiff filed a notice of claim with the claims commissioner, including a physician’s opinion letter. The claims commissioner failed to resolve the claim within the statutory two-year period and an additional one-year extension granted by the General Assembly. Despite this, the commissioner eventually authorized the plaintiff to sue the state. The plaintiff then filed the present action in the Superior Court.The state moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the claims commissioner’s waiver of sovereign immunity was invalid because it was issued after the expiration of the one-year extension. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the commissioner did not have the authority to grant the waiver beyond the extension period.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court improperly dismissed the plaintiff’s action. The court held that, once the claims commissioner authorizes suit and waives sovereign immunity, the state cannot challenge that decision in the Superior Court. The court emphasized that such challenges should be raised before the claims commissioner. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with direction to deny the state’s motion to dismiss. View "Marland v. University of Connecticut Health Center" on Justia Law

A law firm, Kleinbard LLC, provided legal services to the Lancaster County District Attorney's Office, led by then-District Attorney Craig Stedman, to challenge the county commissioners over the use of certain forfeiture assets. Stedman and Kleinbard signed an engagement letter, agreeing that Kleinbard would be compensated for its services. The commissioners, however, refused to pay Kleinbard's invoices exceeding the $5,000 budgeted for legal services, arguing that the additional expenses were unauthorized.The Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas sustained preliminary objections from the defendants, allowing only the $5,000 payment and dismissing the remaining claims. The court ruled that the contract for legal services exceeding the budgeted amount was unenforceable under the County Code, which prohibits contracts that exceed appropriated sums without commissioners' approval.The Commonwealth Court affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that Stedman lacked authority to enter into a contract exceeding his budget without commissioners' approval. The court also expressed uncertainty about the nature of the Program Accounts, which Kleinbard claimed were controlled by the District Attorney and funded by program participants, not taxpayer money.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and found that the lower courts erred by not accepting as true the well-pleaded facts in Kleinbard's complaint at the preliminary objections stage. The Supreme Court held that the allegations, if true, established that the Program Accounts were not subject to the County Code's appropriation limits. Therefore, the court reversed the Commonwealth Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the nature and control of the Program Accounts. View "Kleinbard, LLC v. Lancaster Co. DA" on Justia Law

The case involves the interpretation of Administrative Code of the City of New York § 12-126, which mandates that New York City pay the full cost of health insurance coverage for active employees, retirees, and their dependents, up to a specified cap. The dispute centers on whether the City is required to pay up to the statutory cap for any health insurance plan it offers or just one plan. Petitioners argue that the City must pay for any plan offered, while the City contends it only needs to pay for one plan and any additional plans are subject to collective bargaining agreements.The Supreme Court of New York County granted a preliminary injunction preventing the City from enforcing an opt-out date for a new Medicare Advantage plan and later permanently enjoined the City from passing any costs of the current plan to retirees, except where costs exceed the statutory cap. The court did not determine the exact statutory cap but suggested that the cost of the Senior Care plan did not exceed it. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, agreeing that the City must pay the full cost, up to the statutory cap, for any health insurance plan it offers to retirees.The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, holding that § 12-126 requires the City to pay up to the statutory cap for each health insurance plan it offers to employees and retirees. The court did not address the issue of how the statutory cap should be determined for Medicare-eligible retirees, as the City had not preserved this question for review. The court concluded that the legislative history supported the interpretation that the City must pay for any plan it offers, aligning with the intent to provide a choice of health insurance plans to employees and retirees. View "Matter of NYC Org. of Pub. Serv. Retirees, Inc. v Campion" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when he lost control of his motorcycle on Lark Street in Albany, allegedly due to a road defect the City knew about but failed to repair. The case centers on whether reports submitted through the City's online system, SeeClickFix (SCF), constituted "written notice" of the defect and if those reports were "actually given" to the designated official.The Supreme Court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment, holding that SCF reports might constitute prior written notice but that factual issues precluded summary judgment. These issues included whether the complaints were based on verbal or written communications, whether the defects described were related to the accident, and whether the City's actions created or exacerbated the defect. The court also rejected the City's claim of governmental immunity.The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, agreeing that SCF complaints could be considered written notice and rejecting the City's immunity argument. The Appellate Division granted the City leave to appeal and certified the question of whether it erred in affirming the denial of the City's motion.The New York Court of Appeals held that SCF reports could constitute written notice and that the City's implementation of SCF meant the reports were "actually given" to the Commissioner of General Services. The court also found that issues of fact precluded summary judgment on whether the City's negligence created a dangerous condition and rejected the City's claim of governmental immunity, as the repair of the road was a proprietary function. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's order and answered the certified question in the negative. View "Calabrese v City of Albany" on Justia Law

