Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Fiorisce, LLC, a limited liability company, filed a qui tam lawsuit against Colorado Technical University (CTU) under the False Claims Act (FCA), alleging that CTU misrepresented compliance with federal credit hour requirements to fraudulently obtain federal student aid funds. Fiorisce claimed that CTU's online learning platform, Intellipath, provided insufficient educational content and falsified learning hour calculations to meet federal standards. Fiorisce's principal, a former CTU faculty member, created the company to protect their identity while exposing the alleged fraud.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the case. CTU moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the FCA’s public disclosure bar precluded the suit because the allegations were substantially similar to previously disclosed information. The district court denied CTU’s motion, finding that Fiorisce’s specific claims about misrepresentation of credit hours and the use of Intellipath were not substantially the same as prior disclosures. The court also suggested that Fiorisce might qualify as an original source of the information.CTU appealed the district court’s denial of its motion to dismiss to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, seeking interlocutory review under the collateral order doctrine. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the collateral order doctrine did not apply, as the public disclosure bar did not confer a right to avoid trial and could be effectively reviewed after final judgment. The court emphasized that expanding the collateral order doctrine to include such denials would undermine the final judgment rule and dismissed CTU’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Fiorisce, LLC v. Colorado Technical University" on Justia Law

In the spring of 2018, People's Electric Cooperative and Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company (OG&E) submitted competing bids to provide retail electric service to the Tall Oak Woodford Cryo Plant in Coal County, Oklahoma. The Plant is located in People's certified territory, which grants them exclusive rights to provide electricity under the Retail Electric Supplier Certified Territory Act (RESCTA). OG&E's proposal relied on the Large Load exception to RESCTA, which allows a supplier to extend its service into another supplier's territory for large-load customers. OG&E used third-party transmission facilities to provide service to the Plant without extending its own distribution lines.The Oklahoma Corporation Commission enjoined OG&E from serving the Plant, finding that OG&E was not "extending its service" as authorized by RESCTA. The Commission determined that a retail electric supplier may not use third-party transmission lines to extend its service into another supplier's certified territory under the Large Load exception. OG&E appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and upheld the Commission's determination. The Court held that Article 9, Section 20 of the Oklahoma Constitution requires a limited review of the Commission's order. The Court affirmed the Commission's interpretation that the Large Load exception does not permit a supplier to use third-party transmission lines to extend its service into another supplier's certified territory. The Court's decision applies prospectively only and does not affect existing retail electric services and facilities established under the Large Load exception. View "OKLAHOMA GAS AND ELECTRIC CO. v. STATE" on Justia Law

The City and County of San Francisco operates two combined wastewater treatment facilities that process both wastewater and stormwater. During heavy precipitation, these facilities may discharge untreated water into the Pacific Ocean or San Francisco Bay. In 2019, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a renewal permit for San Francisco's Oceanside facility, adding two "end-result" requirements. These requirements prohibited discharges that contribute to violations of water quality standards and discharges that create pollution, contamination, or nuisance as defined by California law. San Francisco challenged these provisions, arguing they exceeded the EPA's statutory authority.The California Regional Water Quality Control Board and the EPA approved the final Oceanside NPDES permit. San Francisco appealed to the EPA's Environmental Appeals Board, which rejected the challenge. The City then petitioned for review in the Ninth Circuit, which denied the petition. The Ninth Circuit held that the Clean Water Act (CWA) authorizes the EPA to impose any limitations necessary to ensure water quality standards are met in receiving waters.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that Section 1311(b)(1)(C) of the CWA does not authorize the EPA to include "end-result" provisions in NPDES permits. The Court reasoned that determining the specific steps a permittee must take to meet water quality standards is the EPA's responsibility, and Congress has provided the necessary tools for the EPA to make such determinations. The Court reversed and remanded the Ninth Circuit's decision, emphasizing that the EPA must set specific rules for permittees to follow rather than imposing broad end-result requirements. View "City and County of San Francisco v. EPA" on Justia Law