Vanda Pharmaceuticals, Inc. sought fast track designation from the FDA for its investigational drug, tradipitant, intended to treat gastroparesis. The FDA denied the request, citing a partial clinical hold on the drug due to the lack of long-term animal studies to assess its toxicological effects. Vanda argued that the FDA's denial was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the FDA, upholding the agency's decision. Vanda then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the FDA's denial of Vanda's fast track application was neither contrary to law nor arbitrary and capricious. The court found that the FDA properly considered the drug's development plan, including the clinical hold, in assessing whether tradipitant demonstrated the potential to address unmet medical needs. The court also noted that the FDA's definition of the unmet medical need as long-term treatment of gastroparesis symptoms was reasonable, given the chronic nature of the condition and the existing short-term treatment options. The court rejected Vanda's arguments that the FDA's decision was inconsistent with its prior positions and that the agency improperly considered the clinical hold. The court concluded that the FDA's decision was supported by a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made. View "Vanda Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. FDA" on Justia Law

Dr. Susan Neese and Dr. James Hurly, both doctors in Amarillo, Texas, filed a pre-enforcement challenge against the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regarding the Notification of Interpretation and Enforcement of Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. The Notification, issued in May 2021, interprets the prohibition on sex discrimination to include discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. The plaintiffs, who are unwilling to provide certain gender-affirming care, feared that their medical practices might be viewed as discriminatory under the Notification, potentially leading to enforcement actions and loss of federal funding.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the Notification and ruled in their favor.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The court found that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated how their conduct constituted gender-identity discrimination under any plausible interpretation of the Notification. The plaintiffs did not view their own practices as discriminatory, nor did they provide evidence that HHS would view them as such. Additionally, there was no indication that an enforcement proceeding was imminent. As a result, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for lack of jurisdiction. View "Neese v. Becerra" on Justia Law

Randell Shepherd, a career coal miner, filed a claim for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), invoking the Act’s presumption that he was entitled to benefits due to his over fifteen years of mining and total disability from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), bronchitis, and emphysema. Incoal, Inc., Shepherd’s most recent employer, contested his entitlement, arguing that his disability was caused by smoking, not mining. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found Incoal’s expert opinions unpersuasive and inconsistent with the Act’s regulations and preamble, which recognize pneumoconiosis as a latent and progressive disease. The ALJ ruled that Incoal failed to rebut the presumption that Shepherd was entitled to benefits. The Benefits Review Board (BRB) affirmed the ALJ’s decision.Incoal petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for review, arguing that the ALJ improperly relied on the regulatory preamble over their evidence and that the presumption was effectively irrebuttable, violating the Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The court reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and correctly applied the law.The Sixth Circuit held that the ALJ was entitled to reference the preamble to assess the credibility of expert opinions and found that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that the BLBA’s rebuttable presumption is constitutional, as it is based on a rational relationship between the length of a miner’s career and the risk of pneumoconiosis. The court concluded that Incoal’s arguments were unpersuasive and that the ALJ applied the correct legal principles. Consequently, the court denied Incoal’s petition for review. View "Incoal, Inc. v. OWCP" on Justia Law

The case involves the Pennsylvania Professional Liability Joint Underwriting Association (JUA), which was established by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania nearly fifty years ago to address a medical malpractice insurance crisis. The JUA acts as a professional liability insurer of last resort for high-risk medical providers and is funded solely by premiums paid by its policyholders. Over the years, the JUA has accumulated a surplus of about $300 million through investments. From 2016 to 2019, the Commonwealth attempted to transfer the JUA’s surplus to the General Fund or assume control of the JUA through legislative actions.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania reviewed the case multiple times. In 2017, the JUA sued the Governor after the enactment of Act 44, which mandated the transfer of $200 million from the JUA to the General Fund. The District Court granted a preliminary injunction and later summary judgment in favor of the JUA, holding that the JUA was a private entity and that the Act violated the Takings Clause. In 2018, after the enactment of Act 41, which placed the JUA under the control of the Insurance Department and mandated the transfer of all its assets, the JUA again sued. The District Court ruled in favor of the JUA, reiterating its earlier decision. In 2019, the JUA challenged Act 15, which required the JUA to be funded by the Commonwealth and categorized it as a Commonwealth agency. The District Court granted partial summary judgment for the JUA, holding that certain provisions of Act 15 constituted a regulatory taking and violated the First Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and applied the principles from Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward to determine whether the JUA is a public or private entity. The Court concluded that the JUA is a public entity because it was created to serve a public purpose, exercises the Commonwealth’s coercive power, and only the Commonwealth has a legally protectable interest in the JUA. Consequently, the JUA cannot assert constitutional claims against the Commonwealth. The Court reversed the District Court’s rulings in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania Professional Liability Joint Underwriting Association v. Governor of Pennsylvania" on Justia Law