In November 2021, Lincoln Medical administered a COVID-19 vaccine to the five-year-old child of Jeremiah Hogan and Siara Jean Harrington at a school clinic without obtaining parental consent. Hogan filed a notice of claim in the Superior Court against the doctor, Lincoln Medical Partners, and MaineHealth, Inc., alleging various torts including professional negligence, battery, and false imprisonment on behalf of the child, and emotional distress and tortious interference with parental rights on behalf of the parents.The Superior Court appointed a chair for the prelitigation screening panel, and Lincoln Medical moved to dismiss the notice of claim, citing immunity under the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act. The court granted the motion to dismiss, interpreting the PREP Act to provide immunity to the defendants with no applicable exceptions. Hogan appealed the decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The court held that the PREP Act provides broad immunity to covered persons, including individuals and corporations, from suits related to the administration of covered countermeasures, such as the COVID-19 vaccine. The court found that the federal statute preempts state law that would otherwise allow Hogan to sue, as the claims were directly related to the administration of the vaccine. The court concluded that the defendants were immune from Hogan’s claims under the PREP Act, and the state tort claims were preempted by federal law. View "Hogan v. Lincoln Medical Partners" on Justia Law

The Center for Biological Diversity and 350 Colorado challenged the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule that partially approved Colorado’s plan to reduce ozone pollution. The Clean Air Act required Colorado to lower ozone levels by July 2021, but the state failed to meet this deadline. Petitioners argued that the EPA’s approval of Colorado’s plan violated the Clean Air Act in three ways: by approving the plan after the deadline, by including state-only emissions reductions, and by violating the anti-backsliding provision.The EPA approved Colorado’s reasonable-further-progress demonstration and motor-vehicle-emissions budget, determining that the state showed emissions reductions of at least three percent per year from 2018 to 2020. The EPA also found that the SIP’s projected emissions reductions were based on creditable, federally enforceable measures and complied with the anti-backsliding mandate. Petitioners argued that the EPA’s approval was unlawful because the state failed to attain the required ozone levels by the deadline and included non-federally enforceable control measures in its calculations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the EPA did not act unlawfully in approving Colorado’s reasonable-further-progress demonstration after the state missed its attainment deadline. The court found that reasonable-further-progress demonstrations are distinct from attainment demonstrations and that the EPA’s approval was based on compliance with reasonable-further-progress requirements. The court also held that the EPA’s approval of Colorado’s motor-vehicle-emissions budget was lawful, as it was consistent with reasonable-further-progress requirements. Additionally, the court found that the EPA’s approval did not violate the anti-backsliding provision, as the SIP revisions would not increase emissions and would not hinder attainment.The court denied the petition for review, upholding the EPA’s approval of Colorado’s plan. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

In 2020, Georgia ratified an amendment to its Constitution waiving sovereign immunity for actions seeking declaratory relief from unlawful acts by the State or local governments. This amendment included a procedural requirement that such actions must be brought against and in the name of only the State or the relevant local government, or they would be dismissed. The case at hand questions whether a complaint that does not comply with this naming requirement can be cured by dropping or adding parties to avoid dismissal.Warbler Investments, LLC sued the City of Social Circle, its mayor, and three City Council members in their individual capacities, alleging unlawful rezoning of Warbler's property and violations of the Open Records Act. The defendants moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that the complaint violated the naming requirement of the Georgia Constitution. Warbler then moved to amend the complaint to drop the individual defendants, which the trial court allowed. However, after the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in State v. SASS Group, LLC, which mandated dismissal of cases not complying with the naming requirement, the City renewed its motion to dismiss. The trial court granted the motion, dismissing the case despite the amendment.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that the procedural defect of not complying with the naming requirement could be cured by amending the complaint to drop or add parties. The court held that the waiver of sovereign immunity was not affected by the initial failure to comply with the naming requirement, and the amended complaint, which complied with the requirement, should not be dismissed. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded. View "WARBLER INVESTMENTS, LLC v. CITY OF SOCIAL CIRCLE" on Justia Law

The case involves the Consumer Product Safety Commission's (CPSC) second attempt to regulate small, high-powered magnets that pose serious health risks to children when ingested. These magnets, used in various consumer products like jewelry and puzzles, can cause severe internal injuries or death if swallowed. The CPSC's first attempt to regulate these magnets was struck down by the Tenth Circuit in 2016 due to inadequate data supporting the rule. The CPSC then revised its approach and issued a new rule, which is now being challenged by industry groups.The industry groups petitioned for review of the CPSC's new rule, arguing that the CPSC's cost-benefit analysis was flawed and that the rule was promulgated by an unconstitutionally structured agency. They contended that the CPSC's data on magnet ingestions was unreliable, that the CPSC failed to consider the impact of its own enforcement efforts, and that the rule was underinclusive and arbitrary. They also argued that existing voluntary standards were sufficient to address the risks posed by the magnets.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the CPSC's rule was supported by substantial evidence, noting that the CPSC had adequately addressed the shortcomings identified in the previous case and had conducted a thorough cost-benefit analysis. The court also held that the CPSC's structure, which includes removal protections for its commissioners, was constitutional, reaffirming its previous decision in Leachco, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Commission.The Tenth Circuit denied the petition for review, upholding the CPSC's rule regulating small, high-powered magnets. The court concluded that the rule was necessary to address the significant health risks posed by these magnets and that the CPSC had acted within its authority in promulgating the rule. View "Magnetsafety.org v. Consumer Product Safety Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an intelligence analyst with the FBI, was required to complete the FBI Basic Field Training Course (BFTC), which included in-person training sessions and various tasks and assessments, some of which were scheduled outside working hours. Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging that they were not compensated for all overtime hours worked during the BFTC.The United States Court of Federal Claims denied the government's motion for summary judgment, holding that the OPM regulation 5 C.F.R. § 551.423(a)(3), which bars overtime compensation for entry-level training, was invalid. The court reasoned that the regulation was inconsistent with the Department of Labor (DOL) regulations and that the government failed to justify the categorical rule against overtime compensation for entry-level training. The court certified the validity of the regulation for interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the OPM regulation 5 C.F.R. § 551.423(a)(3) is valid. The court reasoned that the differences between OPM and DOL regulations are justified by the need to accommodate the differences between federal and non-federal employment, particularly considering the Government Employees Training Act (GETA), which generally prohibits overtime pay for training for federal employees. The court concluded that OPM's regulation is a legitimate policy choice consistent with both the FLSA and GETA. The case was remanded to determine whether the OPM regulation is consistent with the FLSA. View "DOE NO. 1 v. US " on Justia Law

The Santa Ana Police Officers Association (SAPOA) and certain anonymous City of Santa Ana police officers (Doe Officers) sued the City of Santa Ana, alleging wrongful disclosure of confidential personnel records, failure to investigate a complaint about the disclosure, and denial of a request for related communications. The first amended complaint included four causes of action: violation of Penal Code section 832.7 and Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045, negligence, failure to investigate under Penal Code sections 832.5 and 832.7, and violation of the Meyers-Milias Brown Act (MMBA).The Superior Court of Orange County sustained the City’s demurrer to the first amended complaint without leave to amend, leading to the dismissal of the case. The court found that the Doe Officers could not proceed anonymously without statutory authority or court authorization. It also concluded that the SAPOA lacked standing and that there was no private right of action for the alleged violations of the Penal Code and Evidence Code sections cited.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the judgment as to the Doe Officers, agreeing they lacked authorization to proceed anonymously. It also affirmed the trial court’s decision regarding the first, second, and fourth causes of action, finding no private right of action for damages under the cited statutes and that the SAPOA failed to exhaust administrative remedies for the MMBA claim. However, the appellate court reversed the judgment concerning the third cause of action, holding that the SAPOA had standing to seek mandamus relief to compel the City to investigate the complaint and notify the SAPOA of the disposition, as required by Penal Code sections 832.5 and 832.7. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this cause of action. View "Santa Ana Police Officers Assn. v. City of Santa Ana" on Justia Law

A minor, through his mother, filed a lawsuit against Best Academy after his teacher, Aaron Hjermstad, sexually assaulted him. Hjermstad had a history of sexual abuse allegations from his previous employment, which Best Academy did not uncover during their hiring process. The school did not obtain reference letters or contact references, which were part of their hiring protocol.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Best Academy, reasoning that hiring decisions are always protected by the discretionary-function exception to municipal tort liability under Minnesota Statutes section 466.03, subdivision 6. The court of appeals affirmed this decision, applying the same reasoning.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that a municipality’s hiring decision is not categorically a policy-level decision involving weighing competing economic, social, political, and financial considerations. The court emphasized that the discretionary-function exception should be interpreted narrowly and that municipalities bear the burden of proving that their conduct involved such considerations. The court found that Best Academy did not provide evidence that its decision not to investigate Hjermstad’s background was based on balancing policy considerations. The court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Minor Doe 601 v. Best Academy" on Justia Law